JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

285

MARXIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST SERBIAN REVOLUTION - - - - - - - *Wayne S. Vucinich*

THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN CUSTOMS UNION PROJECT OF 1931: A STUDY OF GERMAN METHODS AND MOTIVES - - - - - - - *F. G. Stambrook*

THE SOUTHERN SLAV IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY - - - - - *Peter F. Sugar*

THE EASTERN QUESTION AND THE VIENNA CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER 1822 - - - - *Irby C. Nichols, Jr.*

THE POLITICS OF GUSTAF MANNERHEIM - - *Marvin Rintala*

NOTES

BOOK REVIEWS

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

VOLUME XXI APRIL, 1961—62 NUMBER ONE

Board of Editors

F. Lee Benns, Indiana University
Cyril E. Black, Princeton University
Henry W. Ehrmann, University of Colorado
William J. Rose, University of British Columbia
Charles Jelavich, University of California
Oscar Halecki, Fordham University

Reginald Lang, Carleton College
Ralph H. Lutz, Stanford University
Philip E. Mosely, Columbia University
Otakar Odložilík, University of Pennsylvania
R. John Rath, University of Texas

Managing Editor
S. Harrison Thomson, University of Colorado
Edward J. Rozek, University of Colorado, *Assistant Editor*
Aline Stone, *Editorial Assistant*

Publication of the JOURNAL is made possible by a subvention from the University of Colorado.

The JOURNAL is published quarterly in January, April, July and October at the University of Colorado. Annual subscription price $6.00. Single number: $1.75. Correspondence concerning subscriptions or advertising space should be addressed to the Managing Editor, University of Colorado, Boulder, Colo. Agent in the United Kingdom, B. H. Blackwell Ltd., 51 Broad St., Oxford. Contributions to the JOURNAL should be addressed to the Managing Editor or any member of the Board of Editors.

NOTES 84
BOOK REVIEWS
- *Brno v minulosti a dnes* (Jiři Kolaja) 86
- Winter, *Russland und das Papstum,* (O. Odložilík) 87
- Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (D. Treadgold) 88
- Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials* (W. E. Wright) 89
- Bury, *The New Cambridge Modern History. Vol. X* (O. Odložilík) 91
- Rassow and Born, *Akten zur staatlichen Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 1891-1914* (P. Anderson) 93
- Jareb, *Pola Stoljeca Hrvatske Polike* (D. Tomašić) 95
- v. Müller, *Regierte der Kaiser?* (R. H. Lutz) 96
- Weber, *Das Ende der alten Armee, Osterreich-Ungarns Zusammenbruch* (L. O'Boyle) 98
- Alatri, *Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica (1919-1920)* (R. Albrecht-Carrié) 99
- Borsody, *The Triumph of Tyranny* (O. Hammen) 100
- Kramer, *Iredenta a separatizmus v slovenskej politike, 1919-1938* (C. Wojatsek) 101
- Schwartz, *America and the Russo-Finnish War* (M. Rintala) 103
- Hefer, *Croatian Struggle for Freedom and Independence* (O. Ambroz) 104
- Kulski, *Peaceful Co-Existence, an Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy* (K. Grzybowski) 105
- Jäckel, *Die Schleswig-Frage seit 1945* (I. N. Lambi) 107
- Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (E. Kollman) 109
- Rotocki, *Odrodzenie Sił Zbrojnych w Niemieckiej Republice Federalnej* (Z. Jarski) 110
- Nowak, *Zarys Czynnikow Rozwoju Gospodarczego Niemiec Zachodnich* (J. Wszelaki) 112
- Zaremba, *Obszary Stykowe w Planowaniu Przestrzennym* (J. Wszelaki) 112
- Turnau, *Studia nad struktura ludnosciową, polskiego Wrocławia* (W. Sukiennicki) 113
- Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (A. T. Anderson) 115
- Meissner, *Russland unter Chruschtschow* (W. Sukiennicki) 116

SHORTER NOTICES 119
RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE 124
BOOKS RECEIVED 131

Copyright 1961 by S. H. Thomson

JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

INDEX TO VOLUME TWENTY ONE

ARTICLES

Andic, V. E.: The Economic Aspects of Aid to Russian and Ukrainian Refugee Scholars in Czechoslovakia 176
Braham, Randolph L.: The Rumanian Schools of General Education 319
Cecil, Lamar: The Kindermann Wolscht Incident: An Impasse in Russo-German Relations 1924-26 188
Dallmayr, Winfried R.: Background and Development of the Austrian Constitutional Court 403
Forster, Kent: Finland's Policy in the United Nations and the Paasikivi Line 465
Hamerow, Theodore, S.: The German Artisan Movement 1848-49 135
Kollman, Eric C.: Reinterpreting Modern German History: The Weimar Republic 434
Kubat, Daniel: Patterns of Leadership in a Communist State: Czechoslovakia 1946-1958 305
Nichols, Irby C., Jr.: The Eastern Question and the Vienna Conference, September 1822 53
Procházka, Theodore: The Delimitation of Czechoslovak-German Frontiers after Munich 200
Raditsa, Bogdan: Yugoslav Nationalism Revisited: History and Dogma 477
Remak, Joachim: Sarajevo—Design and Accident 165
Rintala, Marvin: The Politics of Gustaf Mannerheim 67
Senn, Alfred Erich: The Polish-Lithuanian War Scare, 1927 267
Stambrook, F. G.: The German-Austrian Customs Union Project of 1931: A Study of German Methods and Motives 15
Sterne, Margaret: German Liberalism and Austrian Censorship in 1865 153
Sugar, Peter F.: The Southern Slav Image of Russia in the Nineteenth Century 45
Tarulis, Albert N.: A Heavy Population Loss in Lithuania 452
Vnuk, F.: Munich and the Soviet Union 285
Vucinich, Wayne S.: Marxian Interpretations of the First Servian Revolution 3

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost 219
Archiv f. Sozialgeschichte 486
Austrian Forschungsinstitut f. den Donauraum 485
Austrian Ministry of Education 485
Balkan Studies 85
Canadian Association of Slavists 219
Central Statistical Office in Warsaw 486
Communication on *Sarajevo—Design and Accident* 350
Corrigendum 354

Deutsche Akademie d. Wissenschaften ... 485
Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945 ... 84
Dual Citizenship ... 485
Far Western Slavic Conference ... 219 and 486
Fellowships for graduate study in Poland and Romania—Institute of International Education ... 220
Jahrbuch f. Gesch. d. deutsch-slawischen Beziehungen u. Gesch. Ost u. Mitteleuropas ... 219
Joachim Lelewel ... 220
National Archives and Records Service ... 84
Osterreichische Zeitschrift f. Aussenpolitik ... 85
Prof. John Mirtschuk ... 485
Society for Italian Historical Studies ... 84
Studia Croatica ... 84
Sudetendeutscher Tag for 1961 ... 485
The Hungarian Quarterly ... 85
Ukrainian Institute of America ... 219

REVIEWS

Adam, tt al, *Magyarorszag és a második villághaboru* (A. J. Molnar) ... 383
Adams, *Prussian-American Relations 1775-1871* (D. M. Smith) ... 362
Alatri, *Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica* (1919-1920) (R. Albrecht-Carrié) ... 99
Bain, *The Reluctant Satellites* (S. Borsody) ... 243
Basdevant, *Terres roumaines: contre vents et marées* (J. C. Campbell) ... 492
Beau, *Das Leistungswesen des frühindustriellen Unternehmertums in Rheinland u. Westfalen* (H. Freudenberger) ... 225
Besson, *Württemberg u. d. deutsche Staatskrise 1928-33* (K. Epstein) ... 372
Birke and Oberdorfer, *Das Böhmische Staatsrecht in den Deutsch-Tschechischen Auseinandersetzungen* (E. Taborsky) ... 226
Born, *Hist. Forsch. u. Probleme, Peter Rassow z. 70* (H. A. Schmitt) ... 361
Borsody, *The Triumph of Tyranny* (O. Hammen) ... 100
Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of the Ukraine* (B. Dmytryshyn) ... 236
Bracher, Sauer and Schulz, *Die nationalsozialistiche Machtergreifung.* (F. Koehl) ... 503
Brno, v minulosti a dnes (Jiri Kolaja) ... 86
Bry, *Wages in Germany 1871-1945* (A. G. Pundt) ... 496
Bucsay, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Ungarn* (D. Ritschl) ... 222
Bussenius, *Die Preussische Verwaltung in Süd-u. Neuostpreussen 1793-1806* (C. V. Easum) ... 360
Bury, *The New Cambridge Modern History*. Vol. X (O. Odložilík) ... 91
Dallin, *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs* (A. T. Anderson) ... 382
Daniels, *The Conscience of the Revolution* (A. T. Anderson) ... 115
Delzell, *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance* (H. R. Marraro) ... 500
Deutsch and Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (E. C. Kollman) ... 109
Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945 (O. Halecki) ... 507
Donohoe, *Hitler's Conservative Opponents in Bavaria 1930-1945* (J. L. Snell) ... 506
Dornberg, *Schizophrenic Germany* (P. R. Anderson) ... 515
Dragović, *Srpska štampa izmedju dva rate, I* (M. Petrovich) ... 378
Droz, L., *Europe Centrale* (S. H. Thomson) ... 221
Engel-Janosi, *Österr. u. d. Vatikan* Bd. I-II (K. v. Schuschnigg) ... 366
Engels, *Die Zollgrenze in der Eifel* (H. Freudenberger) ... 225
Erlich, *The Soviet Industrialization Debar, 1924-28* (G. Barany) ... 501
Esterhues, *Die Seidenhändlerfamilie Zurmühlen in Münster* (H. Freudenberger) ... 225
Faltan, *Slovaci v partizanskych bojoch v Sovietskom Svaze* (G. Waskovich) ... 241
Faltan, *Partizanska Vojna na Slovensku* (G. Waskovich) ... 241
Faust, *Das Potsdamer Abkommen u. seine völkerrechtliche Bedeutung* (J. Korbel) 239
Feis, *Between War and Peace* (J. Korbel) ... 239
Fiedler, *Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie u. Praxis* (H. W. Ehrmann) 237
Gablents, v.d., *Die versaumte Reform* (F. Koehl) ... 381
Geiss, *Die polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-1918* (P. S. Wandycz) ... 231

Gonda, *Bismarck és az 1867-es osztrák-magyar kiegyezés* (F. S. Wagner) 229
Gottlieb, *The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis* (H. Duhnke) 233
Gsovski, *Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe* (L. Frendl) 510
Hefer, *Croatian Struggle for Freedom and Independence* (O. Ambroz) 104
Heidenheimer, *Adenauer and the CDU* (K. von Klemperer) 240
Istoriya Latviyskoy SSR (A. Spekke) 487
Jäckel, *Die Schleswig-Frage seit 1945* (I. N. Lambi) 107
Jareb, *Pola Stoljeca Hrvatske Politike* (D. Tomasic) 95
Jenks, *Vienna and the Young Hitler* (E. C. Kollman) 369
Kann, *A Study in Austrian Intellectual History from Late Baroque to Romanticism* (W. E. Wright) 223
Kiraly, *Die Arbeiterselbstverwaltung in Ungarn.* (F. S. Wagner) 515
Knoellinger, *Labor in Finland,* (M. Rintala) 505
Konstantinović, *Deutsche Reisebeschreibungen über Servien u. Montenegro* (A. Vucinich) 490
Korskisch, *Die Mährisch-Trübauer Stadtlandschaft* (W. E. Wright) 357
Koszyk, *Zwischen Kaiserreich u. Diktatur* (O. J. Hale) 230
Kramer, *Iredenta a separatizmus v slovenskej politike, 1919-1938* (C. Wojatsek) 101
Kropilak, *Účast Vojakov v Slovenskom Narodnom Povstani* (G. Waskovich) 241
Kulski, *Peaceful Co-Existence, an Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy* (K. Grzybowski) 105
L'Institut Imre Nagy des Sciences Politiques, *Contribution de la revolution hongroise à la pensée socialiste* (P. F. Sugar) 513
Macek, *Tyrolská selská válka a Michal Gaismair* (F. G. Heymann) 355
Marlot, M., *Zgodovinski zbornik* (T. Hočevar) 489
Marx, *Die Osterr. Zensur im Vormärz* (G. Barany) 363
Mauser, *Karl Hillebrand* (R. A. Kann) 380
Meissner, *Russland unter Chruschtschow* (W. Sukiennicki) 116
Mésáros, *Rolnicka a národnostná otázka na Slov. 1848-1900* (G. Waskovich) 365
Michal, *Central Planning in Czechoslovakia* (J. Korbel) 244
Miskolczy, *Ungarn in d. Habsburger-Monarchie* (G. Barany) 358
Müller, v., *Regierte der Kaiser?* (R. H. Lutz) 96
Nowak, *Zarys Obszary Stykowe w Planowaniu Przestrzennym* (J. Wszelaki) 112
Orlando, *Memorie* (1915-1919) (R. Albrecht-Carrie) 234
Paasivirta, *Eisimmäisen maailmansodan voittajat ja Suomi* (J. H. Hodgson) 375
Plavsić, *Srpske stamparije od kraja XV do polovine XIX veka* (M. Petrovich) 378
Pöls, *Sozialistenfrage u. Revolutionsfurcht in ihren Zusammenhang mit den angeblichen Staatsstreichplänen Bismarcks* (O. J. Hammen) 228
Rassow and Born, *Akten zur staatlichen Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 1891-1914* (P. Anderson) 93
Ritter, *Staatskunst u. Kriegshandwerk* (C. V. Easum) 370
Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (D. Treadgold) 88
Rosenfeld, *Sowjetrussland u. Deutschland 1917-1922* (A. T. Anderson) 376
Schenk, *Magie der Planwirtschaft* (H. Duhnke) 238
Schulte, *Die Entwicklung der gewerblichen Wirtschaft in Rheinland Westfalen im 18.* (H. Freudenberger) 225
Schwartz, *America and the Russo-Finnish War* (M. Rintala) 103
Sepić, *Supilo Diplomat,* (B. Raditsa) 497
Stupperich, *Kirche im Osten* (F. T. Epstein) 491
Sutter, *Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen v. 1897, ihre Genesis und ihre Auswirkungen vornehmlich auf die innerösterr. Alpenländer* (W. E. Wright) 493
Tigrid, *Marx na Hradčanech.* (J. Korbel) 511
Turnau, *Studia nad strukturą ludnosciową polskiego Wrocława* (W. Sukiennicki) 113
Viefhaus, *Die Minderheitenfrage u. d. Entstehung d. Minderheiten-schutzverträge auf d. Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919.* (M. Sterne) 499
Wangermann, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials* (W. E. Wright) 89
Weber, *Das Ende der alten Armee, Osterr.-Ungarn Zusammensbruch* (L. O'Boyle) 98
Winter, *Russland u. das Papstum,* (O. Odložilík) 87
Wytrval, *America's Polish Heritage* (S. P. Mizwa) 494
Zaremba, *Obszary, Stykowe w Planowaniu Przestrzennym* (J. Wszelaki) 112

SHORTER NOTICES

Aspaturian, *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy* (C. Morley) 249
Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive* (E. B. Richards) 520
Comenius, *Pampaedia* (M. Spinka) 385
Cysarz, *Das Deutsche Nationalbewusstsein* (P. R. Anderson) 518
Czikann-Zichy, *Turmoil in South Tyrol: New Hope for National Harmony* (E. G. Fenz) 122
Duda, *Die Protokollbücher des Kadiamtes Sofia* (J. D. Somogyi) 251
Embree, *The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses, 1952-1956* (C. E. Black) 123
Gimbel, *A German Community under American Occupation, Marburg, 1945-1952* (P. W. Blackstock) 387
Gunther, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia 1522-1747* (G. Hoffman) 120
Henderson, *The Zollverein* (E. E. Kraehe) 248
Jahrbuch d. Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau (S. H. Thomson) 247
Keckemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution* (T. Sogor) 519
Kirn, *Politische Geschichte der Deutschen Grenzen* (S. H. Thomson) 517
Kiszling, *Die militärischen Vereinbarungen d. Kleinen Entente 1929-1937* (P. W. Blackstock) 121
Klyuchevsky, *Peter the Great* (R. P. Browder) 385
Koszyk, *Dortmunder Beiträge z. Zeitungsforschung* (F. T. Epstein) 518
Macek, *25 ans d'historiographie tchécoslovaque 1936-1960* (S. H. Thomson) 248
Omrčanin, *Istina o Drazi Mihailovicu* (I. Avakumovic) 249
Řiháček, *Základní struktura nákladů oběhu a vývoj její proporce na socialistickém organizovaném trhu* (F. Munk) 250
Ritter, *Die deutschen Militär-Attaches u. das Auswärtige Amt* (A. G. Whiteside) 517
Ritter, *Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich* (B. B. Frye) 120
Scheder, *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line* (L. D. Steefel) 122
Slusser, *A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957* (R. P. Browder) 388
Sobel, *The Origins of Interventionism* (E. C. Helmreich) 386
Wannemacher, *Die Umstellung auf sozialistiche Ernährungwirtschaft* (F. Meissner) 387
Weill, *Frederick the Great and Samuel von Coccji* (J. B. Wolf) 386
Zadnikar, *Romanska arkitektura na Slovenskem* (T. Hočevar) 119

JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOL XXI APRIL, 1961 NUMBER ONE

MARXIAN INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST SERBIAN REVOLUTION

by Wayne S. Vucinich

IN 1954 Yugoslavia celebrated the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the First Serbian Revolution; this occasion evoked a spate of new literature on the subject and the latest investigation has served to emphasize the contrast between the Marxian and other interpretations of this ignificant event in the modern history of the Serbian nation. Yugoslav Marxian historians treat the Serbian Revolution as a logical culmination of historical processes long at work and governed by the presumed laws of ocial development. They maintain that to understand the causes of the .804 insurrection one must first assess accurately the ideological essence of Ottoman feudalism and its effects on Serbian society.

Marxian historians, unlike many of their predecessors, argue that from he very beginning Ottoman feudalism[1] was more backward than medieval Serbian feudalism and that Ottoman domination seriously retarded Serbian ocial and economic development and destroyed medieval Serbian culture. In addition, Ottoman rulers killed off the nobility, reduced the remainder of the people to the status of a *rayah,* imposed discriminatory legislation upon them, and compelled them to lead an isolated agrarian pastoral life. Moreover, Ottoman feudalism resuscitated some of the outdated institutions uch as *knežina* (local self-government) and the *knez* (the local headman). For all of these reasons the Marxists view Ottoman feudalism as having had a retrogressive effect on Serbian society. At the same time they agree with other historians that antiquated institutions such as the *knežina* and the *knez* (as well as the Church) played a prominent part in the Serbian liberation movement.[2]

---

[1] Branislav Djurdjev, "O uticaju turske vladavine na razvitak naših naroda," *Godišn-ak istoriskog društva Bosne i Hercegovine,* II (1950), 19-82. (Hereafter cited as *GID*); "Osnovni problemi srpske istorije u periodu turske vlasti nad našim narodima," *Istoriski lasnik,* Nos. 3-4 (1950), 107-118; "Prilog pitanju razvitka i karaktera tursko-osmanskog eudalizma — timarskospahiskog uredjenja," *GID,* I (1948), 101-167. Djurdjev's main point is that immediately after the Ottoman occupation of Yugoslav lands the "productive forces" began to decline, that Ottoman feudalism was more backward than the eudalism of the medieval Serbian states, and that Ottoman "feudal relations" retarded he social and economic development of the South Slavs.

For another significant Marxian study of the character of Ottoman feudalism, see Nedim Filipović, "Pogled na osmanski feudalizam sa naročitim obzirom na agrarne odnose," *GID,* IV (1952), 5-46. This is an extensive documentary study of agrarian prob-ems under Ottoman feudalism. For Yugoslav Marxian assessment of the Ottoman period of history, see also Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Yugoslav Lands in the Ottoman Period," *Journal of Modern History,* XXVII:3, September 1955, 287-290.

Nationalist historians* stress the positive rôle of the *knežina* and the *knez* in the preservation and defense of the Serbian nation. They describe the *knežina* as the self-governing equalitarian community in which there were no classes and all people were dedicated to one supreme goal, the national welfare. Marxian historians, on the other hand, bring out the fact that the *knežina* served Ottoman feudalism and emphasize the element of class conflict in it, which became especially apparent in the eighteenth century. They point to the development of the *knežina* economy as a result of expanded livestock trade and show how this led to the growth of a "rural bourgeoisie" capable of supplying the leadership which initiated and led the First Serbian Revolution.[3]

The rôle of the Church in the movement for liberation of the Serbian people has been immensely important. Nationalist writers identify the fate of the Serbian people with that of the Church and present the latter as the principal savior of the nation. In contrast to this view, Marxian authors carefully discriminate between the people and the Church, which, they conclude, served as "an instrument of Ottoman feudalism."[4] They distinguish the clergy from the people, and differentiate between the native low-ranking clergy and the high-ranking Greek clergy. Nonetheless, Marxian historians concede that the insurrections against the Turks were often led by the Serbian clergy.

There is little disagreement between the nationalist and Marxian historian in interpreting the almost unique Serbian folk epic as a factor in the emergence of the liberation struggle.[5] Both grant the epics their artistic excellence and their value as chronicles of important events in national history. They emphasize that by reminding the Serbs of their past glory the epics instilled in them a revolutionary spirit and a revengeful attitude toward the Turks. But Marxian historians find in addition that the Serbian epic poems extolled "democratic revolutionism," which was so important in prompting the political and national consciousness of the people and in preparing them for the Revolution.[6]

---

[2] For a long time Yugoslav historians have been interested in the origin and historical rôle of the institutions of *knez* and *primučar.* The best postwar studies on the subject are Branislav Djurdjev, "O knezovima pod turskom upravom," *Istoriski časopis,* Nos. 1-2 (1948), 132-166, and Ružica Guzina, *Knežina i postanak srpske buržoaske države* (Beograd, 1955). For their information on *knez* and *knežine,* Yugoslav authors to a large extent rely on the writings of Vuk Stefanović Karadžić, the eminent Serbian grammarian and ethnographer. See, for example, Vuk S. Karadžić, *Život i običaji naroda srpskog* (Beograd, 1957), 238-240.

*For the purpose of convenience and want of a better term we shall refer to non-Marxist historians as "nationalist historians."

[3] Nikola Vučo, *Privredna istorija Srbije. Do prvog svetskog rata* (Beograd, 1955), pp. 154-156; Guzina, vi-vii; Vasa Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli u Srbiji* (Beograd, 1958), p. 58f. The latter is not a Marxist, but has endeavored to present his study in accordance with the principles of "social classes" and "class struggle." In this he fails to satisfy recognized Yugoslav Marxist historians. See Dragoslav Janković, "O metodu u knjizi Prof. V. Čubrilovića," *Naša Stvarnost* (February, 1959), pp. 214-223.

Both schools of historians argue that a successful revolution would have been impossible without leadership and military experience, and they find that two centuries of sporadic insurrection against the Ottomans, the *hajduks,* the volunteers of the Austrian *Freikorps,* and the national militia organized in the 1790's supplied the military experience. The Marxians, however, add that out of the experience of the *hajduks* emerged the "Partisan method of struggle" which was so effectively employed during the First Serbian Revolution.[7]

Both nationalist and Marxian writers realize that the causes of the Revolution should not be sought in the Serbian patriarchal community alone but also in the profound socio-economic crisis of the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth century. In this connection we encounter a major disagreement between the views of the nationalist and Marxian researchers. Nationalist historians associate the continuing decay of Ottoman feudalism with an intensified exploitation of the masses during the eighteenth century and the economic deterioration of the Ottoman Empire. For the most part, the Marxian historians accept this. The disintegration of Ottoman feudalism, seriously undermined by twenty years of Austrian occupation of Serbia at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and the emergence of the so-called *čifči* relations impeded the growth of productive forces. But, the Marxists argue, the new situation permitted the growth of Austro-Serbian trade and attracted the Serbs from other districts to the Pashalik of Belgrade. They also point out that the special concessions which the Porte made to Serbia between 1793 and 1796[8] gave an impetus to the expanding money and marketing economy ("commodity-money" relations). The so-called rural and commercial bourgeoisie became an important factor in the Serbian village and the expanded trade of the Belgrade Pashalik stimulated agricultural production.

Hence, the Marxian historians insist, the intensified feudal exploitation should not be regarded as the only determinant of economic growth. Instead it is necessary to assess the effects of intensified exploitation on the development of the productive forces and conditions that facilitated the revolutionary attack against the old order.[9] Marxian historians, like their

---

[4] Miroslav Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije XIX i XX veka,* I (1804-1813), (Beograd, 1956), pp. 10-12; Branislav Djurdjev, "O uticaju turske vladavine na razvitak naših naroda," *GID,* II (1950), 19-82; *Idem.,* "Uloga srpske crkve u borbi protiv osmanske vlasti," *Pregled,* No. 1 (1953), 42; Čubrilović, *op. cit.* p. 80f.

[5] Compare Čubrilović, pp. 36-49, with Vladimir, Dvorniković, *Karakterologija Jugoslovena.* (Beograd, 1939), pp. 533-580, Janković *inter alia* criticized Čubrilović for exaggerating the "influence of epic poems" and accused him of following in the footsteps of "national romantic" authors. See Janković, "O metodu u knjizi Prof. V. Čubrilović," pp. 214-223.

[6] Čubrilović, pp. 36-49.

[7] No special study on this subject has appeared in recent years. For a somewhat longer treatment of the subject, see Fuad Slipičević, *Istorija naroda FNRJ,* I (Sarajevo, 1954), 293-295.

[8] This topic is discussed by Vučo, Guzina, Čubrilović, and many other authors.

[8] Djurdjev, "Osnovni problemi . . .," p. 115.

[9] Djurdjev, "Osnovni problemi . . .," p. 115.

nationalist predecessors, recognize the contribution of external pressures and influences to maturing revolutionary conditions in Serbia. In the eighteenth century Serbia was the scene of three major wars fought by Austria and Turkey and was occupied by Austrian troops from 1718 to 1739 and again from 1788 to 1791.[10] The political and economic impact of Austria upon patriarchal Serbia significantly accelerated the revolutionary processes among the Serbs. The cultural and educational work of the Serbs in Hungary inspired their co-nationals in Turkey and was of inestimable import in the shaping of Serbian nationalism and in stimulating a revolutionary spirit.

From the centers of Serbian learning in Hungary modern ideas seeped through the Ottoman curtain into Serbia. Of some significance were contacts with Russia in generating the feelings of Serbian and Slavic solidarity. The presence of Napoleon in the Adriatic had psychological repercussions in the villages of Serbia. All of these factors contributed to a powerful movement in Serbia, and both schools of historians give them due consideration.

In one regard the Marxian historians are pioneers: they make serious efforts to define the ideological undercurrent of the liberation struggle at different stages in its evolution.[11] They argue that until the end of the eighteenth century the struggle lacked precise social goals; the peasants who constituted the basic force of the liberation movement would have been satisfied with the replacement of Turkish rule by that of some other state or with the restoration of their own feudal state.

During this stage insurrections against the Ottoman state took place in time of wars between European states and the Ottoman Empire and their outcome depended on these wars. But from the end of the eighteenth century, according to Marxian historians, the liberation struggle of the Serbs became a revolutionary mass movement aimed at full economic, political, and national liberation. In their decision to strike against the Ottoman rulers the Serbs no longer waited for an international war in which Turkey was involved; the uprising of 1804 occurred when the Ottoman Empire was not at war.

Let us leave the basic causes of the Serbian uprising and examine the recent interpretations of the First Serbian Revolution itself. The relative economic prosperity which the Serbs of the Pashalik enjoyed at the turn of the century was cut short when, in violation of the Treaty of Sistovo of 1791,[12] the Janissaries returned to the Pashalik in 1801 and annulled the privileges given the Serbs by the recent Sultanic firmans. In February 1804 the Janissaries murdered seventy-two Serbian *knezes* and elders.[13] This became the immediate cause of the First Serbian Revolution, which the nationalist historians generally divide into two phases. During the first phase the Rebels fought as loyal subjects of the Sultan; they did not struggle for independence but for the restoration of the privileges given them in 1793-1796 which would have ultimately led them to independence.

---

[10] Much has also been published on the political and economic development affecting Serbia in the eighteenth century. Among the best studies of this period are Dušan Pantelić, *Beogradski pašaluk pred Prvi srpski ustanak* (1794-1804) (Beograd, 1949), and Dušan Popović, *Srbija i Beograd. (1718-1739)* (Beograd, 1950).

[11] Miroslav Djordjević, *Djakova buna* (Beograd, 1953), pp. 23-28.

[12] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, p. 23f. For a detailed discussion of the Austro-Turkish War of 1788-1791 and the immediate aftermath, see Dušan Pantelić, *op. cit.*

Consequently, in the beginning the Rebels did not direct their fire against the Sultan's power, but against the Janissaries, the enemies of both a reformist Sultan and the oppressed Serbian people. Not until after the Rebels had tested their strength and had completely vanquished the Janissaries did they (in 1805) decide to fight for national independence. This second phase of the conflict was generally characterized as a national struggle for liberation.

Marxian historians, on the other hand, insist that the Rebels from the very start had national liberation as their objective.[14] They cite discussions of revolutionary aims among prominent men, the plan for a national uprising which had been proposed by the Montenegrin Prince-Bishop, Peter I, and the special missions that had gone to Russia to elicit the Tsar's blessing on revolutionary action against the Turks. The war plan, which called for operations beyond the frontier of the Pashalik and negotiations with the peoples in the adjacent provinces with a view to effecting a concerted action against the Turkish rulers, are also cited by Marxian historians to prove that the Rebels, in 1804, would not have accepted anything short of "a broad internal automomy" or "complete independence."

Marxian authors explain the Serbian "armed struggle" which began in 1804 against the *dahis* – the leaders of the Janissaries – as a "tactical move."[15] Because the Janissaries represented the only armed force in the Pashalik, the Rebel strategists decided first to concentrate their attack against them and to avoid conflict with the Porte. Once the Janissaries were driven out of the Pashalik, the Rebels would be in possession of two indisputable requisites for a successful war against the Porte: "a liberated territory" and "an army."

Perhaps the most hotly debated question concerning the Serbian Revolution is its ideological character, a problem which concerns the nationalist historians less than it does the Marxian historians, who find the answer in the examination of the social and economic background of the leaders of the Revolution. Marxian historians believe it significant that, in choosing their leader, those present at the Skupština, which assembled at Orašak in February 1804, chose Djordje Petrović (1752-1817), a merchant, a *hajduk*, and a decorated member of the Austrian *Freikorps*, and not one of the *knezes*. They reason that the Skupština knew that a *knez* could not lead the Revolution because he would be regarded as "compromised" by rela-

---

[13] Pantelić, pp. 420-428. The best work on the murder of the *knezes* and the rebellion against the *dahis* is still Stojan Novaković's *Ustanak na dahije* (Beograd, 1954). This is a new and annotated edition of the book first published in 1904.

[14] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, p. 6f.

[15] *Ibid.*

tions with the Turks. They point out that the people chose their *knezes* because of their ability to get along with the Turks; but that in a revolutionary situation they wanted men noted for bravery who could lead a war against the Turks.[16]

All Marxian historians agree that the character of the Serbian Revolution is established not only by the specific nature of Serbian patriarchal society inside the Ottoman Empire, but also by "socio-economic relations" prevailing in the Ottoman Empire in general. When it comes to a precise ideological labeling of the Serbian Revolution, the Marxian historians find themselves in disagreement.

One group contends that the Serbian Revolution, which was initiated exclusively by the peasantry, had the character of a "national liberation" or "an agrarian" movement. They note that the Revolution resolved two fundamenal problems: it liberated the Serbian people from Ottoman rule and it destroyed Ottoman feudalism. In the opinion of this group of historians, the First Serbian Revolution could not have been "bourgeois democratic" in its character simply because there was no "bourgeoisie" in the Pashalik of Belgrade that could have led the Revolution.[17]

Another group of Marxian historians took the opposite stand, undertaking to prove that the Serbian Revolution was a "bourgeois democratic" movement. This thesis obviously has the stamp of official approval and is supported by all major Yugoslav historians. The reasoning behind it is that although Serbia lacked an "urban middle class" it had a "rural middle class." Economic developments in the eighteenth century, accelerated by the concessions made by the Porte to the Serbs of the Pashalik after 1793, led to the emergence of a "thin stratum" of well-to-do merchants (*gazde*) and *knezes* who constituted a "rural bourgeoisie."[18]

We are told that this Serbian "rural bourgeoisie" saw in the Ottoman state and the feudal system obstacles to its political and economic aspirations, that it played the same rôle in the Serbian Revolution that the urban bourgeoisie in Western Europe played in its struggle against antiquated "production relations," and that the results of the struggle in Serbia and in the West were "almost the same," since in both instances the feudal order was abolished and "capitalist relations" established.[19]

Closely related to the ideological character of the Serbian Revolution is a question concerning the founding of the Serbian state to which Marxian historians have given particular attention.[20] At the beginning of the Revolution the traditional popular assemblies *(skupštine)* were still convoked on the village and *knežine* levels to decide major issues of common concern and to elect local leaders. The national assembly *(skupština)*, the supreme legislative and executive organ of Serbia, was modeled after the democratic local assemblies *(skupštine)*, which accounted for its success. No one attempted to violate the principle of sovereignty of the national assembly or *skupština*. But this was not true of the local assemblies.[21]

---

[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 66-68. Guzina, p. 76f. The only popular biography of Karadjordje to appear after the war is Dušan Baran's *Karadjordje* (Beograd, 1957). On the election of Karadjordje as the leader of the insurgents, see pp. 49-53.

[17] Guzina, vi-vii.

[18] *Ibid.* According to Guzina the Serbian people with their uprising "won only the ground for a revolutionary liberation struggle but not the liberation itself." See Guzina, p. 258. Vasa Čubrilović ("Prvi srpski ustanak," *Istoriski glasnik*, Nos. 1-2 [1954], pp. 3-13) says that the Serbian peasant revolution of 1804 destroyed Ottoman feudal relations and thereby supplied conditions for the same kind of social change that occurred in France as a result of the French Revolution (p. 12).

[19] Janković, *Istorija države i prava u Srbiji u XIX veku* (Beograd, 1955), p. 11.

Nationalist historians argue that the war situation made it difficult to convoke local assemblies, which were abused and eventually abandoned. According to Marxian writers, however, the war was not the main reason why local assemblies were abandoned; they contend, instead, that the local assemblies were victims of "anti-democratic" and "autocratic" tendencies of the leaders of the Revolution. Consequently, soon after the liberation struggle began, the *knez* and the *knežine*, bastions of traditional self-government, were eclipsed by *vojvode*, the military commandants, and *vojvodstva*, the districts under their jurisdiction.[22]

The *vojvode* (some of them former *knezes*) became despots of their districts, appointed the local *knezes* and behaved like the feudal lords whom they displaced. When the central government was finally formed in 1805, the so-called State Council *(Pravitelstvujuščij sovjet serbskij)* consisted of twelve councillors – one from each of the twelve *nahis*. The councillors were drawn from local military leaders and chosen by the *vojvode;* they were not representatives of *knežine*, whose functions were reduced to routine civil matters.[23]

Marxian historians ask why it is that the *knežine*, "so wily and resistant to Turkish feudal authority," became incapable of defending their self-government from the encroachments of the emerging Serbian central authority.[24] The answer, they say, lies in the social and economic transformation of Serbia during the Revolution. They argue that the abolition of feudalism, the acquisition of land by peasants (on the principle that land belongs to those who till it), and a certain amount of colonization led to an increase in agricultural production and this, in turn, stimulated trade. The result was an opportunity to trade outside the village and to accumulate a "larger capital." The *vojvoda*, like the *knez* before him, took advantage of his position to acquire land and to trade in livestock. The tendency of the Serbs to settle in towns, where they took the place of the disappearing Turks and other foreigners, led to the beginning of the urban *čaršija* (a city clique). In addition, those who acquired wealth by black marketing and other devious practices increased the size of the "rural bourgeoisie" and it was under the influence of this class that the Serbian "bourgeois national state" developed.[25] Thus what had begun as a "typical peasant revolution" aimed at liberation from the Ottoman state and feudalism was transformed into "a bourgeois revolution."

---

[20] The best on this topic are Dragoslav Janković, *op. cit.*, "Praviteljstvujušči sovjet," *Istoriski glasnik*, Nos. 1-2 (1954), 15-88. Milovan Ristić, *Narodne skupštine u Prvom srpskom ustanku* (Beograd, 1955). Also Guzina, *op. cit.*

[21] Čubrilović, "Prvi srpski ustanak," p. 11.

[22] Janković, "Praviteljstvujušči sovjet," p. 60; *Istorija države*, p. 11f. Guzina, pp. 251-253, pp. 75-91.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli*, p. 11.

The Serbian "rural bourgeoisie" pursued a "progressive revolutionary" policy in relation to the Ottoman feudal state, and in regard to the "agrarian question" it was in accord with the aspirations of the peasantry. But—according to the Marxian historians — once the national liberation was attained and the question of the formation of a government arose, the "rural bourgeoisie" and the peasantry parted ways. The former, we are told, favored a national authority which would be "a new instrument for the oppression of the people." The peasants, on the other hand, wanted a government based on the "patriarchal democracy" to which they were accustomed.[26] One Marxian author observes that "the peasants who took the main brunt of the Revolution were unable to transfer the principles of their patriarchal democracy to the new state."[27] Serbia simply lacked "social forces" that could have sustained a "democratic state."

It is understandable that the Yugoslav Marxian historians, like their nationalist precursors, should give thought to the reasons for the collapse of the Serbian resistance in 1813. Nationalist historians usually had attributed the destruction of the local power of resistance to the "crudely established centralism" in 1811 and the "bureaucratization" of the contacts between the leadership and the people.[28] Curiously enough the Marxian historians agree with them in this respect and emphasize that the "military monarchy," which was established in 1811, sapped the strength of resistance from the local state organs, and thereby greatly contributed to the collapse of Serbia in 1813.[29]

Marxian and nationalist historians give other reasons for the collapse of Serbian resistance. Serbian leaders could not agree upon a common defense, and "without a unified plan and a unified command" successful resistance to the overwhelming superiority of Turkish troops was not possible.[30] In contrast with the military measures taken in 1805 and 1806, the Serbs restricted themselves to defensive actions; they did not even try to engage in strong political agitation in neighboring regions in order to pin down some Turkish forces in case of attack against Serbia.[31]

There has been much discussion in historical circles as to why the Serbs did not continue guerrilla resistance in 1813. Marxian historians point out that after the dispersion of the Serbian army many troops remained in hiding, the manpower resources were depleted through heavy war casualties, and about 24,000 persons, including many prominent leaders, escaped to Austria. They claim that these conditions, together with political factionalism, disillusionment after many years of exhausting struggle and international isolation, explain the passive character of the Serbian defense.[32]

---

[25] Guzina, pp. 92-103. Vučo, p. 167f.

[26] *Ibid,* pp. 254-258. Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli,* pp. 70-81.

[27] *Ibid.*

[28] Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli,* p. 77ff.

[29] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije,* pp. 349-354. Čubrilović, "Prvi srpski ustanak," p. 11.

[30] Djordjević, p. 352ff.

[31] Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli,* p. 94. The author says that reasons for Serbia's defeat were superiority of enemy forces, more solid enemy command, and sounder strategy employed by the enemy.

The course and final outcome of the First Serbian Revolution were influenced by changed relations among the European powers and by the international situation in the time of the Revolution. The Serbs started the Revolution themselves, but it took place during the Napoleonic wars and its outcome was unavoidably influenced by them.[33] The Serbian question became an international question, and a part of the whole Eastern Question; the policies of the great powers toward Serbia were dictated exclusively by their own interests. Austria for the first time became apprehensive about the dangers inherent in a strong Serbian and South Slav state on her southern frontiers and worked against the cause of the Rebels.[34] The struggle led by Karadjordje did not serve Napoleon's objectives in the Near East. Although he espoused the interests of the French bourgeoisie, Napoleon was indifferent, if not opposed, to the "progressive" national liberation movement in Serbia.[35] Russia, of course, played the most active rôle in connection with the liberation struggle in Serbia, and there has been much discussion on this subject.[36]

The military and political situation in Serbia was influenced greatly by the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war in December 1806. Under Russian pressure the Serbs rejected extensive concessions which the Ottomans made to the Serbian negotiator, Petar Ičko, and gambled on winning complete independence;[37] they accepted an alliance with Russia, thereby tying their fate to the outcome of the Turko-Russian war.

Both nationalist and Marxian historians emphasize that the national liberation objectives of the Serbian Rebels and the imperial goals of Russia coincided in that they were anti-Turkish, but that otherwise their aims were at variance. Russia wanted to transform Serbia into a vassal and found it expedient to support the Rebel leaders opposed to Karadjordje, who was bent on making himself an absolute monarch. Her interference fanned the internal political conflict in Serbia, and this served to weaken the power of the revolutionary forces.[38]

Threatened by the Napoleonic invasion in 1812, Russia withdrew from its war with Turkey and signed the Treaty of Bucharest, which (Article

---

[32] Djordjević, p. 353f.

[33] Čubrilović, p. 9.

[34] *Ibid*, p. 8. Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, pp. 213-224.

[35] *Ibid.*, pp. 263-266. Dragoslav Janković, *Francuska štampa o Prvom srpskom ustanku* (Beograd ,1959), pp. 1-17.

[36] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, pp. 162-176, 192-196.

[37] Djordjević, p. 157ff.

[38] Janković, "Praviteljstvujušči sovjet," pp. 34-38.

VIII) restored in Serbia the conditions that existed prior to the Revolution: the restoration of the *knežine* in their original form, the re-occupation of cities by the Turks, the payment of annual tribute, and so forth. The Russians accepted Article VIII without consulting the Serbian Rebels.[39] Because the Serbs refused to permit the restoration of Turkish authority in the Pashalik, it became clear that the Turks would use force to achieve the concessions made by the Russians.[40] Released in 1813 from war with Russia, the Ottoman Empire ignored the Treaty of Bucharest and re-established its unchallenged rule over the Pashalik.

One important aspect of the Revolution, which nationalist historians have neglected and which Marxian historians stress, is its impact on neighboring peoples. The activities of the Serbs in Vojvodina, their contributions in materiel and volunteers, and their help in providing Serbia with a legal and an administrative system have long been recognized. But the relations with other neighbors—Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks—have been slighted. Marxian historians observe that the Serbian Revolution, until 1806, had essentially a local character, but that after 1806 it acquired an international significance.[41] The Serbian victories at Mišar and Deligrad in 1808 demonstrated to the Christian *rayah* everywhere and to the South Slavs in particular that the Serbian Revolution had a deeper significance than first appeared. To quote one Marxian historian: "The broad socio-revolutionary and national-liberation character of the First Serbian Rebellion was fully expressed during the years 1806-1809. It provoked a whole series of movements among the peoples of Turkey and Austria and especially among the Serbs, who saw it as a general Serbian Revolution."[42]

Nationalist and Marxian historians differ on the contribution and significance of the First Serbian Revolution. Because the Turks were able to re-establish complete mastery over Serbia in 1813, some nationalist historians minimize the achievements of the Revolution. Marxian historians, on the contrary, regard the First Serbian Revolution as the incipient phase in the development of the revolutionary movement, which continued after 1813. According to one author: "The Serbian Revolution of 1804 was crushed in 1813 but its flames were not extinguished. The same forces that started the First Serbian Revolution started the second one in 1815."[43]

The Revolution was spearheaded by "bands of earlier heroes" who, after the collapse of Karadjordje's Serbia and the ensuing terror of Suleiman Pasha, "refused to surrender to the Turks" and "chose the life of the *hajduks*." This, in the opinion of Marxian historians, is clear proof that the legacy of the insurgent Serbia of 1804-1813 was "neither forgotten nor destroyed."[44] The First Serbian Revolution, we are told, was a great social revolution which brought an end to Ottoman feudal society and imperial rule in the Pashalik of Belgrade. But as for the catastrophe in 1813, its direct consequence—according to Marxian scholars—was that it delayed the development of Serbia for half a century.[45]

---

[39] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, p. 7.
[40] Čubrilović, *Istorija političke misli*, p. 95. Guzina, pp. 104-114.
[41] *Ibid.*, pp. 90-96. *Iem.*, "Prvi srpski ustanak," p. 8.
[42] *Ibid.*
[43] Djordjević, *Politička istorija Srbije*, p. 354.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 352f.

* * * * *

The most serious task for a Marxian historian is to search for and select evidence that attests to the regularity and predictability of social development. He must assess the Serbian Revolution according to a definite set of laws, and is compelled to work within a theoretical framework. Yet this does not mean that there is no room for controversy and discussion in Marxian historiography. An illustration of this is a polemic over the assessment of the ideological character of the First Serbian Revolution.

However challenging their ideas, the Marxian historians have not been able to offer sufficient evidence in support of their theses that (a) the national liberation movement which culminated in the Revolution of 1804 was an historical force long in process and led by a socially conscious element with a definite social, economic and political program, (b) that the revolutionary struggle, initiated in 1804, from the very start was directed toward winning national independence, and (c) that the Serbian Revolution had a bourgeois democratic character.

Very little is known, for example, about the wealth of the Pashalik or the scope of commercial activities and the volume of trade in which the *gazde* engaged. In fact documentary materials on the social and economic life of the Serbs in the Ottoman Empire are likewise scanty. The Serbian, Turkish, Austrian, French, and other documents on the Serbian Revolution which have been published represent only an infinitesimal part of widely scattered materials. To be sure, Marxian historians are fully aware of this situation, and in recent years they have concentrated on the collection, systematization, and publication of source materials on the life of the Serbs before and during the Serbian Revolution.

Marxian historians are least convincing when they attempt to create a historical setting and use special labels in order to fit the Serbian Revolution into one of the established ideological molds. To prove that the Serbian Revolution is a "bourgeois revolution," Marxian historians must first discover that (a) the patriarchal Serbian village of the eighteenth century was socially differentiated and dominated by a class struggle; and (b) that in it was born a class of leaders who are identified as "commercial" or "rural" middle class. These ideas regarding class struggle and a middle class in the Serbian village seem unduly exaggerated.

One field of historical work in which the Yugoslav Marxian historians deserve special commendation is their painstaking investigations of social and economic developments before and during the Serbian Revolution. At least four volumes of documents, several republished memoirs, three bibliographies and catalogues, and many monographic studies on various aspects of the First Serbian Revolution have appeared.[46] The latter include works on government, distinguished men, agriculture, trade, mining, law, clothing, learning and the arts, and on the international repercussions of the First Serbian Revolution. All of this has enriched the literature on the Serbian Revolution, has shed new light on the subject, and has opened for historians new and challenging vistas.

---

[45] Čubrilović, "Prvi srpski ustanak," p. 13.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

---

[46] Radoslav Perović, *Gradja za istoriju Prvog srpskog ustanka* (Beograd, 1954), Pero Damjanović, ed., *Gradja iz zemunskih arhiva,* I (1804-1808) (Beograd, 1955). Hazim Šabanović, ed., *Turski izvori o srpskoj revoluciji 1804*, I (Beograd, 1956). Dragoslav Janković, *Francuska štampa o Prvom srpskom ustanku* (Beograd, 1959).

THE GERMAN-AUSTRIAN CUSTOMS UNION PROJECT OF 1931: A STUDY OF GERMAN METHODS AND MOTIVES

by F. G. Stambrook

THE DECISIONS reached at the two Hague Conferences of August 1929 and January 1930, providing as they did for a settlement of the reparations question and for the evacuation of the Rhineland by French troops by the end of June 1930, together with the death of Foreign Minister Stresemann on October 4, 1929, form a turning point in German foreign policy. The evacuation of the Rhineland five years prior to the time-limit laid down in the Treaty of Versailles was a triumph for Stresemann's policy of "fulfilment," a triumph he was able neither to enjoy nor to make the basis for Germany's future policy. The conduct of German policy passed into other and less skilful hands and within eighteen months of Stresemann's death, in March 1931, the outside world was suddenly confronted with the proposal for a German-Austrian customs union, a proposal presented in such a way as to make it appear that the technique of foreign policy by surprises, abandoned under Stresemann, was once more being employed.[1]

Stresemann at no time made a secret of the fact that he regarded a settlement of the reparations problem and the evacuation of the Rhineland as a prerequisite for any future foreign policy[2] and therefore as justifying the great attention bestowed upon them. It is thus somewhat ironical that the reproach was leveled at him by his successor Curtius that these two problems had taken up so much of Stresemann's time and that of his collaborators that other aspects of foreign policy and relations with certain other states had suffered.[3] Curtius, with little experience in foreign policy and lacking Stresemann's broader outlook and his skill, was determined to force the pace. It had long been his conviction, he subsequently wrote, that it would be necessary to "intensify" Germany's relations with East and South-East Europe as soon as a settlement in the West had been reached. In particular he thought that a new approach to Austria was essential.[4] The customs union of 1931 was the outcome of this new approach.

It was a question hotly debated at the time, and also subsequently, whether the proposed customs union was designed as a measure to relieve the growing economic emergency or whether it harbored more long-term designs.[5] It was thought then, and also later, that the German Government was influenced by considerations of domestic policy in seeking for some success in foreign affairs,[6] a contention which has been angrily rebutted by Curtius.[7] The suggestion was made at the time,[8] and has been maintained,[9] that the proposed union was a measure for economic recovery within the framework of the Briand Plan for European Union,[10] and indeed that it would promote rather than restrict Austria's political independence.[11] It was also argued that there had been no intention of creating a *fait accompli* and that it was only because a leakage had occurred in Vienna and/or because the Organization Committee of the League's Commission of Enquiry for European Union decided to meet in Paris on March 24, 1931, that hasty notice was given to the other powers on March 21 instead of the original schedule, which called for the other powers to be notified during the May session of the Commission of Enquiry, being adhered to.[12] Hitherto the main sources for the study of the German-Austrian plan, apart from the statements made in public at the time, have been the two books by Curtius[13] and the documents published in Documents on British Foreign Policy.[14] The German diplomatic documents which, in the form of photostats or microfilm, are now available to researchers at the Public Record Office, London, and at the National Archives, Washington, cast fresh light on the subject and make it possible to provide more substantial answers to these questions.[15] It is on these German records that the present account is primarily based. It should, however, be noted that the files of the German Foreign Ministry on this topic are not complete. In particular the most important series of files *Handel 13A Österreich (geheim)*, the working files of Department II[16] on the customs union, is missing, except for volume 17. Missing, too, are the *Handakten* of Ministerial-Direktor Ritter,[17] the economic expert of the German Foreign Ministry, on the customs union. Fortunately, however, there are frequently several copies of documents, and the author was able to search for relevant documents in the files of the Foreign Minister, State Secretary, and other departmental files, as well as in those of the Reich Chancellery. Moreover, Curtius, before he relinquished his post in October 1931, compiled a collection of copies of and extracts from documents to which he wrote a linking commentary. Documents no longer to be found elsewhere in the Foreign Ministry files have been traced there and the commentary, too, sheds light on otherwise obscure events.[18]

---

[1] How far even French statesmen and diplomats were from suspecting the imminent announcement may be gathered from Briand's remarks on the receding danger of an Anschluss and Austria's increasingly solid consciousness of her own nationality during a debate in the French Chamber of Deputies on Mar. 3, 1931 *(Journal Officiel, Débats Parlementaires, Chambre,* p. 1525) and from the statements made by the French Ambassador in Washington (see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1931,* vol. I (Washington, 1946), p. 571).

[2] Cf., for example, his statements to Seipel during his and Chancellor Marx's official visit to Vienna in November 1927 (Memorandum by State Secretary Pünder of Nov. 22, 1927; 3086/D614241-60).

[3] Julius Curtius, *Bemühugen um Oesterreich, das Scheitern des Zollunionsplan von 1931* (Heidelberg, 1946), p. 10. Curtius used much the same words in May 1930 when suggesting to Grandi that there should be closer German-Italian relations (Memorandum RM 701 of May 15, 1930; 4679/E224462-65).

[4] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 11.

---

[5] For a contemporary account of the German-Austrian project see *Survey of International Affairs, 1931* (London, 1932), pp. 297-323. For a recent German account see Ludwig Zimmermann, *Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Ära der Weimarer Republik* (Göttingen, 1958), pp. 407-415; for a French view see Maurice Baumont, *La Faillite de la Paix* (Paris, 1951) p. 411ff., who tersely heads this short section "La tentative d'Anschluss en 1931."

[6] See *Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,* eds. E. L. Woodward and Rohan Butler (hereinafter cited as *DBFP*), Second Series, vol. II, No. 34, and André François Poncet, *Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Berlin* (Paris, 1946), p. 19.

[7] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 33.

[8] Cf. Article I of the Customs Union Protocol (for an English text of which see *DBFP,* 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 3, encl. 1), and *ibid.,* No. 2, encl. 2, and No. 21.

[9] See Oswald Hauser, *Der Plan einer deutsch-österreichischen Zollunion 1931 und die europäische Föderation* in *Historische Zeitschrift,* vol. 179, (1955), No. 1, pp. 45-92.

[10] For the Briand Plan see *Survey, 1930* (London, 1931), pp. 136-142.

[11] Cf. the argument by the Austrian advocate, Prof. Kaufmann, before the International Court (Permanent Court of International Justice, Series C, XXII Session — 1931, No. 53, *Customs Regime between Germany and Austria* (Leyden, 1931), pp. 100 and 312), and Curtius, *Bemühungen,* pp. 31 and 57ff.

[12] See *DBFP,* 2nd Series, vol. II, Nos. 6, 8, 21 and 28, enclosure; see also Zimmermann, *op. cit.,* p. 410, and Hauser, *op. cit.,* p. 66f.

[13] Julius Curtius, *Bemühungen um Oesterreich* (see fn. 3 above) and *Sechs Jahre Minister der deutschen Republik* (Heidelberg, 1948).

[14] The British documents also reveal contemporary German efforts to indicate that, while the subject of a customs union had often before been discussed, all the negotiations for the 1931 project had been carried out during Curtius' visit to Vienna at the beginning of March (*DBFP,* 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 28, enclosure, and No. 34; cf. also M. J. Bonn, *So Macht Man Geschichte* (Munich, 1953), p. 312 and fn. 1). In his two books Curtius has already shown that these negotiations had a longer history.

[15] Material from the German Foreign Ministry and Reich Chancellery is here identified by the serial and frame numbers allotted to the documents by the German Docu-

* * * *

Following the attempts made in 1918 and 1919 by the newly constituted Austrian Republic to join the German Reich, article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles imposed upon Germany an obligation to respect Austria's independence. Article 88 of the Treaty of St. Germain declared that Austria's independence was inviolable, except with the consent of the League of Nations, and Austria undertook, in the absence of such consent, to abstain from any act which might directly or indirectly "or by any means whatever" compromise her independence. This undertaking was reaffirmed in the first of the three Austrian Reconstruction Protocols signed at Geneva on October 4, 1922, by which Austria undertook to refrain from any negotiations or from any economic or financial engagement calculated directly or indirectly to compromise her independence, and not to violate her economic independence by granting to any state a special regime or exclu-

---

ments Project; these serial and frame numbers enable reference to be made to the relevant German text both in the films and in the original files. The serial number, which was allotted to a file or series of files on filming, consisted of two, three, or more usually four numerals, which may be preceded by the letters K, or M. Each page of every filmed document is identified by a frame number stamped on the original at the time of filming. Frame numbers consist of six (sometimes only five) numerals, which may be preceded by the letters D, E, H, K, L, or M, or may be without such prefix. In the document cited in footnote 3 above, the number 4679 is the serial number and the numbers E224462-65 are the frame numbers.

[16] The German Foreign Ministry was at this time organized into a number of geographical and a number of functional departments. Department II dealt with the political and economic affairs of West, South and South-East Europe, as well as with disarmament problems and League of Nations affairs. The Director of Department II was Gerhard Köpke.

[17] Dr. Karl Ritter, head of Sonderreferat W. which dealt with reparations as well as with general economic and financial matters.

[18] Curtius sent one copy of his collection of documents to the Foreign Ministry, another to the Reichsarchiv, at the beginning of 1932. In March 1932 the Foreign Ministry requested, and the Reichsarchiv agreed, that it should be regarded as secret, and that no reference should be made to its existence (K928/K234451-52). The collection in the custody of the Foreign Ministry has been filmed on Serial K49.

sive advantages calculated to threaten this independence.[19] That the conclusion of a customs union between Germany and Austria would, under the terms of the Treaty of St. Germain and of the Geneva Protocol, require the consent of the Council of the League of Nations appears to have been recognized both in Vienna and in Berlin during the 1920s. The German view was expressed in a despatch of February 4, 1930, from Schubert, the State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry, to the German Minister in Vienna. This stated that although there might be doubt as to whether the conclusion of customs and economic alliances in the form of terminable treaties of fixed duration was to be regarded as a limitation of the political and economic independence of the countries concerned, there could scarcely be any doubt that the signatories of the Geneva Protocol would regard the conclusion of a customs union between Germany and Austria as a measure which would endanger the economic independence of Austria, and would therefore withhold their consent.[20] The binding nature on Austria of the Geneva Protocol would therefore appear to have been clearly acknowledged, else there would have been no mention of the need for the consent of the Signatory Powers. The Austrian view was stated by the Austrian foreign trade expert Schüller; it was a clear acknowledgement that the other powers would regard a customs union as prohibited in the same way as the political Anschluss. In any case, Schüller said, the Geneva Protocol entailed no commitments which were not already contained in the peace treaties.[21]

While it was thus recognized that there were considerable difficulties in the way of implementing either an Anschluss or a customs union with Austria, the Anschluss remained "the obvious aim of German Policy."[22] But if, during the 1920s, the political Anschluss was regarded as impracticable because, for Germany, a settlement of the Western questions had priority as a political aim and because nothing must be done which might jeopardize the evacuation of the Rhineland,[23] the utmost care was nevertheless taken to ensure that no additional barriers were placed in the way of an eventual Anschluss. From this arose Germany's concern to prevent the question of Austria from being brought into the Locarno negotiations.[24] Conversely, everything which might harm the Anschluss idea in Austria was studiously avoided, hence Germany's refusal to make a fresh affirmation guaranteeing the Brenner frontier between Austria and Italy and her concern not to make any statements regarding the South Tyrol which might be construed as a sign of approval of conditions there.[25] On the other hand, the Anschluss concept was fostered in various ways. Cultural exchanges were promoted, preparatory work was done on the coordination of the legal systems of the two countries, and steps were taken to assure the propagation of the Anschluss idea both in the press and through various organizations in Austria.[26] While demonstrative advocates of the Anschluss movement were apt to be discouraged,[27] constant and quiet preparations and propaganda were carried on, and it appeared evident that the settlement of the reparations question and the evacuation of the Rhineland, by allowing greater freedom to German policy, would, as Stresemann had told Seipel in 1927,[28] enable Germany to bring up the two territorial demands—the Polish Corridor and the Austrian Anschluss—at much the same time.

---

[19] For the text of the first Austrian Reconstruction Protocol of Oct. 4, 1922, see League of Nations, *Treaty Series,* vol. XII, pp. 386-389.

[20] Schubert to Vienna, despatch II Oe.136 of Feb. 4, 1930 (4938/E266582-85). Karl von Schubert was State Secretary of the German Foreign Ministry from December 1924 to June 1930 and German Ambassador in Rome from October 1930 to October 1932.

[21] Agreed record of the German-Austrian conversations in Berlin on Feb. 22 and 24, 1930 (3086/D614740-80). This undated and unsigned record is based on the Austrian record (K59/K006680-724), which bears insertions embodying the German Foreign Ministry's suggestions for additions to the record. These additions were approved by the Austrians (K59/K006779).

[22] Undated and unsigned memorandum II Oe.293 of 1931 (K920/K229674-77). The Austrian Federal Chancellor Seipel insisted in November 1927 that any public German pronouncement on foreign policy should not include a reference to the Anschluss (Memorandum by Pünder of Nov. 22, 1927; see fn. 2 above).

[23] Stresemann and Chancellor Marx to Seipel (*ibid*).

[24] Köpke to Rome, telegram No. 125 of May 7, 1925 (3086/D614020-21), Stresemann to Rome, telegrams Nos. 139 of May 15 (3086/D614038-39) and 150 of May 23, 1925 (3123/D643290-96), Schubert to Paris, telegram No. 702 of June 2, 1925 (4509/E126478-84). For expressions of later German fears lest Austria's independence be guaranteed by

Although it was subsequently argued that the customs union was purely economic in nature and not a forerunner of a political Anschluss, no such distinction appears to have been made within the German Foreign Ministry. There the customs union was regarded as a prelude to and a temporary substitute for the Anschluss. A Foreign Ministry brief prepared for Curtius prior to the Austrian Chancellor's visit to Berlin in February 1930 stated that, as the Anschluss was out of the question for the time being, Germany had all the more interest, for political and economic reasons, in maintaining very close economic ties with Austria and that the closest of all ties would be a customs union.[29] "The Anschluss," so Curtius told the Cabinet on March 16, 1931, "is politically not ripe, but it can be decisively furthered on the economic plane."[30] The axiom "commercial policy is

---

Italy or by a general agreement preserving the *status quo* in Central Europe see Schubert to Rome, telegram No. 32 of Jan. 29, 1926 (6038/E445006-08), Hoesch (Paris) to Berlin, telegram No. 183 of Feb. 17, 1928 (5972/E438918-20) and Hoesch to Berlin, telegram No. 304 of Apr. 20, 1929 (K450/K131290-93).

[25] Minute by Counsellor Toepke of Sept. 11, 1920 (K442/K126198); Vienna Report A 460 of Nov. 10, 1926 (K430/K124185-87).

[26] Among the newspapers which were at one time or another in receipt of subsidies from the German Foreign Ministry were the *Wiener Neueste Nachrichten* and the *Reichspost* (Memoranda by Counsellor Redlhammer of Nov. 15, 1929 (4576/E173741-44) and Jan. 28, 1930 (4576/E173953-55)). Among the organizations subsidised directly by the Foreign Ministry and the Reich Ministry of the Interior were the *Oesterreichisch-Deutscher Volksbund* and the *Deutsch-Oesterreichische Arbeitsgemeinschaft.* Both these bodies were organized in Austria and in Germany; Reich funds were transmitted to the German branch, sometimes with the condition that part should be forwarded to the Austrian organization. The amounts involved in these cases were comparatively small; relevant documents have been filmed on Serials K55 and K56.

[27] Cf. Chancellor Müller to Reichstag President Loebe, letter of Sept. 25, 1928 (K1064/K273227-29); memoranda by Schubert of Feb. 10 and Feb. 24, 1930 (4576/E174-007-08 and E174116-22).

[28] Memorandum by Pünder of Nov. 22, 1927 (see fn. 2 above).

[29] Unsigned Memorandum II Oe.171 of Feb. 12, 1930 (3086/D614671-90).

[30] Minutes of the Conference of Ministers held on Mar. 16, 1931 (3575/D786142-47).

an instrument of diplomacy" was familiar to German diplomats; the use of economic and financial means to achieve political ends was no novelty at a time of Germany's political weakness,[31] and the possibility of furthering the Anschluss by economic agreements with Austria had been considered before Curtius became Foreign Minister. The subsequent State Secretary, von Bülow,[32] at a time when he was still Deputy Director of Department II, wrote in the early summer of 1929:

> ... Normally we would be able to hope that the Rhineland will be evacuated by the spring of next year and that the other problems which keep us and France apart will have been settled or postponed. If the British Labour Party is then still in power and, as seems probable, pursues an active foreign policy, then the moment will perhaps have arrived for us also to embark on a greater activity. The questions of the Corridor and of Upper Silesia as well as the Anschluss question are the problems which will then force themselves to the fore. Coming to grips with Poland would, for practical reasons, deserve priority, because if we were to wait much longer it could happen that all the Germans would have been driven out of the occupied territories. But it could be that the time for raising the Eastern problems may not be ripe, and that we must tackle the Anschluss question in some form or other. For my own part I am not here thinking of an Anschluss in the fullest sense of the word, but rather of active steps in respect of preferential tariffs and similar things.[33]

How Stresemann would have conducted German policy after the evacuation of the Rhineland is a matter of hypothesis and outside the scope of this article. The stage was, however, set for his successor who, by his own account, had long been convinced of the need to pursue an active policy in the South-East and especially towards Austria. Two factors, apart from the settlement in the West, appeared from the outset to favor the course Curtius had in mind. In the first place, the new Austrian Chancellor, Schober, was a non-party man who was regarded as a "good German" as well as a "good Austrian"[34] and was in any case not tainted by the suspicion that he was at best lukewarm about the Anschluss such as clung, in German eyes, to the personality of Ignaz Seipel, who had long been the dominant figure on the Austrian political scene.[35] Of equal if not greater importance was the fact that Austria was in serious economic difficulties. This was held to be conducive to the Anschluss, and throughout the period of preparation of the customs union project the Foreign Ministry maintained the view that pro-Anschluss feeling in Austria was in the main due to direct material interests and essentially the outcome of economic depression.[36]

---

[31] "Wirtschaftspolitik ist Instrument der Diplomatie" (Hans Riesser, *Haben die deutschen Diplomaten versagt?* (Bonn, 1959), p. 30). As an instance of this may be cited the German efforts, through the Governor of the Bank of England, to prevent the raising of loans for Poland's effective economic rehabilitation in 1926 (London reports A 492 of Mar. 1 (4569/E168585-93), A 644 of Mar. 19 (4569/E168605-14), A 689 of Mar. 30 (K160/K019878-81) and A 754 of Apr. 8 (K160/K019886-96), all of 1926, and Stresemann to London, despatch RM 644 of Apr. 19, 1926 (4569/E168665-71)). See also Zimmerman, *op. cit.*, p. 339f., which does not, however, give a complete picture.

[32] Bernhard Wilhelm von Bülow, the Foreign Ministry's expert on League of Nations affairs, Deputy Director of Department II 1928-1930, State Secretary June 1930-June 1936.

[33] Bülow to Counsellor of Embassy Smend, Rome, letter of June 5, 1929 (4607/E193757-59.

[34] Lerchenfeld (Vienna) to Curtius, letter of Dec. 25, 1929 (3086/D614605-11). Schober's Government, a coalition of the Christian Social, *Grossdeutsche* and *Landbund* parties, was formed on Sept. 26, 1929.

Three other factors made the closer attachment of Austria to Germany not only desirable but of the greatest importance at that time. These were the Heimwehr movement, that same economic depression which, in its other aspect, was favorable to the Anschluss concept, and the Pan-Europe idea which the French Foreign Minister, Briand, had advocated in Geneva in September 1929. The Heimwehr movement appeared to be of particular importance during the constitutional conflict which threatened Austria during the autumn of 1929. Its attitude towards the Anschluss was ambiguous and undefined, and in as much as it strove to promote Austrian national sentiment it could become an obstacle to the Anschluss. Moreover, so the German Minister in Vienna, von Lerchenfeld, reported, its complete victory would render inevitable a semi-Fascist dictatorship and, because this would involve firm commitments to the Italian-Hungarian bloc, would very seriously threaten "the development of German-Austrian relations."[37] The economic depression, too, while providing a pro-Anschluss attitude in Austria, also contained elements of danger for German policy. If pro-Anschluss sentiment was essentially an outcome of economic depression, it was nourished by the conviction that this could be overcome only by alignment with the Reich.[38] Should it become apparent that Germany was unable to provide effective help, then Austria would have to turn elsewhere for the assistance of which she was in need. This could only be towards either Czechoslovakia and France or towards Italy and Hungary, and, as will be seen, both possibilities were equally unwelcome to Germany. Thirdly, it was known that France was preparing a plan for the organization of Europe which, it was thought, would attempt to secure the political and territorial *status quo.* Such a development, so Bülow warned in August

---

[35] Seipel had been Austrian Chancellor, with one interruption in 1926, from May 31, 1922 to Apr. 3, 1929, and remained thereafter the most powerful man in the Christian Social party. In the autumn and winter of 1929 he was, however, not active in political life owing to illness. For a sympathetic treatment of Seipel's often contradictory utterances on the Anschluss see *Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich,* H. Benedikt, ed. (Vienna, 1954), p. 330f. Curtius' antipathy to Seipel is reflected throughout his writings, cf. especially *Bemühungen,* p. 13.

[36] Memorandum II Oe. 293 of 1931; see fn. 22 above. The Anschluss appeared in the programmes of all Austrian parties, but only for the numerically weak *Grossdeutsche* party was it a matter of principle; see also *Geschichte der Republik Oesterreich,* pp. 384-390.

[37] Vienna report A 435 of Nov. 21, 1929 (K921/K230973-80); cf. also Innsbruck report 33 of Jan. 30, 1930 (K926/K233370-72) and *Innsbrucker Nachrichten* of the same date (K926/K233373-74).

[38] Memorandum II Oe. 293 of 1931; see fn. 22 above.

1929, might have an adverse effect on Germany's opportunities in Central Europe.[39]

Curtius' convictions could therefore only have been strengthened by a letter of December 25, 1929, from Lerchenfeld in Vienna. Lerchenfeld pointed out that the Hague Conference, due to be held the following month, would give Curtius an opportunity for making contact with Schober, the "good German" and "good Austrian," and to hold conversations which could be of great significance. "Austria," so Lerchenfeld continued, "is one of the few truly active factors on our political horizon. At the moment the Austrian economy is aiming at a customs and economic union [with Germany]. Business circles are by nature opportunist and have to be so. The political extension of our mutual relationship cannot come about without the economic. This view is held both by Schober and by [Finance Minister] Juch. From this there emerges the possibility of an active policy which can, in its outward appearances, be presented as being based on international or Pan-European principles."[40]

An invitation to Schober to visit Berlin as the guest of the German Government had already been issued on December 21, 1929. In his reply to Lerchenfeld Curtius stated that he had already had the intention of approaching Schober at the Hague and that he would follow Lerchenfeld's advice, but he expressed concern at the fact that Schober had agreed to visit Rome before coming to Berlin.[41] Curtius has since stated that during their discussions at the Hague in January 1930 both he and Schober were thinking of a customs union.[42] Schober also informed Curtius that he had successfully resisted French attempts to get him to renounce the Anschluss or otherwise to draw this question into the negotiations.[43] But if Curtius had already decided on the customs union project, he either failed to inform his senior officials of his decision or there developed a difference of opinion, or at least of emphasis, between himself and his State Secretary,

---

[39] Memorandum by Bülow of Aug. 2, 1929 (L1508/L444666-68); cf. also his memorandum of Aug. 7, 1929 (L1508/L444661-65). Briand was charged with the preparation of a memorandum on European Union in September 1929. Briand had first mooted his idea to Stresemann during the Madrid session of the League Council in June 1929 (memorandum by interpreter Schmidt, RM 911 of June 11; 2406/D507172-78); Stresemann spoke appreciatively of Briand's initiative at Geneva on Sept. 9, (League of Nations, *Official Journal*, Special Supplement No. 75, pp. 67-71).

[40] Lerchenfeld to Curtius, letter of Dec. 25, 1929 (see fn. 34 above).

[41] Curtius to Vienna, telegram No. 43 of Den. 21 (K924/K231933), Curtius to Lerchenfeld, letter of Dec. 31 (3086/D614612-13); the invitation appears to have been issued at Lerchenfeld's instigation and after a hint from Schober, who is said to have regarded a visit to Berlin as an essential counterweight to his visit to Rome (Vienna report A 485 of Dec. 10, Vienna telegram No. 54 of Dec. 14; K924/K231930-32).

[42] Curtius, *Sechs Jahre Minister,* p. 119. This claim is not made in his earlier and more detailed book on the customs union.

[43] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* pp. 12 and 17; unsigned memorandum of Jan. 4, 1930 (3086/D614620-24), memorandum by Curtius, RM 65 of Jan. 14 (3086/D614626-27). Neither of these memoranda indicate that Curtius and Schober discussed a customs union; nor is there any such indication in Schubert's brief minute of Jan. 3 (4498/E110024) in which the State Secretary recorded what Curtius told him regarding his first conversation that day with the Austrian Chancellor. No memorandum by Curtius on this conversation has been found.

Schubert. In the despatch of February 4 which has already been cited Schubert instructed Lerchenfeld that, in reply to any Austrian enquiries and in order to remove any misconceptions, he should state that Germany regarded a customs union as very desirable but not feasible at that time as Austria was bound by the Geneva Protocol, whose signatories would doubtless regard a customs union with Germany as incompatible with Austrian independence and would therefore refuse their consent. Lerchenfeld was also to say that "a solution of the question would therefore be possible only by means of a carefully prepared understanding [with other states?] which would take these external political factors into account. To bring this about was Austria's affair." Consquently there was no need at that time to enter into a discussion of the technical issues involved in the creation of a customs union.[44]

Austria's serious economic difficulties and the possibility that these might cause her to be drawn into the orbit of France or of Italy aroused considerable concern in Berlin. The brief drawn up for Curtius by Department II in preparation for the Austrian Chancellor's visit stressed Germany's interest, at a time when the Anschluss was out of the question, in very close economic ties with Austria; the closest of all such ties would be a customs union. The memorandum continued: "From a political point of view its conclusion would be of the greatest value, as only thus could we ensure that German and Austrian foreign policy interests would no longer seriously diverge, and the danger that Austria would be drawn into a closer, and to us undesirable, relationship with other states would thereby be avoided." The technical problems posed by a customs union were stated to be great though not decisive, but the political impediments created by the Geneva Protocol still remained. The memorandum therefore recommended that, at any discussion of a customs union, it should be made plain to the Austrians that, while Germany would in principle welcome this, the agreement of the other powers signatories to the Geneva Protocol would first have to be obtained.[45]

Other information subsequently reaching the Foreign Ministry may, however, have convinced Curtius, if he had not already determined on this course, that it was essential for him to take the initiative in order to obtain a binding commitment in favor of the customs union from Schober and to embark on a joint study of the technical problems involved. In the collection of documents which Curtius compiled he noted, in connection with Schober's visit, that Austria expected a decisive step to be taken on economic integration with Germany, especially as overtures to Austria from her neighbor states and from Italy were again to be expected.[46] For this statement Curtius cited a letter from Herr Karl Lahm to Dr. Paul Goldmann of February 11, stating that the majority of Austrian industrial circles wanted a customs union with Germany and that this opportunity, which might not recur for many years, ought not to be missed,[47] and one from Herr von Loesch to Senior Counsellor Reinebeck urging that Germany should take the initiative in order to forestall Czechoslovak overtures to Austria.[48]

---

[44] Schubert to Vienna, despatch II Oe.136 of Feb. 4 (see fn. 20 above).

[45] Memorandum II Oe.171 of Feb. 12 (see fn. 29 above); an earlier version is dated Feb. 1 (4576/E173967-80).

[46] Curtius commentary (K49/K004861).

Two days before Schober's arrival the German Cabinet approved the concessions to be made to Austria in the trade treaty negotiations which had been dragging on for two years. Speaking in support of these concessions, Chancellor Müller stressed the relative unimportance of the difficulties which had arisen in the trade negotiations when compared with the great political issues involved, especially the Anschluss question. No mention was made, however, of a customs union.[49]

Schober's visit to Berlin took place on February 22-24, 1930; discussions between Chancellor Müller and Curtius on the one hand and Schober on the other were held on the 22nd and 24th;[50] the intervening day, a Sunday, was passed in consultations between the accompanying experts, largely on the trade negotiations. The general political situation, especially the Pan-Europe movement, the affairs of the Little Entente, and Schober's recent visit to Rome, took up much time on the first day, but when the conversation turned to economic matters the subject of a customs union speedily came up, being broached somewhat tentatively by Schober and then more particularly by the Austrian economic expert, Schüller. In Austria's view, the latter said, a customs union was not feasible as the Entente considered it to be prohibited in the same way as the political Anschluss; this had also, he said, previously been the view of the German Government. Curtius, while recognizing that the former allies would interpret the peace treaties to Germany's and Austria's disadvantage, strongly urged that preparatory discussions on a customs union should be begun soon. The decision, he said, must be taken in principle, and although the present political scene was not favorable for such action they "must be prepared for the future." Both Schüller and Ritter, the German economic expert, opposed this suggestion, the former because he was doubtful about the feasibility of a customs union, the latter because he feared that the negotiations could not be kept secret and because once it became a political possibility technical negotiations could be completed in 6-8 weeks. No decision was thus reached on the first day, but Curtius returned to the charge on February 24 and suggested that it be agreed to begin preparatory work. He had, he said, no fears regarding lack of secrecy; there were good grounds for thinking that the peace treaties were not a decisive obstacle as it could be argued that a terminable customs union was not a renunciation of independence. A favorable moment must, of course, be chosen for this struggle [*Kampf*], and political and diplomatic preparations made. He wanted some decision that day as to whether and how the whole problem could be tackled. It should not be put off, as the political constellation was capable of very sudden change; if the overall European situation provided an opening they must be able at once to make use of it *("Wenn die gesamt-europäische Konstellation eine Lücke bietet, müssen wir sofort hineinstossen können.")* Schober now gave a warm welcome to Curtius' statements and, after a discussion of the technical problems which would arise, it was agreed that the question of the customs union should be studied, although Chancellor Müller's final words on the subject contained no mention of the "great speed" to which Schober had explicitly referred and which Curtius had implied.[51] In conversation with Schubert later that day both Secretary General Peter and Schober expressed their satisfaction at the decisions which had been reached, Schober adding "if we effect the customs union we will thereby get the whole Balkans."[52]

---

[47] The extract in Curtius' collection is K49/K004862; a fuller extract, initialled by various officials of Department II on Feb. 18, is K920/K229614-18. Goldmann was Berlin correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* and was in regular contact with the German Foreign Ministry; it is not known to whom he transmitted Lahm's letter, but Lahm had asked him to bring it to the attention of the Foreign Ministry. Lahm was Vienna correspondent of the *Vossische Zeitung* and a member of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft (see fn. 26 above). He stated that he was acting on behalf of this and various other pro-Anschluss organizations and also for Herr Richard Riedl, one of the principal exponents of the idea of Central European economic integration.

[48] Letter of Feb. 20, submitted to Curtius the following day (3086/D614710-12; the excerpt in Curtius' collection is K49/K004863-65). Loesch was head of the *Deutscher Schutzbund,* one of the main organizations for the promotion of Germanism; Reinebeck was the Foreign Ministry official in charge of German internal affairs.

[49] Record of the Cabinet session of Feb. 20, 1930 (3575/D782804-20). The collection of Cabinet protocols in the files of the Reich Chancellery is almost complete, but it lacks the full record of a Conference of Ministers held on the same day, of which only a brief extract (3575/D782837) has been found. In view of the secrecy which attended the final negotiations in 1931, it is most unlikely that the Ministers were given an indication of Curtius' intentions. No record of the Cabinet's being informed of the outcome of the conversations in Berlin with Schober has been found, and again it is highly improbable that they were told.

[50] Others taking part were, on the German side, State Secretaries Pünder (Reich Chancellery) and Schubert, Ministerialdirektoren Kölpke and Ritter of the Foreign Ministry, and the Minister in Vienna, Lerchenfeld; on the Austrian side, Secretary General Peter of the Foreign Affairs Department of the Federal Chancellery, *Sektionschef* Schüller of its economic section, Minister Junkar, the Austrian *Chef de Protocol,* and the Austrian Minister in Berlin, Frank.

The immediate result of this acceptance in principle of the customs union, a decision evidently taken by the politicians in the face of the misgivings of their officials, was meagre enough, for during the ensuing months there were developments in Austria's foreign as well as domestic affairs which boded ill for Curtius' policy. Particular anxiety was felt in Berlin when Schober visited Paris at the end of April 1930, for it was feared that, in connection with Austria's search for financial assistance, Schober might again be pressed to renounce the Anschluss. No such renunciation appears to have been made, but Curtius was not wholly reassured when Schober wrote to him to say that the Anschluss had not been discussed in either Paris or London, which he also visited, for the Austrian Chancellor added that Briand had constantly spoken of an "independent" Austria and had assured him that, to facilitate Austria's existence as an independent State, France would continue to exercise her influence on the Little Entente with a view to obtaining concessions for Austrian trade. Curtius sent only a brief reply to Schober's letter.[53] Lerchenfeld, too, reported that in the official memorandum on Schober's conversation with Briand (of which he had been shown an extract by Schober) there was no mention of the Anschluss but merely constant reiteration of the advantages of Austrian independence. To this Curtius minuted "Independence—no Anschluss."[54]

---

[51] Agreed record of the conversation (see fn. 21 above). Bülow, who had not taken part in the discussions, rightly noted that the record shows that it was Germany who demanded preparations for a customs union and that the Austrians consented only very reluctantly; this, he claimed, did not correspond to what he had heard from the participants (Minute of Apr. 30, 1930; K59/K006729).

[52] Memoranda by Schubert of Feb. 24, 1930 (4576/E174110-15, 116-22).

There were fears too that the Briand Plan for European Union, which had been communicated to the other powers in May, was designed to restrict Germany's freedom of action. In a memorandum of May 21, 1930, Bülow wrote:

> . . . Accordingly the purpose of the whole plan seems to be to yoke us with new chains by making use of the fact that the consolidation of Europe is, in the prevailing view, only possible on the basis of the *status quo* [cf. p. 6 and III A, para. 3]. At stake here are not only the territorial *status quo* but also all obligations arising out of the peace treaties . . . [55]

The consolidation of the political structure of Europe would rule out the possibility of the Anschluss, and the closer economic contacts and greater stability at which the Briand Plan aimed might well render even a customs union between Germany and Austria superfluous. There was also constant concern on another score, for it was feared in Berlin that Austria might be changing her policy with regard to a Danubian Confederation, and Lerchenfeld too, in a report of June 4, stated that there were renewed attempts, by the former French Minister Loucheur and others, to bring about closer economic relations between Austria, Hungary and the Successor States. Such plans, he said, were motivated by the political aim of drawing Austria away from Germany, and France's ability to promote her plans by providing capital made the situation very dangerous. Although some satisfactory assurances were received on this account from the Austrian Minister in Berlin at the end of June, the German fears were revived in a slightly altered form in August, when Lerchenfeld reported that, while no great importance had previously been attached in Austria to the various economic conferences of the Successor States, the attitude to the conferences of the agrarian States had now changed significantly.[56]

---

[53] Schober to Curtius, letter of May 14 (3086/D614834-37), Curtius to Schober, letter of May 23 (3086/D614842). Cf. also marginalia by Curtius on p. 1 of Paris telegram No. 453 of May 1 (K1090/K281224; the full telegram is K1090/K281215-21) and Rome report I 810 of May 8 (K1090/K281267-76).

[54] Vienna report A 240 of May 12, with Curtius' marginalia (K1090/K281283-84).

[55] Memorandum by Bülow of May 21, 1930 (L1712/L503550-56); cf. also Curtius' circular despatch of June 10 (L1712/L503685-91).

[56] Memoranda by Köpke of June 3 (3241/D702696-97), June 6 (3086/D614850-51) and June 30 (3086/D614866-68), by Curtius of June 14 (3086/D614853-55) and by Bülow of June 28 (3086/D614864-65); Vienna reports A 285 of June 4 (K1101/K282833-36) and W 623 of Aug. 9 (K2103/K572689-92). Conferences of agrarian states, with

In his report of June 4, Lerchenfeld had also drawn attention to an improvement in relations between Austria and Italy, for which the Austrian Heimwehr movement was constantly pressing, and to an increase in Legitimist activity. State Secretary Bülow was much perturbed by Schober's negotiations with the Heimwehr and the pro-Italian trend which this might entail, and when Lerchenfeld wrote that Prince Starhemberg, the Heimwehr leader in Upper Austria, had visited Mussolini at the end of July with the approval of the Austrian Government, Bülow feared that this might indicate Schober's capitulation to the Heimwehr.[57]

Thus it came about that, despite urgings from both those who knew of the conversations in Berlin in February and those who did not, the customs union project made no outward progress. A warning that pro-Anschluss feeling in Austria was at a low ebb owing to Germany's failure to give the requisite assistance in order to relieve the complete economic stagnation which prevailed there, and that, if no German help were forthcoming, there would be a serious danger of such feeling disappearing altogether, came from the Secretary General of the German Center Party, who added that even Austian quarters which were on the whole hostile to the Anschluss were sympathetic to the idea of a customs union. Lerchenfeld too, in the report of June 4 which has already been cited, pointed out that Germany could counter Austrian receptiveness to French plans only through the press and by overcoming dissatisfaction with the German-Austrian Trade Treaty through closer economic relations with a customs union in view, and in his report of August 9 he again suggested that the time had come for Germany and Austria jointly to examine the preconditions for the establishment of unified economic area. It is no doubt not without significance that there are heavy sidelinings by Ritter against the passage urging joint consultation on the customs union.[58]

But such urgings were in truth not necessary, for it was realized in the German Foreign Ministry that Austria's economic recovery through Germany's help and through close ties between the Austrian and German economies was the best and most effective guarantee against Austria's entering into relationships with other states which were unwelcome to Germany.[59] But such close links could not be imposed upon the Austrian Government against the latter's will. Thus it was German policy, at a time when the Austrian Government appeared to be displaying little or no interest in the decisions reached in Berlin, to seek to preserve Austria's independence and to prevent her, if possible, from entering into closer association with other states or groups of states, for only thus would the

---

varying participants, were held at Bucharest and Sinaia in July and at Warsaw in August 1930.

[57] Vienna report A 415 of Aug. 8 (K921/K231162-66), Lerchenfeld to Bülow, letter of Aug. 8 (4620/E198649-55), Minute by Bülow of Aug. 14 (4620/E198668).

[58] Memorandum by Counsellor Heeren of May 24 on his conversation with Dr. Vockel (3086/D614844-46); for the Vienna reports of June 4 and Aug. 9 see fn. 56 above.

[59] Memorandum by Köpke of May 8 (3086/D614828-32); cf. also the Vienna report of June 4 cited in fn. 56 above.

way be left open for the conclusion of the Anschluss or of a customs union at some more favorable opportunity. In a circular dispatch to various Missions dated June 4, 1930, Curtius was at pains to make reassuring statements regarding Austrian policy under Schober, saying that he had not entered into any fresh commitments and that his policy to date had not run counter to Germany's interests; but he went on to state that further attempts to influence Austrian policy in a direction unwelcome to Germany were to be expected, and he instructed the Missions to keep a close watch on Austrian policy. Regarding Germany's policy, he wrote that, while it was true that every measure of stabilization and every step towards economic recovery fostered Austria's national pride and harmed the Anschluss idea, Germany must nevertheless welcome such recovery for political reasons because an internally divided and economically disrupted Austria would necessarily fall into the French or Italian net; as long as Germany was unable to effect the political Anschluss she wished Austria to maintain her political and economic independence which, he stated, was threatened by France's aim to set up a Danubian Confederation and by Austria's need for financial aid which forced her to turn towards France.[60]

But internal preparation of the customs union was not neglected. Ritter made a careful study of the question in the spring of 1930 and, on June 20, presented his conclusions in the form of a memorandum.[61] On July 3—just three days after French troops left the Rhineland—Ritter wrote to Schüller suggesting that they should at long last meet to give effect to the decisions reached at Berlin, but he met with no positive response and the two did not in fact meet until the League Council's and Assembly's sessions at Geneva in September. Curtius ascribed this delay to vacations and other pressing business (which he did not specify).[62] It seems most likely that the Austrians had not exhausted other means for assuring their economic recovery. We now know that in Paris Schober had indicated to Briand that, if Germany declared herself ready to enter into a close economic alliance with Austria, he would be unable to decline, and that this obvious attempt to use the German bogy had elicited from Briand the statement that he would do his utmost to prevent Austria from being placed in such desperate straits as to be forced into acceptance, and had led to Schober being given a preview of the Briand Plan.[63] Possibly analagous efforts to procure financial and economic aid were made elsewhere too, for, as will be seen, Schober subsequently told Curtius of

---

[60] Curtius despatch II Oe.938 of June 4, 1930 (K59/K006781-90); the same despatch also forwarded for information a shortened version of the record of the Berlin conversations (see fn. 21 above), omitting all mention of the customs union.

[61] Curtius commentary (K49/K004878); the memorandum of June 20 has not been found.

[62] *Ibid.* (K49/K004879); neither Ritter's letter of July 3 nor any reply has been found.

[63] This follows the account given by Schober to Curtius in May 1931 and recorded by the latter in November 1931 (Curtius commentary; K49/K005134). In his letter to Curtius of May 14, 1930 (see fn. 53 above) Schober implied that the Briand Plan had not been discussed. The Embassy in Paris reported on July 23, 1930, that, despite Briand's best endeavors, French participation in a loan to Austria had not come about (Report A 2652; K1090/K281300-02).

Italian and Hungarian attempts to enter into closer relations with Austria. Moreover, so the Austrian Finance Minister, Juch, told Lerchenfeld, there was passive resistance in certain Austrian Government departments to the idea of a customs union with Germany. In the same conversation Juch also hinted that it would be desirable for Germany to urge Schober to more decisive action on the customs union question, a view which Lerchenfeld strongly supported.[64]

Juch's approach to Lerchenfeld might be taken as an indication that the Austrian Government were now ready to enter into further negotiations with Germany on the customs union, or it might merely have been a move occasioned by divisions of opinion inside the Austrian Cabinet. But the next initiative came very definitely, and for the only time, from the Austrian side; for on August 27 Schober told Lerchenfeld that the line of economic integration decided upon in Berlin should now be energetically pursued. Schober suggested that the efforts of the Eastern States, especially Yugoslavia and Rumania, should be made the point of departure in the German-Austrian discussions.[65]

But if Curtius expected that when he and Schober met at Geneva in September the Austrian Chancellor would come out unequivocally for the customs union, he was disappointed. It was agreed that Curtius should pay a return visit to Vienna at the end of October, but then Schober went on to speak at some length of Austrian discussions with Hungary (Schober had visited Budapest in June) and with Italy, and especially of an Italian suggestion that Austria should act as a kind of trustee in the exchange of agricultural produce and manufactured goods between Austria, Hungary, Germany and Italy. Schüller would discuss this with Ritter and would probably not be as frank as he, Schober, had been. In these circumstances, so Schober continued, he thought it desirable that German-Austrian negotiations of an economic approach [*Annäherung*] should begin. At Curtius' request they then discussed the tactical treatment of the Pan-Europe question, and Curtius stated that he found considerable identity of views.[66] It was at Geneva, too, that Schober delivered a speech in which he suggested that regional economic agreements might eventually lead to European union.[67] In view of Schober's statements to Curtius, of subsequent Austrian attempts to conclude customs unions simultaneously with both Italy and Germany, and of the conclusion, albeit at a time when Schober was no longer in office, of preferential economic agreements with Italy and Hungary, it would appear not unlikely that Austrian policy, especially as expounded by the Austrian economic expert Schüller, was aiming at achieving a preferential treatment for her trade with most of her immediate neighbors, and it is in this light that Schober's speech at Geneva should perhaps be viewed.[68]

---

[64] Lerchenfeld to Bülow, leitter of Aug. 20 (4620/E198659-62).

[65] Lerchenfeld to Bülow, letter of Aug. 29 (4620/E198665-67). Yugoslavia and Rumania agreed at Sinaia at the end of July to set up permanent commissions to work out plans for cooperation in the marketing of cereals and for the establishment of a customs union.

[66] Memorandum by Curtius of Sept. 7 (4679/E224498-501).

[67] For the text of Schober's speech of Sept. 12, 1930, see League of Nations, *Official Journal, Special Supplement* No. 84, p. 60f.

What passed between Ritter and Schüller at their meeting on September 22 cannot be ascertained at present, as no record exists in the German archives. Curtius states that they both appeared to agree on essentials regarding the form which the projected customs union should take, and that careful internal studies were made subsequently.[69] In any case the basis on which the proposed customs union was founded was abruptly shattered when the Schober Government, brought down by a scandal involving an appointment in the Austrian Federal Railways, resigned on September 25. From Germany's point of view this was most detrimental for not only did it put a stop to Curtius' projected visit to Vienna but, as Lerchenfeld reported, "the move towards the intensification of economic relations between Germany and Austria has also been temporarily broken off."[70] The new Government, with Vaugoin as Chancellor and Seipel as Foreign Minister, was not auspicious for Curtius' plan. Seipel, indeed, took pains to stress the continuity of Austrian policy, but with the motto "no combination without Germany,"[71] which was not likely to arouse confidence in Berlin. Vaugoin was regarded as a supporter of the Habsburg monarchy and as "extremely Austrian,"[72] and Seipel was always viewed with extreme suspicion by Curtius, who blandly states that "Seipel steered away from Germany on a Hungarian-Italian course."[73] This assertion was not substantiated in a memorandum on the foreign policy aims of the Vaugoin-Seipel Cabinet which Curtius ordered prepared for him before he left office in October 1931, for this stated that there was no basis for such a supposition. But, the memorandum continued, "the very fact that an Austrian government was formed in which a personality like Seipel had complete responsibility for foreign policy was bound to give cause for concern in pro-Anschluss quarters in Austria and in the Reich.

---

[68] For Austrian negotiations with Italy immediately after the announcement of the German-Austrian customs union project see Bülow to Rome, telegram No. 78 of Mar. 28, 1931 (5269/E324469), undated memorandum by Ritter on his discussions in Vienna, Apr. 11-13, 1931 (5269/E324681-92), and Rieth (Vienna) to Bülow, letter of Apr. 25, 1931 (4620/E199580-90). These negotiations were viewed with great disapproval by the Germans. For the published texts of the three protocols signed in Rome in March 1934 see League of Nations, *Treaty Series,* vol. CLIV, pp. 281-303; see also *Documents on German Foreign Policy,* Series C, vol. II, Nos. 332-334. No texts are available of the so-called Brocchi Agreements of 1931 and 1932, which had the effect of establishing a system of preferential tariffs between Austria, Hungary and Italy. Schüller took part in the preparation of all these agreements. As the Austrian foreign trade expert for two decades he had a vast fund of experience at his disposal and, as far as can be judged from the German documents, tended rather towards links between Austria and Italy and Hungary than between Austria and Germany. His influence cannot yet be adequately assessed. Lerchenfeld once described him as an official who, in the last resort, did as he was told but who also knew that Austrian Governments tended to be short-lived (Lerchenfeld to Curtius, letter of Dec. 25, 1929, see fn. 34 above).

[69] Curtius commentary (K49/K004879-80).

[70] Vienna report A 487 of Sept. 26, 1930 (K921/K231212-18).

[71] Vienna telegram No. 40 of Oct. 6 (3086/D614902).

[72] Memorandum by Heeren, II Oe.892 of May 24, 1930 (6401/E474764-66).

Whatever the true intentions and wishes of Seipel for Austria's future may be, he is certainly no friend of the Anschluss concept."[74] Thus, even when Seipel expressly identified himself with the policy of his predecessor and requested that the personal contacts which had been discussed in Berlin should now be brought about between special delegates of the two Foreign Ministries,[75] this evoked no response in Berlin. During the Vaugoin-Seipel Government's two months' period of office the customs union project, apart from any internal preparations in the German Foreign Ministry, was simply placed in cold storage.

At the beginning of December, however, a new Austrian government was formed with Ender as Chancellor and Schober as Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister. This enabled the former contacts to be re-established; Curtius states that Schober very speedily telephoned him to suggest that negotiations on the customs union be resumed and brought to an early conclusion.[76] At the turn of the year Ritter paid an unobtrusive visit to Vienna and, on January 2, 1931, he handed Schüller his draft of the customs union agreement.[77] Three days later Schüller expressed his approval of the draft as a whole, and also asked Ritter some questions concerning it, two of which are of particular interest. In the first place he asked whether Ritter was serious in proposing that other states too might be included in the customs union. In reply Ritter explained that this provision had been incorporated because the Geneva Protocol prohibited Austria from restricting her economic independence by granting exclusive advantages to any other state; it was therefore necessary to anticipate possible objections by stating that the mutual concessions were not necessarily confined to the two countries. Besides, he said, Germany was not in principle opposed to the inclusion of other countries, and Hungary would probably be forced to seek admission to the new union. In reply to another question, Ritter stated that he had included a provision that the customs union could be terminated "at any time" because Schober and Schüller had said in Berlin the previous year that Austria must safeguard her "independence."[78] But, Ritter added, he had in any case incorporated safeguards to ensure that no precipitate use would be made of the right to terminate the union.

Ritter and Schüller agreed that the details of the draft agreement should be considered further and discussed, in the strictest confidence, with experts from other departments. But if agreement in essence had thus been reached as far as technicalities were concerned, the political question of whether Austria wished to conclude a customs union with

---

[73] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 28.

[74] Memorandum by Köpke, e.o. II Oe.2119 of Sept. 25, 1931 (K1101/K282866-70); cf. also Curtius commentary (K49/K005187-91).

[75] Lerchenfeld to Curtius, letter of Nov. 15, 1930 (3086/D614908-13).

[76] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 28.

[77] This and the account which follows are based on Ritter's memorandum of Jan. 7, 1931, on his negotiations in Vienna (K49/K005109-15); the draft text of the customs union agreement has not been found.

[78] In quotation marks in the original.

Germany and, if so, when she thought the time would be right, presented more difficulties. Schüller was very vague and attempted to push the decision on to the German Government; the German and French Foreign Ministers, he said, should first discuss the matter. Ritter countered that it was Austria, not Germany, who was bound by treaty obligations. Secretary General Peter, whom Ritter saw the following day, refused to comment on the question of whether and when a customs union should be concluded.

On the same day, January 6, Ritter saw Schober, who also approved the draft text. Unlike his civil servants, Schober stated himself to be, in principle and without qualification, in favor of a customs union; he was moreover of the opinion that the time had now come to take active steps towards this end. But, said Schober, he was opposed to the idea that Germany and Austria might "one fine day surprise the world by concluding a customs union" and he thought that diplomatic preparations should be made. Ritter, in reply, explained that the whole plan had so far been shrouded in secrecy because the Geneva Protocol imposed on Austria the obligation not even to enter into negotiations which might directly or indirectly compromise her independence. In any case Curtius would like to discuss the matter with Schober in Geneva.

Schober's favorable views having thus been ascertained, the negotiations now moved from the private to the official plane. In Berlin Curtius, evidently only because his senior officials urged him that this was necessary, informed Chancellor Brüning of his intention of engaging in official conversations with Schober on the subject of the customs union and received his assent.[79] At Geneva, in the course of a lengthy conversation on January 15, Curtius and Schober reached agreement on a number of points. Schober agreed that the negotiations, and especially the Austrian reply to the German draft text, which had previously been handled in a dilatory fashion, should be accelerated, so that an overall picture might be available at the end of February, when Curtius and Brüning were to visit Vienna. The whole project was to be kept secret until the negotiations between the Governments were concluded, and in particular Schober now concurred with Curtius' view that the time was not opportune for a discussion of the customs union with the other powers. Curtius also explained to Schober that Germany could not take the initiative in informing the other powers, as this might give the impression that she was bringing up the Anschluss question. "The initiative must therefore come from Austria and it would be advisable to place the whole action within the framework of Pan-Europe;" this would moreover be natural in view of Schober's previous statements on regional cooperation. To this, too, Schober agreed.[80]

---

[79] Retrospective memorandum by Ritter of Feb. 17, 1932 (K1148/K294596-98).

[80] Geneva (Delegation) telegram No. 2 of Jan. 16, 1931 (4622/E202511-14), Memorandum by Bülow of Jan. 17, recording information from Curtius (4619/E197056-58). Schober also told Curtius of negotiations between Austria and Hungary on a hidden preferential system.

Preparations were now set on foot in Berlin for Curtius' visit to Vienna. Strict secrecy was still observed, the Cabinet was not informed of the scope of Curtius' discussion with Schober when he presented his report on his activities at Geneva,[81] only a restricted circle in the Foreign Ministry knew of the plan and there appears to have been no consultation with officials in other Ministries. But one senior diplomat to whom preliminary information was given in strict confidence at an early date, and this because he might not otherwise be informed in good time, was Ambassador Prittwitz in Washington. On January 20 Bülow wrote to him:

> ... There is, however, a plan, which can perhaps be implemented, to enter into an economic union with Austria, which would probably very speedily lead to the accession to it of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. ... It is quite possible that it may lead to political conflicts, although we will dress the whole matter up in a Pan-Europe cloak [*obwohl wir der Angelegenheit ein paneuropäisches Mäntelchen umhängen werden*]. ...

The plan, Bülow stated, would probably be brought up at the earliest in May.[82]

The legal situation was now subjected to renewed scrutiny. Gaus produced a lengthy memorandum in the course of which he examined the provisions of the peace treaties and of the Geneva Protocol, explained how and why certain provisions of the customs union agreement had been drafted in order to try to obviate the need to obtain the express consent of the Council of the League of Nations or of the States signatories to the Geneva Protocol, and advocated that it would be advantageous to conclude only a *pactum de contrahendo* rather than a final treaty. But, Gaus warned, it would be dangerous, even with the careful formulation which he had chosen, to allow the League Council to refer the matter to the International Court at the Hague; Germany would be in a better position if the plan could be discussed in the Commission of Enquiry for European Union, where the economic aspects and the connections with the new "European" endeavors could be placed in the forefront.[83]

Further economic and technical preparations, too, were made at this time, but no details of these have been found. Much attention was naturally also focused on the general international situation, and especially on the reaction which the project might be expected to evoke in France. Franco-German relations appeared to have reached an impasse. Curtius has ascribed this to the effect on France of the Reichstag elections of September 14, 1930, at which the National Socialists increased their representation from 12 to 107. German diplomats in Paris, however, discerned an additional reason, the German failure properly to appreciate the French evacuation of the Rhineland five years before the time fixed in the Treaty of Versailles, and regretted the resultant bitterness and misunderstandings.[84] Curtius and Bülow, however, appear to have thought, and this at a time when disarmament negotiations were believed to be imminent and when Germany was anxious to secure further concessions in the reparations question, that the successful conclusion of a customs union with Austria, to which other states too might well be obliged to adhere, would put sufficient pressure on France to force her to negotiate on general questions and to resume her old policy of understanding [*Verständigungspolitik*]. It is clear, however, that there was no intention of using the customs union with Austria as a bargaining counter which might be given up if France made suitable concessions in any general negotiations which might ensue.[85]

---

[81] Minutes of the Cabinet meeting of Jan. 28, 1931 (3575/D785726-32).

[82] Bülow to Prittwitz, letter of Jan. 20, 1931 (4620/E199138-44).

[83] Memorandum by Gaus of Feb. 23, 1931 (K1168/K299826-39). Gaus was Director of the Legal Department of the German Foreign Ministry. The draft of the customs union agreement which Gaus appended to his memorandum has not been found; from the memorandum itself it emerges that Gaus' draft differed on some points from the text Ritter had discussed in Vienna, and it was probably not much different from the text submitted to the Cabinet on Mar. 16 (see fn. 103 below). It is a tribute to Gaus' skill as a draftsman that the customs union agreement so nearly withstood the scrutiny of the International Court.

Curtius has claimed that he summoned the heads of mission in France, Czechoslovakia and Italy to inform them in good time of the plan and to seek their advice, and that he received their concurrence or at least no warning. The Ambassador in Paris, von Hoesch, in particular, is described as being much in favor of the proposed course and as welcoming it as an opportunity to get away from the stagnation which had set in in Franco-German relations. In fact, only Hoesch and the Ambassador in London, von Neurath, were asked for their views before Curtius visited Vienna, and doubts were later raised as to whether they had been consulted in the full sense of the word.[86] No direct record has been found of Curtius' conferences with Hoesch and Neurath, but on his return to Paris Hoesch submitted a long exposé in which, so he wrote the Köpke, he repeated the views he had put forward in Berlin. If Hoesch's account is accurate, then the opinions which Curtius has ascribed to him are either a complete invention on Curtius' part or are based on a colossal misunderstanding. In his exposé Hoesch discussed the six major problems confronting German foreign policy—reparations, the Eastern frontier, disarmament, the

---

[84] Curtius, *Bemühungen*, p. 30f.; Paris report A 3393 of Oct. 10, 1930 (K936/K240381-86); Paris telegram No. 53 of Jan. 13, 1931 (K936/K240571-73). Cf. also Curtius, *Sechs Jahre Minister*, p. 137, Hauser, *op. cit.*, p. 53, and Zimmermann, *op. cit.*, p. 393.

[85] Curtius, *Bemühungen*, p. 32, where this opinion, with which Curtius obviously concurred, is ascribed to Hoesch; Bülow to Hoesch, letter of Jan. 23, 1931 (4620/E199035-41). Bülow, writing before Hoesch was informed of the customs union project, spoke merely of "independent steps in Central Europe in the direction of an economic union."

[86] Curtius, *Bemühungen*, pp. 29f., 32; Curtius commentary (K49/K005275); Köpke subsequently noted that these consultations took place, some immediately before Curtius' visit to Vienna and some only just prior to the publication of the plan, at a time "when the heads of mission were entitled to assume that in view of the advanced stage of the action the purpose of the consultation was in the main purely informatory, and that it was no longer their comment on the question 'whether' but only on the question 'how' which was expected." (Memorandum by Köpke of Feb. 24, 1932 (K1148/K294599-603). Schubert (Rome) noted that he was "informed" of the content and aim of the impending German and Austrian démarche by Curtius and others in the Foreign Ministry on Mar. 13, 14 and 15 (Memorandum of Mar. 17, 1931; 5269/E324233). Koch (Prague) did not arrive in Berlin until Mar. 19.

Saar, Austria, and colonies. He saw no prospect of successful discussions with France on the Anschluss question at that time, nor for that matter, on the other questions either. But he counselled patience and moderation. "*Without* France," he wrote, "let alone *against* France, none of the problems facing us can be solved," and he concluded with the hope that Germany would continue to follow the path of *Besonnenheit, Geduld* and *Klugheit*.[87]

Although the exact nature of the advice given to Curtius by the officials of his own Ministry cannot be determined, warning notes were sounded there too. Gaus had pointed out (see above) that the legal situation was not altogether secure. On the political side, Counsellor von Heeren, the official in charge of Central European affairs, is said to have repeatedly and strongly urged in February and March that the plan should be abandoned.[88] Köpke, the Director of Department II, claimed that he too had repeatedly voiced the misgivings of his department to Curtius.[89] A memorandum of February 21, drafted by Heeren and signed by Köpke, clearly outlined the political implications and dangers of the proposed action and contained an explicit warning of the strength of the opposition to be expected from France and Czechoslovakia. Although not openly opposing the plan, the memorandum sought to show that Austria would have less to lose than Germany if the attempt should fail and must for this reason not be regarded as an altogether steadfast partner. The utmost care in the preparation and timing of the project was therefore advocated.[90]

In the meantime the date for the Foreign Minister's visit to Vienna had been fixed for March 3-4, and Brüning had decided that it would be more prudent not to accompany Curtius.[91] No definite information was as yet given to the Cabinet. Curtius merely informed his colleagues that he intended to discuss disarmament, the Pan-Europe negotiations and related economic matters; within this framework, he said, negotiations on assimilating tariffs [*Zollannäherung*] appeared likely to succeed.[92]

Very few details regarding Curtius' visit to Vienna, which in fact lasted from March 3rd to 5th, are known. Curtius tells us that he became convinced of Austria's willingness and determination to proceed with the plan, even in the face of opposition. The Austrian President, Miklas, and Chancellor, Ender, showed themselves to be fully informed, and approved the project. Curtius and Schober agreed on the text of the customs union agreement, and also that it should be presented in the form of a preliminary agreement and not as a final treaty. They also decided that the consent of the two Cabinets should be obtained during the following three weeks and that the statesmen of the interested nations should be informed during the May session of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union.[93] Thus far Curtius. From an account given shortly afterwards by Schüller to Ambassador Schubert in Rome, however, it would appear that it was not all quite such plain sailing. Schüller said that he had voiced his doubts both as to the timing and as to the wisdom of proceeding in the absence of any other diplomatic activity on questions of international importance; he had therefore suggested that the project should be postponed until during the Disarmament Conference the following year, but Curtius had said that "the affair could be managed [*dass die Sache gemacht werden könne*]."[94]

---

[87] Memorandum by Hoesch, forwarded to Berlin under cover of his report A 820 of Mar. 6, 1931 (K936/K240609-26); Curtius initialled this on Mar. 14. Cf. also Hoesch to Köpke, letter of Mar. 6 (K936/K240607-08). Nowhere in Hoesch's exposé does the phrase "customs union" appear.

[88] Memorandum by Ritter of Feb. 17, 1932 (see fn. 79 above); it is not known at what stage Heeren was drawn into the small circle which knew of the project.

[89] Memorandum by Köpke of Feb. 24, 1932 (see fn. 86 above).

[90] Memorandum by Köpke of Feb. 21, 1931 (K51/K005880-86).

[91] Bülow to Curtius, letter of Feb. 16, 1931 (4619/E197113-14).

[92] Minutes of the Conference of Ministers held on Feb. 28, 1931 (3575/D786070-80).

Curtius has maintained that the date on which the other powers were to be notified of the German-Austrian agreement had to be brought forward from May to March 21 because of an indiscretion in an Austrian newspaper on March 17. This, he said, made it necessary to inform the other powers before the Organization Committee of the Commission of Enquiry for European Union met in Paris on March 24, and he has angrily denied Schuschnigg's charge that the Germans took Schober by surprise.[95] Yet it was on March 9—a week before the first leak—that the Legation in Vienna was instructed to tell Schober that the German Cabinet would approve the customs union protocol on March 21 and that the joint démarches should take place on March 27. The following day Curtius suggested to Schober that the démarches should take place at the beginning of the week starting March 23, because the Organization Committee would meet in Paris that same week, and on March 12 the Legation in Vienna was further instructed to suggest to Schober that the démarches should take place on March 21 or at the latest on March 23. On March 13 the Legation in Vienna reported Schober's approval of this suggestion.[96] But it had been known in Berlin in February that the Organization Committee would meet in Paris in March, and if the Germans nevertheless agreed at the beginning of March that the project should be communicated to the other powers in May, it would seem that their subsequent justification was disingenuous and that, as Schober told the British Minister, Sir Eric Phipps, Austria's hand had been forced by Germany.[97]

The Austrians, indeed, appeared ill-prepared for this advance of the date of notifying the other powers. Differences of opinion also existed on the mode of making this notification and on the text of the declaration which was to be made to the other powers. Austria endeavored to restrict the first information to vague intimations of the two countries' intentions, while the Germans contended that specific information should be imparted on the occasion of the démarche, together with the text of the customs union protocol. The Austrians proposed, too, that the declaration which should be made should state that Germany had offered to Austria to conclude a customs union with her within the Pan-Europe concept, and that Austria had accepted this offer; this formulation was naturally rejected in Berlin. It was, however, agreed that Germany should take the first step in Paris, and Austria in London and Rome.[98] In fact, however, the Austrian envoys were not as well briefed as their German colleagues and, although they were able to transmit the agreed declaration, they were without instructions as to how it should be interpreted and they did not at that time know the text of the customs union protocol.[99] Schüller told Schubert that this was due to two reasons—because the instructions would not have arrived in time and because experience had shown that such instructions often shattered the faith in his own cause [*"das Glauben an die gute Sache"*] of the diplomat concerned.[100]

---

[93] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 36ff.; Curtius commentary (K49/K005245-264).

[94] Memorandum by Schubert of Mar. 29, 1931 (5269/E424490-92).

[95] Curtius, *Bemühungen,* p. 39ff.; Kurt von Schuschnigg, *Dreimal Oesterreich* (Vienna, 1937) p. 169. See also fn. 12 above.

[96] Curtius commentary (K49/K005264 and 276); the only reason for advancing the date which Curtius gives in his commentary was the fear that secrecy could not be long preserved after the two Cabinets were informed. While this was likely, and in fact borne out by events, this factor too must have been appreciated when Curtius agreed to the May date.

[97] Item B of the memorandum of Feb. 24, 1931 (K59/K006864-79) prepared for Curtius as a brief for his visit to Vienna; *DBFP,* 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 6.

In Berlin active preparations were in full swing. Very brief and strictly confidential information on the outcome of Curtius' negotiations in Vienna were sent on March 9 to the Missions in Paris, London, Rome, Budapest and Prague.[101] A memorandum of the previous day examined the economic consequences of the customs union and spoke of the advantages which would accrue to Germany. It is estimated that the reduction of foreign imports into Austria and the decrease in Austria's own production would in due course lead to an increase in Germany's exports to Austria of between a half and one milliard marks; but whereas this increase would be brought about partly at the expense of Austria's own industries, an increase n Austrian exports to Germany would be achieved mainly at the expense of other foreign competitors. In conclusion the memorandum did not fail to point out that the customs union would effectively avert the danger of Austria being drawn into some form of Danubian or South-East European economic unit, or into dependency on Italy, and thus of becoming a barrier instead of an outlet to the South-East.[102]

---

[98] Memorandum by Ritter of Mar. 14 on a telephone conversation with Schüller (K49/K005277-80); on this occasion Schüller also stated that the first Austrian Cabinet session on the subject of the customs union had been satisfactory.

[99] For the communication made in London on Mar. 21 by the Austrian Minister see *DBFP*, 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 2 and enclosure. Evidence of the lack of proper instructions to the Austrian Ministers in Rome and Paris is contained in Schubert's memoranda of Mar. 19 (5269/E324305-10 and 313-17) and in Bülow's memorandum of Mar. 20 on a telephone conversation with Hoesch (3086/D614995-96).

[100] Memorandum by Schubert of Mar. 23, 1931 (5269/E324410-13).

[101] Despatch II Oe.303 of Mar. 9 (3086/D614971).

[102] Unsigned memorandum of Mar. 8 (K49/K004881-87). The memorandum expressed some concern at the detrimental effect of the customs union on Austrian industry and suggested that German firms be advised to make private arrangements with Austrian ones, at least for an interim period, to afford the latter some protection. But

Mention has already been made of the German insistence on bringing forward the date of notifying the other powers and efforts to ensure that analogous statements should be made by the Austrian and German diplomatic representatives. All these activities took place before the German Cabinet was informed of the proposed action, for it was not until March 16, when Curtius presented his report on his visit to Vienna, that the Ministers heard for the first time of the lengthy negotiations. Curtius stated that the Austrian Government had at first been very lukewarm towards the proposal, but now welcomed it. Austria had turned away from the idea of a Danubian economic confederation, and this situation must be turned to account. The Anschluss, he said, was politically not ripe, but it could be decisively furthered on the economic plane. The draft protocol[103] was explained to the Cabinet by Ritter. Curtius then described the proposed diplomatic action. The form of a protocol had been chosen so as not to give offense to the interested Governments. Czechoslovakia and France would probably be hostile and a difficult phase of diplomatic discussion was to be expected. Brüning congratulated Curtius on his achievement, but added that the timing was perhaps not entirely fortunate. But this, Brüning remarked somewhat cryptically—and erroneously—had not been chosen by Germany. The ensuing discussion revealed general agreement in principle, but misgivings were voiced on particular aspects by various Ministers, each speaking solely from the point of view of his own department. There was, however, general rejection of a clause in the draft text providing for the reference of disputes to the Hague Court. At Brüning's suggestion it was decided that departmental experts should study the proposals on the following day and that the Cabinet should consider them again on March 18. At this resumed Cabinet session Ritter reported that the Austrians had agreed to the deletion of the clause providing for reference to the Hague Court. Various Ministers now spoke of the need for Germany to retain in her own hands leadership and preponderance in the union, and after Curtius had stressed the domestic political advantages which the German initiative might be expected to have, the Cabinet gave their unanimous consent to the project.[104]

The instructions to the German Missions were by this time already

---

this, it was stated, would be feasible only with some industries, and despite protective treatment of this sort German industry would gradually push under [*zurückdrängen*] a section of Austria's industry. For another estimate see Herbert Gross, *Industrie-wirtschaftliche Wirkungen einer deutsch-österreichischen Zollunion in Schriften des Weltwirtschaftsarchivs Kiel* cited in Hauser, *op. cit.*, p. 55, fn. 2, where the economic advantages for Austria were estimated at 600 million marks and those for Germany at 500 million.

[103] This draft (3575/D786148-61), which was the text agreed on in Vienna, contained the provision (said by Curtius to have been a German proposal which need not be upheld) that disputes arising out of the customs union should be referred to the International Court at the Hague; otherwise it differed only very slightly from the final text (see fn. 8 above).

[104] Minutes of the Conferences of Ministers held on Mar. 16 (3575/D786142-47) and at 4 p.m. on Mar. 18 (3575/D786165-71).

drafted and ready for despatch. The démarches were to be carried out on March 21 if possible, and besides directions as to language to be held the missions were also sent the final text of the customs union protocol and a memorandum dealing with legal aspects. The protocol, however, was not to be handed over until March 24 or 25. Hoesch in Paris was instructed to stress the connection with the Pan-Europe movement, Schubert in Rome to promise German cooperation with Italy in dealing with the economic problems of the Balkans. No special aspects were to be stressed in London, mainly because British interests were not directly affected. Nothing was to be said that might in any way suggest that the German Government were asking the other powers for their consent. There could be no question of this, Curtius wrote, for the German and Austrian Governments were convinced that their intention of concluding a customs union did not violate any international commitments and that no foreign state had the right to hinder them.[105] Bülow supplemented this despatch with identical letters to Hoesch and Neurath in which he warned that no member of their Embassies must show any signs of a bad conscience over the plan or the mode of its presentation. Germany, he said, had every right to take the action on which she was now embarking, even if it involved what he called a "play with Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles," and she had a greater right than other powers to look after her own interests. The text of Bülow's letters is given in Appendix I.

On March 19 Ritter informed Schüller by telephone of the outcome of the German Cabinet's discussion and of the text of Curtius' letter to Schober formally notifying him of the German Government's consent to the plan. The Austrian Cabinet reached their decision a day later than the German, and Schober hastened to send formal intimation of their approval to Curtius.[106] On March 19, too, the Germans received the text of the declaration which the Austrians proposed to make in London (and with minor amendments, in Rome) and decided that there was no need to make such a formal declaration in Paris, although Hoesch was authorized to make use of the ideas expressed therein. That day, too, Schubert was instructed, at Curtius' request, to postpone his interview with Grandi, the Italian Foreign Minister, until March 23 so that, in Rome at least, Austria's initiative in the whole matter might be made to seem more obvious; but this Schubert declared himself unable to do, as he had already arranged to see Grandi on March 21.[107]

The formal notification of the three Great Powers duly followed on

---

[105] Curtius to Hoesch, Neurath and Schubert, despatch II Oe.352 of Mar. 18 (K49/K005284-306) with enclosures (K49/K005307-33). Cf. also Curtius' despatch to various other missions of the same date (K49/K005281-83). An earlier draft of the despatch to the principal missions, handed to Schubert during his visit to Berlin, (5269/E324236-54) differs in some respects from the final instructions.

[106] Memorandum by Ritter of Mar. 19 (3086/D614976); Schober to Curtius, letter of Mar. 19 (3086/D614994); Vienna report A 162 of Mar. 20 (5002/E284343-44).

[107] Ritter to Paris, telegram No. 133 of Mar. 19 (Kii68/K299843-45), Ritter to Rome, telegram No. 58 of Mar. 19 (5269/E324369-71), Schubert to Berlin, telegram No. 54 of Mar. 20 (5269/E324373); for the text of the Austrian declaration made in London see ***DBFP***, 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 2, enclosure.

March 21, but by then the cat was out of the bag. The Czechoslovak Minister in Vienna called on Schober on March 18 to inquire about the rumors which were by then current in Vienna, and, on receiving an evasive reply, he gave warning that there were likely to be serious repercussions. By March 20 the French Foreign Minister was addressing requests to the British and Italian Governments asking that the signatories of the Geneva Protocol of 1922 instruct their Ministers in Vienna to remind Austria, on March 21 if possible, of the engagements into which she had entered in that Protocol. No such action was evidently taken by the British Government, while in Rome Grandi told Schubert that, acting on the basis of reports from the Italian Minister in Vienna, he had declined to associate Italy with such démarches, although he had asked for further enquiries to be made in Vienna.[108]

Thus inauspiciously was the customs union project launched into the public arena, without either that prior consultation with the other Great Powers which the Austrians had desired or the achievement of that element of surprise which the Germans seemingly hoped for.

* * * * * *

A distinguished historian has written that it is scarcely to be doubted that Curtius, in pressing forward with the customs union plan, was motivated more by considerations of domestic than of foreign policy, and that it was a mistake, arising mainly from these considerations of domestic policy, to attempt to spring a surprise on the world.[109] But from many German points of view the project appeared eminently desirable. It accorded well with ideas long held both by Curtius and by State Secretary Bülow; Bülow told the British Ambassador that he had long had some such customs union in mind and believed that it would provoke less opposition on the part of other powers than two other questions of urgent interest to Germany—reparations and the eastern frontier.[110] If in its inception the plan was more than just a move on the chess-board of domestic politics, its realization, as Curtius did not fail to point out to the Cabinet, would ease the position of the whole Government, which, together with Curtius' own position as Foreign Minister, had grown steadily more precarious during the long period of planning and negotiation.[111] But the plan was more than the culmination of ambitions, however long-cherished, of the Foreign Minister and the State Secretary, or the outcome of the exigencies of domestic politics. The basic reasons for the attempt in 1930 and 1931 to conclude this customs union with Austria must rather be sought in the field of foreign policy. It accorded with the long-term objectives of German foreign policy, as seen in the Foreign Ministry, in that it would at the same time link Austria securely to Germany and forestall efforts to include Austria in some form of regional Danubian association or to bring her into a closer relationship with Italy. This consideration remained paramount throughout the year of preparation. The customs union and eventual Anschluss, moreover, would open the way to the South-East and, together with the tariff preference treaties which Germany was at that time negotiating with Rumania and Hungary, and which she had also proposed to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria,[112] would ensure German dominance in the Danube Basin and the Balkans.

---

[108] Memorandum by Ritter of Mar. 19 (see fn. 106 above); *DBFP*, 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 1; Schubert to Berlin, telegram No. 56, of Mar. 21 (3086/D615008-10).

[109] Erich Eyck, *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik*, vol. II (Zürich, 1956), p. 405f.

[110] *DBFP*, 2nd Series, vol. II, No. 34; cf. also Bülow's letter to Smend quoted in fn. 33 above. Bülow has often been regarded as the real author of the customs union (*DBFP*, *ibid.*, No. 262 (where Ritter's name is coupled with Bülow's), Eyck, *op. cit.*, p. 379, and Herriot in *Ère Nouvelle* of May 7, 1931) but it would appear that the original initiative, and especially the determination to get an agreement in principle from the Austrians in February 1930, came from Curtius. It is, however, curious that Bülow's name does not appear in Curtius' book on the customs union.

[111] Bülow described Curtius' precarious position in a letter to Hoesch of Dec. 12, 1930, (4620/E198591-94), stating that the majority of Curtius' party no longer wished to be represented in the Cabinet and that there was a tendency to concentrate the Government in fewer hands. It was therefore necessary for Curtius to cut a good figure in public at Geneva. See also *DBFP*, 2nd Series, vol. I, No. 326.

Germany also hoped, by presenting the plan in the year following the Briand Memorandum on European Union, by "dressing up the whole matter in a Pan-Europe cloak" and by stressing its economic aspects, to ensure a favorable intellectual response throughout Europe and a tactical advantage in the diplomatic repercussions which were expected. Moreover, advantage could be taken of the favorable political constellation in Austria as represented by Schober's leading position in the Government and by the desperation arising from the economic crisis. In the mind of one of the principal advocates of the project, however, there was yet one further motive. Bülow elaborated his ideas regarding the ultimate aim of the customs union with Austria in a letter of April 15 to Koch, the German Minister in Prague, a letter interesting also for the confidence it expresses in Germany's ability to bring about this union. Czechoslovakia, so Bülow wrote, would quickly be forced to join the German bloc, and Germany would be able to secure the dominant position in South-East Europe. If, meantime, Germany's economic ties with the Baltic States had been strengthened, then a solution might in due course be found to a problem which otherwise appeared insoluble—namely that of Germany's eastern frontier. Poland, with her unstable economy, Bülow continued, would be surrounded and in the grip of a vise, and would perhaps be willing to make political concessions in return for tangible economic advantages.[113]

Thus the German-Austrian customs union, far from being conceived as a step within the framework of the Pan-Europe movement and purely to give aid to Austria at a time of economic crisis, was a long-planned project designed to achieve at one stroke the realization of Curtius' ambition. This envisaged attaching Austria irrevocably to Germany, ensuring to Germany the dominant position in South-East Europe and, in so doing, disrupting the Little Entente, and, finally, bringing about, in the long run, a situation in which Poland could be forced, by the application of economic pressure, to make territorial concessions to Germany.

---

[112] See also League of Nations, *Official Journal,* Special Supplement No. 86, pp. 47-49, where, however, no countries are specifically named. The texts of the Treaties concluded on June 27, 1931 with Rumania and on July 18, 1931 with Hungary have been filmed on Serials K2107 and 9841 respectively. The treaties were, however, not implemented under the Weimar Republic because of opposition from the United States (cf. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1932,* vol. II, pp. 338-349).

[113] For the text of Bülow's letter see Appendix I. Koch, in his reply to Apr. 22. (4620/E199520-22), stated that he did not share the view that economic difficulties would sooner or later force Czechoslovakia to align herself with Germany.

University of Sydney
Sydney, Australia

APPENDIX I

4620/E199091-94; 130-33

State Secretary Bülow to Ambassadors Hoesch (Paris) and Neurath (London)

Berlin, March 17, 1931.

You will receive by the same courier the despatch and other material concerning the customs union with Austria. By way of a supplement I wish to refer to one point which could not well be incorporated in a despatch: Under no circumstances must we show any sign whatsoever of a bad conscience during discussions on this matter and during the outcry in the press which is to be anticipated. I would be grateful if you would instruct the members of your Embassy, and, as far as this appears appropriate, German correspondents there, in this sense. Nobody has the right to complain about our having kept our agreement with Austria secret until now and to reproach us with launching a surprise attack [*Überrumpelung*]. The Naval Agreement, for example, and other matters in which we had a legitimate interest, were treated with the same secrecy by the other side. Furthermore no one can complain that our action was an act of disloyalty or a betrayal of Europe's common interest. Our action is entirely within the framework of the Pan-Europe concept, even if not of the Briand version of this, which in any case we never accepted. That we thereby considered our and Austria's own interests is our perfect right. We, who are so severely crippled by reparations obligations and who for the most diverse reasons suffer doubly from the world economic crisis, are more entitled than others to look after ourselves. Finally we must under all circumstances hold fast to the thesis that by our agreement we are not violating any treaty provisions, and no one is entitled to reproach us if we come very close to the limits of what is legally permissible. It is not our play with Article 80 of the Treaty of Versailles which is in any way immoral or suspect [*anrüchig*], but it is this article which is immoral by denying to one country, namely Austria, the right to self-determination which Wilson and the Allies proclaimed so loudly during the war. I mention all these points, not because they are new, but from a concern that at your end, as is the case here, some people, although not lacking in courage, may begin to be troubled by their conscience [*einigen Leuten zwar nicht der Mut versagt, aber das Gewissen sich zu regen beginnt*]. I therefore return to the starting point, that we have the right, and must consequently also present for appearance's sake the best of consciences in carrying through the whole action. Reproaches of disloyalty, or whatever it may be called, can only alienate and painfully surprise us.

With best wishes etc.

Bülow

APPENDIX II

4620/E199512-15

State Secretary Bülow to Minister Koch (Prague)

BERLIN, April 19, 1931.

YOUR EXCELLENCY: The conjuctures which, in your report A III 7 of April 8, you link with the fact that Beneš spoke with such marked asperity against the German-Austrian customs union at his Party's Easter Congress, seem to me to be entirely logical. They would also explain his original moderation, which probably still sprang from the feeling of certainty that France's poltical power would without further ado enable her to nip the German-Austrian plan in the bud and thereby relieve Beneš of the necessity of laying himself too open *vis-à-vis* Germany. Since, however, we are resolutely determined to carry through the customs union, it will probably be necessary to reckon with the possibility of Beneš' resignation in the foreseeable future unless that man of many stratagems [*der Vielgewandte*] should after all decide, under the compulsion of circumstances, to alter the course of his foreign policy in good time and try to make this, his country's, change of course plausible as being a systematic continuation of his "European" policy.

In this connection you will be interested in private reports which I have recently received about statements by Beneš. According to these, in a conversation of some length which he had shortly before Easter with an international financier, and during which he had first adopted an attitude similar in harshness to that in his speech at Easter, Beneš finally did consider the possibility of the customs union being put into effect, and stated that for reasons of domestic and foreign policy he did not think Czechoslovakia's accession to it feasible unless it should prove possible to include France in it too. If this did prove possible, then the whole Czechoslovak population would be one hundred per cent in favor of participating. I know very well that there is nothing new about this attitude of Beneš'. As long ago as 1928 he spoke in similar terms to Herr von Schubert. But this train of thought does show that Beneš too recognizes that Czechoslovakia's adherence is, economically, a necessary development and that it is only for political reasons that he feels he must resist it tooth and nail. But I consider Beneš to be too clever not to realize that opposition to a natural economic development—an opposition based solely on the precarious grounds of a purely political ideology—can nowadays no longer be permanent.

The inclusion of Czechoslovakia in our economic system is entirely in line with the long-term foreign policy of the Reich as I visualize it. Once the German-Austrian customs union has become a reality, I calculate that the pressure of economic necessity will within a few years compel Czechoslovakia to adhere to it in one way or another. I would see in this the beginning of a development which would be likely to lead to a solution, scarcely conceivable by other means, of vital political interests of the Reich. In this I am thinking of the German-Polish frontier problems. If we should succeed in incorporating Czechoslovakia in our economic bloc, and if meanwhile we should also have established closer economic relations with the Baltic States, then Poland with her unstable economic structure would be surrounded and exposed to all kinds of dangers: we should have her in a vise which could perhaps in the short or long run make her willing to consider further the idea of exchanging political concessions for tangible economic advantages.

At present of course these are only castles in the air which have but limited significance for everyday policy. Nevertheless I wanted to inform you, Your Excellency, of these ideas which are greatly occupying my mind at present, so that you may be in a position to follow particularly closely everything which, in the course of further developments, might appear favorable to these plans and, where opportunity occurs, also to promote them as far as possible.

I would ask you to treat these lines as strictly confidential and I leave it to your discretion to send me any remarks and suggestions on these questions, also by means of private letters.

I remain etc.

Bülow

THE SOUTHERN SLAV IMAGE OF RUSSIA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

by Peter F. Sugar

IN MAY 1803 Prince Adam Czartoryski in a memorandum submitted to Tsar Alexander I recommended that "the mass of the Turkish territories in Europe should be divided into separate states . . . upon which Russia would be able to secure to herself a decisive and lawful influence by means of the title Emperor or Protector of the Slavs of the East [sic] which would be accorded to his Imperial Majesty. In any case this influence would be established by the part the Russians will have taken in the liberation of these territories [and] by identity of religion and origin . . ."[1] At that time such a policy represented more than wishful thinking. The Ottoman Empire, rent by dissensions caused by the reforms of Sultan Selim III, was more vulnerable than ever. Montenegro, the only independent Slav state in Southeastern Europe, had looked for guidance to Russia ever since the days of Peter the Great. Even the leaders of the Serbs, the first Christians under Ottoman rule to express political ideas within the borders of the Sultan's realm, thought along lines similar to those expressed by the prince.[2] Rebuffed by the Austrians Karadjordje sent his best educated follower, Matija Nenadović, to St. Petersburg. In the Russian capital the Serb delegation was not well received. Czartoryski favored Montenegro as a pro-Russian agitation center in the Balkans and did not want to build up a competing Orthodox-Slav power in the region. Émile Haumant even credits Montenegro's agent in St. Petersburg with having invented and sold the idea of "a Sloveno-Serb Kingdom protected if not ruled by the Tsar" to the counsellors of Alexander I.[3] After his return to Serbia Nenadović, nevertheless, made an optimistic report. He did this for two reasons: he was convinced of the need for a close alliance of all Slavs and Orthodox with Russia, and he was also afraid that bad news from the Russian capital would dishearten his countrymen then in full revolt against Ottoman rule.[4] Shortly after Tilsit the Vladika Petar I of Montenegro wrote to Marmont:

> I beg you, Mr. General, do not criticize . . . the greatest of all nations whose devoted son I am. The Russians are . . . our brothers of the same faith and race. . . . We Slavs see in our mighty Russian brothers alone our hope and renown. . . . The one who is against the Russians is agains all Slavs too.[5]

---

[1] L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times,* vol XXVII, Nos. 1-4 in William D. Gray, Hans Kohn and Ray A. Billington (eds.), *Smith College Historical Studies* (Northampton, Mass., Oct. 1941 - July 1942), p. 37.

[2] For example: for the views of Stevan Stratimirović, Metropolitan of Karlovci, see Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism* (New York, 1956), p. 13 and Alfred Fischel, *Der Panslawismus bis zum Weltkrieg* (Stuttgart and Berlin, 1919), p. 151. For those of Archimandrit Arsenije Gagović see Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, p. 23, n. 56.

[3] Émile Haumant, *La Formation de la Yougoslavie* (Paris, 1930), p. 197.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 226f.

[5] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 214f.

The Serbs of the Vojvodina, having enjoyed a certain degree of self-government since the days of Leopold I and also a better education than most other Southern Slavs, were for a long time conscious of their existence as an ethnic entity. They, and the Slovenes and Dalmatians, who were reminded of their particular characteristics while subjects of Napoleon's Illyrian Provinces, thought of themselves as Slavs, not as Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. As Slavs or, later, as Illyrians, they looked to Russia for inspiration and often for guidance. This outlook was reinforced by the romantic outlook of such early Czech reformers as Palacký and Kollár, whose ideas were widely accepted by the Southern Slavs and by the views of their own early intellectual leaders such as Obradović and Karadžić. They were all Slavs, worked for a common Slav language, and even tried to bridge the gap which separated Catholics from Orthodox. This religious, linguistic and cultural unity of all Slavs was the aim of the Illyrian movement led by Ljudevit Gaj. The political goal of the Illyrians, a Slav state stretching from the Andria to the Marmara and Black Seas, was only the first step leading to the establishment of a large all-Slav state in which Russia, as the first among her peers, was to play a leading part. As long as the Southern Slavs equated nationalism with ethnic and linguistic unity, Russia had to loom large in their thoughts. Many years later, in 1876, a deeply religious Catholic bishop could say: "I am a Catholic and the Servians are Orthodox, but this is only a difference of unimportant details, and I should be well content to be under the political administration of Serbia."[6] Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer, who made this statement, had become interested in politics in his youth under the influence of the Illyrian government.

Russia was certainly considered as the potential liberator, savior and unifier by all those who thought of themselves as Slavs. If the Catholic minority had some reservations, the Orthodox majority had none. Yet, as early as the first decade of the nineteenth century, we can find certain signs that the Russians and Southern Slavs did not always see eye to eye. Karadjordje, who needed a professional army in his prolonged battle with the Ottomans, wanted to establish a Serb officers' school. The Russian agent in his camp, Rodofinikin, opposed this. A regular army would have given Karadjordje the means to impose his authority on several *Knezovi* whom Rodofinikin controlled.[7] Why he did not wish to relinquish this domination becomes clear from a letter which he wrote in 1818 to General Prozorovski, then commander of the Russian forces on the Danube. While the Serbs fought for their independence, the Russian agent was interested in establishing a Russian *gubernia* in Serbia as a base of operations in the remaining parts of European Turkey and as an obstacle to Austrian ambitions in the Balkans.[8]

---

[6] Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism, Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame, 1953), p. 55.
[7] Haumant, *op. cit.*, p. 211.
[8] Fischel, *op. cit.*, p. 212f.

When the Russian envoy, Count Ivelits, threatened to depose the Vladika Petar I, who later wrote the above-quoted letter to Marmont, the Montenegrin Zbor became quite explicit in the complaint it sent to the Tsar in 1803 which said:

> So far we have never heard that the Holy Synod has any jurisdiction over the Slavs outside Russia, and, therefore, it cannot give us orders. We, the people of the Crna Gora and Brda, are not subjects of the Tsar of Russia, although we gladly accept his moral protection. Even if Russia were to renege on her moral obligation, we shall remain loyal to her as long as she is an Orthodox country, but with the clear understanding that we do not want to become subjects of Russia. . . . We are ready to defend our independence . . . and would rather die with arms in our hands than become slaves of any other power.[9]

Thus we see emerging, right at the beginning of the century under discussion, the main features which dominated both Russian and Southern Slav thinking in the years to come. Russia's basic aims, as expressed by Czartoryski and Rodofinikin, did not change in spite of the shifts her policy underwent during the nineteenth century. Orthodoxy and Slavdom, to which, later, Conservatism and the expectation of gratitude were added, remained the main principles and weapons on which Russia relied in her attempts to dominate Southeastern Europe.[10] As long as Slavdom and Orthodoxy remained the chief values of the Southern Slavs, Russia and a close connection with her were the ideals of these people in spite of occasional disagreements. Thus Czartoryski's ideas found an echo in the lands whose future he outlined in his memorandum.

At late as 1844 Slavism remained the dominant feeling in Southeastern Europe. It found expression in the following poem by an unknown poet:

Millions think like one
From the banks of the Sava to those of the Nava.
No Slav will spare his life.
We fight for a Slav fatherland![11]

After the revolutions of 1848 such sentiments found fewer and fewer followers. Just as in the rest of Europe, romantic, liberal nationalism disappeared in Southeastern Europe also. Ljudevit Gaj, the prophet of Illyrism, vanished from the stage of history. Together with the majority of their countrymen, Bishop Strossmayer and the great Croat historian Rački made the transition from Illyrism first to the Croat, then to the Yugoslav ideal. Johann Bleiweis, the leader of the Slovenes, transformed his paper, *Kmetijske i rokodeske novice,* from a journal propagating the Slav ideal in the mouthpiece of Slovene particularism. The Serbs of the Vojvodina, who collaborated closely with Jellašić during the 1848 revolution, turned against the Croats and looked only to Belgrad for leadership. The Bulgars, who became conscious of their individuality later than the other Southern Slavs, fought their own, particularistic battle right from the beginning of their movement. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, where the idea of unity never existed, the differences between Catholics, Orthodox and Muslims yielded to those between Croats, Serbs and Turks. The Montenegrins never showed any interest in the various plans for unifying all Slavs, or at least all Southern Slavs. Proud of their independence, they were not willing to sacrifice it for any other solution. In short, the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the death of Slavism and the birth of a great variety of regional nationalisms.

---

[9] Z. Kostelski, *The Yugoslavs* (New York, 1952), p. 303f.

[10] See the analysis of Charles Jelavich, *Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism. Russian Influence in the Internal Affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879-1886* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1958), p. viii ff.

[11] Josip Mal, "Okrog Ilirizma" in Grga Novak (ed.), *Šišićev Zbornik* (Zagreb, 1929), p. 63.

With the disappearance of Slavism Russia was left with Orthodoxy as her main weapon. After all, Moscow was the third Rome, and Russia the traditional protector of the Southeastern Slavs, whose churches and monasteries she had supplied for many years with books and money. "Russia's strongest influence in the Balkans was exercised through the Orthodox Church. In this sphere Russia could sway not only the Balkan governments, but also the individual citizens," wrote Charles Jelavich only recenly.[12] Some excellent works have been written proving the validity of this statement,[13] but it will suffice to remember only the roles played by such church dignitaries as Archbishop Clement in Bulgaria and Metropolitan Mihailo in Serbia to appreciate the political importance and russophilism of the Orthodox clergy. The influence of the popes was strongest in the countryside, but even in the towns it was far from negligible. Yet religion, just as Slavism, cannot be separated from nationalism.

The Ottoman millet system equated religion with nationality and in this manner helped the Christian people to retain their individual identities during the long centuries of Muslim rule. Cyril E. Black, speaking of Bulgaria, has regarded "the struggle for a national church [as] . . . only the first step in the direction of political independence."[14] Naturally this religious, self-preserving, Orthodox, russophile nationalism of the long years of Ottoman overlordship was different from the modern, nineteenth century nationalism which, coming directly or indirectly from Western Europe, conquered the Southern Slavs, separated church from state, and became, after 1848, their paramount concern.

This new nationalism was incompatible with the aims of Russia in Southeastern Europe. These aims were clearly expressed in the dictatorial and paternalistic tone of Khomiakov's *Epistle from Moscow to the Serbs,* published in 1860. It drew the following answer from a leading Serb historian, Stojan Novaković, who wrote under the pseudonym "Dopis" in the January 1, 1862 issue of Zagreb newspaper *Danica*:

---

[12] Jelavich, *op. cit.,* p. 174f.

[13] For example: Radoslav Gujić, *Pravoslavna srpske crkva* (Belgrad, 1920); Alois Hudal, *Die serbisch-orthodoxe Nationalkirche* (Graz, 1922); Jean Mousset, *La Serbie et son Église (1830-1904)* (Paris, 1938) and Ladislav Hadrovics, *L'Église Serbe sous la domination Turque* (Paris, 1947).

[14] Cyril E. Black, *The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria* (Princeton, 1943), p. 15.

> It is the aspiration of the modern age that all people should gain independence for themselves and their own nationality. All the Slavic people must pursue this . . . each in their own way.

Then he went on, in the same article, asking whether or not Russia would help the Southern Slavs to achieve this goal. He found the answer to his question in an article which Ivan Aksakov had written in the October 15, 1861 number of *Deń'* in which he stated that it was "Russia's political calling, her moral right and obligation" to grant the Slavic people the "gift" of an independent spiritual and political existence "under the shade of the mighty wings of the Russian eagle." To Novaković this article of Aksakov explained the *Epistle,* and he concluded his article by pointing out that

> For my own part, I would not say that the Slavic people will ever liberate themselves if what Mr. Aksakov desires is Russia's mission and if it is realized. I cannot understand why precisely "the mighty wings of the Russian eagle" constitute the condition of this independence.[15]

Similar feelings were expressed by the various Bulgarian revolutionary leaders. Hristo Botĭov declared that the examples offered by the unifications of Italy and Germany could not serve as models for the Bulgars "because the Prussian is a German, the Piedmontese is an Italian, but the Bulgar is not a Serb, and a Serb is not a Russian."[16] Another Bulgar, Ljuben Karavelov, write in 1870 in *Svoboda:* "If Russia comes to liberate, she will be met with great sympathy; but if she comes to rule she will find many enemies. . . ."[17] The Southern Slav mentality had changed, but nobody realized it, least of all the Russians. Georgi Stoĭkov Rakovski complained with good reason that "however much we may try to convince Europe that we are not attached to Russia, we meet with no success. This idea has become fixed in their minds."[18] The difference between the attitudes expressed by the Serbs and Bulgars after 1860 and those contained in Petar I's letter to Marmont or in the lines of the unknown Illyrian poet is very great. Something had obviously changed drastically. What had happened was, to quote Alfred Fischel, that "romanticism . . . [had been], at least in part, replaced in all groups by realism. . . . Each of the greater Slav nationalities had its own particular imperialism . . . [which] proved stronger than the awareness of racial and linguistic kinship."[19] Nationalism had replaced Slavism and Orthodoxy.

This change was reflected in the image the Southern Slavs held of Russia in the various periods of the nineteenth century. It might be permissible to offer a tentative hypothesis in two parts concerning this image. Hermann Wendel already touched on it when, in 1921, he pointed out that the weaker a people, the more oppressed it was, the easier did it believe in the reality of 100 million brothers ready to help it.[20] When the century began, the weak, oppressed Southern Slavs all believed in this brotherhood and looked to big brother Russia for help. When, in June 1861, Garašanin and Renieris discussed plans for an anti-Ottoman Balkan alliance they decided to exclude the Bulgars because "no Bulgarian was to be found . . . [who had] broad views, [was] conscious of the future to which his country should aspire, and [who was] immune to the 'Russian fever'."[21] Thus for the independent and relatively strong Serbs and Greeks the still dependent and russophile Bulgars appeared as undesirable allies. From this we deduce the first part of our tentative hypothesis: the image the Southern Slavs had of Russia became less and less favorable to the Tsar's country to the same degree to which nationalism became the dominant factor in their thinking. The second part of the hypothesis, working within the framework of nationalism, would equate the degree to which the image of the Southern Slavs was unfavorable to Russia with the size and strength of a given nation and with the amount of independence it had achieved. Thus in the 1890s the Slovene newspaper, *Slovanski List,* still agitated for the union of the Catholic and Orthodox Churches and for Russian as the common language to be adopted by all Slavs.[22] To the stronger Croats, who enjoyed a degree of self-government, Russia was only the lesser of two evils. In 1886 Bishop Strossmayer stated that only the oppressive policies of the Hungarian polticians could make russophiles or panslavs out of the Croats who "driven to extremities . . . will inevitably cry unanimously: 'Rather the Russians than the Magyars'."[23] In 1890 the Belgrad newspaper *Videlo* editorialized:

---

[15] Petrovich, *op. cit.,* p. 101, n. 87.

[16] Black, *op. cit.,* p. 44 and Kohn, *op. cit.,* p. 60.

[17] Black, *op. cit.,* p. 41.

[18] *Ibid.,* p. 38.

[19] Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 479.

> . . . among us there were individuals who, in their youthful inexperience and in their poetic enthusiasm, believed that Slavic brotherhood was a common temple in which each of our peoples had the altar of its freedom. . . . This . . . would not be very dangerous if the slavic idea were nothing but a foolish fancy. But in reality, it is also the unexpected instrument which permits one powerful Slav state to oppress its "brothers".[24]

In spite of all the excellent work and scholarship in the field of Slavic studies, we cannot yet test the validity of this hypothesis. Before this can be done a few problems must be investigated. Some of these are: when and how and under whose influence was nationalism differentiated from religion in the various Southern Slav regions; when and how did Slavism turn into particular nationalisms; when and how did the new ideas and views find acceptance among the majority of the people, and to what extent did this acceptance influence its concept of the great Orthodox, Slav power. We must find out who wrote what in the various Southern Slav lands at different times; under what influences did they write and for what purpose; who and how many people read (or had read to them) what the various authors wrote, and to what extent did these readers accept their views, especially where they contradicted the "truth" as preached by the conservative, russophile, Orthodox clergy. These and many similar problems must be investigated before the tentative hypothesis offered in this paper can be tested. The author of this hypothesis, for one, is not able to answer them satisfactorily with the knowledge at his disposal. When he sought answers to some of the enumerated problems, the available information proved to be self-contradictory. Thus, for example, the Bulgarian cultural historian, Mishev, writing about translations of foreign works into Bulgarian and about models for Bulgar authors in the 1870s and the 1880s, mentioned Fénelon, Milton, Voltaire, Chateaubriand, George Sand, Silvio-Pelico, Lessing, Schiller, Harriet Beecher Stowe, Victor Hugo, Lytton, Ferrol, Pushkin and Gogol.[25] On the other hand, Cyril E. Black stated that "Russian literature was almost the sole model for young Bulgarian writers before the liberation, and in the later renaissance Pushkin and his successors were widely quoted and imitated."[26] Fischel found no difference between the ideas expressed by the members of the Omladina and those of Ristić and Ignatiev.[27] Stavrianos saw "many" among them, those who followed Svetozar Marković, "were under the influence of Herzen, Bakunin, Dobrolyubov, Pisarev, Czernyshevski and other revolutionaries."[28] Wendel discovered in the members of the *Omladina* the romantic followers of Pushkin, Tolstoi, Lermontov, Gogol and Turgenev.[29] Finally, B. H. Sumner stated that it was not "Russia that supplied the main literary and cultural influences on which the youthful Serbian nationalism fed: German romanticism, then French and Italian influences bulked much larger."[30] While individual members could and probably did follow all these different models, the *Omladina* as a movement could hardly have reflected in its aims, publications and actions so many varying influences. For reasons, which the examples of the Bulgarian authors and the *Omladina* illustrate, this paper cannot forthrightly present the Southern Slav image of Russia in the nineteenth century, but must offer a hypothesis instead.

---

[20] Hermann Wendel, *Aus dem südslawischen Risorgimento* (Gotha, 1921), p. 95.

[21] Stavrianos, *op. cit.,* p. 86.

[22] Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 479.

[23] Émile de Laveleye, *The Balkan Peninsula* (London, 1887), p. 31.

[24] Albert Mousset, *Le Monde Slave* (2nd. ed., Paris, 1946), p. 61. No exact date given for article.

Irrespective of the value of this hypothesis, the image of Russia in the Southern Slav regions underwent drastic change in the nineteenth century, and an investigation of this change should be of more than purely academic or historical interest. After all, there is not too great a difference between Novaković, who claimed the right for each Slavic people to achieve independence in its own way, and Tito, who claimed the same right for those who wanted to achieve communism. Both asserted these individualistic claims in the face of a Russian centralizing policy. Historians specializing in various fields will have to work hand in hand with linguists, with students of comparative literature, sociologists, theologians, economists, and statisticians in order to find a fully satisfactory answer. The problem of establishing the image of Russia among the Southern Slavs in the nineteenth century presents a perfect subject for interdisciplinary research to which our Slavic and East European Institutes are devoted.

---

[25] D. Mishev, *The Bulgarians in the Past. Pages from Bulgarian Cultural History* (Lausanne, 1919), p. 324.

[26] Black, *op. cit.,* p. 30.

[27] Fischel, *op. cit.,* p. 408.

[28] Stavrianos, *op. cit.,* p. 115.

[29] Wendel, *op. cit.,* p. 83.

[30] B. H. Summer, *Russia and the Balkans, 1870-1880* (Oxford, 1937), p. 129f.

UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON

THE EASTERN QUESTION
AND THE
VIENNA CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER, 1822

by Irby C. Nichols, Jr.

RECENT historians of European diplomacy either have ignored completely the Vienna Conference of September 1822 or have relied upon the traditional interpretation of Adolphus W. Ward and Charles K. Webster that this reunion was a mere preliminary to the more brilliant Congress of Verona[1]. But that which appears obvious is not always true. An analysis of the Vienna Conference leaves some doubt that the conventional conclusion is altogether justified. While Castlereagh's suicide (12 August 1822), the late arrival of Wellington in Vienna, and fundamental disunity among the allies, all combined to stalemate the discussion of Spanish and Italian problems, a signal and significant achievement, which contributed to the preservation of peace between Russia and Turkey for six more years, was scored in the negotiations concerning the Eastern Question.

The Vienna Conference had its origin in the Russo-Turkish-Greek dispute and stemmed directly from the Hanover Rendezvous of Metternich and Castlereagh in October 1821. The Austrian chancellor's anxiety to have British assistance at Vienna is explained by the importance which the Eastern Question assumed during the summer of 1821. The news of Alexander Ypsilanti's invasion of Moldavia on March 6, 1821, reached the Tsar at Laibach on the 19th. Although condemning the Moldavian insurrection as a revolutionary movement and disavowing its leader, he opposed collective action. A month later Demetrios Ypsilanti, Alexander's younger brother, hurled the fire brand of revolution into the Morea and several of the South Aegean islands, where the minority Turkish population was slaughtered. The Tsar learned of the Greek revolt just before leaving Laibach on May 13. Both the anti-Ottoman policy inherited from Catherine the Great and personal sympathy for his Greek co-religionists made the Emperor reluctant to accept Metternich's suggestion that he condemn the Greek cause as inspired by Jacobinism. On the eve of his departure, Sir Charles Stewart, the British ambassador to Vienna and an observer at Laibach, and Prince Metternich attempted to discuss the Greek insurrection with Alexander, but the Tsar refused to comment on his intentions regarding the Balkans since he considered the Turko-

---

[1] For example, neither Pierre Renouvin, *Le XIXe siècle: 1815-1871,* Tome V of *Histoire des relations internationales* (Paris, 1954) nor René Albrecht-Carrié, *A Diplomatic History of Europe since the Congress of Vienna* (New York, 1958) even mentions the Vienna Conference; nor does Paul R. Sweet, *Friedrich von Gentz: Defender of the Old Order* (Madison, Wisconsin, 1941) (hereafter cited as *Gentz*), despite the fact that Gentz was secretary of the conference and exercised great influence on Austrian policy in the Near East.

Greek conflict as an issue to be decided solely between Russia and the Porte. Furthermore, he wished to keep Austria out of the Balkans.[2]

By September 1821 the Eastern situation had so deteriorated that the Cabinets of London and Vienna feared a Russo-Turkish war was imminent. The elements of this crisis were the nationalistic uprising of the Greeks and the Russo-Ottoman dispute over flagrant Turkish violations of the Treaties of Kuchuk Kainarji (21 July 1774) and Bucharest (28 May 1812). During May Christian churches had been pillaged, Greek bishops and priests decapitated, Russian ships insulted, Russian sailors murdered, and Danesi, the banker of the Russian embassy, was arrested. Russian protests against these outrages and provocations were ignored. On June 5 Baron Gregory Alexandrovitch Stroganov, the Russian ambassador to the Porte, suspended diplomatic relations with Turkey. His dispatches, describing the bloody May days in Constantinople and the obstinacy of the Porte, upon their arrival in St. Petersburg, caused great resentment against the Turks.[3] On July 18 Stroganov transmitted to the Porte a four-point ultimatum which must be met if Turkey were to coexist with the other states of Europe:

(1) The destroyed or pillaged Christian churches in Greece must be restored. (2) The Christian religion must be protected in accordance with treaty provisions. (3) A distinction must be made between innocent and guilty Greeks in the suppression of the insurrection. (4) Turk-

---

[2] The traditional date for the beginning of the Morean uprising is April 6; however, fighting did not actually commence until April 9, Paul W. Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy at its Zenith: Austria and the Congresses of Troppau, Laibach, and Verona" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Texas, 1958), pp. 239n, 244 (hereafter cited as "Metternich's Diplomacy"); Andrei A. Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825* (Durham, N. C., 1947), p. 388; *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, eds. A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch (3 vols.; New York, 1922-1923) (hereafter cited as *Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol.*), II (1815-1866), 41; Vicomte Adrien Maggiolo, *Corse, France, et Russie: Pozzo di Borgo, 1762-1842* (Paris, 1890) (hereafter cited as *Pozzo di Borgo*), p. 265f. Before leaving Laibach, Alexander instructed Pozzo, the Russian ambassador at Paris, to work toward an alliance with France in the event he declared war on Turkey. Again, in July 1821, he proposed a Russo-French alliance to Count de La Ferronays, the French ambassador to Russia, but Pasquier, the French foreign minister, quickly rejected these overtures. *Ibid.*, p. 266; La Ferronays to Pasquier, lettre particulière, St. Petersburg, 19 July, 1821, Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Russie, Correspondance, Vol. 161; *La Restauration, 1820-1824*, Vol. V of *Histoire de mon temps, mémoires du chancelier Pasquier*, ed. le duc d'Audiffret-Pasquier (6 vols.; Paris, 1894), p. 342ff.; Maurice Bourquin, *Histoire de la Sainte Alliance* (Geneva, 1954), p. 303ff.; for a scholarly account of the Russian attempts to secure a French alliance during the summer of 1821, see Albert Sorel, "L'Alliance russe et la Restauration," *Essais d'histoire et de critique* (2nd ed.; Paris, 1883), pp. 99-112. Pozzo di Borgo exerted great influence on the Tsar and was one of the chief Russian policymakers at Troppau, Laibach, and Verona.

[3] Comte Joannes Capo d'Istria, "Aperçu de ma carrière publique, depuis 1798 jusqu'à 1822." *Sbornik Russkoe Istoricheskoe Obschestvo*, III (1868), 266ff. (hereafter cited as *Sbornik*); Count Anton von Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen vom Türkischen Reiche im Jahre 1821 und der Gründung des Hellenischen Königreiches aus Diplomatischen Standpuncte* (6 vols.; Vienna, 1867) (hereafter cited as *Geschichte des Abfalls*), III, 84-86, 110-111, 113-114, 116; Nesselrode to Stroganov, St. Petersburg, 28 June, 1821, *ibid.*, p. 91; Edouard Driault et Michel Lhéritier, *Histoire diplomatique de la Grèce de 1821 à nos jours* (5 vols.; Paris, 1923-1925) (hereafter cited as *Hist. de la Grèce*), I, 146-147. The last dispatches of Stroganov from Constantinople are dated June 9, 1821.

ish troops must be evacuated from the Danubian Principalities (Wallachia and Moldavia), and the hospodars (princes) re-established.

The Russian note also declared that, unless the Porte made a satisfactory answer in a week, the Russian ambassador would be withdrawn. When an answer was not delivered on the 26th, Stroganov requested his passports and boarded a Russian frigate in the harbor. Although the Turkish reply was presented a day later, the ambassador refused to accept it. After waiting two weeks for his passports, he sailed for Odessa on August 10 without them. That he was allowed to go unmolested was due largely to the efforts of Viscount Strangford, the British ambassador, and Count Lützow, the Austrian internuncio.[4]

Britain and Austria wished to prevent the dissolution of the Turkish Empire at the hands of Russia, and this common interest demanded that they work together to preserve peace. Their efforts infused blood into the Quadruple Alliance because both recognized that it offered the best means of thwarting isolated action by Russia.

When Alexander returned to St. Petersburg from Laibach in the middle of June 1821, he assured the British ambassador, Sir Charles Bagot, of his loyalty to the Alliance and his intention not to support the Greek insurgents, whom he suspected of being the tools of the Paris liberals.[5] While encouraged by this assurance and also by the knowledge that the Tsar was weary of military campaigns and did not want war, Castlereagh and Metternich yet were disturbed by his vacillating nature. Alexander's loyalties were divided between Europe and Russia. To continue to ignore the Greek cause or to denounce it as tainted with Jacobinism would be to disregard traditional Russian interests and religious sentiment and to offend national honor. The Cabinets of London and Vienna realized, too, the pressure which would be put on the enigmatic Tsar by the St. Petersburg "war party" led by that patriotic Greek, Capo d'Istria. The opinion of his court was almost unanimous that Russia should put an end to the Ottoman Empire. His soldiers, moreover, were growing impatient of inaction, and their morale was being "undermined by revolutionary intrigue." The *mémoire* of Johann Ancillon, Director of the Political Division of the Prussian Foreign Ministry, also inspired in the Tsar bellicose ideas. Despite his aversion to war, Alexander seemed to be yielding to the demands of the war faction. The moment appeared propitious, for Europe was unwilling to contest Russia's supremacy on the continent. The question of the Tsar's policy in the Greco-Turkish affair, therefore, continued to cause Britain and Austria grave concern.[6]

---

[4] For the French text of this document see Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls,* III, 95-101. This note, dated 28 June, 1821, does not bear the name of its author, but according to C. W. Crawley, Capo d'Istria wrote it; see Crawley, *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833* (Cambridge, 1930) (hereafter cited as *The Greek Question*), p. 17; Driault and Lhéritier, *Hist. de la Grèce,* I, 150; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* p. 418; Sir Charles K. Webster, *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822: Britain and the European Alliance* (London, 1925) (hereafter cited as *Castlereagh*), p. 356f; Capo d'Istria, *Sbornik,* III, 267.

[5] Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, 15 July, 1821, *Les rapports diplomatiques de Lebzeltern,* ed. Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailovitch (St. Petersburg, 1913) (hereafter cited as *Lebzeltern rapports*), p. 76; Bagot to Castlereagh, St. Petersburg, 20 June, 1821, quoted in Webster, *Castlereagh,* p. 358f; Ward and Gooch, *Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol.,* II, 41.

As the storm clouds of war gathered ominously over Southeast Europe, time became an important factor. Realizing the necessity for speeding up the normal processes of diplomatic intercourse, which could be done only by a personal exchange of views, Castlereagh and Metternich agreed to rendezvous in Hanover during October 1821, when George IV visited his one continental possession.[7] On October 8 Metternich confided to Baron Ludwig Lebzeltern, the Austrian ambassador to Russia:

> I am entirely of the conviction that by my interview with Lord Castlereagh . . . I shall achieve more in a few days to settle the general question, to strengthen the present and to save the future, than in six months of writing. It is also necessary that I know a little about the English; their role is extremely influential in the European-Russo-Turko-Greek affair. Only this conviction could induce me to travel 500 leagues in the space of four weeks at the most.[8]

Private conversations between Castlereagh and Metternich at Hanover got under way on Saturday, October 20, and their tenor set the mood of cordiality which prevailed at subsequent conferences.[9] At the first official interview, Monday, October 22, the two ministers indorsed "the maintenance of peace on the basis of existing treaties" and agreed that any project for a rapprochement with the Porte should come from Russia herself rather than from Russia's allies.[10] They concluded, however, that a joint declaration would be unwise since such a démarche might persuade the Tsar that a conspiracy or combination against Russia had been formed at Hanover. Nor must the Russian court think Britain and Austria needed a conference to agree on fundamental aims. Therefore, Castlereagh and Metternich sent separate dispatches to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Castlereagh dispatched the necessary instructions to Bagot and Strangford on Sunday, October 28, and Metternich followed suit on the 31st. While identical in purpose, these notes differed in emphasis, as required by the special interests of each nation. Both governments were motivated by a common fear that Russian intervention in behalf of the Greeks would lead to the overthrow of Turkey and, thereby, to Russian hegemony in the Balkans and the Near East. This ascendancy would upset the balance of power in Europe, a contingency that must be avoided.[11]

---

[6] Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, 3 July, 1821, *Un collaborateur de Metternich: mémoires et papiers de Lebzeltern,* ed. Emmanuel de Levis-Mirepoix (Paris, 1949) (hereafter cited as *Mémoires*), p. 412; Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, 15 July, 1821, Mikhailovitch, *Lebzeltern rapports,* p. 76; Gordon to Castlereagh, Laibach, 13 May, 1821, *Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers of Viscount Castlereagh,* ed. Charles W. Vane (12 vols. in 3 ser., 3rd ser.; London, 1848-1853) (hereafter cited as *Castl. Corres.);* Edouard Driault, *La question d'Orient depuis ses origines jusqu'à la paix de Sèvres* (8th ed.; Paris, 1921), p. 106; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1825-1878* (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1954), p. 14; Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," p. 258. The Ancillon *mémoire* had been published by Count Bernstorff at the instance of Alopeus, the Russian ambassador to Berlin.

[7] Entry for Wed., 3 Oct., 1821, *Aus dem Nachlass Varnhagen's von Ense: Tagebücher von Friedrich von Gentz,* ed. Ludmilla Assing (2 vols.; Leipzig, 1873-1874), II, 464; Gordon to Castlereagh, Vienna, 3 Oct., 1821, Vane, *Castl. Corres.,* IV, 439-440; Webster, *Castlereagh,* p. 364f.

[8] Metternich to Lebzeltern, Vienna, 8 Oct., 1821, Mikhailovitch, *Lebzeltern rapports,* p. 236.

[9] Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, 28 Oct., 1821, Public Record Office, London, MSS, Foreign Office, Continent: Hanover, file 92, fol. 47 (hereafter cited as "F. O., Continent: Hanover, 92/47"); H. Montgomery Hyde, *Princess Lieven* (Boston, 1938), p. 129; Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 509.

[10] Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 24, 29 Oct., 1821, Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 555, 558; Ward and Gooch, *Camb. Hist. Brit. For. Pol.,* II, 43. Metternich's note was based on his last dispatches to Constantinople and St. Petersburg, copies of which had just been brought to Hanover by a special courier.

The arrival of Count Christophe de Lieven in Hanover on October 28 was a matter of great import to Castlereagh and Metternich, for he brought from St. Petersburg the assurance that Alexander was not planning a declaration of war on Turkey. The Chancellor was convinced that the Tsar desired peace but did not know how to reconcile its preservation with what he regarded as his honor.[12]

Anglo-Austrian efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East did not end with sending instructions to St. Petersburg and Constantinople. Austria and Britain also pressed Berlin and Paris to fall into line behind them, and in this their diplomacy was successful. To find a solution to the Russo-Turkish impasse, Castlereagh and Metternich also agreed at Hanover to hold a conference at Vienna in September 1822, just before the Congress of Florence (the original site of the meeting later shifted to Verona). The presence of the Tsar was urged, but it was not at all certain he would attend. Britain and Austria, nonetheless, regarded a reunion of the powers as imperative, not only to refuse intervention in the name of the Alliance, but also to deny Russia the right of interference: the attention of Russia must be turned from the Southeast. Consequently, the two statesmen decided "to humour him by appealing to his idealism and reminding him of his solemn engagements to Europe."[13] Confronted with the "alternative of offending the sentiment of his people or bringing down in ruin the whole edifice of his international ideal," the Tsar chose the former. He deferred to his allies and agreed in June 1822 to attend the Vienna Conference. Thus the danger of separate intervention by Russia was postponed.[14]

---

[11] Castlereagh to the Emperor Alexander I, London, 16 July, 1821, Vane, *Castl. Corres.*, IV, 404-408; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 24, 29 Oct., 1821, Metternich, *Mémoires*, III, 555, 557f; Castlereagh to Bagot, No. 13, Hanover, 28 Oct., 1821, F. O., Continent: Hanover, 92/47 (this dispatch was 139 pages in length); Sir Archibald Alison, *Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart* (3 vols.; Edinburgh, 1861) (hereafter cited as *Castl. and Stewart*), III, 163; Webster, *Castelreagh*, pp. 375-379. Capo d'Istria was perfectly aware of the real motives behind the Anglo-Austrian mediation, Capo d'Istria, *Sbornik*, III, 275ff.

[12] Metternich to Lützow, Vienna, 5 Oct., 1821, Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, III, 207; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 29 Oct., 1821. Metternich, *Mémoires*, III 558f.; Metternich to Lebzeltern, Hanover, 31 Oct., 1821, Mikhailovitch, *Lebzeltern rapports*, p. 238; Léon de Crousaz-Crétet, *Le Duc de Richelieu en Russie et en France, 1766-1822* (Paris, 1897), p. 475. Count Lieven, Russian ambassador to London, had been in Russia on leave of absence. The title of Prince was not conferred upon him until 1826.

[13] Metternich to Count Zichy, Vienna, 25 March, 1822, Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, III, 355; Metternich to Strangford, Vienna, 31 July, 1822, Metternich, *Mémoires*, III, No. 682, 600; Maggiolo, *Pozzo di Borgo*, p. 265; Myrna Boyce, "The Diplomatic Relations of England with the Quadruple Alliance, 1815-1830," *University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences*, ed. F. E. Haynes, VII (1918-1921), p. 52; Webster, *Castlereagh*, p. 380.

Castlereagh, however, did not commit himself at Hanover to attend either the Vienna Conference or the Florentine Congress because Parliament had been displaying increasing animosity to the "entangling Alliance" with autocratic continental sovereigns. Despite the fact that he had no assurance of Britain's presence either at Vienna or Florence, Metternich boasted to his master: "I have the conviction that next year we shall have Lord Londonderry at the congress which will meet in Italy."[15]

Florence remained the site of the forthcoming congress until June 1822, when Metternich suggested to Castlereagh that its location be shifted to Verona, and that affairs not pertaining directly to Italy be discussed at Vienna. His reason for the first proposal was that a site within Habsburg dominions would ensure greater Austrian control of the congress. The Chancellor's second proposal aimed at conciliating Castlereagh, who since the Congress of Troppau had not permitted British representation at any meeting on Italian affairs. According to the Austrian plan, the agenda for the Vienna Conference would include only issues of interest to Britain. Actually Metternich did not want to raise the Russo-Turkish issue at all, but he had to mention it to give the British minister a pretext to attend. Castlereagh indorsed this plan on June 22, but Cabinet approval was not secured until July 25. Announcement then was made to the London diplomatic corps that Lord Castlereagh would leave for the continent on August 15.[16]

---

[14] W. A. Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe* (London, 1920), p. 226; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* p. 421. Metternich received word from Lebzeltern on June 14, 1822, that Alexander would come to the Vienna Conference early in September. On August 1 he learned that the Tsar expected to arrive in Vienna on September 7. Private letters, Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 580, 597.

[15] Harold W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-1827* (London, 1925), p. 7; Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 29 Oct., 1821, Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 559. See Castlereagh's letters to Stewart on 24 Feb., 15 Oct., 1820, 5 Jan. and 13 March, 1821, published for the first time in Alison, *Castl. and Stewart,* III, 15n-17n, 23n. These documents were taken from the Londonderry MSS. still in the possession of the family. All these dispatches emphasize Castlereagh's conviction that "our Allies ... may be assured that they will deceive themselves if they suppose that we could for six months act with them unless the mind of the nation was in the cause." Castlereagh to Stewart, London, 24 Feb., 1820, in *ibid.,* p. 215n.

[16] Metternich to Castlereagh, private letter, Vienna, 6 June, 1822, cited by Webster, *Castlereagh,* p. 480; Castlereagh to Metternich, Foreign Office, 22 June, 1822; *ibid.;* Metternich to Castlereagh, Vienna, 8 July, 1822, *ibid.,* p. 481; Chateaubriand to Mme. Récamier, London, 6 Aug., 1822, Jeanne Françoise Julie Récamier, *Souvenirs et correspondance tirées des papiers de madame Récamier* (2 vols.; Paris, 1859), I, 428; Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," p. 299n; Sir A. W. Ward, *Aix-La-Chapelle to Verona,* Vol. III of *The Period of the Congresses* (London, 1919), p. 62. Nesselrode opposed the move from Florence to Verona, protesting that "Austria was determined to exercise a monopoly on the Congresses," but Alexander was won over by Metternich's arguments that the Lombard police were superior to the Tuscan and that it was necessary to exclude "all

When Castlereagh committed suicide three days before his scheduled departure, his mission was given to Wellington (August 17), but influenza and the business of appointing George Canning as the heir to "the whole heritage" of Castlereagh delayed the Duke's departure until September 17. Meanwhile the instructions, which Castlereagh had drafted for his own guidance at Vienna, received the approval of the Cabinet and were transmitted to his Grace by Lord Bathurst, undersecretary of foreign affairs, on September 14.[17]

British policy toward the Eastern Question, as revealed by Castlereagh's instructions, was a continuation of the course followed in conjunction with Austria since April 1820. The main points of this policy were respect for treaty obligations, the prevention of war between Russia and the Porte, amelioration of the hardships and horrors of the Greco-Turkish war, and observance of strict neutrality. An attempt should be made to reconcile differences arising from Russian protection of Orthodox Christians in Turkey and over navigation of the Straits. If this effort succeeded in preventing a Russo-Turkish war, the problem of Greece might be discussed, but with great caution. Castlereagh warned that Greece had gained so much in the last year that it would be difficult to avoid dealing with the provisional government; Britain, however, should refrain either from recognizing Greece or forcing Greek submission to the Porte, and not commit herself beyond the limits of good offices.[18]

During the interval between the Hanover Rendezvous and the Vienna Conference, the Russo-Ottoman crisis had abated, though no solution had been found. In February 1822 Count Dmitri Tatischev had been sent to Vienna for negotiations on the Eastern Question (March 8-April 19) which resulted in the Tsar's complete acceptance in May of Metternich's proposals and the announcement that he would renew diplomatic rela-

---

strangers, curiosity-seekers, and foreign agents from the scene of the Congress." Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," p. 300. Metternich to Francis I, Hanover, 24 Oct., 1821, *Mémoires, documents, et écrits divers laissés par le prince de Metternich*, ed. Prince Richard de Metternich (8 vols.; Paris; 1880-1884) (hereafter cited as *Mémoires*), III, 553; private letter, Hanover, 25 Oct., 1821.

[17] Stewart to Bathurst, Nos. 7 and 8, Vienna, 12 and 15 Sept., 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; Wellington to King George IV, London, 18 Aug. and 7 Sept., 1822, *Despatches, Correspondence, and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington*, ed. Arthur Richard Wellesley (3 vols.; London, 1867-1880) (hereafter cited as *Well. Desp.*), I, 258, 274; Bathurst to Wellington, Downing Street, 14 Sept., 1822, *ibid.*, p. 284; Marcellus to Chateaubriand, London, 15 and 24 Sept., 1822, Comte Marie L. A. de Marcellus, *Politique de la Restauration en 1822 et 1823* (Paris, 1853), p. 91f.; A. Aspinall, "The Canningite Party," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 4th ser. (hereafter cited as *TRHS*), XVII (1933-1934), 205.

[18] Castlereagh's Instructions, *Well. Desp.*, I, 285f.

[19] Lebzeltern to Metternich, St. Petersburg, 22 May, 1822, Metternich *Mémoires*, III, 443. For Metternich's notes on his talks with Tatischev, and the official protocols, see *ibid.*, pp. 431-450. Despite the fact that Capo d'Istria had proposed Count Pierre Tolstoy for this mission, Alexander, much to the embarrassment of the Foreign Ministry, chose Tatischev, whom Nesselrode had nominated. Capo d'Istria, *Sbornik*, III, 279. Tatischev returned to Vienna at the end of June to renew the conversations on the Eastern Question. Jubilant over this diplomatic triumph, Metternich boasted that it was "the greatest victory ever won by one Cabinet over another." Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," p. 278f.

tions with the Porte when the Principalities were completely evacuated.[19] Evacuation had begun on May 13, and on July 19, 1822, the Sultan, Mahmud II, had appointed two Rumanians as hospodars: Gregory Ghica for Moldavia and Jonitza Stourdza for Wallachia. Pleased with these results, the Tsar had proposed a conference between Russia and Turkey at Podolsk, where the Porte might announce officially the evacuation of the Principalities and the return of the hospodars, and so make possible the renewal of direct relations.[20] Finally, on August 10, Mohammed Sadik, the Reis-Effendi (Turkish Foreign Minister), had declared to Lord Strangford and Count Lützow that Turkey had complied with every demand to which Russia was entitled under existing treaties; therefore, he considered the mediation of Austria and England at an end. Any further intervention by the allied powers might delay the restoration of relations between Russia and Turkey.[21]

But, with characteristic indifference, the Turks blandly delayed the execution of their promise to evacuate the Principalities until a Russian minister had returned to Constantinople. This rebuff, coupled with Turkish accusations that Russian agents had fomented the Greek Insurrection and the renewal in August of the decree closing the Sea of Marmora to commerce in grain (a measure which severely hurt the Russian wheat export trade centered at Odessa), so exasperated the Tsar that his conciliatory mood of May gave way to severity during August. But though his attitude toward the Turks changed, his opinion of the Greeks did not. He arrived in Vienna on September 9, complaining that "All or most of my servants are either Greeks or Liberals. With such men, how can one avoid trouble?"[22]

On September 19, 1822, Metternich received from Strangford the protocol of a conference which he had had on August 27 with the Reis-Effendi and the Salih-Effendi (Grand Marshal of the Empire), Gianib Tschaousch-Bachi. The Chancellor gave a copy of this protocol together with other dispatches from Strangford to Count Karl Robert Nesselrode, the new Russian foreign minister who had replaced Capo d'Istria at the end of July. Nesselrode, however, was afraid to show the Tsar one dispatch in which the British ambassador to the Porte had complained of the activities of the Russian agent Dashkoff; consequently, he suppressed it, thereby creating an incident which embarrassed the allies.[23]

---

[20] Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, 24 Sept., 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; *Dépêches inédites du chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars de Valachie,* ed. Count Anton von Prokesch-Osten (3 vols.; Paris, 1877) (hereafter cited as *Gentz aux hospodars*), II, 150; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* p. 411. Strangford was materially assisted in obtaining these concessions from the Porte by the outbreak of a Turko-Persian war (summer 1822), which convinced the Sultan of the necessity of averting hostilities with Russia at the same time.

[21] Stuart to Bathurst, No. 246, Paris, 5 Sept., 1822, F. O., France, 146/48, quoting dispatches from Constantinople of August 10 and Vienna of August 24, 1822. Mohammed Sadik had replaced the more moderate Hamid Bey as Reis-Effendi in November 1821.

[22] Stewart to Bathrust, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, 24 Sept., 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 152; memorandum of Gordon to Canning: "State of Affairs and the Subjects Likely to Come under Discussion," Vienna, 22 Sept., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I, 299; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* p. 395; Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," pp. 246, 281.

During his August 27 conference with the Reis-Effendi and Grand Marshal, Strangford had offered to inform the allied sovereigns of the Porte's views. The *procès-verbal* of his conversation with the Ottoman ministers enraged the Tsar by revealing Strangford's Turkophile bias. Why had a minister charged with representing Russian interests not contradicted the Turkish accusations against Russian agents? Why had Strangford seemed to accept the allegation that the Porte had remained faithful to its treaties while Russia had broken them?[24] Tatischev declared impatiently: "These affairs shall be ended only by cannon fire."[25]

Perceiving this hostile attitude, Metternich feared that Tatischev and other members of the Russian delegation would destroy Strangford's reputation before his arrival in Vienna. He was alarmed, too, that unless something was done quickly to mend the damage caused by Strangford's blunder, Anglo-Austrian mediation in the East would be seriously compromised. Consequently, Metternich came to the defense of the British ambassador and discovered Nesselrode's suppression of Strangford's report on the activities of Dashkoff. He then revealed to the Tsar the entire contents of Strangford's letters and succeeded in correcting Alexander's impressions of the ambassador. As a result of this affair the Tsar condemned all his ministers who espoused the Greek cause, denouncing them for supporting a movement the success of which would prove his own ruin.[26]

Friedrich von Gentz, secretary of the Conference and a colleague of Metternich, also was astonished at the contrast between the sentiments of the Tsar and the conduct of his agents and generals on the frontiers of the Principalities. Their intrigues, as well as those of Greek émigrés, Gentz and Metternich were convinced, had caused no end of inconveniences which had resulted in the present attitude of the Porte. But Alexander was sincere in disavowing every agent who obstructed his policy of restoring order in the Principalities. Indeed, he dismissed Pini, the Russian consul general at Bucharest, capital of Wallachia, and Pisani at Jassy, capital of Moldavia. Pini was replaced by Minciaky while the Jassy post was discontinued; thus Minciaky became in 1822 consul general for both Principalities. Gentz, who read the instructions sent to Minciaky, certified that they conformed to the avowed principles of the Tsar.[27] One accomplishment of the Vienna Conference, therefore, was the purging of the Russian diplomatic and consular staff in the Balkans in the interest of peace.

---

[23] Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, 24 Sept. 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; Edmond de Boislecomte, "Résumé historique du congrès de Vérone," A. A. E., 722 (hereafter cited as "Boislecomte, A. A. E."); Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 441. On August 1, 1822, Metternich learned that Capo d'Istria had fallen on the issue of War with Turkey. Private letter, Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 597.

[24] Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 144f.; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, 24 Sept., 1822, F. O. Austria, 120/54; Louis de Viel-Castel, *Histoire de la Restauration* (20 vols.; Paris, 1860-1878) (hereafter cited as *La Restauration*), XI, 450-455.

[25] Viel-Castel, *La Restauration,* XI, 457.

[26] Gordon to Canning, iVena, 22 Sept., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I 298f.; Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, separate and confidential, Vienna, 24 Sept., 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 146; Viel-Castel, *La Restauration,* XI, 457.

On September 26, two days after Strangford's arrival in Vienna, Nesselrode submitted to the Conference a *mémoire* on the Eastern Question in which the Tsar expressed deep regret that so little progress had been made in the last eighteen months in bringing the Porte "to satisfy the just demands of Russia." Turkey, moreover, had adopted measures which paralyzed the commerce and prosperity of Russia's southern provinces. The note concluded with a list of new conditions which must be met before diplomatic relations with the Sultan were restored.[28]

Concerning Greece, the Porte was given a choice of action: either enter into direct negotiations with Russia and her allies for granting toleration and amnesty to those Greeks who returned to their former allegiance, as called for by the Austrian memorandum of April 19, 1822; or prove "by a series of deeds" that the Greek religion would be respected and peace re-established in Greece on a just and durable basis.[29]

Nesselrode insisted that the Porte must completely evacuate Wallachia and Moldavia and permit Russian agents to verify that the measures taken conformed to existing treaties.[30]

Relative to commerce and navigation, Russia exhorted the Porte to revoke "all measures taken to restrict the commerce and free navigation of the Black Sea." Turkey again was offered two alternatives:

> (1) Either accept the passage [through the Straits] of Sicilian, Portuguese, Spanish, and other vessels [sailing under their own flags],
>
> (2) or else respect the [Russian] flag which has protected these ships, this custom being sanctioned by long practice.[31]

This *mémoire* was not received calmly by the Conference. It annoyed France and Prussia because they had thought the Russo-Turkish dispute indefinitely adjourned and had regarded the Greek Question as nearly ended. Lord Strangford protested to Metternich that:

> A victim was necessary for offended Russian pride, and they wanted to offer me up as the holocaust! But the sacrifice shall not be killed without resistance, and the calf, while struggling, shall shake the temple. They have thrown down the gauntlet! Well, I shall take

---

[27] Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 153ff.; Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* p. 407. Prior to his appointment, Minciaky had gained experience in dealing with the Porte as the Russian Chancellor of Commercial Affairs in Constantinople. Both Pini and Pisani were Greeks, as, indeed, were nearly all of the Russian consuls in various cities of the Ottoman Empire. Stephen P. H. Duggan, *The Eastern Question: A study of Diplomacy,* Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, XIV, No. 3 (1902), 62.

[28] Nesselrode to Montmorency: Copy of Note, Vienna, 26 Sept., 1822, A. A. E., 723.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ibid.* The Principalities had been occupied in March 1821 and were not completely evacuated until 1826.

[31] *Ibid.*

> it up, and since they have made me the champion of the Turks, I shall play the role![32]

True to his word, Strangford, in conversations with the allied ministers, insinuated that the Turks were completely right and the Russians wrong, and that Baron Stroganov was the real culprit responsible for the Greek revolt.

Astonished by his tactlessness, and fearing that it would undermine the Anglo-Austrian *entente* in the East, Metternich, for the second time during the Vienna deliberations, undertook to repair damage caused by Strangford's blunders. To achieve this end he resorted to duplicity, that subtle and effective weapon of a skillful diplomat. He assured Nesselrode that he had answered, as circumstances required, the unjust slanders of the Porte. No one would believe Russia guilty of fostering "revolutionary insurrection." To Strangford, on the other hand, the Chancellor deplored the temper of the Russian note, severely criticized Tatischev, and attributed to him the unexpected change in the Tsar's attitude.[33]

Believing tension too high for serious negotiations, Metternich began to press for an adjournment to Verona. But first, Nesselrode's note had to be answered. The Austrian reply, delivered on September 30, praised the Tsar's conduct and the moderation of the *mémoire,* promising support for its proposals. Metternich regretted that the Porte was not "intelligent enough to distinguish the policy of the powers from the activity of a sect whose great objective was to disunite the allied courts and especially the two imperial courts."[34] Prussia and France also replied on September 30. The Prussian note was similar to the Austrian, while the French paper was vague and general. Vicomte Mathieu de Montmorency, the French foreign minister, promised only that France would cooperate "to inspire in the Porte dispositions capable of assuring the re-establishment of good understanding and diplomatic relations."[35]

Wellington received the Russian note upon his arrival in Vienna on September 29. His reply, transmitted two days later, was an apology for Lord Strangford which was not likely to please the Russian court. The Iron Duke declared that the ambassador deserved the Tsar's commendation for past concessions obtained from the Porte. Strangford regretfully could not deny the Turkish accusations against Russian agents in the Balkans since he had no proof that they were false. The Tsar, Wellington *précis* of the August 27th conference because it named the Russian agents. affirmed, was not shown the dispatch which accompanied Strangford's If His Majesty had known the facts, surely his sense of justice "would have prevented his passing a censure on this minister."[36]

---

[32] Boislecomte, A. A. E., 722.

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] Viel-Castel, *La Restauration,* XI, 458.

[35] *Ibid.,* p. 458f.

[36] Boislecomte, A. A. E., 722. Wellington's note paralleled closely the arguments used by Metternich in defending Strangford, as they were recorded by Sir Charles Stewart on September 24, 1822. It is probable that Sir Robert Gordon, secretary of the

But Wellington was equally convinced that Russia had a case regarding Turkish restrictions on Black Sea commerce, and desired Strangford to be more forceful in pressing for a settlement of this issue. Consequently, he requested Canning to urge the Sultan to grant the petition of those powers which were seeking permission to pass the Straits. If these negotiations were successful, the just rights of the Porte would be preserved and Russian commerce would be placed upon "a better footing than it was before, inasmuch as a legal commerce is more secure than one under a false flag."[37]

After the Russian note had been answered, the allied sovereigns and ministers were ready to leave for Verona. All of Wellington's efforts to delay their departure were in vain, and on October 2 the mass exodus from Vienna began. Meanwhile the Duke anxiously awaited the next courier from London. Should he remain in Vienna, return to London, or go to Verona? On October 3 Canning's orders arrived, directing him to attend the Congress of Verona. Wellington, accompanied by Stewart and Strangford, left Vienna on the 5th and reached Verona on the 15th.[38] Until the end of September, the London Cabinet had held such disdain for the Congress of Verona that no plenipotentiary was accredited to it. If a British minister had been in Vienna by September 7, as originally planned, none would have gone to Verona. Only the unforeseen accidents of Castlereagh's suicide and Wellington's illness were responsible for the Duke's presence at the Italian Congress.

The negotiations at Verona on the Eastern Question, in contrast to those at Vienna, were definitely anticlimactic. The Congress of Verona wisely refrained from making this issue an "*affaire de congrès,*" but treated it confidentially as a Cabinet question. The conversations, moreover, were confined entirely to the points of the Russian note of September 26, which was reaffirmed on November 9, 1822. The attitude of the Russian ministers indicated that all idea of a rupture with Turkey had been abandoned. The Tsar had resorted to severe language only to avoid being accused of weakness or fear. In reality, his thoughts were so occupied with Spain that he waited only for the first opportunity to return his minister to the Porte. Much depended, however, on the tone of the Turkish reply to the Russian note of September 26.[39]

Lord Strangford, reprimanded and chastened, again was placed in charge of negotiations with the Porte. In this capacity, he was directed

---

Vienna embassy, conveyed this information to the Duke before he reached Vienna, perhaps at Munich. Stewart to Bathurst, No. 11, Vienna, 24 Sept., 1822, F. O., Austria, 120/54; J. E. S. Green, "Castlereagh's Instructions for the Conferences at Vienna, 1822," *TRHS,* 3rd ser., VII, 123.

[37] Wellington to Canning, Vienna, 4 Oct., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I, 353.

[38] Canning to Wellington, Foreign Office, 24 Sept., *ibid.,* p. 349f. Wellington to Canning, Vienna, 4 Oct., and Verona, 18 Nov., 1822, *ibid.,* pp. 354, 542; Canning to Stewart, No. 1, Foreign Office, 24 Sept. 1822, F. O. Austria 120/54; Prokesch-Osten, *Gent aux hospodars* II, 146.

[39] Declaration of Tatischev, Verona, 9 Nov., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I, 525ff.; Boislecomte, A. A. E., 722; Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 159; Lebzeltern, *Mémoires,* p. 423

to take the lead in discussions with the Reis-Effendi and "to fix" for the other allied ministers "the part which they are to take severally in the negotiation." Departing from Verona on Thursday, November 28, Strangford returned to his post via Trieste and Corfù. Upon his arrival in Constantinople, he found the new Austrian internuncio, Baron Franz v. Ottenfels, who had presented his credentials to the Sultan on October 15.[40]
15.[04]

If the Congress of Verona disposed of the Russo-Turkish dispute by adopting a "meaningless formula," which "involved no action," it disavowed the Greeks' struggle for independence by turning a deaf ear to their appeals for assistance. Throughout 1822 Strangford's orders from home remained the same: do not meddle in Greek affairs. According to Gentz, "it was a matter of courtesy not to mention Turkish difficulties at Verona." This general attitude of indifference or disapproval was laconically expressed by François Chateaubriand. When asked what he made of the Greek question, the French plenipotentiary replied: "Nothing." Under these circumstances, the Greek question was treated with silence at Verona, a silence which Metternich interpreted as a satisfactory understanding among the allies.[41] While the rejection of the Greek cause amazed the friends of Greece, it gave great satisfaction to the Turks. Commenting on this repudiation of the Greeks, Gentz declared:

> It is a remarkable circumstance . . . that after all the stormy discussions, all the diplomatic maneuvers, and the immense excitement which this famous insurrection has produced in all the nations of Europe, not one voice has been raised in favor of the Greeks at the Congress of Verona.[42]

Castlereagh's suicide had deprived Metternich of a close personal friend and staunch ally whose influence on the Tsar was great, but so complete was the Anglo-Austrian *entente* that his death neither stalemated nor seriously impaired joint efforts to preserve the status quo in the Near East. The decisions reached on the Eastern Question at the Hanover Rendezvous and its sequel, the Vienna Conference, reversed the Troppau Protocol, which sanctioned armed intervention in the internal affairs of independent states. In the name of the Alliance, Alexander, once more "grouped" at Vienna as he had been at Laibach, was restrained from declaring war on the Porte for the sake either of the Sultan's Greek subjects, or the Danubian Principalities, or Black Sea commerce. The purging of the Russian diplomatic and consular staff in the Balkans and the restoration of Strangford to the Tsar's confidence were other accomplishments of the Vienna Conference which promoted the cause of peace. Since the Congress of Verona contributed nothing to alter decisions which had previously been taken, its role in the Russo-Turkish dispute was distinctly secondary to the Vienna Conference.

---

[40] Boislecomte, A. A. E., 722; Wellington to Canning, Verona, 18 and 28 Nov., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I, 540, 599; Wellington to Strangford: Separate Memorandum, Verona, 28 Nov., 1822, *ibid.,* p. 604; Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls,* I, 179. Because of Strangford's Turkophile sympathies, the Tsar was strongly disposed for a while to replace him with the Austrian minister to the Porte. Indeed, the Russian delegation at Verona considered Strangford's "précis of his conference of the 27th of August with the Reis Effendi ... to be a romance from beginning to end." Wellington to Canning, Verona, 18 Nov., 1822, *Well. Desp.,* I. 540.

[41] Sweet, *Gentz,* p. 248; Crawley, *The Greek Question,* pp. 26, 35; H. du Coudray, *Metternich* (New Haven, 1936), p. 221.

[42] Prokesch-Osten, *Gentz aux hospodars,* II, 157.

After the Russian note of September 26, 1822, had been transmitted to Constantinople, it remained for Austria and Britain to persuade the Porte to adopt three proposals in order to end her dispute with Russia. First, Turkey should inform the allies of the measures already executed in Wallachia and Moldavia. Secondly, Turkey should enter into immediate negotiations with the allies on the navigation of the Black Sea and the abuse of the Russian flag. Thirdly, Turkey should pacify Greece herself. In February 1823 the Porte, under constant prodding from Strangford, finally notified Russia of the evacuation of the Principalities (then proceeding with agonizing slowness), and of the re-establishment therein of normal government.[43] Anglo-Austrian mediation, however, ultimately failed to solve the Eastern Question, and after August 1824 the Tsar, because of Metternich's intrigues with the Turks, refused to cooperate with Austria on this issue. Although Minciaky went to Constantinople as Russian chargé d'affaires in 1825, and Ribeaupierre followed him as ambassador in 1827, a permanent solution to the Eastern Question eluded the Great Powers like a will-o'-the-wisp.[44] Indeed, this enigmatic issue has continued to confront and confound European diplomats down to our own time. During the nineteenth century it merely shifted from one phase to another. Its three main points were: (1) rising Balkan nationalism and rivalry, (2) rivalry between Russia and the West, and (3) the corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire. The diplomacy of Austria and Britain succeeded not only in preserving peace in the Near East until 1828, but also in keeping Russia out of the Balkans. The continuation of this policy *vis-à-vis* commissars no less than tsars has culminated in the "Truman Doctrine" and the NATO alliance of contemporary world politics.

North Texas State College

---

[43] Metternich to Ottenfels, Venice, 21 Dec., 1822, Metternich, *Mémoires,* III, 621; Schroeder, "Metternich's Diplomacy," p. 279f.

[44] Lobanov-Rostovsky, *Russia and Europe, 1789-1825,* pp. 415, 426. After the Porte adhered to the Convention of Akkerman (October 7, 1826), Ribeaupierre was sent to Constantinople, arriving there on February 11, 1827.

THE POLITICS OF GUSTAF MANNERHEIM

by Marvin Rintala

GUSTAF Mannerheim was quite probably the most famous and the least known modern Finnish political figure. For three decades he was a leading member of the older generation of conservatives. Twice, during critical postwar situations (first in 1918-1919 and again in 1944-1946), he served as a head of state, first as Regent and then as President. Around his name there grew a myth of international proportions. Since the Winter War his military genius has been widely recognized. Mannerheim is one of two Finns (the other being Jean Sibelius) of whom most civilized Westerners have heard. On his seventy-fifth birthday, in June 1942, he became the first and undoubtedly last Marshal of Finland; among those visiting Mannerheim's military headquarters that day to offer congratulations was (to use the visitor's own phrase) an unknown soldier from the First World War, Adolf Hitler. Mannerheim, who had been a general in the Great War, was one of the few human beings before whom Hitler showed any signs of humility after 1933. Unlike some other Marshals, Mannerheim did not grovel before the former corporal. As they met, Mannerheim stood stiffly as ever while Hitler bowed before him. During the luncheon in the Marshal's honor Hitler's table talk was confined to gracious statements about his host.[1] Hitler was not the first German ruler to honor Mannerheim. In 1918 the latter had been awarded the Iron Cross; according to the statement of Emperor William II, he was the first foreign military officer who had fought against Germany to receive such recognition.[2]

In the land of his birth Mannerheim was loved and hated intensely. Those whom he led to victory in the Finnish Civil War of 1918 saw him as the chief figure in the attainment of Finnish independence; those whom he defeated in 1918 saw him as the devil incarnate. His supporters considered Mannerheim the greatest Finn of his time,[3] the greatest Finnish soldier,[4] or simply the greatest of all Finns.[5] After his death, the League of Finnish Nobles proudly proclaimed that Mannerheim was the pride and glory of the Finnish nobility.[6] A Finnish newspaper reported that on the first anniversary of the beginning of the Civil War "Finland's uncrowned king" was followed around Vaasa by throngs of worshipful subjects.[7] Justification for these unqualified endorsements was seen in the fact that Mannerheim was the Savior of Finland in three wars: 1918, 1939-1940, and 1941-1944.[8] It appeared that he had been chosen directly by God to save his nation; it was divine intervention which led the wandering Finn back to his homeland in December 1917 after three brilliant decades in the Imperial Army of the Russian Emperor.[9] There is no evidence that Mannerheim considered himself the agent of God, but he did state privately that Fate had made him the embodiment of what the Finnish nation needed in 1918-1919.[10]

---

[1] Erik Heinrichs, *Mannerheim Suomen kohtaloissa,* II, *Suomen marsalkka* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1959), p. 317f.; Taru Stenvall, *Marski ja hänen "Hovinsa"* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1956), pp. 158f., 164.

[2] Erik Heinrichs, *Mannerheim Suomen kohtaloissa,* I, *Valkoinen kenraali 1918-1919* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1957), p. 224n.

[3] Anni Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka—elämäkerta* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1953), pp. 8, 378, 405; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 446.

[4] Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* pp. 12, 319, 387, 405; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 295.

[5] Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* pp. 12, 309; Tancred Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim* (London, 1940), pp. 247, 278; Gustaf Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim—Muistopuhe," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka Vapaaherra Gustaf Mannerheim. Sotilas—Valtiomies—Ihminen* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1953), p. 32; Olof Lindeman, "Muistelmia Marsalkan viimeisiltä vuosilta," in *ibid.*, pp. 144, 155.

[6] Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim," pp. 9, 24. In view of the fact that this nobility has been dying out since Finland became a republic in 1917 or 1919 (the date depends upon one's preferences in constitutional law), this judgment, at least, is likely to remain unchallenged.

Not all Finns accepted this favorable estimate of Mannerheim, especially during the interwar decades. For those defeated in the Civil War he remained "the butcher of Finland's workers and farmers."[11] Critics of his large policy of Finnish intervention in the Russian Civil War referred to Mannerheim as Finland's chief warmonger.[12] He was attacked as responsible for Finland's involvement in the Second World War,[13] and venomously satirical cartoons depicted his checkered career.[14] Indicative of the mistrust in which his name was held among those defeated in 1918 was the budget request of the Social Democratic Cabinet in 1927: additional government support for General Mannerheim's Child Welfare League would be dependent upon a change in the name of that organization.[15] The Social Democratic Party had vigorously opposed election of

---

[7] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 314f.

[8] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* pp. 170f., 174, 245; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 10; Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* pp. 192, 195f.; Hugo Backmansson, "Hajanaisia muistelmia," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 86; Wolf. H. Halsti, *Suomen puolustaminen—Suomen puolustuskysymyksen ja puolustusmahdollisuuksien pääpiirteet. Mitä jokaisen kansalaisen tulisi tietää näistä asioista* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1939), p. 154. This was true outside of Finland as well. For instance, Mannerheim was described during the crucial Russo-Finnish negotiations of 1939 as "... the one man who won freedom for Finland ..." in 1918. "The Liberator of Finland Mobilizes Against Russia," *Life,* Vol. 7, No. 17 (October 23, 1939), p. 22. A few months later, the British public was told that "... because of him, Gustaf Mannerheim, Finland was free" in 1918. Paul Rodzianko, *Mannerheim: An Intimate Picture of a Great Soldier and Statesman* (London, 1940), p. 144.

[9] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 115; Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 396. The German Minister to Finland during the Second World War was less charitable in describing Mannerheim's return: "But when Bolshevism came to power in Russia, Mannerheim remembered that he had been born in Finland and returned to Finland." Wipert v. Blücher, *Suomen kohtalonaikoja—Muistelmia vuosilta 1935-44* (translated by Lauri Hirvensalo, Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1950), p. 239.

[10] Carl Enckell, "Muutama muistelma yhteistyöstäni Gustaf Mannerheimin kanssa," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 42; Carl Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani,* II (translated by Heikki Impola, Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1956), pp. 336, 346.

[11] O. Vilmi, *Fasismi Suomessa—Sen syyt ja tarkoitus* (Leningrad: Valtion kustannusliike kirja, 1931), p. 51.

[12] O. H. Puro in Parliament, *Valtiopäivät 1919, Pöytäkirjat,* II, 1357.

[13] A. Äikiä, *Tulikantele—Runoja* (Petrozavodsk: Karjalais-Suomalaisen SNT:n valtion kustannusliike, 1947), p. 91; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 397f.

[14] A. Halonen, editor, *Suomen Luokkasota—Historiaa ja Muistelmia* (Superior, Wisconsin: Amerikan Suom. Sos. Kustannusliikkeiden Liitto, 1928), p. 80.

[15] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 389.

Mannerheim to the presidency in 1919 because of his role in the Civil War. It was therefore ironic when, at Mannerheim's state funeral in 1951, the Social Democratic Speaker of Parliament, Karl-August Fagerholm, stated that only the deceased could have led Finland out of war in 1944 without an internal struggle.[16] This was not merely funeral oratory—in 1944 Fagerholm had privately predicted that the election of Mannerheim to the presidency would prove "a blessing to the Fatherland."[17]

Today, largely because of his role in the Second World War, Gustaf Mannerheim has many more admirers in Finland than there were in the interwar decades. In many important respects he is a symbol of the *Volksgemeinschaft* which the Finnish nation experienced during the Winter War. His grave is a national shrine, and yet the substance of his politics remains, as before, shrouded in mystery. If this is true in Mannerheim's homeland, it is doubly so outside of Finland. Mannerheim's politics appear to have confounded most foreign observers. He has been labelled a Francophile,[18] a Russophobe,[19] a Germanophile,[20] and even pro-Nazi.[21] His surname has been frequently and mistakenly assumed to be "von Mannerheim," not only by non-scholars,[22] but by authors of scholarly monographs[23] and even in dictionaries.[24]

The easiest, and at first glance the most reasonable, of all resolutions to the conflicting interpretations of Mannerheim's politics is to conclude that (for instance in 1918) he ". . . was neither pro-German nor pro-Entente. He was simply pro-Finnish."[25] This would be, in the case of most Finnish political figures, an entirely correct resolution. In the case at hand, however, this is an overly simple and misleading interpretation. Gustaf Mannerheim was an extremely complicated, sophisticated, and atypical Finn; this fact, rather than lack of intelligence on the part of foreign observers, is responsible for much of the existing confusion about Mannerheim's politics.[26] It is remarkable, but nonetheless true, that Mannerheim was not a Finnish nationalist. His evaluation of the Finnish nation was not always the highest. In 1922 he privately warned the King of Sweden that his fellow Finns were conceited and that their promises should not be trusted.[27] The crucial aspect of Finnish nationalism in the nineteenth century (when Mannerheim was maturing intellectually) was acceptance of the language of the Finnish-speaking majority rather than the language of the Swedish-speaking minority. Not only was Mannerheim born into a Swedish-speaking family, but he did not learn the Finnish language until he was fifty years old.[28] He learned, and found much more use for, the great cultural languages of Europe before he mastered Finnish. A Frenchman who met him after the Second World War observed that Mannerheim spoke that precise French which one heard only from persons who had once been at the court of the Russian Emperor.[29] As Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guards in 1918 he needed an interpreter to deal with his troops, as he did not yet know the language which most of them spoke.[30] Several delegations visited the Cabinet, demanding his removal because of inability to speak Finnish adequately.[31] Even as Regent of Finland, Mannerheim was not proficient in Finnish.[32] This linguistic deficiency was one of the factors leading the Agrarian Party to oppose his election to the presidency in 1919.[33]

---

[16] Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 401; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 460f.

[17] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 396.

[18] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 90.

[19] Walter Duranty, *USSR: The Story of Soviet Russia* (Philadelphia, 1944), p. 251. In describing the beginning of the Russo-Finnish War of 1941-1944, an American scholar stated: "In Finland, bloody Baron Mannerheim, put in power by German arms in 1918, launched his war of revenge against Russia." Frederick L. Schuman, *Design for Power: The Struggle for the World* (New York, 1942), p. 131. In fact, German arms put P. E. Svinhufvud, not Mannerheim, into power in 1918; it was only the defeat of the Central Powers which made possible Mannerheim's election to the regency in December 1918. It should further be apparent that Mannerheim had no reason to seek revenge against Russia, which had been very good to him for three decades.

[20] Frederick L. Schuman, *Night over Europe: The Diplomacy of Nemesis 1939-1940* (New York, 1941), p. 399. During the Winter War a Finnish-born British scholar stated heatedly but correctly that to label Mannerheim pro-German was ". . . utterly baseless, indeed grotesque . . ." Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 137.

[21] Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York, 1948), p. 388.

[22] Erich von Ludendorff, *Ludendorff's Own Story—August 1914 - November 1918: The Great War from the Siege of Liege to the Signing of the Armistice as viewed from the Grand Headquarters of the German Army* (New York 1919), II, 263f.; *A King's Story: The Memoirs of the Duke of Windsor* (New York, 1951), p. 270.

[23] C. Jay Smith, Jr., *Finland and the Russian Revolution, 1917-1922* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1958), pp. 30, 219, 221, 223, 225, 227, 232.

[24] *Webster's Biographical Dictionary* (first edition), p. 963.

[25] George F. Kennan, *Soviet-American Relations, 1917-1920: The Decision to Intervene* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 40.

Prior to 1918 Gustaf Mannerheim was unknown in Finland, except among his Swedish-speaking noble relatives and friends.[34] A member of the (conservative) Old Finnish parliamentary bloc later described a meeting of that bloc as the Finnish Civil War was beginning, on January 28, 1918: "Who was Mannerheim? Not one member of the parliamentary bloc could give an answer."[35] Four months later, Mannerheim left for Stockholm, having been ousted as Commander-in-Chief by the Finnish Cabinet: "My departure from Finland presented me with no difficulties, since I possessed neither a home nor goods. My earthly possessions could easily be contained in a couple of suitcases."[36] The reason for this rootlessness was simple: at the age of twenty, expelled from the Finnish Cadet Corps for disciplinary reasons, the young Mannerheim had decided to make his career in Russia rather than in Finland, as an officer in the Imperial Army. When, in December 1917, after thirty years in that army, Mannerheim returned to Finland, he was, to use a formulation of his most important biographer, a stranger from a sunken world.[37]

---

[26] A friend of his went so far as to exclaim that Mannerheim "... led the strangest, most tumultuous life that ever befell a great soldier ..." Rodzianko, *Mannerheim*, p. 222.

[27] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, II, 468.

[28] It is mistaken, although politically useful, to assert that Mannerheim "... had always known Finnish ...," as does Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim*, p. 128.

[29] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, II, 50.

[30] Martti Pihkala to author, May 14, 1956; Blücher, *Suomen kohtalonaikoja*, p. 239; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 100; A. E. Martola, "Marsalkka Mannerheim ja vapaaehtoinen puolustustyö," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka*, p. 106.

[31] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 101.

[32] Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani—II*, p. 335; Enckell, "Muutama muistelma," p. 40; Paavo Virkkunen, *Itsenäisen Suomen alkuvuosikymmeniltä—elettyä ja ajateltua* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1954), p. 22.

[33] Paavo Hirvikallio, *Tasavallan presidentin vaalit Suomessa 1919-1950* (Helsinki: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1958), p. 11.

[34] Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim," p. 18; Enckell, "Muutama muistelma," p. 33f.; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani*, II, 330, 346; Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka*, pp. 384, 399; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 391.

[35] Paavo Virkkunen, *Kahden sataluvun vaiheilta—elettyä ja ajateltua* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1953), p. 320.

The world of Gustaf Mannerheim was sunken in more than one respect: he was a cosmopolite in the age of nationalism; an aristocrat in the age of democracy; a conservative in the age of revolutions. These facts were at the same time his glory and his tragedy. That Mannerheim remained after 1917 an exception to the world about him was a measure of his individuality and personal integrity; his uniqueness, however, inevitably made him a leader without followers, a general without an army in politics. Mannerheim could not be a Finnish nationalist because of his language; he could not be an extremist member of the Swedish-language minority in Finland because of himself. After 1918 he resisted the efforts of these extremists to bring his famous name into their camp. Even though he was a Swedish-speaking Finn, it is not known whether he voted for candidates of the Swedish People's Party, to which a large part of the minority belonged. Furthermore, at a crucial point in the language struggle within Finland, in the 1930s, he publicly called for linguistic peace.[38] In his personal life he was conspicuous for the divergent nationalities of his friends and acquaintances. It seems safe to say that he had more personal friends outside of Finland than in it: within Finland his only close friend, outside the family circle, was Rudolf Walden, a wealthy industrialist. Mannerheim's foreign friends ranged from Indian maharajahs with whom he went big-game hunting to British and French aristocrats (notably absent were Germans). Before the First World War, while stationed in Warsaw, he found substantial personal satisfaction in the social life of the Polish nobility, especially as a member of the Cercle de Chasse.[39] While in St. Petersburg Mannerheim partook fully of the luxurious and cosmopolitan world of the Russian nobility.[40] He was a truly European *grand seigneur*.[41] When he wanted news of international politics—even during the darkest and busiest days of the Second World War—he faithfully consulted his favorite source of news, the *Journal de*

---

[36] *The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim* (translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt, New York, 1954), p. 184.

[37] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 17.

[38] *Memoirs,* p. 283f.; Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 225f.; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 60ff.

[39] *Memoirs,* p. 76f.; Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim," p. 15f.; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* p. 102ff.; Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 58; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 14f.

[40] Enckell, "Muutama muistelma," p. 34; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani,* II, 330.

[41] Erik Heinrichs, "Mannerheim ylipäällikkönä," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 57; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 15, 406.

Genève.[42] Mannerheim's last years were spent, appropriately enough, in Switzerland, where he was a man of the world to the very end.[43]

No fact about Mannerheim's politics is as important as that, although he was a cosmopolite, there was one land he loved very deeply and very persistently: the old Russia that he grew to know during his career in the Imperial Army. At the age of twenty he arrived in Russia, and was overwhelmed by the grandeur of it all. In the words of a sycophantic biographer: "And certainly, to a Finn, at the impressionable age of Gustaf Mannerheim in 1887, the whole was very strange, very wonderful: opening up, too, boundless fields for his ambition."[44] More than six decades later, the Marshal of Finland recalled this important decision: ". . . I thus took a step which was to be of enormous importance for my future by removing me from the limited opportunities offered by my own country into a wider world."[45] In this larger world Mannerheim married the daughter of a well-known and well-to-do Russian family; Anastasie Arapov's father was a general *à la Suite* of the Emperor.[46] A Lutheran, Mannerheim appears to have been overwhelmed by the Russian Orthodox Easter.[47] At the coronation of Emperor Nicholas II, he was one of two Chevalier Guards who, sword in hand, walked before the Emperor in the coronation procession.[48] Mannerheim, fifty-five years later, still remembered the ceremonies preceding the coronation as "indescribably magnificent."[49] He volunteered for service in the Russo-Japanese War, even though General Brusilov disapproved.[50] In the war Mannerheim served under General Kuropatkin, who in Finland was ". . . particularly disliked as the chief instigator of the measure which led to the adoption of the Conscription Act of 1901 [drafting Finns into the Imperial Army] and to the destruction of the Finnish army."[51] At the same time that Gustaf Mannerheim was fighting in the Russo-Japanese War his brother Carl was in exile from Finland because of his opposition to Russification measures. Although Carl Mannerheim objected vigorously to his brother's participation in the war,[52] there is no sign that the latter suffered pangs of conscience at this (or any other) time concerning service in the Imperial Army. During the Russo-Japanese War, Finns who were working actively for Finnish independence not only hoped for a Russian defeat[53] but were able to purchase arms with Japanese funds.[54] Even those Finns who supported a relatively conciliatory attitude towards Russia viewed Russian military setbacks with satisfaction.[55]

---

[42] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 188, 329, 382, 420f.

[43] G. A. Gripenberg, "Marsalkka Mannerheimin luonnekuvan piirteitä," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 65.

[44] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 19.

[45] *Memoirs,* p. 5.

[46] *Ibid.,* p. 9f.; Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 20f.; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 285; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* pp. 50-52. Gustaf and Anastasie Mannerheim separated after seven years of marriage, and were eventually divorced many years later. Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 40f.

[47] *Memoirs,* p. 10; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* pp. 30f., 98.

[48] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 21; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* p. 54.

[49] *Memoirs,* p. 11.

[50] *Ibid.,* p. 13f.; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* p. 61; Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 32.

[51] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 32.

[52] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 40.

Throughout the First World War Mannerheim fought for Russia, rising to the rank of Lieutenant General, in command of the Sixth Cavalry Army Corps in Transylvania. Even after he left Russia in 1917 Mannerheim felt a sense of loyalty and gratitude towards the Imperial Government which had been so generous to him for so long.[56] One of the less important—but highly revealing—ways in which this loyalty and gratitude was manifested were the regular visits paid to the Dowager Empress Maria Feodorovna in Denmark in the interwar years.[57] The definitive statement of Mannerheim's attitude towards the old Russia was given when, near the end of his life, he remembered his return to Finland after the October Revolution:

> My thirty years of service in the Imperial Army were ended. It was with great expectations I had begun them in Russia, that vast and alien country, and when I now looked back on the many years I had worn the uniform of the Tsar, I had to admit with gratitude that my expectations had been fulfilled. I had entered into wider fields which had given me a broader vision than I could have had had I remained in Finland in the years around the turn of the century. I had been fortunate in belonging to, and in commanding, crack troops with good officers and excellent morale. It had given me great satisfaction to command troops such as these, both in peace and war. Also I had seen so much of great interest in two continents.[58]

Mannerheim, in turn, was remembered with gratitude by his fellow officers in the Imperial Army. In the early 1920s his former Commander-in-Chief, Grand Duke Nicholas, toasted him as a man who had fulfilled his obligations.[59] After Mannerheim's death former officers in the Imperial Army held a Requiem Mass in Paris for their former comrade-in-arms.[60]

One concrete reminder of Mannerheim's life in Russia during the three decades of his participation in Finnish politics was his ability to use the Russian language. This was an advantage which, remarkably enough, was shared by very few other Finns in public life, except for other members of the generation of older conservatives like J. K. Paasikivi. This linguistic talent was by no means the only remnant after 1917 of a career in Russia. In a much more fundamental sense, Mannerheim continued to speak the language of Russian politics even after the Bolsheviks came to power. During the Russian Civil War he actively supported armed Finnish participation in that war. After the Bolsheviks were firmly entrenched in power, Mannerheim consistently supported a policy of Finnish conciliation toward what he considered either legitimate or unavoidable Russian demands. In other words, he was vigorously anti-Bolshevik but never anti-Russian. This fact would be difficult to overemphasize. Immediately after the February Revolution in Russia Mannerheim unsuccessfully attempted to arouse counterrevolutionary sentiment against the Provisional Government.[61] This revolution made a deep impression on him.[62] Indicative of his attitude towards the Kerensky regime was the feeling that 'Russia's grave-digger," Kerensky, ". . . contributed actively to the downfall of Russia." Mannerheim drew from the history of the Provisional Government the moral that ". . . socialists are incapable of defending democracy."[63] He therefore sympathized with the Kornilov Rebellion. In view of this attitude, it is hardly surprising that he continued his counterrevolutionary conversations with other officers after the October Revolution.[64] It was, in Mannerheim's view, the obligation of those Finns who had served in the Imperial Army to prevent a Bolshevik takeover of Finland.[65] Such a task, however, was much too small to satisfy his dream of personal grandeur. After his return to Finland Mannerheim saw as his life's mission the continuation of the struggle against Bolshevism.[66] The latter he considered the most barbarous of all despotisms.[67] It was a menace to the whole civilized world.[68] A close associate referred to Mannerheim as an apostle of anti-Communism.[69] Mannerheim wanted to lead Russia back to the old regime in a Crusade against Bolshevism.[70] He was not alone in this evaluation of his capabilities. No less a personage than Emperor William II considered Mannerheim to be the appropriate leader of the counterrevolution in Russia.[71]

---

[53] Herman Gummerus in Juhlatoimikunta, editors, *P. E. Svinhufvud 1861-1936* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1936), pp. 11, 15; Wihtori Kosola, *Viimeistä piirtoa myöten—muistelmia elämäni varrelta* (Lapua: Lapuan kirjapaino, 1935), p. 57.

[54] K. G. Idman, *Maame itsenäistymisen vuosilta—Muistelmia* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1953), p. 22; Kalle Väänänen, *Vainotien vartijat —Etelä-Karjalan maanpuolustushistoriaa* (Viipuri: Viipurin suojeluskuntapiirin piiriesikunta, 1939), p. 26.

[55] *Paasikiven muistelmia sortovuosilta,* I (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1957), p. 136.

[56] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, p. 183f.

[57] *Ibid.,* p. 321f.; *Memoirs,* p. 9.

[58] *Memoirs,* p. 124.

[59] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 9f.

[60] Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 405.

For Mannerheim the Finnish "War of Independence" was merely one aspect of military action on a broad scale to overthrow the Bolshevik

---

[61] *Memoirs,* p. 115.

[62] *The Memoirs of General Wrangel, The Last Commander-in-Chief of The Russian National Army* (translated by Sophie Goulston, London, 1929), p. 16.

[63] *Memoirs,* p. 128. The author of this statement today lies buried among some of his soldiers from the Second World War, almost half of whom were Marxists of one shade or another.

[64] *Ibid.,* pp. 120, 122.

[65] Martin Wetzer, "Muuan kohtaus Karpaateilla," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 89.

[66] Enckell, "Muutama muistelma," p. 44; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani,* II, 338.

[67] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 296, 378.

[68] *Memoirs,* pp. 197, 233.

[69] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 51f.

[70] Heinrichs, "Mannerheim ylipäällikkönä," p. 57; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 356.

[71] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 253; Yrjö Nurmio, *Suomen itsenäistyminen ja Saksa* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1957), pp. 215-219.

Government in Russia. In a proclamation addressed to "Russia's brave soldiers" (that is, those Russian troops still in Finland), dated January 30, 1918, he stated: "Those under my command, the farmers' troops of the independent Republic of Finland, are not fighting against Russia, but have risen to defend freedom and the legal government, and to subdue without pity those groups of hooligans and bandits who publicly threaten the country's legal order as well as property."[72] Once Finland was rid of the Bolsheviks, the larger task could begin. After initiating the war in Finland, Mannerheim ". . . sent information about the victory to Stockholm, from where the news spread over Europe. In the hope that the fight against Bolshevism which the improvised Finnish Army had begun would be regarded as a common cause by all responsible and thinking people in our part of the world, I ended my message with an appeal to all who were able and willing to do so to hasten to our help in the struggle which was not only for Finland alone."[73] During the war in Finland Mannerheim received arms and other assistance from Russian counterrevolutionaries in Petrograd.[74] As Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guards, he probably envisaged military cooperation between his troops and the Entente to drive the Bolsheviks from power in Russia. Mannerheim expected a supply of arms from French depots at Murmansk.[75] His intention was to march with his troops to Petrograd which, in his judgment, could be captured rather easily.[76] Given this objective, occupation of East Karelia and seizure of the Murmansk railway would be necessary preliminaries to actual capture of the womb of the revolution.[77] During the spring of 1918 Mannerheim overcame his antipathy for Germans long enough to urge the German Minister in Finland to support German participation in the restoration of the old Russia.[78] As the war within Finland was drawing to a successful close, Mannerheim wanted to continue the war into Russia.[79]

---

[72] Erkki Räikkönen, *Svinhufvud ja itsenäisyyssenaatti—piirteitä P. E. Svinhufvudin ja hänen johtamansa senaatin toiminnasta ja vaiheista syksyllä 1917 ja keväällä 1918* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1935), p. 520; see also Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 98. Later, of course, bourgeois Finns came to view the Finnish Civil War as a War of Independence in which Finland defeated Russia. The inaccuracy of this assumption is treated at length in my forthcoming study of *Three Generations: The Extreme Right Wing in Finnish Politics.* The bitterness with which both sides fought the Finnish Civil War is indicated by Mannerheim's Order-of-the-Day to his troops, dated March 14, 1918: "The hour has come. the hour for which the whole nation is waiting. Your starving and martyred brothers and sisters in southern Finland fix their last hope on you. The mutilated bodies of the murdered citizens and the ruins of the burnt-down villages call to heaven: vengeance upon the traitors. Break down all obstacles! Advance, White army of White Finland!" Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 138.

[73] *Memoirs,* p. 143. This appeal did not go unheeded. The response was particularly favorable among the Swedish extreme right wing. Many able Swedish officers joined Mannerheim's staff, enhancing considerably its military competence. Aid from Sweden was not confined to volunteers, however. "In this connection should be mentioned the great financial support given by Baron J. Mannerheim and Baron Karl Langenskjöld." J. O. Hannula. *Finland's War of Indebendence* (London, 1939), p. 113f.

[74] *Memoirs,* p. 132; Hannula, *Finland's War,* pp. 100, 110.

[75] *Memoirs,* pp. 123f., 135; Carl Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani,* I (translated by Heikki Impola, Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1956), p. 253.

[76] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 184; A. R. Cederberg, *Suomen uusinta historiaa 1898-1942* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1943), p. 180.

[77] "The Memoirs and Recollections of Rudolf Holsti: An Abridgement" (MS, 1930), p. 16, cited by Malbone W. Graham, *The Diplomatic Recognition of the Border States: Part I: Finland* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1935), p. 185.

Mannerheim's broad policy was destined to remain largely unfulfilled. After the signing of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk on March 3, 1918, such an advance upon Petrograd by Finnish troops was incompatible with the desire of the German military command to prevent a recurrence of hostilities on the Eastern Front.[80] The Finnish Government, anticipating the victory of the Central Powers, refused to risk German displeasure, even though the prospect of Finnish territorial expansion into East Karelia was by no means unattractive. Mannerheim therefore resigned as Commander-in-Chief.[81] The German policy with respect to an advance upon Petrograd by Finnish troops received its clearest expression in the supplementary treaty between Russia and the Central Powers signed at Berlin on August 27, 1918. Article Five of that agreement read:

> Russia will at once employ all the means at her disposal to expel the Entente forces from North Russian territory in observance of her neutrality.
>
> Germany guarantees that during these operations there shall be no Finnish attack of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on St. Petersburg.[82]

According to the Finnish Foreign Minister, his government had not been consulted concerning this guarantee prior to the signing of the supplementary treaty.[83]

Even after the military collapse of Germany Mannerheim's large policy met with insurmountable obstacles. He was elected Regent of Finland to replace P. E. Svinhufvud when the need for a foreign policy orientation based on cooperation with the Entente powers finally became apparent to bourgeois party leaders in Finland—after the Armistice had already been signed. As Regent, Mannerheim engaged in extensive negotiations with counterrevolutionary Russian generals, who were finally prepared to act. These discussions did not result in official Finnish participation in a march upon Petrograd, for the White Russians repeatedly insisted that Finland was within the historic boundaries of the Russian Empire and thus refused to recognize Finnish independence.[84] The fact that the

---

[78] Nurmio, *Suomen itsenäistyminen*, p. 219; Juhani Paasivirta, *Suomi vuonna 1918* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1957), p. 242.

[79] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 222f., 237.

[80] Nurmio, *Suomen itsenäistyminen*, p. 209f.; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani*, II, 111; Otto Stenroth, *Puoli vuotta Suomen ensimmäisenä ulkoministerinä—tapahtumia ja muistelmia* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Otava, 1931), p. 84.

[81] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 238f.

[82] This treaty is reproduced and translated in United States Department of State, *Texts of the Russian 'Peace'* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1918), pp. 179-189.

[83] Stenroth, *Puoli vuotta*, p. 96.

[84] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 340, 354, 356; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani*, II, 112-132; *Memoirs*, pp. 192, 198, 208, 220f.; James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia April - December 1918: Documents and Materials* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1936), p. 341; Leonid I. Strakhovsky, *Intervention at Archangel:*

Finnish extreme right wing not only insisted upon White Russian recognition of Finnish independence, but also anticipated acquisition of considerable areas which (unlike Finland) were an integral part of Russian territory substantially decreased the possibility that Mannerheim's large policy would be carried out. These difficulties did not cause Mannerheim to abandon hope, however. Throughout 1919 his thoughts constantly centered on the idea of intervention.[85] As Regent he not only permitted Finnish volunteers to fight the Bolsheviks in Estonia, but he dictated the choice of Major General Martin Wetzer as their commander.[86] Furthermore, Mannerheim instructed Wetzer as to the way in which these troops should be utilized.[87]

Most Finns were convinced during the Russian Civil War that any Russian government, Red or White, was dangerous. This belief was not shared by Mannerheim. As Regent he reasoned:

> To have taken part in an operation which, so far as Finland was concerned, would be limited to co-operation in the capture of Petersburg [*sic*] and securing a sufficiently large basic area for a stable and healthy government, would represent such a valuable service to reconstituted Russia as to provide in all probability the most enduring basis for future friendly relations. It would indeed be a generous gesture for a neighbour who had lived until quite recently under Russian oppression to repay this with chivalrous assistance.[88]

On October 28, 1919, after his involuntary withdrawal from Finnish politics, Mannerheim sent from Paris an open letter to K. J. Ståhlberg, the new President of Finland, stressing the urgency of Finnish military participation in the capture of Petrograd.[89] To the end of his life Mannerheim remained convinced of the soundness of his large policy. On the thirtieth anniversary of the Armistice, in a letter to a former colleague, he praised President Truman for the latter's firm stand during the Berlin blockade, while expressing regret that not everyone had seen the Bolshevik threat early enough.[90] And Mannerheim later reminded his readers, "Europe and the whole world have had to pay a heavy price for allowing Bolshevism free play in 1919."[91]

Mannerheim's hatred of Bolshevism never led him to support a Finnish foreign policy rigorously antagonistic to Russian national interest. After he realized that Bolshevism was in Russia to stay, he urged Finnish party leaders to meet the Russians half-way in negotiations. During the diplomatic discussions which led to the Winter War, Mannerheim favored

---

The Story of Allied Intervention and Russian Counter-Revolution in North Russia 1918-1920 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), pp. 198-212.

[85] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 371.

[86] Einar W. Juva, *Rudolf Walden 1878-1946* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1957), p. 164; Vilho Helanen, *Suomalaiset Viron vapaussodassa* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Kirja, 1921), p. 130f.

[87] *Memoirs*, p. 207.

[88] *Ibid.*, p. 233.

[89] *Ibid.*, p. 234f.; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, I, 378f.

[90] Enckell, "Muutama muistelma," p. 46; Enckell, *Poliittiset Muistelmani*, II, 339.

[91] *Memoirs*, p. 236.

more concessions to Russia than the Finnish Government was willing to grant.[92] As Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army during the Winter War he recognized that the eventual outcome of the war could only be a Finnish defeat, and therefore urged a speedy peace.[93] In the Russo-Finnish War of 1941-1944 Mannerheim led Finnish troops into East Karelia. It is possible he considered that the only alternatives were German or Finnish occupation of East Karelia, and chose the latter. In any event, he expressed the view that permanent annexation of East Karelia by Finland was not in the national interest of the latter.[94] Indeed, his Chief of Staff concluded that Mannerheim not only opposed territorial expansion to the east, but favored, even during the war of 1941-1944, ceding at war's end territory on the Karelian Isthmus which had belonged to Finland before 1939.[95] Much earlier than most Finns Mannerheim realized that Germany would lose the war and that it was therefore a categorical imperative for Finland to remove itself from the war before the final military collapse of Germany.[96] As President he led Finland out of the war and into that remarkably successful adjustment of Finnish foreign policy which came to be known as the Paasikivi line.[97]

The fact that the politics of Gustaf Mannerheim were so different from the politics of most Finns in the twentieth century is attributable to his being one of the last great aristocrats in European politics. He was a baron, and his father a count. Gustaf Mannerheim did not grow up among the masses, but in a castle. He never learned, or needed to learn, to be thrifty as the bourgeoisie or the proletariat. Fame was for him a very sharp spur. His life's goal was far above the ordinary.[98] Mannerheim was, to use Alexis de Tocqueville's formulation, one of those men who had been shaped by the old order, and who, despite superficial alternations due to the march of events, never changed out of recognition. Mannerheim's bearing aroused respect for his person—if not agreement with his politics—wherever he went.[99] His most emphatic criticism of others came when he felt that they had not acted in a chivalrous manner.[100] His personal experiences in the

---

[92] *Ibid.*, pp. 300-303, 314f.; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, II, 90f., 97f., 184; J. K. Paasikivi, *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939-41*, I, *Talvisota* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1958), pp. 2, 69, 100ff.; J. K. Paasikivi, *Toimintani Moskovassa ja Suomessa 1939-41*, II, *Välirauhan aika* (Porvoo: Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 1958), p. 80; Väinö Tanner, *Olin ulkoministerinä talvisodan aikana* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1950), pp. 52f., 86.

[93] Paasikivi, *Toimintani*, I, 122, 161; Tanner, *Olin*, p. 368.

[94] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, II, 236, 276, 306f.

[95] *Ibid.*, p. 251.

[96] *Ibid.*, pp. 336f., 347f.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 465. This policy of good relations with all powers, especially the Soviet Union, is well described by John H. Hodgson, "The Paasikivi Line," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. XVIII, No. 2 (April, 1959), pp. 145-173; Allan A. Kuusisto, "The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. XII, No. 1, Part 1 (March, 1959), pp. 37-49.

[98] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim*, II, 462.

[99] King Edward VIII considered Mannerheim the most impressive figure among foreign dignitaries at the funeral of King George V. *Ibid.*, p. 49.

[100] Gripenberg, "Marsalkka Mannerheimin luonnekuvan piirteitä," p. 64f.

Russian Revolution reveal the kind of man he was. With many other representatives of the old Russia, Mannerheim spent the evening of March 11, 1917, at a ballet performance in the Imperial Opera. Upon emerging from this gala event, he encountered for the first time the revolution.[101] When he finally decided to return to Finland, in December 1917, he found himself in Odessa. Mannerheim refused to make any concessions to the fact that the equalitarian revolution was omnipresent and apparently omnipotent. He traveled from Odessa to Petrograd in a private railway car, dressed in the full uniform of an Imperial Corps Commander.[102] Upon arrival in Petrograd "... it disgusted me to see generals carrying their own kit. However, I found two soldiers who quite willingly took charge of mine..."[103] Within Finland Mannerheim's aristocratic manner was, according to the German Minister in Finland, unique.[104] Mannerheim's table at military headquarters during the Second World War was known among his aides, with good reason, as "Mannerheim's court."[105] Late in life he was compared by a Frenchman to a member of the court at Versailles who had survived to the middle of the twentieth century.[106]

Mannerheim's political thought was as aristocratic as his personality.[107] He never accepted democracy.[108] This does not mean that Mannerheim was totalitarian in his politics. Totalitarianism, while it is antidemocratic, recognizes the fact that democratic ideals exist and therefore attempts to integrate all of society by maintaining the fiction of popular consent. The postdemocratic nature of totalitarianism was, if anything, more foreign to the predemocratic politics of Gustaf Mannerheim than democracy. He wanted to retreat to the titled world of St. Petersburg drawing rooms rather than to advance to the equalitarian world of the concentration camp and the permanent purge. Some would call his politics reactionary, but at least he could claim with considerable justice that the new world was not even as good as—let alone better than—his world. Mannerheim never ceased to lament the arrival of democracy. In 1923 he complained that Poland, where he had spent such pleasant years before the Great War, now found it impossible to elect a suitably dignified head of state "because of democratic pressure."[109] He never accepted parliamentary government, the institutional expression of Finnish democracy. One of the major consequences of Finnish participation in the Revolution of 1905 was the abolition of the Diet composed of Four Estates, which was replaced by a unicameral Parliament elected by universal suffrage. Mannerheim described this truly radical reform almost a half-century later: "Were the Finnish people going to show themselves ready for such a revolutionary change? The answer was given eleven years later [in the Civil War of 1918]. It was in the negative."[110] It is difficult to imagine any other well-known Finn making such a statement—without being challenged.

---

[101] *Memoirs,* p. 110.

[102] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 68f.; Rodzianko, *Mannerheim,* p. 118; Martin Franck, "Husaarin muistelmia kenraali Mannerheimista ensimmäisen maailmansodan ajoilta," in Suomen Aatelisliitto, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 98; Räikkönen, *Svinhufvud,* p. 217f.

[103] *Memoirs,* p. 122.

[104] Blücher, *Suomen kohtalonaikoja,* p. 21.

[105] Stenvall, *Marski.*

[106] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 450.

[107] Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim," p. 21.

[108] Voipio, *Suomen Marsalkka,* p. 402.

[109] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 15.

In both 1918[111] and 1919[112] Mannerheim favored a monarchy in the struggle over the Finnish form of government. In 1918, however, he was in political exile from Finland, and his support for a Scandinavian[113] rather than a German prince as King of Finland was therefore politically insignificant. By 1919, when he was Regent, monarchism was a lost cause in Finland. In 1930, Mannerheim supported the antiparliamentary Lapua Movement. Shortly before the crucial parliamentary election in October of that year, he issued a statement praising the "unselfish patriotic aims"[114] of this movement, which was outlawed in 1932 because its leaders attempted an armed revolt against the Finnish Government. Hindsight did not change Mannerheim's mind on this matter. He remained convinced that "this expression of the Finnish people's reaction to the abuse of freedom and democracy . . . " had made possible an end to ". . . the period of decay in the 1920s."[115] In his eyes the Lapua Movement was a demonstration of the fact that ". . . even in the life of a nation, balance reasserts itself sooner or later, and the moment comes when the broad masses feel instinctively that order is preferable to unbridled liberty."[116] This Grand Inquisitorial conception of the relationship between liberty and order might have possessed some validity if the Lapua Movement had embodied order instead of anarchy.

Mannerheim attempted in 1940 to strip the Minister of Defense of some of the latter's powers in favor of himself. The reason given by Mannerheim was that the Minister of Defense was responsible to Parliament, which in turn was subject to control by political parties.[117] In this attempt Mannerheim revealed the basic reason for his mistrust of parliamentary government. The idea of executive responsibility to an unrepresentative legislature would probably not have been repugnant to him. It was the fact that political parties—the peoples' great intermediaries, to use Sigmund Neumann's telling phrase—channeled both the election of members to a representative Parliament and their behavior once elected which made parliamentary government so objectionable. Party activity was, in Mannerheim's judgment, symptomatic of an undisciplined, disruptive, and selfish attitude towards politics.[118] A leading Finnish political scientist has there-ore concluded that Mannerheim was above parties.[119] This is certainly rue in the sense that Mannerheim refused to join or lead[120] any party. It night, however, be more accurate to say that Mannerheim was preparty (just as he was predemocratic) rather than above party in his politics. Rather than rising above political parties, he refused to acknowledge their existence. His leadership, when offered, was intensely personal. In a speech given in 1933, on the fifteenth anniversary of the end of the Finnish Civil War, Mannerheim made eminently clear his preparty conception of politics:

---

[110] *Memoirs,* p. 24.

[111] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 231; Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 235.

[112] *Memoirs,* p. 222.

[113] Idman, *Maamme,* p. 314; Anatole G. Mazour, *Finland between East and West* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), p. 59.

[114] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 19.

[115] *Memoirs,* p. 244.

[116] *Ibid.,* p. 243.

[117] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 208f.

[118] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 292.

> Once upon a time, the sense of justice—enlightened and built up on time-honoured usage and noble traditions—was, especially for our people, more than the written law, the norm for the life of the nation and the actions of the individual. It was this sense of justice which shaped the personality, gave the character its strength, and brought forth resolution, the will to take risks and the readiness to bear responsibility. Nowadays, it seems to me, opinions are formed in quite a different fashion. It is far less the individual who, under the sense of profound responsibility, makes his decision; it is party opinion which—unhampered by traditional conceptions of honour—under the auspices of the vast agglomerations of people and split-up responsibilities, favours the commonplace, appeals to all that is undeveloped, and drastically hems in the intellectual mobility of the individual. Indeed, many indications suggest that the struggle and party strife of to-day are on the point of affecting the very soul of the people. I hope, however, and believe, that if this is the case, it is yet something transitory.[121]

Unfortunately for Mannerheim's dreams of political leadership, the age of parties was not merely transitory in Finnish politics. Isolation was the inevitable result for anyone who rejected party affiliation. If Mannerheim was cold towards Finnish parties, the latter were frigid in their attitude towards him. Finnish party leaders repeatedly made it evident that, in their judgment, Gustaf Mannerheim was by no means indispensable. The Finnish Cabinet was quite prepared during the Civil War to sacrifice his services as Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guards in exchange for German military aid (which Mannerheim bitterly opposed). The Cabinet had gone so far as to find a ready and willing successor.[122] Mannerheim yielded. A short time later, in May 1918, he was forced to resign because of his large policy of Finnish intervention in Russia. Immediately after his resignation, "... the members of the government had not a word to say to me when I left the chamber, and no one rose to offer his hand."[123] This coldness on the part of party leaders continued when, in 1919, Parliament elected K. J. Ståhlberg, instead of Mannerheim, first President of the Republic. After his overwhelming defeat in 1919 Mannerheim retired from public life. For the next twelve years he not only held no official position but was, politically, a very lonely man. The main reason for this isolation —symbolized by the defeat of 1919—was the rejection by the large majority of Finns of the idea of armed intervention in Russia.[124] This fact was expressed in rather direct language by a leading Social Democrat: "... General Mannerheim was overthrown, I believe, by his stupid letter [to President Ståhlberg], in which he altogether incorrectly reviewed the prevailing policy and attempted to put poor Finland into the same state of bankruptcy with Mr. Yudenich."[125] Mannerheim himself recognized in late 1919 that his large policy had been doomed to failure because of lack of popular support within Finland.[126]

---

[119] Göran von Bonsdorff, *Suomen poliittiset puolueet* (Helsinki: Kustannusosakeyhtiö Tammi, 1957), p. 64.

[120] It is confusing rather than clarifying to include Mannerheim in any classification of Finnish party leaders, as is done in Taylor Cole (editor), *European Political Systems* (second edition, New York, 1959), p. 765.

[121] Borenius, *Field-Marshal Mannerheim,* p. 248f.

[122] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 88.

[123] *Memoirs,* p. 182f.; see also Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 242f.

President Ståhlberg refused to appoint Mannerheim Commander of the Civil Guards even though the members of that military organization demanded the return of their wartime leader and Mannerheim was willing.[127] The election of P. E. Svinhufvud to the presidency in 1931 gave Mannerheim an official post specially created for him: Chairman of the Defense Council. Mannerheim took this job seriously, and worked hard to improve the Finnish defense establishment. He met with considerable indifference from party leaders, even from conservatives whose campaign speeches were enthusiastically in favor of such improvement. J. K. Paasikivi, for instance, "... as a former banker ... was inclined to put other matters first and to cut down the appropriation for the armed forces."[128] Mannerheim decided to resign in 1937, since "... my work has been thankless and the ideas I had initiated had not gained sufficient support from either the President or the government."[129] Only repeated urgings by Kyösti Kallio, the new President whose election intervened before Mannerheim could submit his resignation, persuaded the latter to stay on. In the spring of 1939 Mannerheim, as always, urged a conciliatory attitude towards Soviet demands upon Finland, but "... met with no understanding."[130] Prime Minister A. K. Cajander was prepared, during the summer of the same year, to accept Mannerheim's resignation, and had begun the search for a new Chairman of the Defense Council.[131] Several months later, only a few days before the Winter War began, President Kallio, after much tergiversation, agreed in principle to Mannerheim's repeatedly-threatened resignation.[132] It is probably safe to say that if this plan had been carried out, and a new Chairman appointed, Mannerheim's retirement would have been final. The position which he held as Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army during the Winter War rested on the (secret) conditions of his appointment as Chairman of the Defense Council. Under the Finnish Constitution the President may in time of war delegate his powers as Commander-in-Chief. There is no reason to assume that the new Chairman of the Defense Council would not have been appointed Commander-in-Chief in the event of war. As it was, however, the Winter War began before Mannerheim's resignation was submitted formally, and, at the age of seventy-two, Mannerheim undertook the arduous task of leading the Finnish Army in two wars.[133]

---

[124] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 392; Hirvikallio, *Tasavallan,* p. 12; L. A. Puntila, *K. J. Ståhlberg valtiomiehenä* (Helsinki, 1955), p. 2.

[125] Väinö Hakkila in Parliament, *Valtiopäivät 1921, Pöytäkirjat,* I, 364.

[126] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* I, 383.

[127] Virkkunen, *Itsenäisen,* p. 59.

[128] *Memoirs,* p. 270.

[129] *Ibid.,* p. 289.

[130] *Ibid.,* p. 300.

[131] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 70ff.

[132] *Memoirs,* p. 319.

Gustaf Mannerheim was elected President in August 1944. Although they are unrecorded, there must have been moments when the new President felt some sense of compensation for his defeat in 1919. A quarter century earlier, however, he had been in the prime of life, prepared to do great things—especially in Russia. There was little that was triumphant about his election in 1944. Seventy-seven years old, tired, seriously ill, Mannerheim was faced with the agonizing task of leading a defeated nation out of war. The fact that the Finnish nation is today independent is at least partially due to his success in this task. The old unyielding physical strength and indomitable will were both gone, however. The fourteen months of his presidency saw Mannerheim frequently so ill that he was unable to perform his duties. Since these were no ordinary times in the life of the Finnish people, party leaders urged (politely but emphatically) that the President resign. The decisive request, to which Mannerheim agreed, came, ironically enough, from the Social Democratic Speaker of Parliament.[134]

Gustaf Mannerheim's career in Finnish politics, unlike his satisfying and successful career as an officer in the Imperial Army, had been one frustrating crisis of mutual confidence after another. All that remained were five quiet years, spent remembering the glories of a sunken world, and attempting in memoirs to convey the goodness of that world to future generations of Finns. That world had been generous to him, and Gustaf Mannerheim, being a noble man as well as a nobleman, wished to express his gratitude appropriately. Early on January 28, 1951, the Finnish people learned that the proud voice of the past was silenced forever. The older generation of Finns remembered January 28 well from 1918. On that date the Finnish Civil War had begun, and on that date Gustaf Mannerheim had first stepped into world history.[135]

Brown University

---

[133] It should be noted that Gustaf Mannerheim was never *in* the Finnish Army. He was, during the Civil War, Commander-in-Chief of the Civil Guards. The Finnish Army was at that time nonexistent, having been abolished by the Grand Duke of Finland (the Russian Emperor) during the period of Russification. Constitutionally, of course, Mannerheim's position in 1939-1940 and 1941-1944 was *above* the Finnish Army.

[134] Heinrichs, *Mannerheim,* II, 437.

[135] *Ibid.,* p. 459; Ehrnrooth, "Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim," p. 32.

NOTES

The Instituto Cultural Croata Latinoamericano of Buenos Aires has begun publication of *Studia Croatica,* destined for the Latin-American public interested in Central Europe and especially in problems of Yugoslavia. Vol. I, no. 1, July-September 1960, is devoted to the Affaire Stepinac, the trial, papal pronouncements on Cardinal Stepinac as prisoner, patriot and cleric. A short sketch is devoted to the passing of Ante Pavelic. Other short studies in history, art, economics and geography complete the number.

* * *

The Department of State has deposited in the National Archives approximately 1000 containers of microfilms of documents from the Archives of the former German Foreign Office. This collection consists mainly of materials of the 1933-1937 period as well as additional microfilms of the pre-1918, 1937-1940, 1942-1945 and Weimar periods.

Inquiries concerning the purchase of copies of these microfilms should be addressed to the National Archives and Records Service, Washington 25, D.C.

* * *

The work of the Tripartite (United States-British-French) Project for the publication of *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945* will be concluded with the completion of Series C which will span the period 1933-1937 in six volumes of which the first three have been issued, and with the completion of Series D by the issue of volumes XI, XIII which will carry the story to December 11, 1941, the date of the German declaration of war on the United States in consequence of Pearl Harbor.

In December 1960 a conference was held in Bonn, Germany, of historians and officials of the four powers, United States, Great Britian, France, and the German Federal Republic which agreed on a program for the publication of the documents in the original German for the period 1918-1933 and for the years 1942-1945. In the Quadripartite Project Howard M. Smyth will serve as United States Editor-in-Chief, Alan Bullock will serve as British Historical Advisor and Mr. Ronald Wheatley as Editor, Maurice Baumont as French Editor-in-Chief, Hans Rothfels as German Editor-in-Chief and Fritz Epstein as leader of the Editorial Staff (Geschäftsführender Leiter der deutschen Editorengruppe). The four editors will jointly share the responsibility for the selection of the documents to be printed: the technical editing will devolve on the German editorial staff. Work will begin with Series B, 1925-1933.

* * *

The Society for Italian Historical Studies is again offering a prize of $200 for the best unpublished study in the history of Italy of article or essay length. Manuscripts not exceeding 20,000 words in length will be accepted and rated as essays. Manuscripts must be in the hands of Dr. K. R. Greenfield, The Ambassador, Baltimore 18, Maryland, not later than July 1, 1961. The award will be made at the December 1961 meeting of the Italian Historical Association. The Society wishes to express its appreciation to the America-Italy Society for making available the funds for the prize to be awarded the winner of the contest.

Under the editorship of Imre Kovacs a new emigré quarterly publication has begun to appear. *The Hungarian Quarterly,* Vol. I, no. 1 (January, 1961) comes with articles by Ferenc Nagy, Anna Kethly, Thomas J. Dodd, Imre Kovacs and numerous items of news about Hungary and Hungarians, at home and abroad. The tone is vigorously democratic, but does not pass the bounds of reasonable documentation.

* * *

The *Osterreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und internationale Beziehungen* has begun publication of a quarterly, *Osterreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik.* Heft 2, December, 1960 has come to the Editor's desk. The principal articles in this issue are by Alfred Verdoss, "Der europaïsche Schutz der Menschenrechte" and Frank E. Figgures, "Die Aufgaben der Europaïschen Freihandelsassoziation." There are, in addition, numerous documents and a whole dossier "Süditirol vor den Vereinten Nationen." There is a useful "Bibliographie zur österreichischen Neutralität" and a "Chronik zur österreichischen Aussenpolitik" from March 10, 1960 to November 30. The Chronik is provided as a regular feature of the journal.

* * *

The Institute for Balkan Studies of Thessaloniki, Greece, announces the publication of a new journal, *Balkan Studies,* which will be devoted to the historical, literary, political, economic and social development of the Balkan peoples from ancient times to the present, with special emphasis on the period since the Ottoman conquest. The editorial committee consists of Professors Stilpon P. Kyriakides, N. P. Andriotes, D. Delivanis, Ch. Frangistas, and Basil Laourdas. Articles, which may be written in English, German, French, or Italian, may be sent to Dr. Basil Laoudas, Institute for Balkan Studies, Vasillissis Sophias 2, Thessaloniki, Greece or to Professor George G. Arnakis, Department of History, The University of Texas, Austin 12, Texas.

The journal is scheduled to appear twice a year. Annual subscription is $8.00. Single copies can be obtained for $5.00. Subscriptions should be sent to the Institute for Balkan Studies in Thessaloniki, Number 1 appeared in December; Number 2 appears in the spring of 1961.

BOOK REVIEWS

Brno v minulosti a dnes: Sborník příspěvků k dějinám a výstavbě Brna; Brno: Krajské Nakladatelství v Brně, 1959, (vol. 1), pp. 286, illustrations, Kčs. 21; 1960 (Vol. 2), pp. 376, Kčs. 33.

The following historical serial publications are published today in the Moravian capital: *Sborník Matice moravské*, formerly called *Časopis Matice moravské; Vlastivědný věstník moravský,* now also appearing only once a year; *Sborník prací filosofické fakulty brněnské university, historická řada; Brněnský archivní věstník,* and the publication here under review. Thus, interestingly, there are five historical series published in Brno today by different institutions but none of them in less than one year periodicity.

By its editorial program and actual policy, *Brno v minulosti a dnes* represents a transition from a historical to a general social science publication. For example, one finds here A. Gregor's discussion on the origin of the name of Brno (Gregor prefers the explanation which traces the name from the Old Slavic *brbno,* meaning "from mud"), preceded by a study on "The directional plan (*Směrný plán*) of the future development of the Town. There are ethnographical articles on folklore, music, and literary figures, economic history, studies on commerce and industrial developments, on the growth of labor movements, on the struggle between Czechs and Germans, as well as short news items on current activities of scientific, fine arts and musical organizations. In its outline of editorial policy, the Committee for History of Brno states that publication of these different materials will lead to "a planned sythesis of the history of Brno," certainly an ambitious goal according to this reviewer. On the other hand, the program to bring together data collected within different social science and humanities fields corresponds to similar synthesizing social science tendencies in the West. So far, however, the Brno publications have not shown any attempt to develop a theoretical framework within which all of the tremendous amount of historical data on the cultural activities of the Brno citizenry could be collated. To this reviewer the concept of culture, including artifacts, sociofacts, and mentifacts, would probably be the most adequate theoretical concept for the organization of the historical material.

Each volume contains also one major study, supplied in both volumes by Jaroslav Dřímal, who is also listed on the last page of both volumes as the chief editor of both publications. The studies deal with social struggles in Brno of the 1620s, and with the Czech national movement in Moravia during 1848-1871. The latter study provides interesting material on so-called Moravian separatism.

There is one more article which deserves a critical comment. Zdeněk Štěpánek, in his analysis of World War II resistance movements, discusses the program of the major resistance group "Obrana národa." He concedes that the group asked for the nationalization of natural resources and basic industries, but presumably this was done only for "tactical reasons" (see footnote 10 on p. 51, vol. 2). No evidence, however, is presented to support this imputation. Obviously, the author displays here the same attitude as is shown in articles referring to the role of Communists which selectively stress Communist achievements. Interestingly, in the same article one can read how efficient was the October 28, 1939, national independence demonstration, in which not only the popular masses but the Communists themselves spontaneously participated.

On the whole, both volumes contain valuable material. As the industrial and political center in Czechoslovakia, owing to Slovak growth, gradually shifts from the West farther to the East, Brno, being in a more central position than Prague, can be expected to gain in importance. Its history and present problems will consequently become more relevant for a student of Czechoslovak history and of the present socio-cultural system.

University of Kentucky JIŘÍ KOLAJA

WINTER, EDUARD, *Russland und das Papstum.* Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960. Pp. 375. DM 23.

This is the first part of a systematic study of relations between Russia and the Papacy in medieval and early modern times. It covers a long period from the dawn of Christianity among the Eastern Slavs to the accession of Peter the Great. The second volume on the modern era up to 1917 is in preparation.

This is not for the first time that Professor Winter endeavors to present a long period in broad sweeps. On an earlier occasion, while teaching at the German university in Prague, he surveyed in one volume (*Tausend Jahre Geisteskampf im Sudetenraum*) the spiritual and religious struggles in the lands of the Bohemian Crown from the conversion of their inhabitants to the Christian faith to our days. The merits (but also drawbacks) or such outlines are sufficiently known and not much new could be said about them in connection with Professor Winter's new book. A good deal of energy and concentration is always needed to undertake such a burdensome task. For the writing of this book the author prepared himself by long and extensive studies and used his material first for academic lectures at the Humboldt University in Berlin. He speaks of this book as his life's work, thus putting it above monographs and articles published in the earlier stages of his academic career.

The book is not a dispassionate presentation of perplexing and mostly controversial problems in terms of traditional scholarship, but an expression of unconcealed sympathies for one of the partners and of penetrating criticism of the opposite side. The starting point of Professor Winter's detailed investigations is the acceptance of divisions of Christian Europe into three orbits (*Europa tripartita*) Rome, Byzance and Kiev-Moscovy. The driving force, determining the course of European church history (and to a large extent also of political developments) was, according to Professor Winter, the papal bid for absolute control of these three spheres emanating from theories of papal supremacy over other authorities, both spiritual and secular. Sketching rapidly the course of the perennial struggle the author draws sharply a line between light and shadow, right and wrong. In the dialectical scheme adopted by him the papacy figures invariably as the aggressive force, relaxing temporarily under the pressure of adverse forces but resuming, at more favorable turns of history, its drive for subordination to its will of Greek and Russian Orthodoxy. While the author makes no secret of his distrust of the motives and methods used by the pontifs and their emissaries, he has high praise and admiration for the tenacity of the antithetic force, the peoples of the Eastern European plains, governed at one time from Kiev, and later from Moscow.

Books spanning many centuries and covering wide areas often suffer from disproportions, as it is well-nigh impossible to treat all aspects with the same vigor and accuracy. Schemes which at first glance appear to be simple and plausible, like the tripartite Europe, cannot always be applied to the varieties of historical development with the same success. Professor Winter has been strongly tempted to bring into his story other Slavic peoples; but the problem is how to treat them as one family when, in fact, the dividing line between the Roman obedience and Greek Orthodoxy runs across the Slavic-inhabited areas, leaving the Eastern and Balkan Slavs on one side, and the Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Lusatian Sorbs, Slovenes and Croats on the other. The Poles present a particularly difficult problem.

as can be seen from descriptions of their political and religious aims before and after the Union of Brest.

Differences of emphasis in Professor Winter's survey are discernible. In the first part of his book (epochs one and two) he draws heavily from other scholars' works (E. Šmurlo and others) ; in the more modern period, especially the section on the Counter-Reformation, he uses also his own research in original documents. He has devoted one of his earlier books, *Byzanz und Rom im Kampf um die Ukraine* (Leipzig, 1942) as well as some minor studies to this same period. The last chapter on Jurij Križanić is, in fact, a concise biography of that pioneer of Slavic solidarity and other chimerical conceptions. Professor Winter, attracted undoubtedly by Križanić's personality, has written on him with verve and notable success.

University of Pennsylvania **Otakar Odložilík**

Rogger, Hans, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. 319. $6.75.

Professor Rogger of Sarah Lawrence College sets himself the task of determining "the extent to which Russian life and letters in the eighteenth century were concerned with the problem of national identity and culture, and to discover in what terms that concern was expressed." (vii). He associates himself with the prevailing view that the term "nationalism" ought to be restricted to those ideas appearing in Western Europe in the eighteenth century and making themselves felt in Russia only in the nineteenth; therefore in dealing with eighteenth-century Russia he speaks of "national consciousness" as distinguished from "nationalism." By the former, he means "a striving for a common identity, character, and culture by the articulate members of a given community;" by the latter, he means "an inclusive system of thought" whose "basis is belief, not consciousness" (3-4). His application of this distinction, however, remains unclear; he considers the first "distinctly nationalist" thinkers to have been Slavophiles, but since they had a strong concern for the wider realm of Orthodoxy as well as for the Russian nation, it is not certain what criteria his "nationalists" must meet.

The treatment is entirely topical. In the first chapter, "The Government of Foreigners," is presented a political chronology of the period from 1725 to 1796. Four more times he then ranges through this whole period, discussing social customs, the literary language, developing interest in the lower classes, and the writing of history, all in terms of reaction to Western influences; he sums up with a chapter entitled "The Search for a National Character," and adds a Conclusion. As a result, different aspects of the same figures—for example, Lomonosov—may be discussed in several chapters. What is said about each figure and topic is generally sound rather than lively. Several chapters begin with commonplaces such as, "A concern with language has ever been intimately connected with a people's search for its identity" (85). Repeatedly the author labors the obvious, as when, after quoting Catherine II's characterization of Russian character as "a quick and accurate understanding of things, exemplary obedience, and adherence to all the virtues given to man by his Creator," the author comments, "This, clearly, was not a definition of the characteristics which uniquely singled out Russians from all other people," (166). There are interesting but not really relevant footnotes on pp. 193, 210, and 274. The author should not have repeated without correction Tatischev's opinion that the *Russkaia Pravda* antedated Vladimir I (p. 201). Generally speaking, however, the scholarship is sound and the argument clear.

It remains to inquire what contribution the whole book makes. Shorter discussions of the same issues are to be found in the standard works of Berdyaev, Mirsky, and Masaryk; an analysis of considerably greater length, although based on a different formulation of the issue, is given by Miliukov in *Nationalizm i evropeizm;* a recent study of comparable chronological scope and considerably overlapping subject matter is Stuart Tompkin's *The Russian Mind: from Peter the Great through the Enlightenment.* There are also two recent monographs on individual thinkers of the period, D. M. Lang's *The First Russian Radical: Alexander Radishchev,* and Richard Pipes's *Karamzin's Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: a Translation and Analysis.*

Not all of these titles are mentioned in the Bibliography; but the important question is how Professor Rogger has improved on these works. He modestly declares that his conclusions "require no fundamental revision of prevailing views about Russian history" (vii). Indeed, it is difficult to see that they necessitate the revision of any views. The author does not discuss at length how nascent "national consciousness" is to be related to the religious framework within which the educated class had been accustomed to think or to the dynastic state that had claimed the loyalties of its subjects, or how to assess the psychological complexities of the association, often within the same persons, of unbridled Francophilia or Anglophilia with cosmopolitanism (in which one's own nation need not be regarded as inferior) and those in turn with the beginnings of nationalism. In consequence, we are given neither very much new detail or very much new analysis. Students may well find the book useful, but no one will find it very exciting.

University of Washington DONALD W. TREADGOLD

WANGERMANN, ERNEST, *From Joseph II to the Jacobin Trials.* (Oxford Historical Series, New Series). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959. Pp. xi, 212. 25 s.

Times of revolution are times that try men's souls—and usually bring occasions wherein men try each other's words, acts, and even alleged thoughts. At such times standards of right, law, justice, and social utility are rendered nebulous by the particular interests, and uncertain means of protecting them, that drive both parties of the old and the new. To the champions of revolution the old law, the old concepts of right and justice are repressive, or at best inadequate to insure the public welfare. The laws are inadequate because they will not defeat revolutionary subversion quickly enough; the rule of law must be suspended in favor of force and expediency. It is both interesting and instructive to examine the reactions of men and states under such pressing circumstances.

Mr. Wangermann's small volume, another in the series of Oxford dissertations selected for publication, ably treats this theme of men and law in revolutionary times. In addition to the interest inherent in the theme, the work has the further value of bringing illumination to an area of study neglected by English-speaking historians.

The author has made good use of the Austrian archives and contemporary literature, and has consulted secondary works on the period, to compose an account of government policy and public opinion in the heady days of Josephinian reforms, the French Revolution, and the "Jacobin" trials to 1796. The characterization of Joseph II is an echo of the opinion of those, like Holzknecht, who would not accept Joseph as an *Aufgeklärter* so much as a singleminded, centralizing statist. This astringent view of Joseph may be prompted by overmuch concern for the Emperor's later police policy, whereby Pergen's force operated secretly, beyond judicial review. Joseph had awakened the Fourth Estate to political consciousness and used it to oppose the particularism and inefficiency of the old order. Once awakened, and then excited by reports of revolutionary words, followed by deeds, emanating from France, the men of the Fourth Estate in Austria wished to rush on to a radical consummation of the program Joseph himself had initiated. The Emperor balked at the threat of losing control of affairs.

The same words and deeds that inspired the Fourth Estate struck fear into the hearts of the privileged adherents of the old order and gave them the courage of the desperate to resist what they believed to be impending doom. War, revolution, and counter-revolution, at home and abroad, offered more than a measured test for Leopold II's capacities for governance when he succeeded to the doubtful legacy left him by his brother. While giving in to conservative clamor to abolish the less tenable reforms of Joseph, Leopold struggled, using the Fourth Estate as a counterpoise to the clergy and nobility, to maintain the rule of law and the essence, at least, of his brother's reforms.

In two short years death excused Leopold from the contest. He was followed by his son, Franz, who was more inclined to favor the conservatives and eradicate revolution by the revival of the extra-legal police which would punish and silence the Fourth Estate without recourse to the processes of law. However, Austria had come so far under Joseph and Leopold that even in reaction the voices of men such as Kaunitz, Eger, Zinzendorf, Sonnenfels, and Martini could still be heard and could prevail over the counsels of Pergen, Migazzi, and Kollowrat. Conservative though he was, and dangerous as the situation seemed, Franz chose to heed the advice of the former and maintain the *Rechtsstaat* even as he combatted the revolutionary "Jacobins."

While Wangermann's work is a solid and welcome addition to Austrian and eighteenth-century history, one may offer some critical observations. Joseph and Leopold are depicted as being unsympathetic with the principles of the *Aufklärung* because they were reluctant to act radically during and after 1789. It would seem to this reviewer that their reluctance may be ascribed to fears engendered by the French Revolution, which threatened to stampede all reform movements and which the monarchs judged to be too extreme, unpredictable, and costly in accomplishing what they, as enlightened rulers, could better achieve. The difference was not so much in principle as in methods.

Wangermann misconstrues the Land Tax of 1789 when he writes that it "had uniformly limited and commuted feudal (*sic!*) dues." (Pp. 56-57) The majority of the peasants paid too little land tax to qualify for its benefits. (All too many modern historians use the word "feudal" to designate that which is obsolete and/or reprehensible; in this case the author has in mind the *manorial* dues and services owed by serf to lord.) An unimportant error (p. 10, n. 1) is the statement that Eger succeeded Zinzindorf to the presidency of the Labor Commutation Commission (*Robotabolitions-Hofkommission*) in 1789; the commission was the *Steuerrectifications-Hofkomission* and the date was 1788.

Such minor deficiencies, and a somewhat staccato style, may be overlooked and should not divert attention from the excellence and value of the book, for it will be of profitable use to all who are concerned with Austrian history at that time of European crisis.

Finally, credit should be given the publishers for their usual fine presentation: this reviewer noticed only one typographical error, and the notes are at the foot of the pages, where they belong.

University of Minnesota WILLIAM E. WRIGHT

Bury, J. P. T., ed., *The New Cambridge Modern History*. Vol. X. *The Zenith of European Power: 1830-70.* Cambridge: University Press, 1960. Pp. 766. 40 s.

Greeted enthusiastically by reviewers and criticized sharply by others. The New Cambridge Modern History is well on its way to replacing the first version. Of the five volumes covering various periods already on the market, the one under review deals with world affairs around the middle of the nineteenth century.

In organizing this volume the editor decided on a combination topical and geographical arrangement so that chapters on general problems of that era are followed and supplemented by sketches of historical developments in major areas of the world. Several chapters deal with Central and Eastern Europe while in others references are made either to points of contact or to specific features of public life in those parts of the Old Continent to which this Journal is devoted.

In Central and Eastern Europe, more perhaps than elsewhere, the rhythm of events from 1830 to 1870 was determined by continuous struggle between the dynasties and the new forces which had originated in the era of Enlightenment and in the Romantic atmosphere of the early nineteenth century and which, around 1830, were emerging from the stage of incubation. The striving for constitutionalism was forcibly hindered by "the Chief Constable of Europe" and his associates, and the mounting tide of nationalism was channeled to the seemingly safe sphere of learning and of *belles letters*. The progress in both directions, constitutionalism and nationalism, achieved in the course of four decades was by no means startling, being far from its goal, and it has been the task of several specialists to draw the balance sheet in the tenth volume of the Cambridge Modern History.

Taking the broadest view, we can include in Central and Eastern Europe the vast areas east of the line indicated by the course of the Rhine and its imaginary prolongation to the south. Four chapters devoted to geographical and political units in that area have been included in the tenth volume: ch. XIV, on Russia in Europe and Asia, by J. M. K. Vyvyan, ch. XIX, on Prussia and the German Problem, 1830-1866, by James Joll, ch. XX, on the Austrian Empire and its problems, 1848-1867, by C. A. Macartney, and ch. XX, on Italy, by D. Mack Smith. From the editorial note we learn that a chapter on the Austrian Empire before March 1848 is going to appear in the ninth volume. The Ottoman Empire is touched upon at various points but the volume has no chapter on the Balkans from 1830 to 1870.

In order to get a more complete picture of public life in the central and eastern zones, anyone using the tenth volume will have to turn to several other chapters. Two of them introduce the new forces already referred to: Prof. J. A. Hawgood surveys (in ch. VIII) the emergence of liberalism, and the editor of the volume, J. P. T. Bury, contributes a brilliant sketch (ch IX) on nationalities and nationalism. A good deal of information concerning Central and Eastern Europe can be found in Prof. Charles Pouthas' concise description (ch. XV) of the revolutions of 1848. Chapters XVIII, on the Crimean war, and XXII, on the origins of the Franco-Prussian War, are, of course, connected by many links with contributions mentioned above, and the same is true of Prof. Gordon Craig's discussion (ch. X) of the System of Alliances and the Balance of Power. In some chapters (e.g. VII, on Imaginative Literature, or IV, on Religion and the Relations of Churches and States) the emphasis is heavily on the "Western" side according to their authors' training and predilection.

A good deal of thinking and preliminary experimenting must have preceded the distribution and assignment of various topics. The editor's introductory summary as well as many cross-references help to connect individual contributions.

But despite careful and judicious planning some gaps remain unfilled as so often happens in collective works.

Comparing the chapters listed above and evaluating them, this reviewer cannot suppress regrets that information concerning the submerged nationalities in Central and Eastern Europe is not only scattered but inadequate. This is especially true of the Poles, who, despite the partitions, continued to play a significant role in European history. Other nationalities in the Danubian basin or its vicinity joined with the free peoples in 1848 and 1849, and were destined to remain on the stage from that time on. The struggles for reconstitution of dynastic formations along constitutional lines offered them a splendid opportunity for a political début. Prof. Pouthas' survey, crisp in style and on the whole reliable, is too short to do justice to such immense efforts as the founding of a new Germany or attempts at a thorough reorganization of the Habsburg Empire. Related chapters give some help but not as much as would be desirable in view of the ethnic variety of the central zone. Moreover, some of the relevant passages, instead of giving a lead to students not specializing in that area, are lacking in precision and solid grounding.

The new Cambridge Modern History is certainly not intended to serve as a handbook, crammed with names, dates and other technical details. It is debatable where the line between indispensable and superfluous should have been drawn. Omission of such a distinguished figure as Heinrich von Gagern, the President of the Frankfurt Assembly, makes one wonder whether the fear of embarrassing details was not too excessive. As to the lack of precision, this reviewer cannot pass in silence over a sentence in Prof. Pouthas' chapter (p. 402), including among the "races who owed allegiance to the crown of St. Stephen" also the Slovenes from Carinthia. Giving the names of national assemblies, held by non-Magyar nationalities, the same author refers to Blassendorf (p. 403), although since the union of Transylvania with other Rumanian territories in 1918 the name Blaj has been more often used even by non-Rumanian authors.

But let us pass from details to matters of graver importance. Allotting only seven lines to the Slavic Congress of 1848, Prof. Pouthas presented it in its proper light. The corresponding passage in the editor's essay on nationalism (p. 232f.) is less comprehensible as the line was not sharply enough drawn between the chimeric conceptions of all-Slavic solidarity in literary matters, as propounded by Ján Kollár, and the purpose of the Prague Congress. Documents relating to it, and especially to its preparations, make it plainly clear that the Congress was conceived as a meeting place for Slavic delegates from the Habsburg territories to promote better mutual acquaintance and exchange of ideas on current political affairs. Even when the original framework was extended to make possible adequate representation of the Poles, the Congress did not veer away from the set course. Subcommittees elected in the session of the "broader" committee on June 5, 1848, were expected to prepare three documents for discussion and final adoption by the plenary session: a manifesto to the peoples of Europe, a summary of the Congress' aims addressed to Emperor Ferdinand V., and a draft of an agreement among the Slavic peoples in the Austrian Empire to obtain and safeguard their rights and national aspirations. Apart from tendentious comments, emanating from some hostile sources in Vienna and in Budapest, there is very little, indeed, in the sources of 1848 to justify the use of the term Pan-Slavism, popularized recently by some authors. It only blurs the picture and should be used only where it really belongs.

Confusion arising from arbitrary selection of terminology was probably the source of a rather enigmatic statement in Prof. Hawgood's study of liberalism and constitutional developments. It reads (p. 197) as follows: "Although the Slav elements in the empire were early to break away and to refuse further collaboration in the work of the Austrian *Reichstag* which first met on 9 May 1848 (just as they had refused to collaborate from the beginning in the work of the Frankfurt Constituent Assembly, which had originally intended to comprehend the Austrian crown lands in a *Grossdeutsch* federal state), this great assembly, assuming constituent functions, went on to produce at the beginning of 1849 the remarkable Kremsier draft constitution."

Giving a wrong date—the Constituent Assembly was opened on July 22, 1848, by Archduke John—the author tends to imply that the Slavic peoples took an active part in the sessions and deliberations of the first elected Austrian parliament. It is misleading to equate the Frankfurt parliament and the Vienna *Reichstag* when the question of Slavic participation comes to discussion. The Frankfurt parliament was not called together to resuscitate the Holy Roman Empire, universal at least in principle, but to work out a constitution for a German national state. There was no place for any Slavic deputy in Paulskirche at Frankfurt—Palacký's letter to Alexander v. Soiron of April 11, 1848, made that clear for the Czechs as well as for other Slavs. Seeing their future linked with other ethnic groups under the Habsburg scepter, the Poles and Ruthenes from Galicia, the Czechs, the Slovenes and the Croats from the western portion of the Austrian Empire willingly elected deputies to the Austrian Constituent Assembly, and were keenly interested in its program. A major study, even a book could easily be written on the contributions of many Slavic members of the Reichstag. In such a study the names of the Pole, Franciszek Smolka, of the Czechs, Antonin Strobach and František Ladislav Rieger, of the Slovene, Jože Kaučič, would figure prominently among those who actively helped to draft the constitution of 1849. When then did the Slavic deputies break away? Only on March 7, 1849, when they found the archiepiscopal palace at Kroměříž (Kremsier) surrounded by military units ordered there by the Government. No sooner, no later!

A minor point can perhaps be mentioned in this connection. To the countries which, in the revolutionary constitution-making period, were inspired by the Belgian constitution of 1831 (p. 191f.) Austria could be added for better illustration—the charter promulgated by Prime Minister Franz von Pillersdorf on April 25, 1848, followed the Belgian constitution in many articles. Later, in 1866, the Rumanian leaders used the Belgian charter as a model for the constitution of their country.

The New Cambridge Modern History does not follow closely its prototype planned by Lord Action. It differs from it in the overall plan and in the organization of single volumes. To carry on the story from the point at which the first edition had to stop to 1945 without adding new volumes, it was necessary to economize elsewhere. No final judgment can be passed on the tenth volume before the appearance of two more volumes (IX and XI) with which it will make an organic whole covering most of the nineteenth century. If the present tempo of editing is maintained they should soon be available.

University of Pennsylvania Otakar Odložilík

Rassow, Peter and Born, Carl Erich, eds., *Akten zur staatlichen Sozialpolitik in Deutschland 1890-1914.* Band III in Historische Forschungen im Auftrag der historischen Kommission der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1959. Pp. 460. DM 45.

The long history of social legislation in Germany before 1914 presents a unique record; there Bismarck, William II, briefly at least, and the upper bureaucracy of the Reich and Prussia formed a kind of intramural Fabian society, whose efforts made Germany the most advanced industrial society in Europe with respect to aid and protection of the workers. The main lines of this social legislation are well known and can be found summed up and catalogued anew in Syrup and Neuloh, *Hundert Jahre Staatliche Sozialpolitik, 1839-1939* (1957). After World War II, at the suggestion of Professor Peter Rassow and with the intention to broaden and deepen understanding of the background of social policy, the Academy of the Sciences and Literature at Mainz undertook as a project the assembling of source materials relative to state social policy from 1871 to 1914. The work went on for a period of some ten years, under Professor Rassow and his student Privatdozent Carl Erich Born, the editors of the volume of documents now reviewed. In 1957 Doctor Born published a monograph, *Staat und Sozialpolitik seit Bismarcks Sturz,* which appeared as volume I of the Historische Forschungen of the Academy, based upon published sources and upon many of the unpublished materials that he had found, and it is a selection from these latter which appears here as volume III. The present reviewer has no way of knowing whether just these documents constitute the best possible selection; but American teachers especially must be grateful for every such collection of source materials through which to give students the "feel" of problems and periods remote from them, as this volume does give it for Wilhelmian Germany.

In publishing the documents Dr. Born and his sponsors, like Dr. Gerhard A. Ritter, cited below, have assumed that the study of internal German history has been neglected—as it has been by Germans—and, further, that internal affairs and policy are closely tied to external policy. They have wanted to study and to furnish documents for research in internal history in the way foreign policy has been studied, and to do so especially for the period of William II. They consider social policy central to an understanding of the internal history of the period, determined as this policy was by two entirely new social factors, growth of big business and increase of population. The volume provides documents to illuminate the tortuous way in which an empire and its federal components strove to adjust to a new social class, one which they could not disregard in either good conscience or good statecraft but one which they could not bring themselves to accept on an equal footing with the traditional classes. An effort is made to give substantial glimpses of the bureaucrats (e.g. von Berlepsch, Posadowsky-Wehner) responsible for social policy, of the stand and manoeuvres of the several parties in respect to special bills and problems of policy, of the relationship of Prussia to the other states and to the Reich, of the gradual ascendancy of the Reichstag in matters of social policy, of William II's erratic interest in and incursion into social matters, of the frequently long negotiations over bills and their phrasing, and of other affairs connected with the hammering out of social policy and legislation in a constitutional monarchy living under the threat of *coup d'état* and fear of social revolution.

In realizing their aim the editors have drawn upon three main kinds of documents: (1) bills and laws, often in different stages of formulation, and with memoranda about them from varied sources; (2) reports of the representatives in Berlin of many of the state governments to their home offices; (3) legal proceedings against Social Democracy, especially the suit of 1896-97 against the leadership of the SPD. What few materials have actually been published elsewhere appear here as a convenience. The documents are divided into six main sections, as follows: I. *Der "neue Kurs" und die Sozialpolitik;* II. *Von der "Umsturzvorlage" zur "Zuchthausvorlage";* III. *Die Aera Posadowsky;* IV. *Das Reichsvereinsgesetz;* V. *Die Arbeits-*

ammervorlage; VI. *Die Reichsversicherungsordnung.* Sections VII and VIII contain the bibliography and indices, the subject index, as usual, less adequate than an merican student wants it. There are useful and frequent introductory notes and ootnotes; there are, however, no sketches of the correspondents whose dispatches re used.

Fascinating as the materials of this volume are, they do not cover all phases of he problem of social policy, and they do not exhaust the topics needing research. hey seem to me to throw light on (1) the attitudes toward social problems and oward the Reich government of the federal states, whose archives have been drawn pon for the first time in any force, with the exception of those in Potsdam and Ierseburg which were not made available to the editors; (2) the views and rôles of everal members of the bureaucracy in a way often complementary to their biographies and/or memoirs; (3) the way of thinking on the part of the parties and arty leaders about the workers and Social Democracy; (4) the changing constitutional structure of the Reich as the states and the Bundesrat lose to the Reichstag n matters of social policy; (5) the changing attitude toward certain aspects of ocial Democracy on the part of the Reich courts. A good seminar should be possible with this volume of documents, Dr. Born's own monograph (*op. cit.*), the merican Carl Schorske's study of the party (*German Social Democracy, 1905-1917: he Development of the Great Schism* [1955]), and the volume by Gerhard A. Ritter *Die Arbeiterbewegung in Wilhelminischen Reich: Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die freien Gewerkschaften 1890-1900 [1959]*). We need another volume of ocuments to cover the reaction of Social Democracy to social policy and legislation, he social policies of the several states, the connection of social policy and foreign olicy in more detail than here, and Germany's place in Europe with respect to ocial policy.

anta Monica, California PAULINE R. ANDERSON

AREB, JERE, *Pola Stoljeca Hrvatske Politike.* Buenos Aires: Hrvatska Revija, 1960. Pp. 180, $3.00.

This is a study of Croatian politics between 1895 (the revolt of the Croatian tudents against Magyar domination of Croatia) and 1945 (the downfall of the ndependent state of Croatia). The author begins with a short review of the development of Croatian political thought and action in the period between 1895 and 1918 (the end of World War I). The analysis of that period is made only as a background or events that took place in the period between 1918 and 1945, in the course of which both the Yugoslav kingdom and the Croatian state rose and fell. That period s discussed with considerable detail, particularly the period since 1928 (the death of Stephen Radic, the assassination of King Alexander and the rise and fall of the Jstasa regime in Croatia.) The main thesis of this study is that the events in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, particularly the hegemonistic policy of the Magyars, had reatly contributed to the strengthening of Slavophile feelings and Pan-Slavic deologies in Croatia (particularly manifested in the form of anti-Austro-Hungarian and anti-German propaganda and in the idea of political unity of all southern Slavs—the "Yugoslav movement"). Such ideas and propaganda have contributed o the fall of the Empire and made it impossible to reconstruct it on the basis of a onfederation or commonwealth of Danubian nations, thus laying this area open to ubsequent invasions and conquests by the Nazis and by the Bolsheviks. In this connection the author quotes a significant discussion which took place between Stephen Radic, the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party in Croatia, and T. G.

Masaryk, the founder of the Czechoslovak state. Radic proposed to Masaryk not to destroy the Empire entirely but to reorganize it as a confederation of nations. When Masaryk refused resolutely any such suggestion and accused Radic of being an "austriak" (Austrophile), Radic warned him that Czechoslovakia would fall as the first victim of the coming power struggle over Central-Eastern Europe.

Following the same thesis, the author discusses the subordinate position of the Croatian people in Serb-dominated royal Yugoslavia, the efforts of Croatian political parties, particularly the Croatian Peasant Party, to redress the situation and to reorganize Yugoslavia as a federation of nations, the determined resistance to that idea shown by King Alexander and the consequent formation of the Croatian Ustasa movement and the assassination of the king dictator by the members of an Ustasa conspiratorial group. The author discusses then the fall of Yugoslavia, the welcoming of the German Army as liberators by many Croatians and the formation of the Independent State of Croatia. He analyzes the internal contradictions in that state, particularly the conflict between an extreme, violent and pro-Fascist faction around the Poglavnik Pavelic, and a more moderate and more flexible group of leaders who planned to reorient Croatia's politics in the direction of the democratic West and eventually to seek an alliance with the Western Allies. The extermination of the latter faction and an uncompromising stand of Pavelic, even after the fall of Italy, have, according to the author, largely contributed to the fall of Croatia and the rise of Communism on the Croatian territory. In a short summary of the situation of the Croatian people in Tito's Yugoslavia the author states that from the point of view of the Croatian demand for self-government, the position of Croatia has greatly deteriorated even in comparison with the situation that existed in Austria-Hungary and in Alexander's Yugoslavia. As a consequence even the last vestiges of Slavophilism or Yugoslavism have disappeared from the feelings of the Croatian people, according to the author. He claims that anti-Yugoslav attitudes of the Croatian people, as a result of this situation, are at present so strong that no union with Serbia will be possible in the future, not even in the form of a confederation.

The main stimulus for writing this study was the publication of the autobiography of Dr. Vladko Macek (*In the Struggle for Freedom*), the man who succeeded Stephen Radic as the leader of the Croatian Peasant Party. As a result, a great deal of this study and of its criticism of Croatian political leaders revolves around the policies of Macek and of his party. The author has, therefore, tended to treat his subject in terms of personalities and their policies without taking sufficiently into account the internal social forces, the international situation, and other conditions and circumstances which had imposed great limitations on the actions of the leaders. The author himself recognizes this shortcoming (p. 139) and characterizes his study as an outline which will serve him as a base for further study of these problems. But even as an outline this is a well written, well documented and provocative work which should be translated into English to be available also to scholars who are not versed in the Croatian language.

Indiana University D. A. Tomasic

von Müller, Georg Alexander, *Regierte der Kaiser? Kriegstagebücher, Aufzeichnungen und Briefe des Chefs des Marine-Kabinetts, 1914-1918.* Vorwort von Sven v. Müller; hrsg. von Walter Görlitz. Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1959. Pp. 455. DM 28.

This publication of the war diaries, notes, and selected letters of the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral Georg Alexander von Müller, is an amazing documentary contribution to our knowledge of the Kaiser's actual role during World War I and the collapse of the Prussian monarchy in Germany. The scholarly editor, Walter Görlitz, has written a biographical sketch of the Admiral, and annotated the diaries with excellent biographical and bibliographical footnotes.

The notes and diaries are divided into ten chapters, with not always adequate or apt titles: The Storm Brews; Advance to the Marne; Falkenhayn and Tirpitz; The Crisis in Sea Warfare; To the Turning Point of the War, Verdun, Skagerrak, and Unrestricted Submarine Warfare; "Stille Diktatur" of Ludendorff and Hindenburg; The Great Revolution Begins—Czarism Falls, America Goes to War, Bethmann's Dismissal; Abdication Step by Step and End of the Influence of Cabinet Chiefs; The Great Battle That Was Never Won; From "the Black Day of the German Army," 8 August, to the Kaiser's Departure, 9 November.

Admiral von Müller was regarded during his lifetime as the German "Rasputin" in the "Kamarilla" composed of General von Lyncker, Chief of the Military Cabinet, Rudolf von Valentini, Chief of the Civil Cabinet, and others. The memoirs of von Zedlitz-Trützschler, von Eckardstein, and von Pfeil seemed to confirm this. In reality, the liberal Müller, who was constantly with the Kaiser in wartime, detested the courtiers around Wilhelm II, called Plessen "the court fool," felt ill at ease with the *Schwert und Dienst Adel,* tried in vain to rouse his talented emperor to maintain a systematized daily work schedule and a consciousness of his constitutional duties.

The Kaiser was, however, able to make statesmanlike comments on the problems of the war, although he lacked strength of character to maintain any policy. He relied on Müller, who visited America in 1902, to prepare memoranda affecting naval policies involving the United States.

The German Empress exercised during the war a constant influence on her husband to maintain his royal and imperial prerogatives. She became the most reactionary of his *Mitarbeiter,* and in February 1917, following his operation for hernia, the Empress permitted no one, not even the Chancellor or Committee Chairman, to see him, and attempted herself to govern Germany. She hated the liberal Müller, thoroughly damned Bethmann, and despised the socialists. The Empress also encouraged Wilhelm to maintain his kind of self-centered behavior which Müller felt harmed his imperial position in the eyes of the country.

Perhaps the most important revelations of the diary deal with the Kaiser's belated realization of the brutality of Ludendorff and the weakening of the monarchy. On July 22, 1918, at Avesnes, Hindenburg at last told the Kaiser of the failure of the offensive and advised him to go to Spa. That night he spoke of himself as a defeated *Feldherr.*

On September 25 at Kiel, the Kaiser received the news of the collapse of the Bulgarian army and Ferdinand's request for an armistice, and realized it meant the end of the war. September 28, Hindenburg and Ludendorff saw that the war was lost and, September 29, told the Kaiser that Germany must sue for peace. The supreme command completely lost its nerve and demanded an immediate request for an armistice. Helfferich forecast the entente demands and said that the Kaiser should abdicate. Max von Baden addressed the Reichstag on October 5, while the Kaiser had a gout attack and remained in bed. On October 26 the Kaiser said he had it out with Ludendorff and Hindenburg in the presence of Delbrück and others, and Müller reports his remarks verbatim. For this last critical period the diary loses value, since the author takes his leave, and curiously puts a psychological distance between the events and himself.

However, the psychological abdication of the Kaiser occurred as early as the first weeks of the war. Thereafter he was merely kept informed of the decisions of the general staff, provided with an excellent order of battle maps, and required to restrict his impulsive utterances to his court and selected groups. In general, he conformed to the recommendations of his Cabinet chiefs. Visits of the King of Bulgaria and other potentates added a diversion of low comedy throughout the entire war. The Kaiser's marginal notes and wisecracks on state documents and his voluminous memoranda, which were prepared by his officials and signed by His Majesty, often confused the Berlin Government.

British intelligence never doubted the reality of a Hohenzollern autocracy. Ambassador Morgenthau spread the legend, while Ambassador Gerard emphasized the imperious power of Wilhelm up to the fateful decision of Ludendorff to break with America. Wilson's war addresses contain repeated denunciations of the "Prussian autocracy," "the Imperial German Government," and Pangermanism pushing southward and eastward. The Admiral's diary reveals more significant information concerning the Kaiser, his highest officials and advisors than nearly any other known source. It also explains why the Kaiser was neither "Supreme War Lord," nor leader of the chosen people of culture, and why he brought the monarchical form of government to a tragic fall. The answer to the distinguished editor's question, "Regierte der Kaiser?" is an emphatic "no."

Stanford University RALPH H. LUTZ

WEBER, FRITZ, *Das Ende der alten Armee, Österreich-Ungarns Zusammenbruch.* Salzburg/Stuttgart: "Das Bergland-Buch" Verlag, 1959. Pp. 397. DM 14.80.

Written ten years after World War I by a former Austrian artillery lieutenant, this is an account of fighting on the comparatively little publicized Austro-Italian front.

Weber was barely twenty when he was sent in the spring of 1915 to the Lavarone-Folgaria fortifications in the South Tyrol. The undermanned forts, originally intended only to check the Italians for three weeks while an Austrian offensive was prepared, held out for a year against repeated assaults until finally put in safety by the successful Austrian offensive of May 1916. The winter 1916-17 Weber spent in mountain fighting. In one of the book's most interesting sections he describes the peculiar methods and hazards of this type of warfare: the deadening cold; the avalanches that killed thousands; the tunneling of mountains to dynamite peaks in enemy possession, —Weber himself witnessed the destruction of Monte Cimone. Next, Weber was sent to the Isonzo. There he was stationed in the Hermada, key fortress in the defense of Trieste, held successfully in the face of ten previous Italian assaults. He participated in the summer offensive of 1917 and in the sweeping Austrian advance to the Piave in the fall. The decision taken to delay a crossing of the river at that time seems to the author the great mistake of the war. By the summer of 1918 when the attempt was made, Austrian self confidence had declined, the Italians were forewarned, and after three days and nights of disastrous losses the Austrian troops were forced to fall back. The army's faith in its leadership was shaken: "Einer grossen Armee, Siegerin in vier harten Kriegsjahren, war mit dieser Schlacht das Rückgrat gebrochen worden." (p. 260) Fighting degenerated into something aimless, hopeless, seemingingly self-perpetuating. "Der Krieg, Geschöpf des Menschen, ist seiner Schöpfern entglitten, ist Herr seiner selbst." (p. 273) Less an army than a horde of panic-stricken men ground by disease, hunger, and exhaustion, the troops got home in the fall of 1918 as best they could. Observing the breakup into nationalities, Weber felt for the first time the full tragedy of the Austrian Germans, who alone had "keinen Schimmer von Glauben an etwas Neues, würdig des ungeheueren Einsatzes. . . ." (p. 348)

This is not a study of high strategy. Nor is it an analysis of the nationalities problem; actually the breakup of the army into its component national units seems to have surprised Weber. The author's concern is with men's suffering and their heroism. Of the two, he is probably more impressed with the latter. To compare Weber with Remarque, as does the dust jacket, could be misleading, for this is not a novel but a piece of exciting reporting. There is even little introspection. Of the author we learn almost nothing beyond that he was young, well educated, and clearly a good officer who did his duty to the end. The focus remains always the common emotional experiences of men at war. Weber's style seems to the reviewer, whose judgments of German writing must be exceedingly hesitant, as an effective one. All the stories that might so easily be clichés are here: the wounded Italian soldier scteaming "Sono morto! . . . O Mamma mia," throughout the night (pp. 37-39); the encounter with the school friend who is obviously dying but must be reassured (pp. 58-59); the soldier who refuses to go on, "Ich weigere mich, auch nur eine Stunde länger bei diesem Wahnsinn mitzuwirken!" (p. 220). Yet the effect is not one of banality. Rather the narrative impresses as a record of important and deeply felt experience, stated honestly and skillfully, with an avoidance of sentimentality or false dramatics.

The book has numerous excellent photographs, but unfortunately only two not very helpful end paper maps.

Connecticut College LENORE O'BOYLE

ALATRI, PAOLO, *Nitti, D'Annunzio e la questione adriatica (1919-1920)*. Milan: Feltrinelli, 1959. Pp. 544. L. 3,500.

Some twenty years ago this reviewer wrote a study of the vicissitudes of the Italian aspect of the peacemaking that followed the First World War. There were, at that time, serious limitations to such an undertaking, owing to the scantiness of sources, Italian in particular, after the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. New material that has become available, most important the Nitti papers, has now made it possible for Alatri to fill the gap for the period of Nitti's tenure, the year that followed the overthrow of Orlando. This detailed and exhaustive treatment is welcome and leaves little unanswered from the Italian side.

The Italian position in 1919, caught between the allies' wartime commitment of the Treaty of London and the pressure of the Wilsonian New Order, was difficult at best, but the team of Orlando and Sonnino did not handle the problem with skill. The legacy that was Nitti's was thus an awkward one, and its difficulty was soon compounded by d'Annunzio's seizure of Fiume in September 1919. The issue of Fiume, which, already before June 1919, had confused the Italian problem, was by itself very small and in a sense very simple: a small Italian island in a Slav sea; any fair application of the principle of nationality pointed to its incorporation into the new Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. That principle, indeed, called for a modification of the whole Treaty of London arrangement, and this was basically the Wilsonian position, in its own terms unimpeachable. Even more, in economic terms, it could be argued that Trieste belonged with Yugoslavia rather than Fiume with Italy.

But if diplomacy and international relations are largely exercises in the relationships of power, the components of power are complex. For longer than a century even materially impotent nationalism has been a potent force, and the attempt to ignore it has often merely postponed, while exacerbating, the solution of issues. The case of Fiume, even if somewhat synthetically contrived, had come to be in Italy a rallying point and a symbol impervious to merely rational discussion; d'Annunzio was in many ways a charlatan, but the response to his melodramatic action was such as to raise question of the dependability of the armed forces. Temporizing was best in the curcumstances, and Nitti set about improving the climate of relations with Italy's allies. The minutiae of a multitude of proposals, long negotiations over trivial points, are here recounted at length, organized in orderly fashion, and presented with commendable fairness to all.

The details of diplomatic negotiations can make for much dull reading, but there is also fascination in the emergence of the larger picture and the observation of the matching of skills. Italy's chief asset in the circumstances was the American loss of interest in European problems. By the time he was overthrown, Nitti had succeeded in initiating bilateral negotiations with the Yugoslavs, and had come very close to the terms of the Rapallo agreement of November 1920. As a survey of these long and laborious negotiations this account must be rated highly.

There is another strand in this study. Alatri is interested in the significance of the episode for the subsequent course of Italian events. The domestic situation therefore receives much attention, and his book is thus a survey and an appraisal of Nitti's whole administration. Nitti has been the object of severe strictures. His reluctance to make clear decisions, his tendency to provide his subordinates with broad considerations of principle in lieu of definite instructions, are acknowledged, but, on balance, Alatri's verdict is highly sympathetic and favorable, mainly on the score of sound principle and broad understanding. The author is a liberal of the Salvemini school.

The issue of Fiume, or Rijeka, has lost its sting and any but historical significance. It is interesting to consider that another world conflict has had the effect of raising around Trieste a problem in some ways comparable to that of Fiume forty years ago.[1] Here, too, the final settlement took much time and trouble to elaborate. The observation in the Istrian Peninsula of the nice balance between the cruder elements of power and the more subtle forces that stir men's feelings is not the least attractive facet of this excellent book.

Istituto per gli studi di politica internazionale, **René Albrecht-Carrié**
Milan, Italy

Borsody, Stephen, *The Triumph of Tyranny.* New York: Macmillan, 1960. Pp. 285. $4.50.

Stephen Borsody, now an American college professor, has been an exile from Communist Hungary since 1947. As a native of the area of historic Hungary which became a part of Czechoslovakia after World War I, Borsody received his academic training in both lands. In the end he opted for Hungary. By virtue of his training, command over languages, and personal experience, Dr. Borsody appears well qualified to write *The Triumph of Tyranny.*

In speaking of the non-Russian areas of Europe now controlled by Communist regimes and Soviet impulse, the author protests against the use of the term "East-Central Europe." "The West has surrendered so much of Central Europe to the East: why surrender even long-established phraseology?" It raises the question of whether Western scholars, in wishing to separate the area from an identification with a Germany which stands out so formidably in the center, have not sinned in the opposite direction. Borsody, to avoid the two objectionable extremes, borrows and and uses the designation "Middle Zone." The reviewer will do the same on this occasion.

---

[1] In this connection one may look forward to the shortly forthcoming survey of that problem by Professor Duroselle.

The Triumph of Tyranny sketches the history of the Middle Zone from Versailles to some of the earlier gyrations on the summit. Borsody points to excessive nationalism as the major obstacle to peace and international harmony, with federation as a cure. A particular stress is placed on the role played by Czechs and Hungarians, as culpable from opposite sides, in the dissolution of the Habsburg empire and during the succeeding era of national states. The Hungarian transgressions along that line are reasonably well known. But most Americans will be surprised by the author's statement that the Czechs in old Austria had a more favorable position than that enjoyed by the Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees and the protection of minority treaties in the latter case.

If the above gives the impression that *The Triumph of Tyranny* is a case of one-sided pleading, a correction is due. The author generally holds to a balanced view, does not fall into the error of adopting any of many extreme theses advanced to explain controversial events, such as the Yalta Conference, and avoids passing judgment divorced from the framework of the time and its spirit. Yet, where a special emphasis exists, even if only for corrective purposes, it is difficult completely to avoid giving the impression that the argument is weighted.

In discussing future policy, Borsody believes that nothing could be more effective in persuading Russia to seek peace through cooperation than the spectacle of a United West, "moving firmly toward the creation of a United States of Europe, and closely associated with the United States of America." Germany would have to be integrated into such a federated Europe. Questions like the Czech-German conflict over the expulsion of the Sudeten Germans and the issue of the Polish-German frontiers would have to be settled. Otherwise even a fully independent Poland and Czechoslovakia would have to look to the USSR for protection. The Middle Zone as a whole would have to cease to be the ground upon which East and West, or Germany and the East, compete for political and strategic advantages. The formula is good, but the spirit will need much persuading.

Montana State University OSCAR J. HAMMEN

KRAMER, JURAJ, *Iredenta a separatizmus v slovenskej politike, 1919-1938* (Irredentism and Separatism in Slovak Politics, 1919-1938). Bratislava: 1957. Pp. 248.

This book is dedicated to the promotion of Slovak political literature. The author is a member of the Historical Institute of the Czechoslovak Scientific Academy in Prague, which had an auxiliary office in 1955-56 in Budapest where research work was done with the permission of the director of the Hungarian National Archives. The author investigates the important political events of the period 1919-1938, and seeks to uphold a particular point of view. He studies the factors of the Hungarian irredentist movement and its motives, the efforts to regain territories lost after World War I, and the Hungarian attitude toward Slovak aspirations toward autonomy in Czechoslovakia. By the author's admission it was hitherto unimaginable that a Hungarian government should countenance such a purpose or give access to relevant secret documents. He neglects, however, to stress the importance of this admission.

Following the formation of the Successor States after World War I, the re-annexation of former Hungarian regions with Hungarian, Slovak and German populations was the central aim of Hungarian policy, in order to assure their military, political and economic domination.

Concerning the Hungarian-Slovak relationship the author points out that, as a consequence of Hungarian rule, the Slovaks lacked self-respect, and the magyarized intelligentsia had become a functionary of the state. The Hungarian government made every effort to take advantage of the difficulties and deficiencies of the new Czechoslovakia, especially the constitutional disputes between the two main peoples: the Czechs and the Slovaks.

The Hungarian government needed native Slovaks who were willing to represent Hungarian interests on behalf of the Slovaks. One of them, Rev. František Jehlička, founder of the Slovak People's Party in 1905, former deputy in the Hungarian Parliament, who lived for a short time in Czechoslovakia after the proclamation of the new state, became commissar of the University of Bratislava. In 1919 Jehlička and Rev. Andrej Hlinka, leader of the Slovak People's Party, went together to Paris, in defiance of the prohibition of the Czechoslovak government, hoping to present a Memorandum to the Peace Conference on behalf of the Slovaks. The author does not mention the fact that the members of the Czechoslovak delegation at Paris prevented the Slovaks from speaking and submitting their request.

Various leagues and social organizations were formed in anticipation of the reannexation of Slovakia—formerly Upper Hungary—to Hungary. The leader of this movement was Dr. Vojtech Tuka, a former university professor, who was a member of the Slovak People's Party and, simultaneously, a political agent of the Hungarian government. When the Slovak emigration changed its political orientation, it hoped to form a Polish-Slovak federation, set up as an independent state. The Czechs utilized this, intending to stir up strife between the Poles and Hungarians.

The Hungarian irredentists authorized Dvorčak in Paris to assume a political function and publsh a bi-weekly, entitled *La Slovaquie*. This paper was designed to serve as a reporting agency close to the League of Nations' organization for the protection of minorities. The Slovak League in Detroit warned the Czechoslovak government and parliament not to violate the Pittsburgh agreement which secured autonomy for the Slovak population of Czechoslovakia.

On New Year's Day, 1928, Tuka wrote an article entitled "Vacuum iuris." Convinced that the contract between the two nations had expired, and the Slovaks were no longer bound, he endeavored to provoke secession in the Slovak People's Party, and to organize a new party with a strong independent program. Tuka was deputy for the Slovak People's Party in the Parliament of Prague where the Party was a member of the Coalition government. Ten years later, Tuka became prime minister of the first Slovak Republic. As in Slovakia, the American Slovak press called Tuka a Slovak hero, a martyr of the nation, who had written his name in the history of the Slovaks.

When the Nazis took over power in Germany, and when the aggressive behavior of Italy gave revisionism a new impulse, Jehlička started intensive political activities in the international field, until the arbitration in Vienna, when the southern regions of Slovakia were returned to Hungary. Hungarian irredentism, however, was not able to reach its ultimate objective. The final settlement was dictated by Nazi imperialism, which benefited from the anti-Czech policy of the Slovaks and Hungarians. Even Tuka, who was granted amnesty, could not prevent this outcome.

Reading Kramer's book one becomes acquainted with the specific role of Hungarian irredentism and of the Slovak separatism movement. Although the Hungarians had an important effect on this political course, nobody can say that it was an exclusive product of irredentism. In the author's opinion future scientific research must verify the rise and history of Slovak autonomy and separatism by examining the political and economic history of pre-Munich Czechoslovakia. However, in this interpretation the author fails to mention the cultural aspect of the question, which is of vital importance because the Slovaks during their long-coexistence with the Hungarians were under Hungarian cultural influence, which forms a significant part of the present Slovak tradition. But intellectual and spiritual values cannot be disclosed under the rule of dialectical materialism.

This interesting study fills a gap in our knowledge of the internal political affairs of Czechoslovakia. The author does not deal with the year 1939, when the Slovaks openly fought the Czechs, and founded their own state—the Slovak Republic. First of all, the discontented Slovaks speeded up the liquidation of Czechoslovakia. The writer says nothing derogatory about his own nation, because after World War II they were forced to live again in Czechoslovakia.

It is a bold venture to write about Slovak separatism and Hungarian irredentism, since those forces are still influential as an underground movement. Within the Soviet orbit the government of Prague may still rule Czechoslovakia, but not in her pre-Munich form, because the Czechoslovak Parliament in 1945 unanimously voted for the handing over of Ruthenia to the USSR.

The author should be commended for his extensive reading of multilingual literature, even if the scope of the work does not cover, for understandable reasons, the most interesting years of the problem concerned, 1939 or 1945.

University of Colorado CHARLES WOJATSEK

SCHWARTZ, ANDREW J., *America and the Russo-Finnish War.* Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960. Pp. vii, 103. $3.25.

In all probability no European war aroused so much passion and so little action in the United States as the Winter War. Americans generally felt as did President Roosevelt, who referred privately to "this dreadful rape of Finland." After months of uncertainty and debate, both in the Administration and in Congress, Finland received aid which only can be termed inadequate. The United States had antagonized the Soviet Union without really helping Finland. This tergiversation characterized American policy towards the Russo-Finnish relationship throughout the period 1939-1944. Schwartz's study attempts, in a straightforward and unemotional manner, to depict the shifting course of this policy. If his study is not particularly provocative, it at least has few pretentions. Good use has been made of many English-language publications and of Department of State files. Even here, however, there are serious gaps. In order to analyze American public opinion, Schwartz's preface states that ". . . special attention has been devoted to a perusal of both Finnish and American newspapers." This reviewer, however, found only very occasional footnote references to one American newspaper: *The New York Times* (and even these appear to be to news articles, not editorials). The most regrettable gap among English-language sources in undoubtedly C. Leonard Lundin's distinguished study, *Finland in the Second World War.* The significance of this omission should be apparent from a review of Lundin's work in the *Journal* (July, 1958).

The most serious weakness of Schwartz's study, however, results from the fact that only English-language sources are ulitized. It is difficult to see how one can write an effective history of a complicated phase of international politics on a unilingual basis. In particular, the reaction of the Finns (not to speak of the Russians) to United States policy is not depicted with anything like the necessary precision. Excessive reliance is placed upon what American diplomats *thought* was the state of affairs in Finland and the Soviet Union. We may never know with complete accuracy and certainty the reasoning of Soviet officials, but due to the immense outpouring of war literature in Finland, the attitudes of many powerful Finns towards the United States hardly fall under the category of state secret. The linguistic barrier leads to inadequate understanding of the Finnish power structure. Schwartz apparently believes (page 61), on the basis of the gross ignorance of the United States Minister in Helsinki (page 67), that there was some doubt about Väinö Tanner's support of the Russo-Finnish War of 1941-1944. This is a serious error. There were a few Social Democrats who opposed that war, but Tanner was not among them—indeed, he was the strong man of the Finnish Cabinet throughout the war. The lack of Finnish-language sources also makes it difficult for Schwartz to achieve his aim of determining the course Finland ". . . should pursue in its relations with its more powerful neighbors." This is certainly a legitimate goal, but remains an unfulfilled promise. Finnish policy alternatives are not clearly articulated, and therefore it is difficult to judge what, if anything, the Finns did wrong, in Schwartz's opinion.

Indeed, it appears that Schwartz is determined to avoid committing himself on anyone's policy. Critical comment is, for the most part, scrupulously avoided. This study is not likely to offend Americans, Finns, or Russians. To say that Schwartz's approach is cautious would be an understatement. Among numerous examples of this caution is the unchallengeable formulation that "American relations with the Soviet Union became ever closer after Pearl Harbor." Schwartz's account, nevertheless, adheres to the facts so far as possible; this cannot be said for Quincy Wright's introduction, which seems of doubtful relevance. Wright states, for instance, that the United States contributed ". . . to moderating Russia's demands for reparations and territory in the peace treaty of 1947." This is in direct contradiction to what Schwartz states (quite correctly) on page 89.

Brown University MARVIN RINTALA

HEFER, STJEPAN, *Croatian Struggle for Freedom and Independence.* Buenos Aires: Croatian Information Service, 1959. Pp. 238. $2.50.

The author of this work, a Croatian Peasant Party deputy in the prewar Belgrade parliament and a Cabinet member in the wartime Independent State of Croatia, has grown in importance following the recent death of Dr. Ante Pavelich, former chief of that state, who nominated him as leader of the Croatian Liberation Movement, a continuation of the former national-revolutionary Ustashe organization.

This book is a severe condemnation of monarchist Yugoslavia and as such an attempt to justify her collapse and the happenings in Croatia during the War. One thing the author makes clear: "It is evident that Communist Yugoslavia economically exploits and ruins the Croatian people far worse than former royal Yugoslavia." With the Belgrade military coup d'état of March 27, 1941, directed partly against the Tripartite Pact concluded between the government of Serbo-Croatian National Agreement and Hitler, and partly against autonomous Croatia, the fatal hour for Yugoslavia's very existence had arrived. The war-like atmosphere in Belgrade at that moment is credited by the author to "English pounds." A few days before the Axis attack on Yugoslavia, Dr. Vladko Machek, the leader of the Croats, was visited by an emissary of the Nazi Foreign Minister, who proposed to him that he take over the rule of Croatia separated from the rest of Yugosaliva. Dr. Machek, then Vice

Premier, refused. The author, of course, does not share the opinion held by this reviewer that Dr. Machek by his act of quiet but firm defiance of the Nazis saved the honor of the Croatian people.

The Ustashe refute, however, the charge of having been mercenaries in foreign ervice. "The Croatian state was the result of the sovereign will of the Croatian people and not at all a creation of the Axis powers," says Dr. Hefer.

After the dismemberment of Yugosalvia, Mussolini robbed the newly created Croatian State of most of its Adriatic coast and nearby islands by annexing them to Italy. Thus the foe of Yugoslavia became also the foe of Croatia, an important historic lesson. Croatia itself was divided into German and Italian military occupation zones.

Unfortunately, proclaiming the slogan "A severe wound requires painful treatment," Pavelich and his Ustashe embarked on a campaign of extermination of the sizable Serbian minority of almost two million, or one-third of the population of that state, in revenge for Serbian past overlordship. These massacres profoundly shook not only the fragile Croatian State but also the future relations between Croats and Serbs. The Serbian organizations in this country complained to the United Nations about this genocide, in which between 600,000 and 700,000 people lost their lives.

Pursued by the Ustashe, Serbs fled to the woods and mountains, where they either swelled the ranks of the Partisans led by Communists or sought protection from the Italians. The author tries to justify these exterminations of Serbs by alleging that they "rebelled" against the Croatian State and by pointing to the actions of the Chetniks led by General Mihailovich, also strengthened by these Serbian refugees.

"The Italians created a Serbian army in 'allied' Crotia." loyal to King Peter in London. As the Ustashe wished to purge Croatia of non-Croatian elements, so, says the author, the Chetniks tried to create a pure Greater Serbia as part of future Yugoslavia by exterminating some 200,000 people, predominantly Moslem.

The embattled Croatian and Serbian nationalist forces, the Ustashe persecution of Serbs, Italy's capitulation, and considerable British military and political support had greatly contributed to the Communist-led Partisans' strength. The author quotes the Brussels magazine, *Europe-Amérique,* of mid-December 1945, as stating that "Mr. Churchhill recognizes that Tito did not keep the promises given during the war and that the matter of Tito signifies one of his greatest blunders committed during the war." The author is silent about the attempt of several members of the Pavelich Cabinet, parliamentary deputies, and certain colonels in 1944 to bring the Croatian State over to the Allied side, for which all of them paid with their lives.

When the end came, 150,000 Croatian soldiers and officers and some 300,000 civilians with their families fled in order to surrender to the British who, however, handed them back to the Partisans, contrary to the Geneva convention regarding the treatment of war prisoners (but in accordance with the Teheran conference agreements). One-third of them lost their lives in Mass executions without any trial. The author thinks that the total loss of Croats as a result of Communist executions was some 400,000, or 10 per cent of the whole Croatian population.

New York City Oton Ambroz

Kulski, W. W., *Peaceful Co-Existence, an Analysis of Soviet Foreign Policy.* Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. (published in cooperation with the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Inc.), 1959. Pp. xii, 662. $12.50.

Professor Kulski has given us an important book. *Peaceful Co-Existence* is a treatment of Soviet foreign policy which is not conceived solely in terms of our times, but in terms of constant and stable principles guiding the actions of Soviet leadership since the inception of the Soviet State. Co-existence with the free world was and is the only policy possible for Soviet leaders, both in the conditions of complete isolation when Lenin was at the helm of the state, and now with Krushchev in charge of the affairs of the mighty Soviet State in the period of nuclear stalemate. At no time, indeed at no moment, have the Soviet leaders contemplated any departure from the policy of maintaining peaceful relations with all the powers which might involve the Soviet State in war.

Contrary to all unrealistic ideas of "leftist Communists," Lenin insisted on maintaining peace with the capitalist states, and the same policy line has been consistently followed by his successors. It was not Stalin's fault that Hitler attacked Russia in June 1941, and, as Professor Kulski points out, he and his helpmates did everything to appease the German Führer in order to assure peace for their country. In his view even the Berlin blockade and the Korean war cannot be considered as signifying a departure from the general line of Soviet policy. They were, in his opinion, the result of miscalculations due to Stalin's decline in his old age.

The laws of peaceful co-existence were formulated in the Sino-Indian Declaration of April 29, 1954 as five principles of international co-existence (Pancha Shila). So consistent was the Soviet adherence to these principles that even after Stalin's death his successors felt no need to implement or modify the policy.

If our author states all this he by no means suggests that the Soviet Union as a great power will follow a policy of friendly consideration for the national interests of other powers so long as they do not conflict with its own interests. Far from it. Russia's emergence as a revolutionary power has made it possible for her to conduct a policy which has profoundly affected all aspects of international relations. It is not an exaggeration to say, as a Soviet author admitted: "The world has split up . . . decisively and irrevocably, into two camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of socialism. . . . The struggle between these two camps constitutes the axis of all contemporary life, and fills the entire content of the present domestic and foreign policies of the statesmen of both worlds, the old and the new." And this is so because, in spite of the policy of peaceful co-existence which the Soviet Union follows, an imperialistic policy in a dimension unknown to the world until Russia emerged as a revolutionary country has become a bastion of world revolution. Furthermore, this policy is highly successful. In the course of its forty years of existence the Soviet Union has expanded its territory by military conquest, has spread its influence into the area under its exclusive and utter domination, which includes important countries and nations with a long tradition of independent existence, has created a colonial empire of its own, and has forced practically all the world powers to recognize the Soviet State as the main contender for first place among them by threatening the independence of other powers and the general international balance. The policy of the Soviet Union constitutes the most important revolutionary factor in present-day international reality, affects practically all aspects of international life, and has resulted in an arms race which has impeded the peaceful transition of the underdeveloped countries into full statehood and national independence. It has forced other states into alliances and security arrangements which have resulted in trade wars and economic competitions for reasons other than pure economic advantage.

In order to give an adequate presentation of Soviet foreign policies, Professor Kulski has reduced them to a system of ideas and logical actions, treating various aspects of Soviet policies in the order of their importance in terms of motivations, principles, methods and objectives. He finds that in its policies the Soviet leadership relies on political concepts which constitute a peculiar blend of Russian nationalism and Marxist-Leninist *Weltanschauung,* on principles of what may be called *Machtpolitik,* applied to the international world, the image of which is formed according to certain structural principles derived from a deterministc interpretation of history, and in the furtherance of predetermined goals. In the image of the world around them, in the program of changes which Soviet leaders expect to realize, and the methods which they are prepared to use, we find a key, or rather a number of keys, to the Soviet policies of peaceful co-existence. One of the most important of these keys is a firm conviction that force is the chief history-shaping element in the life of a nation.

Professor Kulski is concerned with the analysis of the internal logic of Soviet actions, and therefore none of the fourteen chapters of his book deals exclusively with the theoretical aspects of Soviet policies. As his narrative unfolds he proceeds from the general to the detailed, ending with four major issues of singular significance in the present stage of the peaceful co-existence of the Soviet Empire with the Free World: the underdeveloped countries, the five principles of peaceful co-existence, Soviet colonial possessions and colonial protectorates, and the role of the international Communist movement in the policies of the Communist World Power.

A thorough documentation, reliance on original sources, a broad approach, and constant confrontation of doctrine with the actual record recommend Professor Kulski's book to every serious student of Soviet affairs, and in particular to the academic teacher in this field. Simple organization, a rich bibliography, and an excellent index make of it an outstanding reference tool, meriting a place in every library oriented towards Soviet and general political studies.

The only complaint the writer of these lines wants to register concerns the technical make-up of the book. Footnotes for all chapters are at the end of the text of the entire book, which is simply a nuisance. If it is impossible to have the footnotes at the bottom of the page, where they belong, they should at least follow each separate chapter.

Washington, D. C. KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI

JÄCKEL, EBERHARD, ed., *Die Schleswig-Frage seit 1945. Dokumente.* Herausgeber: Forschungsstelle fur Völkerrecht und ausländisches öffentliches Recht der Universität Hamburg, Institut für Internationales Recht an der Universität Kiel, Institut für Völkerrecht der Universität Göttingen, Band XXIX. Frankfurt am Main & Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1959. Pp. 150. DM 19.80.

This volume is one of the series of document collections published jointly by the institutes of international law at the Universities of Hamburg, Kiel, and Göttingen. The editor, Dr. Eberhard Jäckel, has meticulously put together a number of documents illustrating the development of the minorities issue in the Danish and German areas of Schleswig after the Second World War and the effect of that issue on Danish-German relations. The story which the documents tells is an interesting and hopeful one.

The minorities question in Schleswig, just as in many other areas of Europe, was immensely embittered by the events of the Second World War. During the German occupation, the German minority in Danish Schleswig proved to be willing collaborators with the Nazis, whereas the Danish minority in German Schleswig had suffered various inconveniences since 1933. It was therefore only too natural that after Germany's collapse Denmark, now enjoying a relatively strong position, should have attempted to impose her own solution upon the minorities question. Yet the solution she proposed was not nearly so drastic as those reached by other nations who had had unhappy experiences with German minorities. On the one hand, the Danish government proceeded to punish the German minority by applying to it the general retroactive anti-collaboration laws and by closing down German-language schools and other cultural institutions; on the other hand, it turned an interested eye south of the border where the Danish minority, now organized for political action, was gaining in strength. The Danish party in German Schleswig entertained as its ultimate aim union with Denmark. While the Danish government did not formally support this aim, it did put forward demands for a change of conditions in German Schleswig which would have strengthened the Danish minority as a political force. It requested the separation of the administration of German Schleswig from Holstein and the expulsion of German refugees from the area.

However, the Danish demands were blocked by the British occupation authorities. In 1948 the British foreign office suggested that the long-range interests of Denmark lay in the improvement of relations with Germany and in the settlement of the minorities question within this broader framework. The stabilization of conditions in West Germany and the presence of Danes in Germany and of Germans in Denmark provided the governments of both countries with a real interest in negotiation and in reciprocal regulations of the conditions of both minority groups. In 1949 the Kiel Declaration on the part of the German and the Copenhagen Protocol on the part of the Danish authorities provided the first substantial step in this direction; in 1955 the two governments were able to come to an even more complete agreement which contributed substantially toward the improvement of the German minority in Danish Schleswig.

In the course of the decade 1945-1955, then, the positions of the German minority in Danish Schleswig and of the Danish minority in German Schleswig improved considerably if gradually: a favorable omen for the handling of minority problems in the future.

Dr. Jäckel has done a competent job of editing. He has provided his collection with a lucid introductory sketch, an index, and a very useful bibliography. However, he could have clarified his material better if he had used more explanatory footnotes. While most documents are either self-or mutually explanatory, they occasionally refer to matters which should have deserved editorial comment. The material is organized into two parts. Part A (pp. 21-90), which deals with general developments, is of particular interest to the historian; Part B (pp. 91-144), which comprises documents dealing with special issues such as electoral, educational, and religious laws, is rather technical and legalistic and therefore perhaps of greater use to international lawyers than to historians. Most of the material is of German origin. One would have liked to see more Danish material included, particularly concerning the immediate postwar attitude of the Danish government toward the German minority. Likewise, from a historical point of view one would have appreciated a slightly less legalistic approach which would not have precluded the incorporation of some illustrations of public opinion.

University of Omaha Ivo N. Lambi

Deutsch, Karl W., and Edinger, Lewis J., *Germany Rejoins the Powers. Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. xvi, 320. $6.50.

The purpose of this exploratory attempt to understand recent German foreign policy and to predict, if possible, upcoming changes is twofold. First, Deutsch and Edinger want "to give a brief summary of some of the main background conditions of German foreign policy making." (p. vii) Second, comparing the results of different public opinion polls taken at different times, and by preparing elite inventories (rather than elite samples) the authors sought to find out to what degree recent methods of the behavioral sciences can shed light on political attitudes in the realm of foreign policy making. Thus, the focus of the study is not only on the interplay of mass opinion and elites, but also upon the possible future course of German foreign policy and the changing patterns of influence in the German foreign policy process.

The book is divided into four parts: The first deals with policy images in popular opinion, the second with "Institutions and Elites," the third discusses "the System of Operation," the last raises the question of "Prospects and Perspectives." There is also a list of dates, a good bibliography and numerous tables. The latter furnish the reader with a large store of information about the age structure, the geographical and social origin, the religion, education, military service, and anti-Nazi record of the foreign policy elites. Moreover, the appendix contains a rich inventory—a close-up—of "the incumbents of German foreign policy elite positions, 1954-56." Included in that group are the administrative as well as political, economic, religious and communication elites. Another part of the appendix—"some data on German social structure and mobility, 1938-1955"—reprints the tables from the important study by Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," *The American Journal of Sociology*, LXIV, No. 1 (July, 1958), 6-24.

Insofar as the book purports to bring out systematically some information on postwar German foreign policy, it fulfills its aim rather well. Over many pages it has the character of a useful reference work which makes, however, for slow and tedious reading. All too much of the material is already well known to the specialist and the so-called general reader will get much more out of such accounts as Fritz R. Allemann's more interesting *Bonn ist nicht Weimar* or from such popular (in the best sense of the word) accounts as Alistair Horne's *Return to Power*. In general, the results of the behavioristic approach to recent, present and possible future German foreign policy are disappointingly (but perhaps not astonishingly) meager. Yet there are some valuable conclusions concerning the German foreign policy elites. (E.g. the differences between German foreign policy elites and their counterparts in the United States are clearly and sharply brought out: that the leaders of civic organizations play a much less significant role in Germany; that the "constituents" of various elites appear to have rather weak controls over elite members; that there is obviously far less competition in the "opinion market" among various foreign policy elites in Germany than in the U.S.). But all too often the results labor the obvious, e.g. that more Catholics vote for the CDU, more Protestants for the SPD. And predictions, and often analyses of the inventories on elites and public opinion polls, are so hedged about by "perhaps" and 'might" and "maybe" that the reader wonders why he had to go through all the trouble of studying elaborate tables when he could have come to the same conclusion by regularly reading the *New York Times* reports on German foreign policy. The authors are, of course, much too able and careful scholars not to be aware of the limitations of their approach and state them several times explicitly. To cite at least one example, dealing with the judgment of influence in the German foreign policy pattern,

> Influence is . . . inferred provisionally from repeated association with prevailing policies, together with the continuing enjoyment of substantial status and prestige. It cannot well be inferred in this manner from any one decision, but only from several or many; and the inference should be tested and checked against other types of evidence.
>
> In the end, the ascription of political influence to some person, group, or government is a matter of judgment. The use of operational definitions, quantitative codings, computations and the related apparatus of measurement at best can check and aid such judgments; it cannot replace them .... None of (the tables) . . . are intended to represent anything more than aids to judgment, putting into more visible and systematic form some of the processes of surveying evidence which we are carrying out ordinarily, in our minds, with less formality, when we are forming our opinions about the relative influence of this or that group, agency, or politician. (p. 194 f.)

Significantly enough, the best written, most succinct and most thought-provoking chapter in the whole book is the one freest from behavioristic methodology. It is the first chapter, "What Germans Expect: Historic Memories and Present Aspirations" in which the split in the German political tradition is discussed, with its uneasy combination of admiration for the military prowess and daring of the medieval knight and the veneration of the diligent and skillful medieval craftsman, "while the mercantile traditions of empiricism, rationality, adaptability, and ease of compromise seem markedly underrepresented." (p. 17) For the rest of the book, apart from the unintended result of building up in the reader an allergy against such terms as elite, image, role, etc., the very serious question arises as to how fruitful the behavioristic approach is when it comes to predictions and to the analysis of personal decision making in the area of foreign policy.

Cornell College ERIC C. KOLLMAN

ROTOCKI, ZBIGNIEW, *Odrodzenie Sił Zbrojnych w Niemieckiej Republice Federalnej.* Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959. Pp. 283. Zł. 50.

The building-up of German armed forces is looked upon in Europe with mixed feelings. Two world wars and heavy blows delivered by German hands cannot be easily erased from the memory of European nations. It is understandable that doubts and even fears are particularly strong in Poland, who, as a result of German aggression and occupation, suffered the greatest human, material and cultural losses. Furthermore, these feelings are purposely aggravated by propaganda which serves the current political aims of the USSR. From these two points of view, therefore, a book on the armament of West Germany published in Poland deserves special attention.

Its publisher, Instytut Zachodni in Poznań, remarks rightly that the author has laid main stress on the legal and organizational aspects of the West Germany army, and postulates also that "the economical basis and the social background of remilitarization" should be analyzed, and that "its political aims should be tied-in with the revisionistic ideology of the West German regime." This last tendency is visible in the book; however, the author has fortunately restricted his ambition and does not elaborate the social and economical aspects. Owing to this restriction of the subject, the book is in its greater part informative and matter-of-fact.

The author used as sources mainly German press and political and military periodicals, partly also American, British, French, Swiss, Russian and others, among them even a few Spanish and Portuguese, which proves his conscientiousness, while bordering on exaggeration. He relied much less on books; it is surprising, e.g., that Lord Ismay's *NATO—the First Five Years, 1949-1954* is not among his sources. The use of sources and the choice of quotations are quite selective. But it is clear that the author followed closely the peripeteia of the re-armament of West Germany and knows the subject well. Facts, dates and figures are numerous and generally correct; however, intentions are sometimes presented as if they were already realized. Biographical notes concerning German commanders are valuable, although here and there omissions or mistakes can be found, as e.g. in the case of generals Speidel and Reinhardt. Specific problems are presented calmly and the author's own views take the form of a few words describing a fact or an action as an "opportunist stand" (page 37), "an action in the disguise of . . ." (p. 40), "democratic phraseology" (p. 59), "a tactical Manoeuvre" (p. 59), "return to the militaristic renaissance" (p. 67) and so forth. To sum up, in spite of certain biased comments the book is a valuable source of information which allows the reader to draw his own conclusions.

This appreciation refers to the greater part but not to the book as a whole. Wherever the author departs from purely German questions and deals with their international background, both political and military, not only conclusions but also information are often incorrect or seriously incomplete. E.g. the author writes (p. 19-20) that "the *only* restriction accepted by West Germany. . . is the restriction emanating from No. III protocol of the agreement on Western European Union," and, that "these restrictions can be waived . . . with the approval of 2/3 votes of the Permanent Council of the Union." Thus the author omits the principal restriction contained in No. II protocol which defines the maximum permissable armed forces and can be changed only with the unanimous approval of all members of the Council.

In Chapter IX (Strategical Concepts) the phases of NATO's armament plans are presented falsely, e.g. the NATO Council's decisions in Lisbon (1952). Furthermore, strategical problems are mixed with tactical, official plans with private opinions, rockets with atomic weapons and so on. This chapter gives the reader wrong information and the majority of its theses are faulty.

In the last Chapter (XII), the author points out quite rightly that it was collapse of the European Defense Community which led to the creation of German national armed forces, but he does not, of course, mention how great a role in this Soviet Russia had played by her diplomatic game with France, and how the USSR had mobilized in Germany all nationalistic factions including former Nazis. The author does not mention Great Britain's stand at that time. Finally, he repeats his false conclusion from Chapter X that the German partner of the Western powers, "with the growth of its forces will be able to exert appropriate pressure on them and force its views upon them." Information which the author gives in his book does not justify this exaggerated and unrealistic conclusion.

The last 52 pages of the book contain reprints of documents. Surprisingly, the agreements on the European Defense Community and on the creation of the Western European Union which determine the conditions of the rearmament of Germany are not included. In spite of its mistakes and omissions the book deserves to contain an index of names and places which unfortunately is missing.

London ZYGMUNT JARSKI

Nowak, Zdzisław, *Zarys Czynnikow Rozwoju Gospodarczego Niemiec Zachodnich.* Poznań: Institut Zachodni, 1960. Pp. 259. Zł. 50.

Zaremba, Piotr, *Obszary Stykowe w Planowaniu Przestrzennym Na Przykładzie Regionu Pily.* Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1960. Pp. 80. Zł. 15.

Inexplicable as it is from the standpoint of Marxist-Leninist theory, the West German "economic miracle" is seldom discussed by the Soviet bloc economists. The several Russian studies of the subject this reviewer has read should be dismissed as mere propaganda. In Poland scholars have not yet lost the habit of objective thinking, and public opinion will not accept the black-and-white interpretation of the surprising German recovery. In addition, to one hand-picked Russian who has first-hand knowledge of West German economic conditions, there have been probably a hundred Poles who, since 1956, have had the opportunity to have a look at West Germany when traveling to or from France or Britain. Nowak's study is an attempt to acquaint this relatively well informed Polish community with the reasons for West German prosperity.

This was a thankless task, for under present conditions in Poland any scholar dealing with the German problem must not depart too far from the Moscow made set of prefabricated opinions on this subject; otherwise his book will never be published. Dr. Nowak has done his best to supply his readers with most essential data on West German recovery—a topic with which he is obviously familiar—while interpreting it in such a way as not to incur official displeasure. His description of West German economic development up to 1958 is factual and satisfactory, especially in dealing with the masterful use of the great postwar West German heavy industrial capacity for the recapture of external markets. He rightly stresses the fact that the influx of millions of war refugees from the east has not slowed down but, on the contrary, has accelerated the development of West German economy. Although, for obvious reasons, he cannot praise the West German policy of *Sociale Marktwirtschaft,* he speaks of it with respect. His chapter on the amazing postwar expansion of West German agriculture will displease professional German revisionists but will satisfy any independently-minded economist.

Nowak is much weaker in his unavoidable attempt to give a "political" explanation of West German recovery, where he repeatedly contradicts himself. To quote one example: a scholar working in an atmosphere of intellectual freedom would not try to justify that recovery by low armament expenditures until 1955 and by the return of high armament expenditures after 1955. Among the topics not covered by the study are the psychological basis of recovery through *Arbeitswut* and the present full employment in West German economy which was evident already in 1958. Nowak's thesis to the effect that Dr. Erhard's economic system was favorable to the strong and hard on the weak was true ten years ago but no longer entirely so in 1958.

Despite these shortcomings, this is a useful and, given the circumstances, rather a fair study. An English summary of 22 pages is added to the Polish text. The author of this summary is not very familiar with the English language and indulges in new and fancy words. Upon encountering the term "dension of population," this reviewer was not sure whether it was meant to signify tension or dentation!

In his short study, the noted planner Piotr Zaremba pleads for the formation, out of a dozen districts (*powiaty*) of North-Western Poland situated along the course of the Noteć (Netze), an affluent of the Warta River, of a new province with Piła (Schneidemühl) as its capital.

The region in question had been divided between Prussia and Poland until the latter's first partition in 1772. Frederick II had settled many German colonists on this sparsely populated, mainly pastoral land, a part of which for ethnic reasons was assigned to Poland at Versailles. The remaining German-held part was known between 1919 and 1939 as the *Grenzmark,* of which Schneidemühl was the capital city. Since 1945, with Poland in control of the entire region, its various subdivisions have been made parts of no less than four provinces (voyvodships): of Poznań, Bydgoszcz, Koszalin and Zielona Góra. This, Zaremba claims, has been contrary to common sense and has adversely influenced the region's economic development.

He indicates that the districts of the Noteć Valley gravitate not toward the four distant provincial capitals but toward Piła. This city has suffered immense war damage, but its location close to the Noteć, the canalized course of which forms a part of the important waterway between the Vistula and the Oder, as well as the fact that it is a junction of many railroads and highways, makes Piła the natural metropolis of the Noteć Valley. Cattle breeding, wood processing, various industries based upon local lignite deposits and, finally, tourism will develop more rapidly if a new administrative unit of some 500,000-700,000 people is created. This reviewer, at least, has been convinced that Zaremba is right.

The study is, of course, of little interest to the Poles who are not directly concerned in this local issue, much less so to readers outside Poland. It has been reviewed here because it offers a good sample of the literature on similar half-economic, half-administrative problems which is increasingly being produced in the captive area of Europe. Its scholars share the somewhat wishful belief that their nations' economic development can be greatly helped and accelerated by the mere establishment of "scientific" economic-administrative regions. This is no new fad; one recalls that no less a person than Dimitri Mendeleyev, the Nobel Prize chemist, inaugurated such a discussion in 1890 in his masterful essay on the necessity of a scientific administrative re-division of the Russian Empire. The recent re-partition of Czechoslavkia into ten semi-autonomous provinces was preceded by an exhaustive discussion arousing much public interest. In voluntarist societies ruled by a centrally-planned Socialist economy there is much more to be said for this interest than elsewhere, even though the high hopes associated with the "right" solution of the problem seldom fully materialize.

American University JAN WSZELAKI

TURNAU, IRENA, *Studia nad strukturą ludnosciową, polskiego Wrocławia* (Studies on the Demographic Structure of Polish Wrocław). Poznań: Instytut Zachodni (Western Institute), 1960. Pp. vii, 327. Bibliography. Zł. 55.

The enormous population shifts that accompanied the Second World War and the period immediately following it meant that millions of people who left their homes more or less voluntarily found themselves in new and frequently strange environments and in circumstances to which they were wholly unaccustomed. Mrs. Turnau's study spotlights one small but fascinating facet of the many larger political, economic and social problems to which these years gave rise in Europe, namely the phenomenally rapid growth of a new, large, urban community, populated by people from diverse geographic regions and mostly of rural or small town origin, on the site of a city empty and in ruins.

The prewar German Breslau, which Polish Wrocław replaced, had been a relatively large city whose population had reached 650,000 by 1939. During the earlier part of the war this figure increased somewhat, but it fell drastically towards the end owing to devastation which, according to the author, left "only about one third of all the dwellings habitable after minor repairs." Moreover, many of these stood empty since the inhabitants had fled from the devastated city before the advancing Soviet Army. Only two years later a new city had risen in its place with a Polish population of 250,000, a figure which does not include the steadily dwindling number of Germans. By 1957 the figure had risen to nearly 400,000.

Mrs. Turnau obtained the material on which this study is based during field work done in the years 1947-49, and from it she has built up the demographic structure of Wrocław as it developed from 1945-1947. When, in 1958, she prepared the book for publication, she scrutinized the official statistics relating to Wrocław then, on the basis of this data, presented a demographic picture of the growth of the city and of the development of its social structure up to the end of 1957.

In the first part of the book, except for the first chapter which is devoted to the sources of her material, the methods employed and the relevant literature, the material is treated from a strictly demographic point of view. The new post-war population of Wrocław is described in terms of place of origin, earlier environment, general population statistics, and educational and occupational grouping. Mrs. Turnau's figures disprove the commonly held belief that the majority of Wrocław's new inhabitants lived formerly in Eastern Poland before it was annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939. She shows conclusively that at the end of 1947 from 70 to 75 per cent of the population of Wrocław was made up of people from prewar Central and Western Poland and that only some 20 to 23 per cent had been "repatriated" from the Soviet Union; that is, the majority had been born and bred in the Lwów and Wilno provinces in Poland. None the less, the ethos of Wrocław was so unmistakably that of Eastern Poland, although the proportion of former inhabitants of Lwów never exceeded 10 per cent and those of Wilno barely reached 2.8 per cent, that the myth that the total population of prewar Lwów had been transplanted to Wrocław became generally accepted.

The author suggests that two factors in the former environment of the incomers from Lwów and Wilno account for the active part they have played in determining the social profile of Wrocław, namely their higher educational standards and the fact that they were accustomed to a truly urban rather than a small town or rural way of life, such as had been previously led by the greater part of the city's new population.

Taking the population of Wrocław as a whole, Mrs. Turnau found that it was markedly young (for instance, in 1947 80 per cent of the inhabitants were between 15 and 49 years of age), and that the birthrate was exceedingly high and deathrate low. The rate of natural increase in the decade of 1947-57 reached and in some years surpassed a figure of 3 per cent, as compared with an average of 2 per cent in postwar Poland, and of less than 1.5 per cent in the large cities in prewar Poland.

The second part of the book is devoted to a sociological survey of the way in which this new, predominantly rural population, drawn from many different regions, became organized into a dynamic urban group and of the different modes of adaptation to unforseen and completely fresh social circumstances. The author describes the evolution of the municipal services, the educational institutions (University and Institute of Technology), the local press, industries, etc., and analyzes the social processes by which former rural ways of life and regional divergences, together with their accompanying antagonisms, gave place to uniformly urban mores and types of social relationships. It is possible to follow the emergence in a few years of a large, functioning community with a strong sense of social identity from an aggregation of individuals whose former social loyalties were to small, largely rural, dispersed groups.

The analysis of the material collected has been skilfully carried out from a strictly scientific point of view. As with all such enquiries, Mrs. Turnau's conclusions and comments will not be accepted unquestioningly by other workers in this field, but she has clearly not allowed any political considerations to color her findings. The fact that the work was published in a country behind the iron curtain accounts for the occasional and seemingly not very relevant references to Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, and, indeed, even Bierut, as well as to "Soviet Science," here represented only by Lewczenko; but the author is also familiar with Western sociological literature, though she does not specifically refer to any work published in the West after 1948.

Boston, Mass. WIKTOR SUKIENNICKI

DANIELS, ROBERT VINCENT, *The Conscience of the Revolution: Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. 576. $10.00.

The evolution of intra-Party struggle is not a new theme in Soviet history, but Professor Daniels has attacked the problem in depth. He has worked diligently through a great mass of material. His story is tightly woven and his conclusions are impressively stated. In short, this is a work of first rate importance and should be useful for all who seek plausible explanations for Soviet behavior in both domestic and international affairs.

Not that all the answers are here! As a matter of fact there are questions that arise on nearly every page. Even Khrushchev, in his "Secret Speech" of February 1956, failed to provide more than verification for what intelligent observers had "guessed" about Stalinism for two decades. Much of the documentation undoubtedly disappeared in the purges of the thirties. It seems highly improbable that even the Trotsky archives will do more than substantiate what is already known.

In this book the opposition is a term used to describe the various groupings which took issue with those who were, at any moment, in a position of power, who controlled the Party, who could manipulate the apparatus. Prior to the revolution it was simply a minority which generally bent its will to that of the majority. After the revolution it became, to those who possessed the instrumentalities of persuasion and of force, a factious and contentious clique on the Left or on the Right which was bent upon perverting the mandate of the revolution.

Basic differences had plagued the Party from its earliest days. They persisted into the days of the revolution, and were marked by disputes over the Constituent Assembly, the proposed peace treaty with Germany, the nationality question, the role of the trade unions, the introduction of NEP, and many lesser issues. Throughout this period the author has described groupings such as the Ultra-Left, the Left, and the Center. The Center was invariably the repository of real power. After the death of Lenin there emerged other groupings, one headed by Zinoviev and another which was loyal to Trotsky. For a time these merged forces into what became the "United Opposition." Once this opposition had been liquidated a new Right Opposition emerged, which was headed by Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky. This came about, of course, because Stalin had by that time not only liquidated the Left but had also usurped the Leftist program.

There are a number of pertinent observations which the author makes about the intra-Party struggles. He makes it clear that whatever truth might have existed on one or another side it is clear that the responsibility of ruling a nation brought a different set of problems from those which existed in the era of conspiracy and revolution. And those who wielded power were more sensitive about exercising it than they were about democratic clichés. In short, those who were in wanted to stay in. But, on the other hand, those who were out wanted to get in. This would appear to be a power struggle. And yet it was not a power struggle in the classical sense of the expression because both the Old Bolsheviks and those who arrived later were all pretty much under the hypnotic influence first of Lenin's personality and later of Lenin's principles. The Opposition, whether of the Left or of the Right, acted less like men of real conviction and more like men with a lurking guilt complex. The "conscience of the revolution" was frequently a bad conscience, and therein lay much of its weakness. This was true of most of the lesser fry, and frequently true of the principals, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Trotsky.

Of necessity Mr. Daniels has been forced to submerge himself in a great deal of theoretical Party material. He has obviously faced the dilemma of faithfully rendering his sources and yet telling a coherent story which would delineate the issues. It is not always easy to make bourgeois sense out of what was, at least at times, Communist nonsense. This reviewer believes that he has succeeded very well indeed. Even an occasional lapse in phraseology or the unfortunate oversight in proof-reading on page 45 does not alter that fact. In short, this is an excellent book.

University of Nebraska ALBIN T. ANDERSON

MEISSNER, BORIS, *Russland unter Chruschtschow.* Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Dokumente und Berichte, Band 15. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1960. Pp. xv, 699. DM 64.

Dr. Meissner is one of the most prolific authors of our time. In the last decade he has published at least seven books, not counting numerous articles. He specializes in both domestic affairs of the Soviets and their international relations and policy. On the latter he ha published, in 1954, *Russia, the Western Powers and Germany* (372 pp.) and, in 1956, *The Soviet Union, the Baltic States and International Law* (377 pp.) On the former, in 1951, *Russia at a Turning Point* (91 pp.), in 1954, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union before and after the Death of Stalin* (104 pp.), in 1956, *Soviet Russia between Revolution and Restoration* (231 pp.) and *The End of the Stalin Myth* (214 pp.). The present and seventh book is a direct continuation of this last one. There the author has reported and analyzed the debates and resolutions of the 20th Party Congress and their influence on the Soviet Communist Party; here he is concerned with the post-20th Congress period and the debates and resolutions of the 21st Congress. However, the last book of Meissner is much larger in scope. It covers not only the problems of the Party but also describes and analyzes the problems of the Soviet State, of its domestic and foreign policy, of the Soviet army, economy, legislation and ideology and its influence on the Soviet younger generation.

The present work is divided into three unequal parts. Part One (pp. 3-139) is a chronicle of Soviet political life between the 20th and 21st Party Congresses. In 22 short chapters the author presents in sequence the most important political events: the plenary sessions of the Party's Central Committee, the sessions of the Supreme Soviet, the *Komsomol* Congress, the elections of 1958, etc. He quotes in full all the official communiqués on the plenary sessions of the Central Committee and gives long excerpts from other communiqués, resolutions and the relevant reports, speeches, and even several articles in periodicals and daily papers. Thus we have here a well documented summary of the evolution of Soviet political life between 1956 and 1959, of the several reforms initiated by Khrushchev and of his, and of his opponents, tactics in the internal fight for supreme power within the Party and in the State. On each occasion Dr. Meissner gives also his own evaluation of the events and political moves, mostly in short lucid remarks presented under numbered points.

According to the author's opinion, the political and tactical successes of the First Secretary of the Party, although quite significant, still did not have a decisive character. A widespread manifold anti-Khrushchev opposition still exists both in Soviet society and in various Party circles. Khruschev's victory over the majority of the Presidium of the Central Committee in June 1957, and the subsequent reshuffling of its members, by no means solved all the problems. Prof. Meissner does not agree with the popular view that at the June Plenum the so-called technocrats were defeated by the Party's "apparatchiks." In his opinion, it is necessary to distinguish among the Party's "apparatchiks" Party organizers, Party ideologists and Party technocrats, and he proves that the members of all these groups were on both sides—victorious and defeated.

Having, after his formal victory at the June Plenum, carried through his most radical and controversial reforms (the reorganization of the administration of industry and the liquidation of the MTS), and having in mind a no less radical reform of the system of education, Khrushchev needed a formal acceptance of his moves by the supreme Party authority. Hence the unexpected decision of calling an extraordinary party Congress. Mr. Meissner notes that this decision was published in the Soviet Press on September 7, precisely on the fifth anniversary of Khrushchev's nomination to the post of First Secretary of the Party.

Although the 21st Congress unanimously condemned the "anti-Party group" and formally accepted Khrushchev's "general line," it was far from being his ultimate triumph. This is the conclusion of the second part of Mr. Meissner's book (pp. 143-261). First of all, he notices a comparatively lower level of the general discussion at the 21st Congress than at the 20th. Then, among the speakers, he distinguishes three different groups from the way they condemned the opposition and praised the First Secretary. The differencies stressed by Prof. Meissner are subtle but substantial. Some of the speakers called the members of the "anti-Party group" "traitors" and "criminals" and asked for their legal prosecution. Some others limited themselves to their moral condemnation in more or less strong terms, while some, in their speeches, even tried to pass over this delicate problem. Interesting is Meissner's remark that, as a rule, the representatives of the non-Russian parts of the Soviet Union, and especially of the Ukraine, were less anti "anti-Party group" than were those of the Party organizations in Russia proper.

Mr. Meissner noticed similar subtle differencies in analyzing the speakers' attitude and language in relevance to Khrushchev's person and the report he presented to the Congress. Only the minority spoke about Khrushchev in a way similar to that used in Stalin's time, and expressly called him the head of the Central Committee. The others used the formula "The Central Committee and personally Comrade Khrushchev." However, the maojrity of the members of the Party's Presidium limited themselves to speaking of Khrushchev as the author of the report presented to the congress on behalf of the Central Committee. As the first three groups of speakers did not coincide with the second three, the general picture of political opinions represented at the 21st Congress was even more complicated that the three-way division into two extreme wings and a moderate center.

In a separate extended chapter of Part Two Meissner discusses the data of the Seven-Year Plan adopted by the 21st Congress. He stresses the evident lack of capital for the planned investments as well as new difficulties with the labor force. He has no doubt that the new reform of the Soviet educational system is intimately connected with the actual lack of workers for Soviet industry and agriculture. Very interesting remarks and comparative data on Soviet, American, and West German economy and industrial production lead us to think that the author had at his disposal materials collected by some Institute specializing in economic matters.

After having presented in following chapters of Part II the influence of the 21st Congress on the Soviet military policy and on the ideology of Communism, Mr. Meissner gives, in the very short Part III (less than three-and-a-half pages) his general conclusions. In his opinion, the 21st Congress did not mark the end of the Transitional period which the Soviet Union entered after the death of Stalin. In spite of all his spectacular successes, Khrushchev has not yet finally stabilized his position as that of supreme leader of the Communist Party and the Soviet State. Having successively eliminated all his main rivals, he got so far ahead that he has become isolated. According to Prof. Meissner, the relation of political forces in the supreme Soviet leadership after the 21st Congress is exactly the same as it was before the Congress, and he believes that sudden personal changes in Moscow at the present time are much more probable than they were during the last years of Stalin's life. The actual position of Khrushchev can be compared with Stalin's position of 1930, but not with that of 1939, and, in the opinion of the author, he would be in many ways handicapped should he wish to retread in the 1960's the path of absolute power taken by Stalin in the 1930's.

In addition to numerous long quotations Mr. Meissner's work is supplemented by the verbatim texts of 24 Soviet documents (400 pages), mostly in the official East German translation. Perhaps it could be said that this voluminous book contains but little unknown material, but it is an extremely useful and surprisingly complete collection of sources relevant to Soviet policy and events in the years 1956-1959.

Boston, Mass. WIKTOR SUKIENNICKI

SHORTER NOTICES

Zadnikar, Marijan, *Romanska arkitektura na Slovenskem* (Romanesque Architecture in Slovenia). Ljubljana: Državna založba Slovenije, 1959. Pp. 358. 2,500 dinars. ($3.35) (résumé in French.)

Exploration of church attics, in search of Romanesque elements obscured by later transformations, as well as archive research were all part of the effort which went into this book. With the detailed technical analysis of the monuments Zadnikar addresses himself primarily to the art historian, but even the non-specialist can gain from this work an added insight into the manifold consequences of Slovenia's historical exposure to diverse political and cultural influences.

The common trait of Romanesque monuments on Slovenian territory is that, with the exception of monasteries and a few feudal structures, they are mostly parish churches and village chapels, reflecting the absence of important centers of hierarchical or temporal power in the area. From an architectural standpoint Slovenia is, however, the meeting place of several types of the Romanesque style. In Carniola, the semicircular apse predominates. This type, characteristic of small churches in Central Europe, Italy, Istria, Dalmatia, and even Serbia (Prilep) is, in Slovenia, southern in origin because of its valued superstructure. Northern in origin are the rectangular presbyteries of Styria as well as the "eastern belfry" (so called due to its location in the church plan), which reaches from Carinthia into western Styria, attaining at the confluence of the Savinja and the Sava its southeasternmost point in Europe. The Istrian type of the Romanesque church lacks the belfry, and it stems from the early Christian tradition, of which the sixth century Graeco-Roman basilica in Poreč is a magnificent example. In Slovenia, the Istrian influence reaches from the churches near the sea coast (e.g. Hrastovlje) northward along the valleys of the Soča and the Vipava to the foot of the Julian Alps, where it ultimately unites with Gothic elements in a symbiosis of two contrasting worlds. Has Istria influenced the Pannonian churches discovered in 1946-47 and those of Grisons, as it has been held for both of these groups? In giving a negative answer to the question Zadnikar agrees with Jj. Karaman, according to whom it was the continuity of the old Christian tradition which in all three instances accounted for the preservation of the characteristic niche-type apse. Historically, the Romanesque period in Slovenia encompasses the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, reaching its peak in the first half of the thirteenth.

Photographs, plans, and maps illustrate Zadnikar's book, which lives up to its motto: *Saxa loquuntur.*

Keuka College **Toussaint Hočevar**

Gunther, Erich Rothenberg, *The Austrian Military Border in Croatia, 1522-1747.* Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. 48. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1960. Pp. 156.

This brief but thorough historical study of the famous *Miliärgrenze* (military border) or konfin, which Austria maintained in Croatia between 1522 and 1881, deals with the period from its origin under Ferdinand I to its reorganization under Empress Maria Theresa in 1747. This was the period of maximum Turkish advances and pressure against the Austrian Empire. The main purpose of the military border, with its unique military, political and demographic characteristics, was the organization of a cordon sanitaire against these Turkish advances, with an ever ready military force, the famous *Grenzer*. As the author illustrates on numerous occasions, the military border served not only the Hapsburg rulers as an important defensive outpost for the strategically important roads leading into Inner Austria—Styria and Carniola—, but the specific political organization and dependable *Grenzer* also were valuable as a dynastic instrument to check the restive nobility of Croatia and Hungary.

Much has been written about the purposes, the organization and the history of the military border. Most materal is published, as is only natural, by Austrians, but important and outstanding contributions, according to the author, have been made in Hungary, Slovenia, and especially by the Jugoslavenska Akademija Znanosti i Umjetnosti in Zagreb. The author has made a careful bibliographical check of existing published and unpublished sources. Sixteen pages in this small volume are devoted to bibliographical references alone.

The study is extremely readable, with the author succeeding especially well in focusing his discussions on the main theme—the military border—, a difficult task, in view of the close reciprocal relations between the policies of the emperor regarding the Turks, his many other foreign involvements, and the constant power struggle within the loosely knit Empire. Mention should also be made of a most useful orientation map.

Both the historian and interested area scholars from other social sciences will find Dr. Rothenberg's study an important contribution to the literature of the unique military organization on the Empire's southern borders.

The University of Texas GEORGE W. HOFFMAN

RITTER, GERHARD A., *Die Arbeiterbewegung im Wilhelminischen Reich. Die Sozialdemokratische Partei und die Freien Gewerkschaften 1890-1900.* Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1959.

This work grew out of a thesis presented to the Free University in Berlin in 1952. The author modestly states that he has sought only to sketch some of the problems involved in a history of the German working class movement, seemingly as a guide for later researchers. (p. 218) But the work is also a sketchy history of the Social Democratic Party and the Trade Union movement in the period from 1890 to 1900, a critique of the emphasis of most past studies of the German working class movement and an indictment of the role played by the Marxist theoreticians.

It is Ritter's charge that too much attention has been paid by scholars to the Social Democratic theoreticians, while not enough study has been made of the less glamorous phases of the German working class movement. Bebel, Wilhelm Liebknecht, Kautsky, Luxemburg and even Berstein, in his opinion, often did more harm to the German worker than good. It was the steady, "practical" trade union leaders and the South German reformers, such as Georg von Vollmar, whose labors were productive. The concentration on Marxian theory and illusory goals, he contends, produced an air of unreality in the party which sacrificed the attainable, such as electoral reforms, a greater share of political power and greater social and economic reforms, for the unrealizable. Ritter is unduly optimistic in thinking that the tactics of the Trade Unionists and of the South German leaders could have produced basic changes in the Prussian and Reich governments before 1914, and he underrates the achievement of the Socialist leadership in developing a mass political party in the face of formidable obstacles. In his desire to point up the significance of the more pragmatic Socialist leaders, his criticism of the party ideologists sometimes becomes unconvincing. For example, in discussing the failure of the Socialist agrarian program in Bavaria, no mention is made of the religious barriers which existed between the Bavarian peasant and German socialism. Surely, the "godless' character of German socialism was as much a deterrent to its success in Bavaria as the divisions between the party leaders and the South German reformers.

Ritter's work is a useful introduction to the history of the German working class movement and its literature. The extensive bibliography, the valuable statistical studies and the occasional critical discussion of his sources should prove useful to students of the German working class movement. His harsh judgment of Peter Gay's biography of Eduard Bernstein is as surprising as it is undeserved. (p. 197) This work contributes little that is new to our understanding of the German working class movement, but the author has dealt with many familiar problems in a provocative way. If, through this work, he stimulates interest in research on the German working class movement at the state and local level and on activities outside the Reichstag, we should learn a great deal that is new and important about the German Social Democrats and the Trade Unions.

Colorado State University BRUCE B. FRYE

KISZLING, RUDOLF, *Die militärischen Vereinbarungen der Kleinen Entente, 1929-1937.* Muenchen: 1959, Pp. 91. Verlag R. Oldenbourg.

This monograph, (No. 54 in the Munich Southeast-Institute series published by Dr. Fritz Valjavec), is reportedly based on the secret military documents of the Little Entente powers. It includes a careful summary and analysis of 19 war plans of the combined General Staffs of the Little Entente powers, plans which were hammered out during almost two decades of conferences. In their mutual opposition to Hungarian revisionism, the General Staffs achieved a remarkable peacetime degree of integration in their joint war planning and related activities, including exchange of intelligence information concerning the common enemy, whose actual military strength in being was greatly over-estimated. Following his excellent exposition of the war plans as such, the author includes that all these plans were never implemented, following Hitler's occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, because they were contingent exclusively upon prior military moves by Hungary. This observation may be technically true so far as the complex of military plans is concerned. However, the explanation for the paralysis of the Little Entente's carefully integrated military machinery lies in the political paralysis of France and England, not in the field of military planning. Moreover, the author fails to note that fear of German domination paradoxically had the effect of *improving* Hungarian-Little Entente relations, so that by 23 August 1938 the powers concerned entered into an agreement which, while renouncing the use of force, permitted the rearmament of Hungary.

Although this monograph is written in a clear German prose and includes three useful sketch-maps, it notably lacks documentation, bibliography and index. Even the two illustrative military conventions which make up the Appendix are given in a German translation of the French originals.

University of South Carolina PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

CZIKANN-ZICHY, MAURICE, *Turmoil in South Tyrol: New Hope for National Harmony.* New York: Exposition Press, 1960. Pp. 92, $3.00.

Professor Maurice Czikann-Zichy, a former Hungarian diplomat and a graduate of the University of Innsbruck, is the well qualified author of this brief study of the South Tyrolean Question. In the introductory pages of this study, the author outlines briefly South Tyrol's main problems, which date back to 1919, the year in which this area and its German-speaking population was annexed by Italy under the terms of the Treaty of Saint Germain en Laye.

The author discusses in some detail the historical background of this region, from its Raeto-Roman origins to the pre-World War I period. In the chapter entitled "Fascist Persecution-Nazi Betrayal" the author presents a clear picture of the various forces at play during the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and the elro played by the South Tyrol as a pawn in Hitler's and Mussolini's pre-World War power politics. The Post-World War II period and the signing of the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement between Austria and Italy are well covered. The author feels that through the execution of this treaty, which provided for regional autonomy and included special provisions which were "to safeguard the ethnic character and cultural and economic development of the German speaking element," peaceful and tension-free existence would be possible for both Italians and Tyroleans. As soon as Italian statesmen show themselves willing to solve the South Tyrolean Question in the spirit of European cooperation, and decide to carry out the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement of 1947 in both the letter and the spirit in which it was written, this strife-torn region would, according to Professor

Czikann-Zichy, serve as a bridge rather than a barrier between Austria and Italy.

Although throughout this study the author shows a great deal of objectivity and insight into the problems facing the North Tyrol, he is unable to avoid making some dubious and erroneous assertions. That "the United States had no knowledge of the existence of the London Treaty of April 14, 1915, until the end of hostilities" (p. 26), that "strategic considerations favored the Gorge of Salurn" (p. 23), that the De Gasperi-Gruber Agreement "guarantees the Austrian Government the 'right of protection' over the *Austrian* ethnic group in Bolzano (Bozen) Province," (p. 14) and that the city of Bolzano "despite Italian immigration remains predominantly South Tyrolean" and is inhabited by a "two-thirds majority of South Tyroleans," (p. 59) are *lapsus pennae* which should have been avoided in an otherwise scholarly study.

Since the subject here discussed is of a controversial nature, footnotes, which are completely lacking, would have proved useful. The biographical references in the Appendix include works of many European authors but studies by Italian scholars of the Post-World War II period, who could with authority discuss the other side of the question, are conspicuously scarce. However, since to the reviewer's knowledge no other study of the South Tyrolean Question has appeared in English, this monograph will serve the useful purpose of enlightening the English-speaking public on this very current problem.

University of Colorado EMANUEL G. FENZ

SCHIEDER, THEODOR, ed., *The Expulsion of the German Population from the Territories East of the Oder-Neisse Line.* A selection and Translation from Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. Bd. I.1 und I.2. Bonn: Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims. n.d. Pp. 370.

This is an abridged version of the two-volume German original. The foreword and the introductory description are translated in full except for the account in the German foreword of the methods developed for dealing with the problem of "mass documentation." The supporting documents have been reduced to the number that could be presented in a single manageable volume. For scholarly purposes, as the editors recommend, the German edition should be used.

The work was published under the auspices of the Federal Ministry for Expellees, Refugees and War Victims and copies of the English version were distributed to interested scholars and others by German consulates. It is, however, something more than just another set of atrocity stories intended to influence opinion and win sympathy. The study was initiated a half dozen years after the end of the fighting and the collapse of the Nazi Reich. It was carried out by scholars of high repute whose political orientation and good faith I do not doubt. They have assured us that the committee and its staff of research assistants worked in complete independence of the Federal Government.

The editors were conscious of the difficulty of their task in controlling "emotions of a very undesirable nature" and in checking the factual content and biases of their sources. In the "Introductory Description" of over a hundred pages, they begin with a brief account of the movement of peoples which began at the outbreak of war in 1939 and of the situation in Eastern Germany in the autumn of 1944 on the eve of the Rusian invasion. In the more detailed story that follows, it is recognized that some of the terror was the incidental accompaniment of military operations. Readers are also reminded of the provocation; the radical measures of the National Socialists in the occupied territories led to violent hatreds and desire for revenge. It was, after all, hardly to be expected that in the aftermath a distinction would be made between Nazi and non-Nazi Germans. The documents themselves describe examples of individual acts of mercy to refugees and of the attempts of some officers and officials to prevent indiscriminate acts of brutality. The documents themselves were written or dicated at various intervals after the events. They were carefully checked for inconsistencies and compared for parallels. The "best" documents selected for publication, the editors state, were not necessarily those most vivid in coloring and individual shading or most abundant in tales of horror. Preference was given rather to those reports "which could be checked and counterchecked or were impressive by reason of immediateness and accuracy."

University of Minnesota LAWRENCE D. STEEFEL

EMBREE, G. D., *The Soviet Union Between the 19th and 20th Party Congresses, 1952-1956.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1959. Pp. 365. Guilders 22.80.

The death of Stalin confronted the Soviet political system with one of the most severe tests in its history. It had been dominated for so long by one man, and his methods had been so secretive, that it was impossible for the outsider to judge what was personal and what was institutional in this system—what was likely to die with the leader, and what was likely to survive. Stalin's demise provided an occasion for a wide range of speculations and hopes on the part of non-Communists, and even Stalin's closest associates apparently had serious qualms as to the possible outcome of the crisis. Yet the party-state survived Stalin's death with relatively little turmoil, and soon embarked on a series of policies which reflected a new spirit and style but remained essentially within the general framework of the Stalinist approach.

This period between the 19th and 20th Party congresses thus offers a great challenge to the student of Soviet affairs. In particular, it affords an opportunity for a searching examination of Western interpretations of the Soviet political system in a period in which many generally held opinions were shattered. It is therefore a matter of regret that Mr. Embree's study does not rise to this challenge. Its underlying difficulty is that it makes no effort to probe beneath the surface of Soviet affairs. It has no introduction or conclusion, presents no thesis, states no problem, and suggests no general interpretation. It is neither history nor political science, but simply a generally chronological narrative of events, with special stress on party affairs and foreign policy. It is based on materials available in English and German, with heavy reliance on the current interpretations provided by the press and the journals.

Within this rather limited framework of aims and means, the narrative has a certain value. On specific issues it provides what is on the whole a reliable summary of documents and events, and its judgments reflect the views of the leading contemporary commentators in the West. Indeed, one is impressed by how much can be learned about the Soviet Union with exclusive reliance on English and German. Between the *New York Times,* the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* and occasional collections of translated sources, most public Soviet documents are in fact now available in English. This marks a vast improvement over the situation existing a decade ago. The range of opinion and comment available in English and German is also wide, and would have been significantly wider if the author had drawn on materials in French as well.

Those who desire a fairly detailed account of names, dates, and events between 1952 and 1956 may well find it useful to consult this volume; but for an understanding and interpretation of problems, policies, and personalities, they will have to look elsewhere.

Princeton University CYRIL E. BLACK

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Brzezinski, Z., "The Organization of the Communist Camp," *World Pol.* XIII (1961) 2, 175-209.

Faure, P., "El Comunismo a traves de sus purgas (IV)" *Estudios Sobre El Comunismo*, IX(1960) 31, 52-57.

Haight Jr., J. M., "France, the U. S. and the Munich Crisis", *Jl. of Mod. Hist.* XXXII (1960) 4, 340-358.

Kiraly, B. K., "A New Era? Reflections on Federalism and Nationalism in East Central Europe Federalist Economic Policy", *Cent. Eur. Fed.*, VIII(19602, 3-18.

Neumann, R. J., "Veränderung de Kulturlandschaft Ostmitteleuropas," *Ostbrief*, VI (1960) 64, 712-719.

North, R. C., "Die Diskrepanz zwischen Realität und Wunschbild als innenpolitischer Faktor," *Osteuropa*, X(1960) 11-12, 766-768.

Pundeff, M., "Communism versus East European Traditions", *Intern. Peasant Union*, Jan. 1961, 11-14.

Raschhofer, H., "Der Schutz der nationalen Minderheiten und das geltende Völkerreicht," *Der Donauraum*, 4(1960)5, 193-206.

Scharndorff, W., "Ost-Integration mit Hindernissen", *Pol. Stud.*, 128(1960) 11, 811-816.

Schubert-Soldern, R., "Uber den dialektischen Materialismus", *Wissenschaft u. Weltbild*, 13(1960) , 264-275.

AUSTRIA

Alfred, K., "Herrand v. Wildonie", *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 33(1959) 2/3, 40-53.

Ember, Gy., "Der österreichische Staatsrat u. die ungarische Verfassung 1761-1768," *Acta Historica*, VIII(1960) 1-2, 149-182.

Ferdinand, Tremel, "Das Haus des Erzherzogs Johann in Vordernberg", *Blätter f. Heimatkunde*, 33(1959) 2/3, 35-39.

Gorsic, F., "Die Anfange der slawiscnen Rechtsschule v. Graz (1913/1914)", *Zeitschrift des Historischen Vereines f. Steiermark*, LI(1960) 119-136.

Herwig, E., "Die Bemühungen der Tagierung um Aufteilung des bäuerlichen Grossbesitzes in der zweiten Hälfte des 18. Jahrhunderts," *Blätter f. Heimatkunde* 33 (1950) 2/3. 69-77.

Klein, A. A., "Die Reichsverweserschaft Erzherzog Johanns u. die österreichische Frage im Frankfurter Parlament", *Zeitschrift Des Historischen Vereines f. Steiermark*. LI(1960) , 3-26.

Sikora, A., "Die Herren v. Graben," *Zeitschrift Des Historischen Vereines f. Steiermark*, LI(1960) 43-94.

Straka, M., "Die Seelenzählung des Jahres 1754 in der Steiermark", *Zeitschrift Des Historischen Vereines f. Steiermark*, LI(1960) , 95-118.

BALTICA

Brandell, U., "Ake Thulstrup, Transiteringsfragan 1941-1942 (43). Tyska aktstycken till ämnets belysning. II," *Historisk Tidskrift* 3(1960) 309.

Eitner, H-J., "Gefährdete NATO-Flanke Ostsee", *Schweizer Monatshefte*, 9(1960)40, 867-872.

"Finnlands Schulwesen u. Bildungspolitik", *Osterreichische Ost Hefte*, (1961) /1, 49-54.

Hojer, T., "Bakgrunden till Carl XI:s myndigforklaring", *Historisk Tidskrift*, 3(1960) 302-304.

Karvelis, Paul: "Tragedy of the Baltic Peoples", *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX(1961) 1, 1-5.

Kumlien, v. K., "Schweden u. Lübeck zu Beginn der Hansezeit", *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, 1960/78, 37-66.

Ladner, G. L., "The Holy Roman Empire of the Tenth Century and East Central Europe", *Polish Rev.*, V(1960) 4, 3-4.

Lesnikov, v.M., "Lübeck als Handelsplatz f. osteuropäische Waren im 15. Jahrhundert," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter*, (1960) /78, 67-86.

Lottich, K. V., "The Plight of the Baltic States" *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX(1961) 2, 28-36.

Remeikis, T., "The Lithuanian Komsomol Organization", *Lithuanus*, VI(1960) 3, 104-108.

Stade, ., "Manley's 'History' Meadows 'Narrative' och Carl X Gustafs första danska krig", *Historisk Tidskrift*, 3(1960), 249-301.

Webermann, O., "Deutschbaltische u. estnische Literaturen," *Baltische Hefte* VI (1960) 1, 17-28.

"Where are the Baltic Delegations to the U.N.?" *Lithuanus*, VI(1960) 3, p. 97.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Broszat, M., "Das Sudetendeutsche Freikorps," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* IX(1961) 1, 30-49.

Dresler, J. "Masaryk und die Kommunisten," *Ost Europa,* (1960) /10, 663-668.

Dvornik, F., "The Role of Bohemia and St. Adalbert in the Spread of Christianity in Poland," *Polish Rev.,* V(1960) 4, 15-28.

Dziewulski, W., "Społeczeństwo ślaskie a husyci," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* V(1960) , 5-46.

Franzel, E., "Die sudentendeutsche Politik 1918-1938," *Der Donauraum,* 5(1960)5, 213-228.

Laśtovićka, B., "Vznik a význam Košického vládního programu," *Československý Časopis Historicky,* VIII(1960) 4, 449-471.

Nedvěd, J., "Vytvořeni organisačni a ideologické jednoty dělnické třidy v českých zemích v roce 1948", *Československý Časopis Historicky,* VIII(1960) 4, 472-493.

Otáhal, M., "K boji o pozemkovou reformu (do vydání záborového zákona 16. dubna 1919) ", *Československý Časopis Historicky,* VIII(1960) 4, 502-514.

Turecek, O., "Neue Tendenzen im Aussenhandel der CSSR", *Osterreichische Ost Hefte,* (1960) /6, 457-460.

Wallace, W. V., "The Foreign Policy of President Benes in the Approach to Munich", *Slav. & East Eur. Rev.,* XXXIX(1960) 92, 148-164.

GERMANY

Amelunzen, R., "Berliner Luft," *Polit. Stud.* 11(1960)127, 743-751.

Beck, M., "Der Irrtum des Nationalsozialismus u. seiner Nachfolger zur aktuellen Ursymbolforschung v. Hermann Wirth", *GeoPolitk,* XXXI(1960) 12, 7-10.

Beer, K. W., "Das SPD-Plakat," *Die Politische Meinung,* 5(1960) 55, 38-45.

Berichte des Instituts, "Deutschland u. Polen", *GeoPolitk,* XXXI(1960) 12, 13-15.

Böhm, A., "Emigranten vor dem Tribunal", *Die Politische Meinung,* 5(1960) 55, 46-52.

Bonn, P. T. G., "Die Marginalien Kaiser Wilhelms II," *Die Welt als Geschichte,* (1960) /4, 249-259.

K.W.B., "Um der Freiheit willen", *Die Politische Meinung,* VI(1961) 56, 3-5.

Ciołkosz, A., "The German Social-Democrats and Polish-German Relations", *Poland and Germany,* IV(1960)14, 19-28.

"Das Jahrbuch der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin 1957", *Historische Zeitschrift,* 191(1960) 3, 671.

Deuerlein, E., "Kulturkongress der CDU," *Die Politische Meinung,* '(1960) 54, 13-14.

Eschenburg, T., "Die Rolle der Persönlichkeit in der Krise der Weimarer Republik: Hindenburg, Brüning, Groener, Schleicher", *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte* IX (1961) 1, 1-29.

Fricke, K. W., "How Ulbricht Fights the Bundeswehr," *Sudeten Bltn.,* VIII(1960) 12, 304-308.

Grabowski, K., "Dangers of German Irredentism", *Poland and Germany,* IV(1960) 14, 1-9.

"Historische Forschungen in der DDR", *Ostbrief,* VI(1960) 64, 704-708.

Kaiser, H., "Der Verrat u. die Verräter—Anmerkungen zum 'Fall Frenzel' ", *Zeitschrift f. Geopolitik,* XXXI(1960)11, 9-13.

Kirchheimer, O., "German Democracy in the 1950's", *World Pol.,* XIII(1961) 2, 254-266.

Krueger, W., "Las provincias alemanas del Mar Oriental bajo administración polaca," *Oriente Europeo,* X(1960) 3, 133-136.

Lemiesz, W., "The Nazi policy of 'euthanasia for non-productive consumers' ", *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* (1960) /9(15) , 25-30.

Matyniak, A., "Les Lusaciens, Slaves des bords de la Spree," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne.* (1960) /4, 44-49.

Mayerhofer, C., "Subjektivismus im Strafrecht?" *Wort u. Wahrheit,* XV(1960) 11, 665-672.

Mommsen, W., and H. Auhofer, "Karl Jaspers u. die Wiedervereinigung" *Polit. Stud.* 128(1960)11, 781-791.

Neumann, E. P., "Adenauer in Zahlen", *Die Polit. Meinung.,* VI(1961) 56, 23-31.

v. Nordern, Dr. G., "Der Kirchenkampf im Rheinland 1933-1939," *Geschichte in Wissenschaft u. Unterr.,* 11(1960) 12, 725-743.

Oyer, . S., "Anabaptism in Central Germany: II Faith and Life", *Mennonite Qy. Rev.* XXXV(1961) 1, 5-37.

Piszczkowski, T., "Jaspers vs. Bismarck", *Poland and Germany,* IV(1960) 14, 35-39.

Plum, G., "Widerstand u. Antifaschismus in der marxistisch-leninistichen Geschichtsauffassung," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* IX(1961) 1, 50-65.

Presseisen, E. L., "Prelude to 'Barbarossa': Germany and the Balkans 1940-1941", *Jl. of Mod. Hist.* XXXII(1960) 4, 359-370.

Sczaniecki, M., et al., "Manual of German Revisionism", *Polish West. Affs.*, I(1960)1, 64-109.

Tomicki, ., "The Notion of German Mission in the East", *Poland and Germany* IV(1960) 14, 10-18.

Volter, F. and Jahnke, G., "Expansion of West German Imperialism in the Middle East After the Second Warld War," *Istoriski Zapisi,* (1960) /6, 45-62.

V. Hans, Beyer, "Arnold J. Toynbee u. das Preussentum", *Ostdeutsche Wissenschaft,* VII(1960) .

Wucher, A., "Hitlers Letzte Phrasen", *Polit. Stud.*, 128(1960) 11, 798-805.

Wuschek, A. F., "A Policy of Genocide", *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX(1961) 1, 13-15.

Zaborowski, J., "Ostforschung"—"Science and Revisionism," *Zach. Agencia Prasowa* XI (1960) 8, 12-21.

"Zur Geschichte des nationalsozialistischen Führungsoffiziers", (Waldemar Besson) *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* IX(1961) 1, 76-116.

HUNGARY

Balazs, N., "Forradalmunk és a közép-kelereurópai föderáció", *Szemle.* (1960) /6, 1-8

Barta, I., "István Széchenyi", *Acta Historica,* VIII(1960) 1-2, 64-102.

Kann, R. A., "Metternich: a Reappraisal of his Impact on International Relations", *Jl. of Mod. Hist.,* XXXII(1960) 4, 333-339.

Lacko, M., "La naissance de la démocratie populaire hongroise," *Acta Historica,* VII (1960) 1-2, 1-61.

Lan, H., "Februarirevolutionen 1848, Vrevfran ett svenskt ogonvittne", *Historisk Tidskrift,* 3(1960) , 305-308.

Lavergne, B., "La Hongrie depuis sa Libération du Joug Nazi (1945) ," *L'Année Polit. et Écon.,* Oct.1960) /157, 297-340.

Lavergne, B., "La Hongrie à l'O.N.U.", *L'Année Polit. et Écon.*, Oct(1960) 157, 340-342.

Nagy, Laszló, "L'établissement du systèm du Code du Travail," *Közlemenyei,* X(1960) 3, 4, 293-316.

Radvászky, A., "Das ungarische Széchenyi-Bild", *Der Donauraum,* 4(1960) 5, 207-212.

Rożsa, Gy., "Les sciences sociales hongroises dans les publications de l'UNESCO", *Közlemenyei,* X(1960) 3,4, 325-333.

Tamás, P., "A nyugateurópai államok jelenlegi egységörekvései", *Szemle,* (1960) /6, 25-40.

Tochitch, D., "Workers' Management in Practice", *Review,* I(1960)1, 48-65.

Viktor, S., "A közep-keleteurópai föderáció történelmi hagyományairól", *Szemle,* (1960) /6, 9-24.

ITALY

"The Agriculture Development Scheme", *Ital. Affs.*, IX(1960) 3-4, 3129-3136.

Elli, G., "Italiens ungelöstes Problem," *Die Politische Meinung* 5(1960) 55, 46-52.

"Foreign Language Newspapers and Magazines Published in Italy," *Ital. Affs.* IX(1960) 3-4. 3073-3084.

Nolte, V. E., "Marx und Nietzsche im Socialismus des jungen Mussolini", *Historische Zeitschrift,* 191(1960) 2, 249-335.

POLAND

Andrejew, M., "O niektórych ciekawszych klauzulach w traktacie kniazia Dobrudży Iwanki z Genua", *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.*, XII(1960) 2, 151-176.

Bardach, J., "Polskie państwo wczesńopiastowskie," *Kwart. Hist.*, LXVII(1960) 4, 971-1009.

Bohman, A., "Presión de Polonia hacia el Occidente", *Oriente Europeo*, X(1960) 3, 145-156.

Carstens, K., "Oder-Neisse in the Light of History," *Sudeten Bltn.*, VIII(1960) 12, 299-304.

Cieslak, T., "Review of the Discussion on Polish Recovered Territories in the U. S. House of Representatives", *Polish West. Affs.*, I(1960) 1, 131-135.

Florek, K., H. Pigtkowski, St. Biegański, "Wiek Zmechanizowanych sił zbrojnych: Memoriał Płka de Gaulle ze Stycznia 1940 Roku Listy do Redakcji," *Bellona,* XLII(1960) 2, 136-144.

Folkierski, W., "Segismundo Krasinski en el Centenario de su Muerte," *Estudios Sobre El Comunismo,* VIII(1960) 30, 13-21.

Giergielewicz, M., "Krasinski in the English-Speaking World", *Polish Rev.,* V(1960) 4, 68-102.

Gieysztor, A., "Ideowe wartości kultury polskiej w w. X-XI Przyjzdie chrześcijaństwa," *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVII(1960)4, 922-941.

Gieysztor, A., "L'Avènement d'un nouvel État europeen: l'Europe et la Pologne au Xe siècle", *Polish West. Affs.,* I(1960) 1, 6-27.

Jaksch, W., "Gomulka's Battle with the Windmills", *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX(1961) 1, 9-11.

Jónczyk, J., "O funkcjach inspekcji pracy w polskim przemyśle w latach 1918-1939," *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.* XII(1960) 2, 47-76.

Kage, O., "Narwik i Falaise (Płk dypl. Wł Dec.: Narik i Falaise, Wyd. M.O.N., Warszawa, 1958), *Bellona,* (1960) 2, 151-152.

Kalinowski, F., "O lotnictwie i motoryzacji Wojska w Polsce przed 1939 Rokiem," *Bellona,* XLII(1960) 2, 128-135.

Kaniewska, L., "Stanisław Łupa Podlodowski, działacz sejmowy pierwszej połowy XVI wieku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* V(1960), 47-74.

Koczy, L., "The Battle of Tannenberg", *Poland and Germany,* IV(1960) 14, 29-34.

Kołomejczyk, N., "Powstanie i rozwój organizacji Polskiej Partii Robotniczej na Dolnym Śląsku w 1945 roku," *Sląski Kwart. Sobótka,* XV(1960) 3, 289-304.

Komorowski, Z., "Mineral deposits in Olsztyn voivodship", *Zach. Agencja Prasowa* (1960) /9(15).

Labuda, G., "Zagadnienie suwerenności Polski wczesnofeudalnej w X-XII wieku," *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVII(1960) 4, 1035-1068.

Łaczkowski, G., "New Markets, New Goods", *Polish Perspectives,* III(1960) 12, 7-12.

Makkai, L., "Koncepcja burzuazyjnego państwa narodowego w dziełach Komeńskiego", *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* V(1960), 127-144.

Maleczyńska, E., "W sprawie badań nad historią lokalną," *Sląski Kwart. Hist. Sobótka,* XV(1960)3, 331-354.

Mandic, O., "Pacta conventa i dvanaest hrvatskih bratstava," *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59), 165-206.

Manteuffel, T., "Państwo Mieszka a Europa", *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVII(1960) 4, 1020-1034.

Peschaut, R., "Polens Forste u. Forstwirtschaft", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1960) /6. 461-469.

Pociecha, W., "Poselstwo Andrzeja Jakubowskiego do Francji w roku 1547 i pierwsza misja Jana Monluca w Polsce," *Odrozenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* V(1960), 75-108.

Popiołek, K., "Stan i potrzeby badań nad dziejami okupacji na Sląsku," *Sląski Kwart. Hist. Sobótka.,* XV(1960) 3, 271-288.

Popkiewicz, J., "Stan i perspektywy badań nad rozwojem gospodarczym Slaşka w okresie Polski Ludowej", *Slaşka Kwart.-Hist. Sobótka,* XV(1960) 3, 305-330.

Rhode, G., "La Ligne Oder-Neisse et la Politique Européenne", *Polit. Étrangère,* (1960)/5. 451-475.

Romeyko, M., "Pierwsze dni Niepodległości i zamach stanu", *Kultura* (1960) /12/158. 81-100.

Roos, H., "Polen u. Europa seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1961) /1, 14-21.

Slavin, G. M., "From the History of the Establishment of the Frontiers of People's Poland," *Istoriski Zapisi,* (1960)/4. 50-60.

Smorgorzewski, C., "Un Ouvrage encyclopédique sur la Pologne publié en Allemagne." *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* (1960) /4. 50-60.

Staniewicz, R., "Polish Comments on Book Dealing with German Fifth Column," *Polish West. Affs.,* I(1960) 1, 110-130.

Urban, W., "Praktyczna działalność Braci wobec chłopów," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* V(1960), 109-126.

Vetulani, A., "Nowe wydanie niemieckiego zwodu prawa polskiego", *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.,* XII(1960)2, 195-232.

Wagner, W., "Letter to Congressman Reece", *Polish West. Affs.,* I(1960) 1, 136-152.

Waszak, S., "Y a-t-il encore en Pologne un demi million d'Allemands?" *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* (1960) /4, 7-21.

Wawrzkiewicz, J., "S.p. General Broni Józef-Haller Pierwsza Faza Kampanii Francuskiej 1940 Roku", *Bellona,* XLII(1960) 2, 95-127.

Włodarczyk, J., "Sejmiki łeczyckie do początku XVI wieku", *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.,* XII(1960) 2, 9-46.

Zając, Józef, "Nasze przygotowania do wojny," *Kultura,* (1960) 1/159-2/160, 161-188.

Ziołkowski, J., "Economic Development in the Western Territories", *Polish West. Affs.,* I(1960) 1, 28-63.

U.S.S.R. and the UKRAINE

Achimov, H., "Capitalismo Disfrazado en La Union Sovietica," *Estudios Sobre El Comunismo,* VIII(1960)30, 34-40.

Anderson, P. B., "The Orthodox Church in Soviet Russia", *For. Affs.,* XXXIX(1960) 2, 299-311.

Anderson, M. S., "Some British Influence on Russian Intellectual Life and Society in the 18th Century," *Slav. and East Eur. Rev.,* XXXIX(1960) 92.

Anweiler, Os., "Neue Wege des Geschichtsunterrichts in der Sowjetunion," *Gesch. in Wissenschaft u. Unterr.* 11(1960) 11, 681-692.

Armstrong, T. E., "La route maritime du Nord", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* I(1960) 3, 466-481.

Arnold, T., "The Technique of the Revolutionary War," *Bltn. Int. for the Study of the USSR,* VII(1960) 11, 3-12.

Balmuth, D., "The Origins of the Tsarist Epoch of Censorship Terror", *Amer. Slav. and East Europ. Rev.,* XIX(1960) 4, 497-520.

Bennigsen, A., and Quelqueja, C., "La Problème linguistique et l'évolution des nationalités musulmanes en USSR", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique,* I(1960)3, 418-465.

Bociurkiv, B. R., "The Autocephalous Church Movement in Ukraine: The Formative Stage (1917-1921)," *Ukrainian Qy.,* XVI(1960) 3, 211-223.

Brinkley, G. A., "The 'Withering' of the State under Khrushchev," *Rev. of Polit.,* XXIII (1961) 1, 37-52.

Contius, W. G., "Ein Jahr sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik nach Camp David," *Osteuropa,* X(1960) 11-12, 782-794.

Daniels, R. V., "The Chinese Revolution in Russian Perspective", *World Pol.,* XIII (1961) 2, 210-230.

Durgin, Jr., F. A., "The Growth of Inter-Kolkhoz Cooperation", *Sov. Stud.* XII(1960) 2, 183-189.

Eckhardt, T., "Der Disput über die Gründung des Russischen Staats," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1960) /6, 475-480.

Eitner, H. -J., "Corifeo ideológico del Kremlin", *Oriente Europeo,* X(1960) 3, 121-125.

Flaker, A., "Pravasto i Rusija," *Historijski Zbornik,* I-XII(1958/59) 105-119.

Förster, W., "Rationalisierung u. Produktivitätssteigerung in der Sowjetwirtschaft," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1960) /6, 445-452.

Froment-Meurice, G., "La Sécurité Sociale en URSS", *Sov. Studies* I(1960) 3, 482-496.

Gavrilovic, M., "Mr. Khrushchev, Marxism and A Good Piece of Meat," *Intern. Peasant Union,* Jan. 1961, 6-11.

Ginsburgs, G., "Neutrality and Neutralism and the Tactics of Soviet Diplomacy," *Amer. Slav. and East Eur. Rev.,* XIX(1960) 4, 531-560.

Golman, L. I., "New Data on the Co-operation of Marx and Engels", *Istoria Zapis,* (1960) /6, 15-19.

Hayit, B., "Turkestan in der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik," *Osteuropa,* X(1960) 10, 671-678.

Kerblay, "Quelques données sur l'effort de recherche scientifique en URSS", *Sov. Stud.,* I(1960) 3, 497-501.

Kitaev, M., "The Problem of Surface Activity in the USSR and in the West," *Bltn. Inst. for the Study of the USSR.,* VII(1960) 11, 45-50.

Krengel, R., "Soviet, American and West German Basic Industries: A Comparison," *Soviet Stud.,* XII(1960) 2, 113-125.

Kugurtsev, V., "Forty Years of Soviet Agriculture", *Bltn.-Inst. for the Study of the USSR,* VII(1960) 10, 37-40.

Laurat, L., "La URSS, Pais Sin Impuestos?" *Estudios Sobre El Comunismo,* VIII(1960) 30, 45-48.

Lewytzkyj, B., "Soziale Probleme der Automation in der Sowjetunion", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1961) /1, 26-34.

Maklakov, V. A., "Tolstoï et le bolchévisme," *Le Contrat Soc.,* IV (1960)6, 335-359.

Mamukov, E., "Problems of Town Planning the USSR," *Bltn.-Inst. for the Study of the USSR.,* VII(1960) 10, 20-23.

Mirtsching, A., "Diamantlagerstätten der Sowjetunion", *Osteuropa,* (1960) /10, 696-705.

Morgan, G., "Methods Employed by the Soviet Procuracy in Exercising its 'General Supervision' Function", *Sov. Stud.* XII(1960) 2, 168-182.

Newth, J. A., "Income Distribution in the USSR", *Sov. Stud.* (1960) 2, 193-196.

Pavliuk, M., "Failure of Moscow's Attempt to Depreciate the Economic Importance of Ukraine", *Ukrainian Qy.* VI(1960) 3, 254-262.

Ranec, L., "Die Viehzucht in der Sowjetunion", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1960) /6, 431-444.

Ruewle, J., "El Teatro Soviético," *Estudios Sobre El Communismo,* IX(1961) 31, 33-48.

Schapiro, L., "La Réforme Judiciare en URSS", *Le Contrat Soc.* IV(1960) 6, 365-370.

Scheggia, A., "Historia de Ucrania," *Oriente Europeo,* X(1960) 3, 157-179.

Schlesinger, R., "Social Law. II", *Sov. Stud.* XII(1960) 2, 145-167.

Schiller, O., "Das sowjetische und das chinesische Agrarsystem—Ein Vergleich", *Osteuropa,* X(1960) 11-12.

Seton, F., "Soviet Progess in Western Perspective," *Sov. Stud.*, XII (1960) 2, 126-145.

Seton-Watson, H., "Die nationale Bourgeoisie in Theorie und Praxis der Sowjets", *Osteuropa,* X(1960) 11-12.

Sevcenko, O., "The Christianization of Kievan Rus", *Polish Rv.*, (1960)4, 29-35.

Schier, W., "Die Justiz im totalitären Staat," *Gesch. in Wissenschaft u. Unterr.*, 11(1960) 11 661-681.

Shurmann, H. F., "Organisation und Flexibilität der Kommunistischen Partei in der Sowjetunion u. in China", *Osteuropa,* X(1960) 11-12, 749-752.

Sokolowski, M., "Total extorsión soviética a sus satelitas," *Estudios Sobre El Comunismo,* IX(1960) 31, 49-51.

Stökl, G., "Parteigeschichte f. Sowjetbürger", *Wort u. Wahrheit,* XV(1960) 11, 673-680.

Stolte, S. C., "Aspects of Soviet Economic Expansion", *Bltn.-Inst. for the Study of the USSR,* VII(1960) 10, 16-19.

Triomphe, R., "Le mysticisme d'Alexandre Blok: étude de structure", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique* I(1960) 3, 387-417.

Twarog, L., "Soviet Historical Novelists Look at America," *Amer. Slav. & E. E. Rev.* XIX(1960)4, 561-576.

Vvedensky, G. A., "Fuel Resources of the USSR", *Bltn.-Inst. for the Study of the USSR*, VII(1960) 11, 26-32.

Westen, K., "Der Sowjetische Rechtskreis", *Jahrbücher f. Gesch. Osteuropas,* (1960) /8, 411-421.

Warth, R. D., "Soviet Historians in the Crucible," *Antioch Rev.,* Winter '60-'61, 417-425.

Weif, A. V., "Das Zukunftsbild des Kommunismus in Sowjetischer Sicht", *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* (1960) /6, 423-430.

YUGOSLAVIA

Arnez, V., "Aid and Trade: The Pattern of Tito's Economic Relations with the World", *Review,* I(1960) 1, 32-47.

Belić, A., "Ujedinjeni Narodi I Hrvati," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV(1960) 40, 718-740.

Blažeković, M., "N. D. H. u Stepinčévu Procesu," *Hvratska Revija,* IV(1960) 40, 670-683.

Buturac, J., "Neobjavljeni dokumenti hrvatske povijesti u XV stoljecu," *Hist. Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59) 283-287.

Ciliga, A., "The Problems and Tasks of the Croat National-Polit. Struggle in the Period of Khuschev Blackmail and the Amer. Pressure Upon the Fed. People's Rep. of Yugoslavia", *Croatia Press,* XIV(1960) 215-216, 2-8.

Vukmanovic, G., "Polodzaj radnika na izgradnji solane Vlcinji (1927-1934)" *Istoriski Zapisi,* (1960) /3. 535-552.

Grafenauer, B., "Hrvati u Karantaniji", *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59) , 207-231.

Jukić, I., "Tito's Conflict with Stalin and Khruschev—and the West", *Review,* I(1960) 1, 18-31.

Karaman, I., "Komorska gospostija Cabar 1787-1798," *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958-59) 259-282.

Kesterčanek, F., "Pad Bava u Turske ruke 1571 god.", *Istoriski Zapisi,* (XIII(1960), 565-572.

Klaic, Nada, "Postonak plemstva dvanaestero plemena kraljevine Hrvatske", *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59) 121-163.

Krizman, B., "O putu grofa Stj. Tisza po jugoslavenskim zemljama u septembru 1918," *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59) , 233-249.

Kuhar, A. L., "The Conversion of the Slovenes and the German-Slav Ethnic Boundary in the Eastern Alps," *Christ. Demo. Rev.,* X(1960) 124, 15.

Lisac, A. L., "Branislava i njegova urednika," *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958-59) 251-257.

Magos, G., "Promjene u madarsko-jugoslavensko-taianskim odnosima 1926-27," *Historijski Zbornik,* X-XII(1958),49-64.

Mandić, O. D., "Srebreničko-Visočka Biskupija", *Hvratska Revija* IV(1960) 40, 560-579.

"Mining and the Copper Industry", *Yugoslav Surv.,* I(1960) 3, 344-349.

Milović, D., "Politika cyena Miletačkih vlastiu chercegnovskom Kraju," *Istoriski Zapisi,* (1960) /3, 572-611.

Nevistić, F., "Hrvatsko Sveučilište u Komunističkom Prikazu," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV (1960) 40, 684-697.

Pakojevié, N., "Prilozi istoriji austro-urgarske okupacije Crnoe Groje (1916-1918)," *Istoriski Zapisi* (1960) /3, 611-641.

"The People's Youth Organization" *Yugoslav Surv.* I(1960)3, 315-324.

Pešelj, B. N., "Ekonomske k socijalne Promhene u hrvatskoj," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV (1960) 40, 641-660.

Petričević, J., "Integracija Evrope i Hrvati", *Hvratska Revija,* IV(1960) 40, 698-717.
Pisarev, Y. Q., "Peasant's Riots in Bosnia and the Herzegovina in 1910 and the Agrarian Reform of 1911", *Istoria Zapis,* (1960) /6, 63-105.
"The Principle of Lawfulness in Yugoslavia and its Guarantees", *Yugoslav Surv.,* I(1960) 3, 295-309.
Rieger, V., "Politički Realizm," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV(1960) 40, 579-594.
Sepic, D., "Oktobarska revolucija i jugoslavensko pitanje u Austro-Ugarskoj 1917/8", *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII(1958/59), 7-47.
Tomašić, D. A., "O Narodnosti Muslimana u Bosni i Hercegovini," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV(1960)40, 661-669.
"The Training of Specialized Workers" *Yugoslav Surv.,* I(1960) 3, 363-371.
Wessely, K., "Jugoslawiens neue. Plan u Wirtschaftskurs," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1961) /1, 35-58.
"The Workers' Universities" *Yugoslav Surv.,* I(1960) 3, 372-380.
Žagar, J., "Kolektiv u Radu k odgovornosti," *Hrvatska Revija,* IV(1960) 40, 594-605.
Zaninović, V., "Mlada Hrvatska uoci I., Svjetskog rata", *Historijski Zbornik,* XI-XII (1958/59), 65-104.

JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOL. XXI JULY, 1961 NUMBER TWO

THE GERMAN ARTISAN MOVEMENT 1848-49

by Theodore S. Hamerow

THE passage of time has simplified the German Revolution of 1848. A complex historic event arising out of a wide variety of civic, economic, and social discontents became in retrospect an idealized struggle for national unity and political freedom. In the pages of the memoirist and the scholar it assumed a uniformity of motive and a singleness of purpose which it had never actually possessed. Under the German Empire the heroes of the March days were portrayed as well-meaning patriots seeking in vain to deal with problems of statecraft which only an Iron Chancellor could master. The Weimar Republic saw in them courageous champions of liberty opposing the tradition of conservatism in Central Europe. And after the Second World War they were invoked to prove that totalitarianism was not after all congenital among the Germans. The process of distortion by simplification, moreover, began almost as soon as the revolution ceased to be actuality and became history. Only ten years after the spring uprising the liberal publicist Victor Böhmert was complaining: "About all that is still left to us from the year 1848 is the memory of an unsuccessful patriotic revolution on behalf of the unity, power, and greatness of Germany. We have nearly forgotten, however, that remarkable movement which spread among the artisan and laboring classes of Germany, and whose tendencies were quite definitely nonpolitical."[1]

Yet during the revolution the importance of the artisan movement had been self-evident. Masses of impoverished handicraftsmen roamed through the streets of Central Europe, demonstrating, rioting, demanding bread, threatening mill owners, stoning factories. They fought on the barricades, they marched against palaces, they petitioned state legislatures, they organized labor assemblies. They were the shock troops of the spring uprising, and only with their support did middle-class constitutionalism succeed in forcing the capitulation of the old order. But once the liberals came to power, they were forced to deal with the same social problems which had led to the downfall of royal authority. Now it was they who had to reply to artisan requests for the revival of the guild system, for the restriction of factories, for the prohibition of industrial machines, for the protection of handicraft trades. Rhetoric about freedom of the person and the greatness of the nation, their ideological stock in trade, was not enough to satisfy lower-class demands for economic security. August Hermann Ziegert was facing up to an unpleasant truth when he affirmed in the Frankfurt Parliament: "You cannot deny that the movement of our time is not only political but also social. This is true in a double sense: first of all, in the sense that the propertyless and the less well-to-do are to some extent engaged in a struggle against the rule of property and capital; and secondly, in the sense that the laboring classes wish to participate directly in the improvement of their position."[2]

---

[1] Victor Böhmert, *Freiheit der Arbeit! Beiträge zur Reform der Gewerbegesetze* (Bremen, 1858), p. 163f.

What endowed the artisan movement with a special significance was the sheer weight of numbers which it represented. Despite the steady advance of the factory system, handicraftsmen still constituted the vast bulk of the urban working class during the revolution. All available statistical information supports the contention of the economist Bruno Hildebrand that "the German proletariat is not a factory but a handicraft proletariat." According to official government figures there were in Prussia 2,872,086 persons engaged in artisan occupations and 570,826 in industrial plants. In Bavaria the number of handicraftsmen was well over 350,000, while that of factory workers did not exceed 100,000. Hesse-Kassel had more than two shopkeepers and tradesmen for every mill hand. And in Bavaria, Baden, Nassau, and Hesse-Darmstadt those earning their livelihood in nonindustrial employments made up about 75 per cent of the total urban labor force. Even these statistics do not tell the whole story, for many of the manufacturing establishments classified as factories were little more than enlarged artisan shops, only one step ahead of the guild master toiling in his workroom with two or three journeymen. All in all, there is no reason to question the assertion of a group of Leipzig artisans that "two-thirds of the inhabitants of our cities consist of handicraft families and their dependents."[3]

The factory system, nevertheless, was able to exercise a degree of economic and political influence out of all proportion to its size. In the period following the War of Liberation the artisan found himself little by little deprived of that privileged legal status which had protected him against unrestrained competition. One government after another began to reduce the prerogatives of the guilds, to facilitate admission to the handicraft trades, to invite the establishment of industrial plants, to encourage mechanization. The Nassau law of May 15, 1819, the Bavarian law of September 11, 1825, the Hesse-Darmstadt law of June 16, 1827, the Württemberg law of April 22, 1828, the Saxon law of October 9, 1840, the Prussian law of January 17, 1845, the Hanoverian law of August 1, 1847, each was designed to secure for the state the advantages of large-scale production. But each also represented a new defeat for the masses of handicraftsmen whose familiar way of life was being destroyed before their eyes. As early as the 1820s the small shop owners of Erlangen were complaining to the legislature in Munich that "because of this overcrowded condition we have an increase in destitution and complete impoverishment, and these in turn are further aggravated by the creation of new master artisans which the industrial law favors."[4]

---

[2] *Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der deutschen constituirenden Nationalversammlung zu Frankfurt am Main,* ed. Franz Wigard (9 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1848-49), VII, 5235.

[3] *Offener Brief an alle Innungsgenossen Deutschlands so wie zugleich an alle Bürger und Hausväter. Von zweiundzwanzig Innungen zu Leipzig* (Leipzig, 1848), p. 4. Cf. *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, VII, 5285; *Zeitschrift des königlich preussischen statistischen Bureaus,* I (1861), 50f. Josef Kaizl, *Der Kampf um Gewerbereform und Gewerbefreiheit in Bayern von 1799-1868* (Leipzig, 1879), p. 170; Anton Höfle, *Die Gewerbeordnung der Pfalz seit der französischen Revolution bis 1868* (Munich, 1908), p. 39; *Mittheilungen des statistischen Bureau's in Berlin,* IV (1851), 307f.; Pierre Benaerts, *Les origines de la grande industrie allemande* (Paris, 1933), p. 575.

The great depression beginning in 1845 came as the climax of an uninterrupted succession of economic reverses which the artisans had suffered for more than a generation. Unemployment, a serious problem even under normal conditions, began to mount disastrously. "There are small towns I know which have seventy tailors, of whom not seven have work," Moritz Mohl told the Frankfurt Parliament. Often even the handicraftsman fortunate enough to find work barely managed to keep body and soul together. While a metal worker in the Krupp factory in Essen could earn almost a mark and a half a day, the weavers of Wünschelburg and Donnerau in Silesia were getting forty pfennigs and less. Driven to desperation by hard times, the urban proletariat began to express its discontent in protest demonstrations which often turned into hunger riots. There were outbreaks of violence in Annaberg, Leipzig, Nürnberg, Regensburg, Eiterfeld, Schöningen, Stuttgart, Ulm, and Tübingen. During the spring of 1847 even Berlin, the citadel of Prussian orderliness, had to summon troops to oppose a raging mob bent on pillage and devastation. And throughout the decade the printing presses continued to turn out books, pamphlets, articles, and leaflets eloquently entitled *How to Help Poor Orphans and Avoid the Growth of the Proletariat; Concerning Public Maintenance of the Working Class in Days of Illness and Suffering; Concerning the Impoverishment and Demoralization of the Laboring Classes; Concerning the Distress of the Small Trades and the Means for Thoroughgoing Relief.*[5]

To the hard-pressed handicraftsman the outbreak of the revolution meant above all an opportunity to halt the progress of mechanization. All the pent-up resentments fed by long years of suffering burst forth in a wave of destruction directed against the hated industrial plants. For about four weeks mobs of jubilant artisans marched through Cologne, Düsseldorf, Krefeld, Elberfeld, Bonn, Coblenz, Viersen, Solingen, Berlin, Chemnitz,

---

[4] Bavaria, *Verhandlungen der zweyten Kammer der Ständeversammlung des Königreichs Bayern* (18 vols., Munich, 1827-28), Beylage 36, p. 3.

[5] *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, II, 857, VII, 5285f., IX, 6363f.; Jürgen Kuczynski, *A Short History of Labour Conditions under Industrial Capitalism: Germany, 1800 to the Present Day* (London, 1945), pp. 24, 39, 55-57, 60; Theodore S. Hamerow, *Restoration, Revolution, Reaction: Economics and Politics in Germany, 1815-1871* (Princeton, 1958), p. 84ff.

Schmalkalden, Elterlein, and Mittweida, threatening to demolish factories and extorting concessions from frightened mill owners. Yet the liberal ministries which came to power during the March days eventually managed to suppress popular disorder by a combination of promises and force, and the urban proletariat was now forced to seek redress of its grievances through appeals to an established parliamentary authority. After the spring uprising, therefore, there appeared in Germany a vast body of social literature describing the plight of the small tradesman and proposing means for his relief.

This literature included first of all hundreds of petitions submitted to the national assembly in Frankfurt and to the legislatures of the several states of the German Confederation. Equally significant were the tracts and manifestoes which various organizations of handicraftsmen published: for example, the *Open Letter to All Guild Comrades of Germany* by 22 trade societies in Leipzig, *To Our Brothers in Handicraft* by 391 master artisans of Bonn, or the manuscript memorial issued in the name of 1320 members of the Bremen Civic Association. Then there were the minutes and declarations of various artisan assemblies convoked during the revolution. Some were regional gatherings, among them the meeting of the tradesmen of Hanover on June 13, the First Constituent Handicraft Parliament of the Province of Silesia on June 19, and the convention of the master handicraftsmen of Brunswick in Wolfenbüttel on July 9. Others were organized on an occuptional basis, like the assembly of printers which opened on June 11 in Mainz, the meeting of tailors which began on July 20 in Frankfurt, or the gathering of calico printers and patternmakers in Chemnitz from October 1 to 3. Finally, the great national trade congresses which sought to elaborate a comprehensive program of economic regulation for all of Germany revealed the outlook of the artisan. The most important of them were the Assembly of Delegates of the North German Handicraft and Industrial Class in Hamburg from June 2 to 4, the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress in Frankfurt from July 14 to August 18, and the assembly of journeymen known formally as the General German Labor Congress in Frankfurt from July 20 to September 20.

Out of this mass of records emerges the portrait of a social class on the brink of disaster. Confronted by the combined might of government, wealth, and education, the artisan movement advanced a primitive theory of state and society designed to defend the interests of the small independent producer in an age of factories and banks. To be sure, at first glance the petitions and resolutions issued by the handicraftsmen seem to be only one long cry of discontent. The same complaints, the same demands appear over and over again. Mills are destroying shops, machines are ruining men. There is lack of work, of opportunity, of money, of credit. The law must defend the tradesman; it must reduce competition, prohibit machinery, revive guild corporations, provide stable markets. The weaver wanted protection against the textile mill, the wagoner against the railroad, the sailboat owner against the steamship, the ironsmith against the foundry. On all sides rose a clamor for the preservation of some special occupational privilege, for the maintenance of some traditional economic practice.

Yet that was not all. The struggle against industrialism compelled the artisan to formulate a view of history which could justify his unique position in the social scheme of things; it drove him to adopt an ideology which was essentially anticapitalistic. Unable to admit the inevitable triumph of the factory system, he could not accept the theoretical assumptions of socialism with their implicit rejection of the traditional guild structure to which he was committed. The petty bourgeois in him cried out against the doctrine that he must become the first victim of a cataclysmic conflict between capital and proletariat. Out of sheer necessity, therefore, he turned to the ideal of a corporate organization of manufacture which had prevailed in the days before the advent of mechanized production.

The artisan considered himself above all a burgher, a member of that proud middle estate which had formerly dominated the economic life of the cities of Central Europe. The guild masters of Leipzig maintained that "among them are not to be found the very rich people, but neither does the class of proletarians belong to them." They saw their place in society as a golden mean between the extremes of excessive wealth and abject poverty. But the rapid advance of industrialism threatened to declass the tradesmen, to reduce them to the ranks of the rootless and propertyless urban mob. "See the frightful abyss of the proletariat," pleaded the Bremen Civic Association. "One step farther along this road, and the handicraftsman is irretrievably lost as the heart of the middle estate. To such a position have men of authority and of false doctrine brought him. They are the founders and the true promoters of materialistic communism."[6]

Here was the crux of the matter. The fear of proletarianization which ran through so many of the artisan writings was not primarily motivated by economic considerations. For a factory operative employed in one of the large mills of Berlin or Cologne could expect to earn substantially more than the average handicraftsman trying to make ends meet in some somnolent provincial town. The point was that the man who gave up his own shop and offered himself for hire lost social status, surrendered his claim to independence. Thereafter he could no longer pretend to be his own master, he could no longer aspire to rise through the hierarchy of the guild system to a secure place in the urban patriciate. He had become a slave to the machine, a bondsman of the capitalist, forever deprived of the opportunity to acquire property and win recognition in the community. He was now a mere proletarian.

In their appeals for protection against the ravages of industrialism the artisans repeatedly invoked the memory of an idyllic age long ago, an age in which men had lived in pastoral simplicity joined by ties of mutual respect and obligation. There were no rich and poor in this precapitalistic

---

[6] Bundesarchiv Abteilung Frankfurt am Main, *Akten der Nationalversammlung: Volksw. Ausschuss,* 21 II (Memorial of the Bremen Civic Association). Cf. *Offener Brief,* p. 4.

Arcadia, no oppressors and no oppressed. Everyone had his place, everyone belonged. At the Assembly of Delegates of the North German Handicraft and Industrial Class C. H. Wischmann, a carpenter from Bremen, idealized the historic role of the artisan class, "a tree in whose shadow millions walked." C. F. Fromholz, a tailor from Berlin, lamented the passing of the old patriarchal relationship between the master and his helpers: "When the old order of things still prevailed at the time of the flowering of the handicraft class, the journeyman and the apprentice were members of the family. Now they have become separated." The guildsmen of Leipzig glorified the way of life of the medieval burgher:

> In former times every single master, even if he was only a citizen of low rank, could still feel that he was a member of a highly respected guild. Just as the apprentice and the journeyman saw in his superior a master and a member of the same class, and therefore displayed toward him not merely an outward but also an inward, a voluntary obedience and respect, so the master had the same attitude toward the authorities in the city. Just as the master's chair had not been inaccessible to him, so could he reach the seat of authority. Thus the guild system maintained harmony, cooperation, mutual assistance among the citizens, and this harmony prevailed despite all differences. The struggle of the cities against the robber barons and against the enemies of the cities in general demonstrated what manly strength, what a manly spirit was dominant in the guilds in those days.[7]

But then a serpent appeared in this Garden of Eden. During the French Revolution newfangled liberal doctrines extolling economic individualism began to undermine authority and tradition. According to the General German Labor Congress, the consequences were disastrous:

> Two generations have passed since a great nation [France] broke all bonds of guild regulation, by which its productive energies were restrained and the general welfare was maintained in its natural condition, and proclaimed freedom of labor. Yet history has shown beyond a doubt that what was called freedom of labor was only its unfreedom; and that out of the overthrow of the old order arose an industrial struggle exceeding rule by violence in its evil consequences, a struggle in which dishonest labor triumphed over the honest, in which usury, gambling, and fraud triumphed over diligence and skill.[8]

Artisan spokesmen were usually vague concerning the identity of the proponents of this industrial anarchy. They remained convinced, however, that somewhere in high places, among statesmen and economists, there was lack of understanding of their interests, perhaps even direct hostility. The Assembly of Delegates of the North German Handicraft and

---

[7] *Offener Brief*, p. 13f. Cf. *Verhandlungen der ersten Abgeordneten-Versammlung des norddeutschen Handwerker- und Gewerbestandes zu Hamburg, den 2.-6 Juni 1848* (Hamburg, 1948), pp. 5, 14.

[8] W. E. Biermann, *Karl Georg Winkelblech (Karl Marlo): Sein Leben und sein Wirken* (2 vols., Leipzig, 1909), II, 458. The resolutions adopted by the General German Labor Congress and its commentary on the industrial code of the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress are reprinted in this work, II, 441-474.

Industrial Class complained to the Frankfurt Parliament that "the German handicraft and artisan class, which in former times regulated its own affairs, has lately been excluded from participation in lawmaking by the tutelage of various state authorities," with the result that recent economic legislation was based on "false theoretical principles." Karl Georg Winkelblech, a scientist and social reformer who had thrown in his lot with the handicraftsmen, warned that "almost all state economists and their allies, the Roman jurists, still intend to introduce the vicious principle of free competition throughout the entire civilized world." The German Handicraft and Artisan Congress believed that the bureaucracy "seeks in the greatest possible license and freedom of movement of tradesmen a source of wealth." The Bremen Civic Association maintained that "everything which men of the pen and of learning have so far done for handicraft and trade has by and large proved only too obviously to be empty theory."[9]

Handicraftsmen regarded higher education with the same suspicion which they felt toward great wealth. In the university they saw an ally of the industrialist and the banker. Scholars were at best doctrinaire visionaries without true understanding of the practical needs of the nation. At worst they became active collaborators in a dark conspiracy directed against the guild system. In either case they were as a group advocates of radical ideas imported from abroad, helping to subvert time-honored social institutions. The writings and speeches of artisans were therefore consistently hostile to academic learning: "the educated understand nothing of the situation and the interests of the worker;" "it is our earnest and firm resolve not to allow a handful of deluded scholars and greedy capitalists to force it [industrial freedom] on us;" "almost all scholars and all big capitalists will enter the lists against us, the former out of ignorance, the latter out of greed;" "the revolution in Berlin was only a result of industrial freedom, even if all the men of letters write their fingers off to affirm the contrary." Bureaucrats and politicians were not much better: "the statesman sees in the broadest competition the most powerful instrument of industrial perfection;" "we do not want such a mongrel state of affairs which the so-called half-liberal state economists favor;" "experience shows that the political chamber [the legislature] is overloaded with government officials;" "the spirit of the age . . . tends toward . . . the rule by force of the so-called leaders of the people." As for jurists, the guilds must appoint judges to arbitrate trade disputes, for otherwise "we would fall into the clutches of the lawyers, and everybody knows how terrible that would be."[10]

---

[9] *Verhandlungen des norddeutschen Gewerbestandes,* pp. 19, 55; *Entwurf einer allgemeinen Handwerker- und Gewerbe-Ordnung für Deutschland berathen und beschlossen von dem deutschen Handwerker- und Gewerbe-Congress zu Frankfurt am Main in den Monaten Juli und August 1848. Mit einem Anhange: Mittel zur Hebung des deutschen Handwerker- und Gewerbestandes und einer Beilage* (Hamburg, 1848), p. 5; Bundesarchiv, *Volksw. Ausschuss,* 21 II.

[10] *Verhandlungen des norddeutschen Gewerbestandes,* pp. 5, 19f.; W. E. Biermann, *Winkelblech,* II, 452, 458f.; *Entwurf einer Gewerbe-Ordnung,* p. 6; *Verhandlungen des ersten deutschen Handwerker- und Gewerbe-Congresses gehalten zu Frankfurt a. M. vom 14. Juli bis 18. August 1848,* ed. G. Schirges (Darmstadt, 1848), pp. 162, 176; *Offener Brief,* p. 11.

The educated classes, contended the handicraftsman, were the mercenaries of industrialism leading the attack upon the guild system. The consequences of their ill-advised policy could be seen in France, "the nation divided into millionaires and beggars," where the proletariat had finally seized arms to win redress of its grievances. In Germany the process of social decay had not yet produced the war of each against all, but there too the welfare of the people was being sacrificed on the altar of gold. Master bookbinder Behrens of Magdeburg argued that "the moneybags of the merchants have admittedly been filled as a result of industrial freedom, but the laboring classes have sunk in misery." The artisan could no longer take pride in his work, he could no longer maintain the tradition of his calling. The guildsmen of Bremen reproached liberal parliamentarians for their condescending attitude toward the artisan trades: "It has come to the point . . . where your sons as well as all sons of the rich and educated in Germany, with a few exceptions, consider it beneath their dignity and are ashamed to become handicraftsmen." Economic individualism had opened a widening gulf between diligence and wealth, between honest labor and financial reward. "It has been shown," proclaimed the assembly of journeymen, "that through the introduction of this fundamentally false system the rich became even richer, the poor even poorer; that the middle estate was ruined and the working class reduced to begging; that the freedom which had been sought was no true freedom, but only a caricature; and that in fact the accursed principle was applied: Unto every one that hath shall be given, but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.' "[11]

Only the rapacious capitalist, battening on the misery of the people, benefited by industrial freedom. In their manifestoes and addresses the handicraftsmen inveighed tirelessly against "the aristocracy of wealth," "the power of money," "the rule of capital," "the great Moloch," "the manipulation of the stock exchange," "the men who ride in gilded carriages and drink champagne," "the merchants, manufacturers, and landowners, who represent big capital." Martin May, a master butcher from Frankfurt, warned an audience of artisans that "speculation and usury will oppose us with all their resources, for what is at stake is their predominance over industriousness." The guildsmen of Schleiz urged Julius Fröbel, representing their district in the Frankfurt Parliament, to oppose the economic doctrine "which enables the man of wealth, who already has more than he needs, to rob . . . the oppressed handicraftsman of his last bit of bread and to force masses of these children of the state into the misery of the proletariat." And a correspondent of the *Bayerische Landbötin* gave a sympathetic account of the anticapitalistic fervor of the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress: "Whoever could still doubt that what is at stake is the struggle against capital, and that this struggle will be waged with all energy and all

---

[11] W. E. Biermann, *Winkelblech*, II, 450f., 458; *Verhandlungen des Gewerbe-Congresses*, p. 27; Bundesarchiv, *Volksw. Ausschuss*, 21 II.

German honesty, would have been enlightened by the description of working conditions which the unadorned speech of the representatives of the working people provided."[12]

In the final analysis the complaints of the artisan were not directed against any single abuse, any particular grievance. They expressed rather a general discontent with the dominant ideals of the nineteenth century, with its acceptance of change, its acclaim of progress, its worship of individual talent. "The spirit of the age, insofar as it pays homage to egalitarianism and to a constant urge to advance, insofar as it tends toward a constant fluctuation between lawlessness (anarchy) and the rule by force of the so-called leaders of the people, this spirit of the age obviously cannot favor the enduring orderliness, the calm, peaceful, quiet rule of the guild system."[13]

The time was simply out of joint for the small independent tradesman accustomed to the security provided by a corporate regulation of production. He refused to part with the illusion that the age of economic innocence in which his class had once grown and prospered could be restored. His loud condemnation of capitalism was only the rhetoric of a conservatism compounded of resentment toward the nouveau riche and contempt for the propertyless proletarian, a conservatism demanding that time stand still. The throne, the altar, the manor house were to him part and parcel of a traditional social order in which there was also a place for the trade guild and the handicraft shop. Doctrinaire bureaucrats had unfortunately succeeded in persuading the monarchy to approve the introduction of the factory system, so that the loyalty of the artisan finally gave way during the spring uprising of 1848. But master carpenter Kielmannsegge of Berlin hastened to explain that "without industrial freedom it would never have been possible to alienate the Berliners from their good king," while master carpenter Wischmann of Bremen insisted that "if law and order have on the whole still been maintained in Germany, then this must be credited above all to the German artisan class, in which the sense of morality and order has not been destroyed."[14]

By the same token, those political ideologies which had come to terms with the industrial revolution were suspect to the handicraftsman. He was convinced that the liberals, by accepting the factory system as an unalterable outcome of economic development, had in effect become the apologists of capitalism. "They are actually . . . not enlightened, but want a slavery which is still greater than that which prevailed under the rule of the old monopolies." Radicalism was even worse. The *Open Letter to All Guild Comrades of Germany* warned against "the excesses of egalitarianism, whether adorned with the liberty cap of the republic or with the banner of socialism and communism." And the Assembly of Delegates of the North German Handicraft and Industrial Class maintained that "only a comprehensive guild code . . . can protect Germany against the fate of France and England, and against the dangers of communism." The master guildsmen found fault with a democratic franchise. If all men received the right to vote, "the journeymen will dictate laws to the masters, and the entire system which is now common in France and which undermines the last remnants of diligence, prosperity, and respect will march in triumph with flying colors and martial music, as it were, across Prussia into Germany." In some artisan circles there was also opposition to the emancipation of the Jews, because it was likely to increase competition in the retail trades. The shopkeepers of Halberstadt complained to the Frankfurt Parliament about Jewish peddlers from Dessau who hawked their goods from door to door, while the handicraftsmen of Leipzig launched into an out-and-out anti-Semitic diatribe:

---

[12] *Bayerische Landbötin* (Munich), August 1., 1848. Cf. *Verhandlungen des Gewerbe-Congresses,* pp. 36, 51, 97, 211, 256; *Entwurf einer Gewerbe-Ordnung,* p. 23; *Offener Brief,* p. 20; Bundesarchiv, *Volksw. Ausschuss,* 21 II; Julius Fröbel, *Ein Lebenslauf: Aufzeichnungen, Erinnerungen, Bekenntnisse* (2 vols., Stuttgart, 1890-91), I, 263.

[13] *Offener Brief,* p. 11.

[14] *Verhandlungen des norddeutschen Gewerbestandes,* pp. 5, 20.

> We must declare ourselves most decidedly against the fashionable policy of the emancipation of the Jews. There is no greater enemy of the petty bourgeoisie and of the laboring classes, no greater enemy of the solidity of the small trades than these aliens, who are nowhere at home and who have no heart for the people among whom they live. Their heart is the money bag, and if they are attached to anything else, then it is to their Jewish brothers, whether these live in Europe or Asia. The Russian or even the Chinese Jew is closer to the German Jew than is the German gentile. Usury originates chiefly among the Jews, and they ruin the handicraft shop with their system of bargaining, which is also gaining control over handicraft wares. They may be less harmful in wholesale commerce and contribute to its vigor, but they completely ruin the small trades. We have largely their doing to thank for the growing proletariat, which their orators and writers then incite against the existing order.[15]

The rejection of political liberalism by the artisan movement was logically consistent with its advocacy of a conservative economic program. The hundreds of petitions which guild organizations composed during the revolution varied considerably in style, tone, content, and purpose. But the vast majority had one thing in common, an uncompromising hostility to industrial freedom. The campaign for a restoration of corporate control of production began with the remonstrance of April 17, 1848, which 391 master handicraftsmen of Bonn submitted to the ministry in Berlin: "We have come to recognize that freedom of industry, . . . just like freedom of trade, is only an ideal which in practice is accompanied by a great deal of undeserved suffering." During the months which followed, memorials from towns and villages in all parts of Germany supported this initial attack on liberal economics. In the register of petitions presented to the Frankfurt Parliament there are constant references to addresses from artisan associations, almost all of them opposed to a policy of laissez faire: "Petition of artisan shop owners from Upper Austria, dated Ried, July 29, protest against industrial freedom;" "Protest of all handicraft associations of the seventh electoral district in Saxony against industrial freedom;" "Petition of the handicraft guilds in Hanover against industrial freedom;" "Protest of 10,000 artisan masters of the district of Swabia and Neuburg in Bavaria against the introduction of industrial freedom;" "Protest of all the handicraft guilds of Gotha against unconditional industrial freedom;" "Memorial of all the handicraft guilds in Carlsruhe for an up-to-date industrial code and against industrial freedom." The economic committee of the national assembly, though strongly adverse to a restoration of the guild system, was forced to admit in its report of February 26, 1849: "Only too often did we encounter in these documents [artisan petitions] the opinion that it is above all in a return to earlier conditions, in a re-establishment of exclusive privileges for the handicraftsmen that a cure is to be found for the morbid social conditions of our time."[16]

---

[15] *Offener Brief*, p. 21f. Cf. W. E. Biermann, *Winkelblech*, II, 451; *Offener Brief*, pp. 5, 7; *Verhandlungen des norddeutschen Gewerbestandes*, p. 19; *Verhandlungen der deutschen verfassunggebenden Reichs-Versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main*, ed. K. D. Hassler (6 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1848-49), II, 881.

Many artisan organizations, furthermore, sought to reduce competition through the restrictive control of individual industries. The assembly of printers in Mainz, after demanding the "regulation of machinery in Germany and its restriction insofar as it serves to enrich the private person without general usefulness," called for a limitation of the number of apprentices and for the requirement of practical training for masters. The meeting of tailors in Frankfurt opened its resolutions with the familiar formula that "industrial freedom should under no circumstances be introduced in Germany," and then proceeded to urge the suppression of shops selling ready-made clothes. The gathering of calico printers and patternmakers in Chemnitz wanted to limit the use of machinery, control the employment of apprentices, reduce the hours of labor, and establish a guild representing all workers in the trade. The weavers of Brunswick insisted that "the weaver's craft be made the equal of the other professions and thus be delivered from the freedom or lawlessness which have prevailed until now." Clothmakers guilds in the eastern provinces of Prussia proposed that "factories operated by steam power, water power, or horsepower be restricted or completely abolished," and that "no factory owner be allowed to employ more than six looms." Wagoners and expressmen complained about the competition of freight trains, suggesting the imposition of additional taxes on railroad companies. And owners of sailing vessels on the

---

[16] *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung,* ed. K. D. Hassler, II, 896. Cf. *An unsere Brüder im Handwerk! Acht und zwanzig Artikel. Als Petition der Handwerkmeister in der Stadt Bonn dem Staatsminister Herrn Camphausen übersandt im April 1848* (Bonn, [1848]), p. 3f.; *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, III, 1621, 1741, 2095, IV, 2842, V, 3249, VI, 4719.

Rhine petitioned the national assembly to prohibit the transportation of goods by steamship.[17]

The artisan movement culminated in the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress, which met in Frankfurt to evolve a systematic economic program out of the flood of petitions, memorials, resolutions, and manifestoes. While in St. Paul's Church the members of the national assembly were debating the principles of constitutional government, only a stone's throw away in the *Römer* some hundred handicraftsmen from twenty-four states deliberated concerning the means of saving their way of life from destruction. Yet the distance separating the two gatherings was enormous. On one side was the intellectual elite of Central Europe—lawyers, professors, doctors, writers, bureaucrats, businessmen—resolved to create a new nation in which all men could find free scope for their energies and talents. On the other side stood the representatives of a social class facing total ruin. It was the confrontation of success and failure, hope and despair. The bourgeois liberals who had come to power during the spring uprising could already see in their mind's eye the regenerated Germany of the future, teeming with factories and countinghouses, ruled by an aristocracy of wealth. But for the tradesman, ideals of freedom and unity were a luxury which only the well-to-do could afford. What did he care about theories of statecraft, about the forms of government or the rights of the individual? As far as the artisan masses were concerned, there was one crucial issue in the revolution: the defense of the small independent producer against the advance of capitalism.

In the industrial code which it submitted to the national assembly the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress made its position clear at the outset: "Who can blame . . . the German artisan class, which has but a little breath of life left, if it gathers its last reserves of strength and pronounces before Germany, in the presence of its representatives in the German parliament, a solemn protest against industrial freedom, a protest to which millions of unfortunates subscribe?" Only a corporate organization of manufacture could protect the handicraftsman. The state must help create a guild system authorized to regulate methods of production and conditions of labor for every industry. Membership was to be a condition of the right to practice a trade. The guilds would supervise the training of apprentices and journeymen, they would examine candidates for the master's certificate, they would settle jurisdictional disputes among related occupations, they would curb the activities of shopkeepers and peddlers. "If the number of masters in a community is too great, the appropriate government authority can introduce at the request of the industrial council temporary restrictions in accordance with local industrial and individual conditions." The profits of the capitalist would have to be subordinated to the general welfare. "Factories and large establishments should be taxed according to the size of their output for the benefit of the small trades, and the operation of those factories whose products compete with handicraft articles should be confined." Finally, a hierarchy of guild organizations would guard the interests of the artisan class. Trade corporations were to elect industrial councils, industrial councils would choose special industrial chambers, and at the apex of the pyramid was to stand a general industrial chamber advising the national parliament on questions of economic poilcy.[18]

---

[17] *Petition an die deutsche National-Versammlung zu Frankfurt am Main von der ersten Versammlung deutscher Buchdrucker in Mainz* (Frankfurt a.M., 1848), *passim;* Bundesarchiv Abteilung Frankfurt am Main, *Akten der Nationalversammlung: Volksw. Ausschuss,* 21 II (Resolutions of the Tailors Congress); *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung,* ed. K. D. Hassler, IV, 145f.; Stadtarchiv Frankfurt am Main, *Akten des Frankfurter Handwerker-Kongresses,* Braunschweig No. 91 B (Petition of the Brunswick Weavers Guild); *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, I, 528, 679, II, 1412, IV, 2530, V, 3708, 3780ff., IX, 6373.

Appended to the industrial code was a series of recommendations entitled Means for the Advancement of the German Handicraft and Artisan Class. The state was to discourage the import of manufactured goods by protective duties, while encouraging their export through premiums and commercial treaties with foreign nations. A system of government banks would put an end to the machinations of financiers and speculators by making credit available to artisan shop owners at reasonable rates of interest. Instruction in public elementary schools must be made free and compulsory for all classes of society, because "as soon as the future minister sits on the same school bench as the handicraftsman, the true people's state is established." A progressive tax levied on income and property would place the burden of public expenditures on those best able to afford it. There was to be a "legal obligation for all citizens to contribute a minimum amount to funds established for widows, orphans, and the aged." And since overpopulation was a constant threat to economic stability, every man contemplating marriage would have to provide evidence of financial resources sufficient to support a family. To the handicraftsmen in the *Römer* the need for such a restriction of matrimony was self-evident: "At any given time only a fixed number of people can live in a country very happily. In states which have industrial freedom the provision concerning the possession of a marriage capital would be the equivalent of a prohibition of marriage among the poor. But if everybody is able to save the amount in question because of the industrial code, then this law inflicts no hardship."[19]

The German Handicraft and Artisan Congress even went so far as to ask for a guarantee of employment to every citizen of the state. The same artisans who had proclaimed their resolve to "protect Germany against the fate of France and England and against the dangers of communism" argued for the inalienable right to work in language worthy of a Louis Blanc. Not only did they speak of the "obligation of the state to support poor citizens who have become unable to work because of sickness, disability, etc.," but they insisted on the "obligation of the state to employ in such public works as railroads, highways, canals, etc. all its subjects who are able to work but cannot find employment with private enterprise, and to pay them wages sufficient for their maintenance. We cite as the principal reason for this provision that every human being as such has an incontestable right to his existence. We believe, furthermore, that work of this kind for all unemployed is the only means of completely eliminating involuntary poverty."[20]

---

[18] *Entwurf einer Gewerbe-Ordnung,* pp. 3-28.

[19] *Ibid.,* pp. 29-32.

The authors of the industrial code saw no logical inconsistency between their condemnation of radical foreign doctrines and their advocacy of radical domestic reforms. They were opposed to socialism because it considered handicraftsmen no better than proletarians, because it accepted the victory of the factory system, because it scorned authority and tradition, because it was alien. They too sought to enlist the support of the state in behalf of the oppressed and exploited. But their objective was the restoration of an old social order, not the establishment of a new classless society. Artisan spokesmen and socialistic publicists espoused policies which were in some respects surprisingly similar. The ultimate goals for which they were striving, however, were diametrically opposed.

The industrial code at once became a rallying point of the economic interests threatened by the progress of the factory system. Even those artisan organizations which raised objections to it criticized as a rule detail rather than substance. The journeymen who had been excluded from the deliberations in the *Römer* submitted proposals of their own to the Frankfurt Parliament. But while arguing against the privileged status of the master tradesmen, while demanding a work day of only ten hours and a work year of no more than three hundred days, they announced that "precisely on the most important issues we could join the masters." Their purpose was not to destroy the corporate organization of industry, but to win a more favorable position within it. The village artisans of Weimar complained that the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress was seeking to establish a trade monopoly for city guildsmen, although they apparently found no fault with opposition to industrialism as such. Here and there, to be sure, some small group of handicraftsmen like that from Vechelde or from the Weser district of Brunswick would announce its unqualified rejection of the industrial code. But only in the Palatinate, where guilds had been abolished more than fifty years before, was there widespread and consistent support for a policy of free enterprise.[21]

The artisan movement, however, had to face another opponent far more dangerous than the shopkeepers and tradesmen on the left bank of the Rhine. At the final session of the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress the presiding officer, master butcher Martin May, confidently asserted that "the honorable assembly, which has been convoked by the trust of the German people and which is now occupied with the establishment of its rights and freedoms, cannot reject the unanimous demand of the German handicraft class which we are about to submit to it." He was mistaken. The bourgeois constitutionalists had no intention of using their hard-won authority to restore the guild system. Industrial freedom was for them the inevitable corollary of political freedom; it was one of those sacred rights of man which nature had decreed and which government must defend. Was it logical to proclaim the civic emancipation of the citizen while denying him his economic liberty? The parliamentarian in St. Paul's Church had to favor a policy of laissez faire for the same reason that the artisan opposed it. His view of society, reinforced by a fundamental economic interest, left him no choice. On July 13 Georg Friedrich Kolb stated a cardinal article of the liberal faith before the Frankfurt Parliament:

---

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 31f.

[21] W. E. Biermann, *Winkelblech*, II, 151-160, 442, 464; *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung*, ed. K. D. Hassler, II, 870, 876f., 879; V. Böhmert, *Freiheit der Arbeit!* pp. 170-173.

> Political freedom goes hand in hand with civil freedom. That was always so. There is no right of man more natural than the right to make use of his energies. If we do not guarantee this right, then I do not have much hope for all the political rights. Guild control is part of the Middle Ages, of the feudal system. At that time there were masters, journeymen, and apprentices, just as there were overlords and vassals. There was a serfdom of the workshops, just as there was a serfdom with respect to agriculture. The worker must work for the master, just as the bondsman must work for the liege lord. That is why the guild system everywhere collapsed and was bound to collapse, as soon as political freedom dawned.[22]

Most liberals were willing to concede that the standard of living of the artisan masses was declining. But they argued, invoking the dogmas of classical economics, that hardship was the price of progress. "A long period of peace always produces a significant increase of population in all countries, and especially among the poorer classes of the nation. It is therefore in the nature of the situation that in the occupations where these classes find employment and livelihood a glut develops, and consequently a reduction in wages occurs because of the increase in the supply of labor . . . . This is a perfectly obvious natural process . . . . Just as natural competition determines the value of a product, so it also determines the value of labor." The Malthusian effects of overpopulation were admittedly aggravated by the mechanization of industry. Yet those who clamored for the destruction of the factory system failed to realize that "without the improvements in communication, transportation and production, it would be impossible to compete with countries which also have them, and their customary occupation would still be ruined even without the introduction of those inventions." The worst of it was that with the coming of the revolution radical agitators began to exploit popular discontent, seeking to transform a struggle for civil liberty into a war of class against class. "The passions of the working population suffering from competition were turned . . . by ambitious so-called friends of the people against the wealthy, and the concepts of property were shaken to their foundations. It was this which aroused mistrust among businessmen of every sort, paralyzed their energies, and made it impossible for them to go on providing the workers with the employment which they had still had up to that time."[23]

---

[22] *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, II, 856. Cf. *Verhandlungen des Gewerbe-Congresses,* p. 256.

The national assembly could not accept the demands of the artisan movement without violating the basic tenets of its social creed. It was convinced that "in competition lies a necessary condition of progress, and he who does not accept it will be left behind." The suppression of the factory could therefore serve no useful purpose, since the same economic forces which had led to its rise in the first place would promptly reassert themselves. "If we were to destroy the big industry of today and distribute all capital evenly, without at the same time being able to distribute evenly talents, industriousness, the sense of order, honesty, or even merely the favors of blind chance, then undoubtedly after a few years the same differences would again become apparent." The restoration of the guild system was also illogical, because "now that class privileges have been abolished, we cannot grant any class, whether it be the class of all producers or the class of handicraftsmen, the authority to issue regulations . . . restraining other classes." As for the right to work, "such a guarantee would be the paralysis of diligence, a sanction of laziness, a paralysis of the energy which above all should animate and elevate the populace, if it is to overcome the harshness of its lot . . . . It is our duty to strengthen the self-reliance of those classes on which the Providence of God has imposed labor as a necessity of life, . . . and to harden their moral fortitude by directing their faith to Providence."[24]

There were, to be sure, a few measures which the state could adopt for the relief of the lower classes. "It would be advisable, first of all, that no obstacles be placed in the way of emigration," for the departure of the impoverished and discontented for the New World was likely to raise the standard of living of those remaining behind. The establishment of savings banks, of sickness and funeral funds, and of consumer cooperatives would also help protect the proletariat against the vicissitudes of a free market. In times of depression, moreover, government loans should be extended to large industrial enterprises in order to save them from bankruptcy and prevent the spread of unemployment.[25]

Yet the best way to improve the lot of the worker was through honest toil and thrifty living, the classic virtues of rugged individualism. A commission investigating economic conditions during the spring uprising concluded that "man works his way up only when he relies on himself and is forced by necessity to help himself." Moritz Mohl asserted in the Frankfurt Parliament amid warm applause: "A worker can be sure of work, if he is diligent, if he is faithful and able . . . . But as soon as you give him a guarantee that he will be maintained by the citizens of the state if he does not have work, then he will not take the trouble to be hired by an employer." The economic committee of the national assembly was certain that "once you proclaim a state guarantee of work and remuneration, the vigor of the nation will atrophy, the healthy incentive of competition will disappear, spiritual enervation will follow physical indolence." And an article in the *Zollvereinsblatt* exemplified the attitude of the middle-class press toward corporate regulation of industry:

---

[23] *Verhandlungen des deutschen Parlaments* (2 vols., Frankfurt am Main, 1848), II, 515ff.

[24] *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung*, ed. K. D. Hassler, II, 898f., IV, 146; *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung*, ed. F. Wigard, VII, 5114, IX, 6374f.

[25] *Verhandlungen des Parlaments*, II, 520, 522.

> We may feel a very grave concern for the present sad plight of our artisan class, and yet we must condemn the means which the assembly of handicraftsmen in Frankfurt [the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress] suggests for its improvement. This complete ignorance of the ideas which are fermenting in our time, this disdainful rejection of all interests outside the realm of personal advantage, this contempt for the demands of science, this shameless passion for monopoly . . . , this open declaration of war against technological progress, are all tragic evidence of an intellectual poverty which would be utterly inexplicable in view of the level of German education, were we not to remember that the first manifestation of a long suppressed freedom degenerates only too easily into abuse . . . . The national assembly would have to declare itself bankrupt in justice and intelligence before it could recognize the competence of the artisan congress to settle the unsolved problems of industry.[26]

The Frankfurt Parliament shared this view. Justin von Linde was merely stating the obvious in his speech of July 13: "There is not the slightest doubt in the assembly that the people of Germany must obtain freedom of movement and freedom of industry." Eight days later St. Paul's Church voted to include in the constitution a provision that "every German has the right . . . to engage in any occupation." The economic committee of the national assembly received the representatives of the German Handicraft and Artisan Congress with a noncommittal politeness, but it had no intention of acceding to demands for a restriction of the factory system. On February 26, after some seven months of deliberation, it issued a report upholding the principle of laissez faire. Every man twenty-five years of age who gave proof of technical competence was to become eligible to practice a trade anywhere in Germany. While guild corporations might be formed, they were not to possess any exclusive rights, and membership should be purely voluntary. As for the training of apprentices and journeymen, "everyone is free to prepare himself for an occupation however and wherever he wishes." There was not a word about the regulation of big business, the restraint of mechanized production, the reduction of competition, the protection of the artisan trades. The handicraftsman would simply have to learn to live under the changing economic conditions of the nineteenth century. It was sink or swim.[27]

---

[26] *Zollvereinsblatt* (Augsburg), August 2, 1848. Cf. *Verhandlungen des Parlaments,* II, 520; *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung,* ed. F. Wigard, VII, 5103, 5109.

The national assembly, rushing to complete the constitution before the conservatives could take the offensive, postponed action on the report of the economic committee. But to the artisans it now became apparent that they could find no salvation in liberalism. The revolution for which they had fought on the barricades was bent on destroying them. Instead of establishing a guild system powerful enough to protect the handicraftsman against industrial wealth, parliamentarians were encouraging the growth of the factory system. All the hopes, all the sacrifices of the March days had been in vain. The middle-class constitutionalists seemed even less interested in the preservation of the small independent producer than the aristocratic legitimists had been. Just as the Frankfurt Parliament was preparing for its last desperate struggle with conservatism, the city proletariat began to favor a royalist restoration. The tradesmen of Altenburg had admonished St. Paul's Church in its hour of triumph: "Woe if the parliament, convoked by the people to make Germany free and happy, destroys the most important basis of its welfare. The curse of posterity will long pursue those presumptuous men who in their delusion did not listen to the reproving voice of the people."[28] It was a prophetic warning. Only a year after the wild enthusiasm of the spring uprising, the urban masses watched apathetically as the armies of the reaction crushed the liberal bourgeoisie of Central Europe.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

---

[27] *Verhandlungen der Nationalversammlung*, ed. F. Wigard, II, 866, 1075-1082, VII, 5422f.; *Verhandlungen des Gewerbe-Congresses*, pp. 151-155; *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung*, ed. K. D. Hassler, II, 853-946.

[28] *Verhandlungen der Reichs-Versammlung*, ed. K. D. Hassler, II, 875.

GERMAN LIBERALISM AND AUSTRIAN CENSORSHIP IN 1865*

by Margaret Sterne

When Emperor Franz Joseph of Austria decided to end the Austro-Italian War with the loss of Lombardy in the hastily concluded preliminary peace at Villafranca on July 11, 1859,[1] the obvious success of the Italian unification movement stirred the national German liberals to new activity. After two initial meetings, in Eisenach and in Hanover, the liberals formally founded the *Nationalverein* on September 16 in Frankfort on the Main, uniting the North and South German groups.[2] Their common program called for the establishment of a strong executive power instead of the weak Diet of the German Confederation, and for the creation of a German Parliament. The *Nationalverein* openly demanded Prussian leadership. The founding of the *Nationalverein* caused consternation in Vienna.[3] The Prussian Government denied in Vienna that it was interested in the Frankfort meeting. In contrast to the Italian patriots, the German liberals never could count on the support of the conservative, Junker-dominated Prussian regime.[4]

Some of the members of the *Nationalverein* advocated the reintroduction of the Reich constitution of 1849. Others clamored for Prussia to assume an immediate leadership, especially after William I succeeded to the throne.[5] The Austrian Government feared the militant spirit of the *Nationalverein*. In full accord with some of the reactionary governments of the German Middle States, the Austrian Government fought against its very existence.[6]

The patriotic fervor which swept the German nation soon turned to radical demands in Southwestern Germany. The radical elements found a champion in a young Frankfort lawyer and citizen, Johann Baptist von

---

*This essay is a partial result of a research scholarship grant in Austria, 1952-53, under the Fulbright Act and was read before the Michigan Academy of Science, Arts and Letters at Ann Arbor, Michigan, on March 25, 1960. I am deeply indebted to Professor Goldwin Smith of Wayne State University for his continued interest in my studies.

[1] Heinrich Ritter von Srbik, *Deutsche Einheit. Idee und Wirklichkeit vom Heiligen Reich bis Königgrätz* (4 vols.; 3d ed. München: F. Bruckmann, 1940-42), II, 400-411.

[2] Hermann Oncken, *Rudolf von Bennigsen. Ein deutscher liberaler Politiker. Nach seinen Briefen und hinterlassenen Papieren* (2 vols.; Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1910), I, 337-341.

[3] See Instruction to Count Avensperg-Traun, 4 September, 1859, H. von Srbik (ed.), *Quellen zur deutschen Politik Oesterreichs 1859-1866* (hereinafter cited as *Quellen Oesterreich)* (5 vols.; Oldenburg and Berlin: Gerhard Stalling, 1934-1938), I, 24f.

[4] Schleinitz to Arnim, 23 September, 1859, Christian Friese *et al.* (eds.), *Die Auswärtige Politik Preussens 1858-1871* (hereinafter cited as *Preussen Auswärtige Politik)* (12 vols.; Oldenburg: Gerhard Stalling, 1932-1939), I, 800-802. See also Lenore O'Boyle, "The German Nationalverein," *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XVI (January, 1957), 350f.

[5] Oncken, *op. cit.,* I, 486ff.

[6] Werner to Rechberg, 6 June, 1860, *Quellen Oesterreich,* I, 228ff. The Austrian ambassador in Dresden reported that the Kings of Bavaria and Württemberg had decided to take energetic steps against the *Nationalverein*. Cf. Kübeck to Rechberg, 12 January, 1861, *ibid.,* p. 496f.

Schweitzer.[7] He was an ardent democrat of the more radical shade who later turned socialist in the course of his public career. He advocated a *Volksheer* (a people's army) because he feared the Prussian Junkers and their military might. Like many of his liberal colleagues, he believed that only *ein Volk in Waffen* (a nation in arms) could bring glory, unity, freedom, happiness to the German people; he preached a new revolution.[8]

The influence of this demagogue was felt throughout Southwestern Germany. The radical and anti-Prussian tendencies were spreading so rapidly that Rudolf von Bennigsen, the Hanoverian liberal and one of the founders of the *Nationalverein,* appeared personally in Frankfort on February 19, 1861, to declare that national unity could only be achieved under constitutional-monarchical Prussian leadership. His sincerity and integrity impressed the members of the *Nationalverein.* His arguments won.[9]

But the German patriots, liberals and radical democrats alike, were dealt a severe blow when, on March 5, 1862, King William I of Prussia dismissed his liberal ministry and ordered the dissolution of the Prussian House of Representatives, thus ending the so-called "New Era."[10] They now lost hope that the Prussian king would be a champion of the people and thought that the solution of the German problem would have to come out of their own ranks. The liberals decided to call delegates and representatives together at Whitsuntide in Frankfort to discuss plans for a general *Abgeordnetentag* (gathering of members of the different German Diets and Chambers), in the hope of creating a German Parliament.[11] The radical democrats went their own way: they founded a German Rifle Association and planned a General German *Schützenfest* (sharp shooters' festival) for July 1862, in Frankfort as a forerunner to a "people's army." This *Schützenfest* was under the sponsorship of Duke Ernst of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, although one of the instigators of the meeting and the secretary of the committee on arrangements was Johann Baptist von Schweitzer. Schweitzer immediately sent an invitation to the hero of the Italian unification movement, Giuseppe Garibaldi. When protests from the friends of Austria were heard, this invitation was withdrawn and Schweitzer was relieved of his duties.

The wide response to the *Schützenfest* clearly showed the enthusiasm of the greater part of the German nation for the creation and support of a people's army. But because these demands were connected with similar sentiments of the revolutionary years 1848 and 1849, the Prussian king abhorred them. He wanted to introduce a universal military training period of three years.[12] When the Prussian House of Representatives, with its liberal majority, rejected King William I's whole budget after all attempts at compromise had failed, the king appointed Otto von Bismarck-Schoenhausen as Prussian Prime Minister on September 24, 1862. Here was the man who, on May 12, 1859, had written that the German question could only be solved "ferro et igni." This conservative Prussian was now ready to sponsor the cause of his king against any opposition from the liberal-democratic camp or from Imperial Austrian quarters.[13]

---

[7] Gustav Mayer, *Johann Baptist von Schweitzer und die Sozialdemokratie. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* (Jena: Gustav Fischer, 1909), pp. 47-50.

[8] Schleinitz to Usedom, 16 January, 1861, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* III, 144ff.

[9] G. Mayer, *op. cit.,* p. 78.

[10] Friedrich Darmstädter, *Bismarck and the Creation of the Second Reich* (London, 1948), p. 186f.

[11] J. C. Bluntschli, *Denkwürdiges aus meinem Leben* (3 vols.; Noerdlingen: C. H. Beck, 1884), III, 37-40.

[12] Gordon A. Craig, *The Politics of the Prussian Army, 1640-1945* (Oxford, 1955), p. 155f.

From Vienna came an unexpected move in August 1863 to solve the German problem: Emperor Franz Joseph invited all German crowned heads and the burgomasters of the four Free Cities to meet with him in Frankfort and to discuss reforms of the German Confederation. The Emperor had informed King William of Prussia of his intentions when he visited him on August 2 in Bad Gastein but the Prussian King refused to attend. All the German dignitaries assembled in Frankfort on August 16, 1863, except the King of Prussia. He even refused a second invitation to join his royal brothers. Nothing was accomplished at the *Fürstentag*. The whole Austrian attempt was a failure. Prussia and Austria were far apart.[14]

But there was one issue which could bring the two great German powers together again: a comradeship-in-arms for the solution of the problem of Schleswig-Holstein.

The "Schleswig-Holstein question" had developed into a situation of such complexity between rival claims to sovereignty that Lord Palmerston once said only three men really understood the problem: one of them had died, another had gone crazy, and he himself, the third, had forgotten it all.[15] When Prince Christian of Glücksburg succeeded to the throne of Denmark and signed a new constitution on November 18, 1863, which would separate Schleswig from Holstein and unite it with Denmark, popular feeling ran high throughout the German lands because Schleswig and Holstein were supposed to be "indivisible" and independent. A demand for national armed intervention was raised on street corners and published in the daily press.[16] Frankfort was chosen as the central place for recruiting volunteers and the donation of money for the Schleswig-Holstein cause. But Bismarck had his own plans. He disregarded the popular excitement against the succession and the "Execution" in Holstein.[17] Despite this slap-in-the-face to the other sovereign members of the Diet, the Austro-Prussian motion carried.[18]

---

[13] Otto Fürst von Bismarck, *Gedanken und Erinnerungen* (3 vols.; Stuttgart: J. G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1908), I, 266-269. Cf. Chotek to Rechberg, 26 September, 1862, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* III, 32f. Bismarck was officially installed as Prime Minister of Prussia on October 8, 1862.

[14] Otto von Bismarck, *op. cit.,* I, 339-342. A detailed critical study of the *Fürstentag* will be found in Srbik, *Deutsche Einheit,* IV, 39-76.

[15] A. la Marmora, *Un po' piu di luce sugli eventi politici e militari dell' anno 1866* (Florence, 1875), p. 30f. as quoted in Lawrence D. Steefel, *The Schleswig-Holstein Question* (Cambridge, 1932), p. 3.

[16] Hans Rosenberg, *Die Nationalpolitische Publizistik Deutschlands. Vom Eintritt der neuen Aera in Preussen bis zum Ausbruch des deutschen Krieges. Eine Kritische Bibliographie* (2 vols.; München and Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 1935), II, 707-749.

[17] Identical note of the Austrian and Prussian ambassadors to the German governments, 3 December 1863, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* IV, 255ff.

The national liberals and the radical democrats were indignant. Their general feeling was voiced in loud protests when their *Abgeordnetentag* next convened in Frankfort. Over 500 delegates from all over Germany gathered on December 21, 1863, demanding a German Parliament and remonstrating against the Diet's attitude in the Danish question. They also appointed a Committee of Thirty-six as a permanent Executive Committee. The best description of this meeting comes from the pen of the American Consul General William Walton Murphy. He philosophically observed that the Germans talk but don't act. They "Called a revolutionary Convention, deliberated, ate, drank, passed resolutions, established a permanent committee to carry out their resolutions and to watch the interests of the German people, drank some more. . . . Thus ended the revolutionary Convention which they had intended to turn into a *permanent Parliament* more powerful and effective than the preliminary one of 1848. . . ."[19]

The year 1865 might well be subtitled, as far as the German unification movement was concerned, *Calm Before the Storm.* At first, the Austro-Prussian alliance was continued after the successful defeat of Denmark in the German-Danish War of 1864, despite the forebodings felt by the Austrian ministers[20] and despite the conditions under which Prussia wanted to permit the "liberated" duchies, Schleswig-Holstein, to become an independent German state.[21] These conditions were rejected by the Austrian Government.[22] When the Bavarian, Saxon and Hesse-Darmstadt governments proposed at the Diet that the two great German powers should install Duke Frederick of Augustenburg as sovereign in the Duchies, the Austrian Government supported this proposal whereas the Prussian Government rejected it. The resolution carried.[23] The close alliance of the two great German powers seemed to be collapsing. The liberal anti-Prussian press, especially the *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung,* rejoiced in this turn of events, attacked the Prussian Junkers and openly championed the Austrian cause.[24]

---

[18] The motion carried 8 to 7. See Motion of the Austrian and Prussian governments concerning the "Execution" in Holstein in the session of the Diet, 7 December, 1863, *ibid.,* p. 271, footnote 2.

[19] William W. Murphy to William H. Seward, Secretary of State, 21 December, 1863, U.S. State Department *Consular Despatches Frankfort on the Main 1829-1906* (U.S. National Archives), XIII, No. 11.

[20] Protocol of Austrian Council of Ministers, 11 January, 1865, *Quellen Oesterreich,* IV, p. 507f; see also reports of Count Karolyi, 11 February, 1865, and 25 February, 1865, *ibid.,* pp. 552-554. See further Biegeleben to Blome, 5 March, 1865, *ibid.,* in which Herr von Biegeleben confesses despair and adds that he hopes to be wrong in considering the "devouring" of the Duchies by Prussia as the beginning of the end of Austria's position in Germany.

[21] Bismarck to Werther, 22 February, 1865. *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* V, 687-691.

[22] Mensdorff to Karolyi, 5 March, 1865, *ibid.,* pp. 713-717.

[23] The majority was 9 to 5; the proposal is printed in Bismarck to Savigny, 26 March, 1865, *ibid.,* p. 774, footnote 1. Cf. Kübeck to Mensdorff, 7 April, 1865, *Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchiv Wien* (hereinafter cited as *HHS*), Gesandtschaftsarchiv Frankfurt, Fasc. 61, No. 19.

[24] Murphy to Seward, 31 July, 1865, *Murphy Despatches,* XIV, No. 492: "All the journals here discuss war between the two Great German powers."

In the next few months the gulf between Berlin and Vienna widened. Bismarck's sudden interest in a new candidate for the throne in the Duchies, the Grand Duke Peter of Oldenburg, the calling of the Estates in Schleswig-Holstein, the legal fight about the succession, all these different angles influenced Bismarck's German policy and showed him to be in direct opposition to the Austrian Government. He was even ready to go to war with Austria. Nothing was further from the intentions of Emperor Franz Joseph and his ministers.[25] And instead of the expected war over the Schleswig-Holstein questions, the two great powers of the German Confederation reached a peaceful agreement about the Duchies and concluded with each other the Gastein Convention. The treaty was signed on August 14, 1865. Lauenburg was surrendered to Prussia by Austria for two and one half million Danish thalers; the joint rule of the Duchies Schleswig-Holstein was ended. Prussia was to govern Schleswig, and Austria Holstein. Prussia also received the Holstein harbor of Kiel and the necessary military roads to the northern Duchy.[26] The other members of the German Confederation received the news of this agreement with consternation.[27] Again the liberal press reacted violently against this arrangement.[28] The *Neue Frankfurter Zeitung* interpreted the Gastein Convention as a betrayal by Austria of the unification movement and as the end of a national state.[29]

This time the liberals reacted swiftly. They called a meeting of the *Abgeordnetentag,* with the intention of subjecting the Schleswig-Holstein question to public scrutiny, thus placing it in the hands of the German people and making it a national cause, as it had been in 1848 and 1849. The meeting took place in Frankfort, and the members voted a number of resolutions. Among them was the request to all German deputies to deny loans and to refuse the payment of taxes to their governments. Furthermore, an appeal was addressed to the whole German nation to demand an account of the Gastein Convention and to punish the co-signers for their "treacherous" action.[30]

The language of this appeal was bold. The reaction was prompt and sharp. In accordance with their previous understanding, the Prussian and Austrian governments delivered notes of protest against such liberal demonstrations, with a thinly veiled threat to the Senate of the Free City of Frankfort.[31] The action of the two great German powers created a sensation. The governments of the German middle and smaller states were fearful that one of the small members of the Confederation, namely Frankfort, might be attacked.[32] The general feeling prevailed that it was wrong for the Austrian Government to join the Prussian Government in the sharp protest against the Frankfort Senate. The Austrian minister at the German Diet, Aloys Baron von Kübeck, advised the Austrian Government not to take any steps against the *Abgeordnetentag* because it was a failure anyway. Kübeck then called attention to the meeting of the *Nationalverein* which was to be held in Frankfort on October 28 and again urged the Government to take no steps because the *Nationalverein* was already in a state of deterioration. Kübeck stated that the Frankfort Senate would take no action against the *Abgeordnetentag* or the *Nationalverein* unless the Diet passed a resolution to this effect. As long as the Diet did not act against the Senate of the Free City of Frankfort nothing could be done unless Prussia and Austria were to take matters into their own hands. This would resemble a "rape" of a small state, which might fit in with the Prussian system but which was likely to impair greatly the position of Austria within Germany and might lead to serious complications. If there had been no definite commitment with Prussia it would seem wise to take no action at all.[33]

---

[25] Chester W. Clark, *Franz Joseph and Bismarck. The Diplomacy of Austria Before the War of 1866* (Cambridge, 1934), pp. 236-256.

[26] Die Konvention von Gastein, 14 August, 1865, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* VI, 324-331. See also Blome to Austrian State Department, 14 August, 1865, *Quellen Oesterreich,* V (part I), 1-12.

[27] Reuss to Bismarck, 21 August, 1865, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* VI, 348ff. See also Kübeck to Mensdorff, 25 August, 1865. *HHS,* Gesandtschaftsarchiv Frankfurt, Berichte, Fasc. 61, No. 50 A and B.

[28] Savigny to Bismarck, 28 August, 1865, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* VI, 354ff.

[29] *Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung* (Frankfurt am Main: Verlag der Frankfurter Zeitung [Frankfurter Societätsdruckerei, G.m.b.H.], 1911), p. 129ff.

[30] Wentzel to Prussian State Department, 1 October, 1865, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* VI, 403. See also Reculot to Drouyn de Lhuys, 1 October, 1865, Gustave Ficker, *et al.* (eds.), *Les origines diplomatiques de la guerre de 1870-1871. Recueil de Documents* (29 vols.; Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1910-1932), VII, No. 1603.

The Austrian Government did not follow Kübeck's suggestions. They became involved with the Prussian Government in the so-called *Drohnoten-Affaire,* which became a pivotal point in Bismarck's German policy and changed his attitude towards Austria.[34] This *Drohnoten-Affaire* paved the way for Bismarck's final decision to break with the Austrian Government in the session of the Diet on June 14, 1866.[35] The "Seven Weeks War" followed. Austria's exclusion from all German affairs was the cost she had to pay for Prussia's triumphant success in 1866.[36]

Why was the Austrian Government at first so anxious to play along with Bismarck in the *Drohnoten-Affaire,* risking a further strain on her relations with the smaller states in the German Confederation? There are several points which bear on this question. First, Count Esterhazy, although an Austrian minister without portfolio, was the most influential diplomat at the Imperial Court in Vienna, and he was still convinced in the fall of

---

[31] Instruction Thile to Wentzel, 6 October, 1865, *Preussen Auswärtige Politik,* VI, 406f.

[32] Koenneritz to Beust, 13 October, 1865; Zwierzina and Brenner to Austrian State Department, 17 October, 1865, *Quellen Oesterreich,* V (part I), Nos. 2231, 2233, 2234. Cf. Werner to Mensdorff, 8, 11 and 18 October, 1865, *HHS,* Politisches Archiv Dresden, Berichte, Fasc. V 28, Nos. 3210/564; 85 A; 87 A.

[33] Kübeck to Austrian State Department, 9 October, 1865, *Quellen Oesterreich,* V (part I), No. 2228.

[34] Margaret Sterne, *Frankfurt am Main im Brennpunkt der preussisch-oesterreichischen Auseinandersetzung 1865/1866* (Frankfurt am Main: Waldemar Kramer, 1955), pp. 8-16.

[35] Kübeck to Mensdorff, 14 June, 1866, *Quellen Oesterreich,* V (part II), 882f. See also L. K. Aegidi and Alfred Klauhold (eds.), *Das Staatsarchiv. Sammlung der offiziellen Aktenstücke zur Geschichte der Gegenwart* (86 vols.; Hamburg: O. Meissner, 1861-1871, Leipzig: Duncker and Humblot, 1872-1919), XI, 99-104.

[36] *Ibid.,* pp. 166-169.

1865 that the Prusso-Austrian friendship was valuable to Austria.[37] Secondly, Austria was in bad shape financially. Her government had just started to negotiate a new loan with the House of Rothschild and Baring Brothers and needed a show of strength.[38]

Another reason can be found in the personality of the Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Mensdorff, who was too indecisive in his German policy. On the one hand, he dreaded a situation in which Austria would have to follow Prussia through thick and thin, and on the other hand, he did not willfully want to sever the Austro-Prussian tie; he secretly speculated that the affair with the Frankfort Senate might be an occasion where this could happen naturally. But in any event, he was afraid that Austria would "fall between two stools."[39]

Finally, during Count Mensdorff's absence, on September 19, 1865, an Austrian Council of Ministers had convened in Vienna with Emperor Franz Joseph presiding and had agreed to support Bismarck's contemplated step against the Senate in Frankfort: to reprimand the Senate for having given permission to the *Abgeordnetentag* to hold their meeting in Frankfort. In this council *Staatsminister* Count Belcredi's remarks concerning the revolutionary character of the Committee of Thirty-six and the *Abgeordnetentag* influenced the decision.[40] Any revolutionary element was viewed as a serious threat at the conservative court of Emperor Franz Joseph.

What is the background for Count Belcredi's information and for his statements concerning the *Abgeordnetentag*? Here the Austrian censorship played a decisive role. Here the concept of "censorship" is not used in the general sense of the word, meaning governmental control of publications and entertainments, but rather in the Chinese sense, in which censorship is a systematic effort by the government to police itself.[41] The Austrian Government employed a number of paid agents in various parts of Germany who sent reports regularly to the Police Ministry in Vienna.[42] These agent-reports show an intimate knowledge of the members of the *Nationalverein* and the *Abgeordnetentag*. The reports had been seen by Count Belcredi, and they determined his attitude towards these two institutions.

During March of 1865, the reports sent to Vienna reveal the slow but steadily increasing concern of the liberals about Prussia's attitude towards Schleswig-Holstein and their efforts to keep the liberal Prussian delegates of the Committee of Thirty-Six and members of the *Nationalverein* in line with liberal policy. They appealed to these men from Prussia to think of their patriotic duty first and to support their candidate for the succession in the Duchies.[43] When these same liberals met again in Eisenach in June, 1865, their language became bolder, and the delegates were already talking about the popular demand to end the tragic (*unselige*) Provisorium in Schleswig-Holstein. They decided that a general meeting would be called on the Schleswig-Holstein question for October 1 and the meeting place would be Frankfort.[44] After the Gastein Convention had been published, liberal delegates met again in Eisenach on September 4 and designated Frankfort as their choice for a general assembly of the *Abgeordnetentag.* Here, in Eisenach, the delegates spoke about an appeal to the German nation which would publicly denounce the bartering of territories, as in the Gastein Convention. They were eager to have Prussian and Austrian delegates attend their meeting in Frankfort.[45] Simultaneously, a meeting was held in Leipzig, but all Austrian delegates had stayed away and only half of the members of the Committee of Thirty-Six had put in an appearance.[46]

---

[37] Chester W. Clark, *op. cit.*, pp. 312ff. and 332.

[38] Lawrence D. Steefel, "The Rothschilds and the Austrian Loan of 1865," *Journal of Modern History*, VIII (March, 1936), 27-39.

[39] Mensdorff to Esterhazy, 25 October, 1865, *Quellen Oesterreich*, V (part I), No. 2236.

[40] Austrian Council of Ministers, 19 September, 1865, *HHS*, Kabinettskanzlei, K. Z. 4019, M.R.Z. 40, first published in Chester W. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 554f.

[41] Charles O. Hucker, "Confucianism and the Chinese Censorial System" in *Confucianism in Action* (Stanford, 1959), p. 186.

[42] These reports have not been published before. They are Akten des Informationsbüros, B-M-Akten No. 205 from 1865 (HHS) (hereinafter cited as *Agent-Reports*). They were regularly submitted to the Austrian State Department and then returned to the Ministry of Police.

A most significant report reaching Vienna, shortly before the all-important Council of Ministers took place, is not dated. It must have been sent after the Eisenach and Leipzig meetings and before October 1. It contained an appeal to all members of German diets sent out by the Committee of Thirty-six which reads as follows:

> Through the Gastein Convention, the governments of Prussia and Austria have violated most gravely the clearest principles of justice and especially the right of self-determination of the Duchies which is only limited by the interest of the German nation.
>
> The regulations which may be expected to follow this Convention, besides causing a deep shock to the sense of justice of the German people, also threaten to destroy for years to come the economic and moral welfare of the Duchies which were liberated with German blood from the Danish yoke.
>
> The undersigned Executive Committee therefore deems itself duty-bound to bring about the re-convening of the members of the German diets for the purpose of discussing and arriving at a decision about the salvaging of public law and order in those territories. The Committee expects that the German delegates, who in the assembly of December 21, 1863, and through the legal reservation presented at the London Conference on April, 1864, solemnly bound themselves to stand up for the right of self-determination of the Duchies and for their rights in general, will also redeem this obligation through their appearance at this assembly.
>
> The undersigned Committee therefore extends an invitation to the present members of German diets to come to a meeting in Frankfort on

---

[43] *Agent-Reports* from Munich, 9 March, 1865; from Frankfort, 20 March, 1865; from Berlin, 27 March, 1865.

[44] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 15 June, 1865.

[45] *Agent-Reports* from Nürnberg, 24 August, 1865. As there was no meeting scheduled for the *Abgeordnetentag*, invitations were issued to meet in Eisenach on September 4.

[46] *Agent-Reports* from Darmstadt, 5 September, 1865.

Sunday, October 1, at 10 A.M. A confidential preliminary discussion will be held Saturday evening, September 30.

Frankfort and Leipzig, September 1865.
The Executive Committee of the Assembly of Members of German Diets. The Presiding Officer: Dr. Sigmund Mueller

Attached to this invitation was a secret proclamation which the agent also disclosed to the Vienna police.

Here the language is much more revolutionary, stating that the Committee of Thirty-Six and the entire *Abgeordnetentag* are without influence in German affairs; that the German Confederation, having previously been deprived of power, now has lost the last remnants of honor and dignity; that German peoples are being bartered like cattle, and that the governments of the smaller German states have already become vassals of Prussia and Austria. The proclamation admits that Prussia, due to its position, will always play a prominent role in Germany; but to betray Germany into the hands of Prussia under all circumstances would mean "to betray freedom in the interest of unity."

The proclamation also states that the Schleswig-Holstein problem has not been solved according to the wishes of the German people. Germany is in a state of transition: the battle rages between freedom of the people and princely absolutism. And then comes the main point of this communication: to form a new party, a people's party, which will carry all of Germany in its wake. The writers assert that excellent men of the *Nationalverein* will be in favor of such a party. The agent advised the Ministry of Police that he was proceeding to Frankfort because the *Abgeordnetentag* would be an important event for Germany.[47]

There are similar reports from other parts of Germany. A "Democratic People's Party" was formed in Bavaria, Swabia and Baden which demanded a people's army and the formation of an executive committee to create a People's Parliament for the solution of the Schleswig-Holstein question.[48]

In Württemberg there was great agitation and several meetings were held to instruct the delegates who would be sent to the Frankfort meeting on October 1. In all these gatherings the "Spirit of 1848" was alive and the requests for a German parliament became increasingly more insistent.[49]

The Bavarian Progressive Party sent concrete proposals to the Committee of Thirty-Six, denouncing the illegal procedure of the two great German powers in the Gastein Convention and demanding a new confederation based on a People's Parliament and a People's Army.[50] An even more revolutionary tone was adopted by liberals who gathered in Darmstadt and organized a German People's Party for the first time. They were radical democrats and worked out a program which would include all workers, Turners, military training and folk associations. They also designated the *German Weekly Periodical* (*Deutsches Wochenblatt*) as the organ of the German People's Party.[51] Then they demanded of the Committee of Thirty-Six that they deal with the Schleswig-Holstein question only in connection with the whole German question. Their presiding officer was Dr. Eckardt from Mannheim, who was not only the editor of the *Deutsches Wochenblatt* but who also called another meeting in Nürnberg, where he assured his listeners that the *Reformverein*[52] and the *Nationalverein* had perished through their own guilt and that a new German People's Party would have to take over to create a confederation of the middle and smaller states against Prussia and Austria.

---

[47] *Agent-Reports,* no date given.

[48] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 11 September, 1865.

[49] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 17 September, 1865. This report was sent to the Austrian State Department and signed by Otto Count von Meysenbug, Undersecretary in the Austrian State Department.

[50] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 18 September, 1865.

Rather prophetic was the concern of the Committee of Thirty-Six that not enough members would come to the meeting in Frankfort. They appealed especially for the participation of the Austrian and Prussian delegates, who should demonstrate, without regard for their particularistic interests, that "as German men they have the courage to defend the rights of the German people against their own governments."[53]

The fear of the Committee was justified. A much smaller group than expected showed up at the October 1 meeting. Altogether 271 delegates arrived in Frankfort.[54] A comparison of the attendance of 1863 and 1865 confirmed Baron Kübeck's contention that the *Abgeordnetentag* was losing its strength.[55] The comparable figures were:

	1863	*1865*
Austria	7	1
Frankfort	70	37
South-Germany	263	170
Prussia	47	7
Schleswig-Holstein	4	19
North-Germany	100	37
	491	271

The *Nationalverein,* on the other hand, made a better showing. Its Executive Committee, while present in Frankfort on October 1, called a general assembly for October 29 and 30,[56] and this was attended by about 600 members. All the boxes and the gallery of the *Saalbau* where the meeting took place were overcrowded. Ambassadors and attachés who were accredited to the Diet of the German Confederation also were among the visitors. The joy of the members at this outward success was overwhelming, they rejoiced also over the fact that the Frankfort Senate had rebuked the two great German powers and that "Austria and Bismarck had not dared to execute a dissolution of the *Nationalverein*."[57] The speakers reiterated the platform of the *Nationalverein*: the German people should form a parliament and solve the Schleswig-Holstein question together with that of the unification of Germany.[58]

---

[51] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 22 September, 1865.

[52] The *Reformverein* was founded in October 1862, subsidized by the Austrian Government, to counteract the influence of the *Nationalverein.* Its members had originally belonged to the *Grossdeutsche Partei* during the Frankfort Parliament of 1848/1849 which wanted to retain Austrian leadership in the unification of Germany. See *Geschichte der Frankfurter Zeitung,* p. 68f. See also Golo Mann, *Deutsche Geschichte des neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlag, 1959), p. 328.

[53] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 18 September, 1865.

[54] *Agent-Reports* from Frankfort, 1 October, 1865.

[55] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 10 October, 1865.

[56] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 6 October, 1865.

The agent-reports of 1865 end dramatically with the letter of resignation which several German-Austrians sent to the Executive Committee of the *Nationalverein*. The German-Austrian members protested against the attitude at the general assembly in Frankfort, which played into Bismarck's hands with a renewed program of favoring a "centralized Germany." They could not go along with an association which was willing to consider a division of Germany by permitting Austria to be excluded from the "unity" movement. They wanted to belong from now on to a national people's party which would consider the welfare of German-Austria and modern demands for freedom.[59] Thus, the agent-reports to Vienna.

There was a steady decline of the importance of the *Abgeordnetentag* and of the *Nationalverein* after their October meetings of 1865.[60] Too late had the Austrian Government recognized that it had fallen into Bismarck's trap in protesting against the meetings of the *Abgeordnetentag* on October 1 and of the *Nationalverein* on October 29 to the Senate of the Free City of Frankfort. The Bismarckian tune on the blessings of fighting German revolutionary radicalism on the side of conservative-monarchical Prussia no longer bewitched Imperial Vienna. The Austrian Government returned to its old policy of siding with the German middle states against the constant threat of Prussian expansion.[61]

For their part, the liberals turned their backs on Austria and recognized more and more the inevitability of Bismarck's political success. Their nationalism dominated their liberal *Weltanschauung*. They were Germans first and liberals after that. They considered the Austrian Government under Emperor Franz Joseph weak and unreliable. The repressive measures of Prince Metternich against liberalism and nationalism were not yet forgotten. The biographies of the men who so valiantly had defied Bismarck and his Prussian expansionism,[62] clearly demonstrate one thing: practically all these liberals made their peace with the Prussian Junker after the "Seven Weeks War" and helped to pave the way for the creation of the Bismarckian Empire—a unification of Germany by "blood and iron."

---

[57] *Agent-Reports* from Frankfort, 30 October, 1865.

[58] *Agent-Reports* from Frankfort, 29 October, 1865.

[59] *Agent-Reports* from Würzburg, 24 November, 1865. The Ministry of Police in Vienna requested its agent to furnish a list of names of the German-Austrians whom he mentioned in his report.

[60] The best yardstick for this steady decline is the loss of members of the *Nationalverein*. There were 5000 members in 1859, 15,227 in August, 1861. The peak was reached in October 1862 with 25,000 members. There were still 17,852 members in November 1865. But after the war of 1866 the membership shrank to 1004 in 1867. The *Nationalverein* was dissolved in June of 1868; Koppel S. Pinson, *Modern Germany, Its History and Civilization* (New York, 1954), p. 123.

[61] Chester W. Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 313.

WAYNE STATE UNIVERSITY

---

[62] In the agents-reports which were sent to the Ministry of Police in Vienna from March 9, 1865 to November 24, 1865 the names of 75 German liberals are mentioned. A publication of the biographies of these liberals is contemplated.

SARAJEVO—DESIGN AND ACCIDENT

by Joachim Remak

HISTORIANS, a British critic recently observed, "are all a lot of crypto-Marxists," although when so informed, "they get frightfully annoyed."[1]

The overstatement is intentional, yet the accusation has its sting. Obviously, few Western historians writing today are Marxists of either the orthodox or crypto variety, and serious works of history which explain either the rise of Julius Caesar or the Reformation in terms of the class struggle are rare. But the truth which we sense behind the comment, and which its author had in mind, is that determinism—though it will seldom be of the Marxist kind—does appear to be the basic premise from which most of the teaching and writing of history today proceeds. The world, it is assumed, makes sense. History makes sense. There is a "course of events," governed by identifiable forces and perhaps even laws, and to explain these forces is to understand both general trends and specific occurrences.

This does not mean that a majority of historians adhere to, or even search for, some single theory that will fit all past events. The materialist dialectic decidedly is a minority approach in explaining the forces of history; and Hegel's idealist dialectic, or Toynbee's theories of challenge and response in the rise and decline of whole cultures undoubtedly find more critics than followers among professional historians. Nor are many histories of the United States being written today which explain America's development mainly in terms of Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis. Yet is it not likely that most of us accept a "logic of history," and are determinists to the extent of seeing large patterns behind and within the events we describe? The inequalities of the Old Regime, the discontent of the Third Estate, the tax crisis brought to a head by France's involvement in the American Revolution are all seen as integral parts of a pattern which in the end led to 1789, just as there appears to be a long and fairly straight line going from the arrival of the first slave in the American colonies to the invention of the cotton gin to abolitionist agitation to Fort Sumter. If the Abbé Sieyès had never been born, someone else would have provided the Third Estate with a program and a slogan for action. The Trojan War *Shall* Take Place Tonight! The playwright and the novelist, toying with with the facts of history, might make dramatic capital out of the unlikely, the unreasonable, the unexpected. The scholar, understanding historical necessity as he does, can not.

What is valid about the deterministic approach is that, without it, history is in danger of being atomized into an infinite number of minute and isolated fragments, and that history which is seen as nothing but a series of unconnected accidents is bound to lose both meaning and interest. What is dangerous about it is that it tends to make men's actions appear morally irresponsible, since the historical actor is a person who is grappling with forces that are far beyond his control. Whatever was, perhaps was not right, but it was bound to be, which makes any discussion of right or wrong irrelevent. Determinism and relativism are blood-brothers. Was the murder of the Duc d'Enghien a crime? In the determinist view, surely not, or surely not that of any one individual. No, a long and inevitable chain of circumstance that can be convincingly explained in class room or monograph led up to it, just as a chain of circumstance, beginning with Marx and Engels, if not the Kievan period, finally led to the extermination of the kulaks under—mind you, not "by"—Stalin. But it is hardly in every class room or monograph that this position is taken, and while some historians may resign themselves to both relativism and determinism, others will still call murder a crime, and will hold with the Justice Brandeis that the irresistible is often merely that which has not been resisted.

---

[1] Bernard Levin, in *The Spectator*, Nov. 27, 1959.

What is arguable, too, about determinism is that its splendid panoramic view of history frequently will be panoramic only because the historian who has painted it has been squinting. The details, when looked at closely, all too often will be found to be at variance with the overall composition. And since, as the old German proverb has it, "*der liebe Gott lebt im Detail,*" it may be risky to brush a detail aside because it is inconvenient.

Now one reason for the detail's stubbornly independent existence, for the frequency with which it will contradict rather than support grand deterministic schemes may be that history offers less of a pattern than must be assumed if it is to be written intelligibly. For it should also be suggested that perhaps only the historian who does squint slightly can write general history at all. Another reason may be the role that accident, in the sense of pure chance, plays in the lives of men. It is with this subject that the following pages will deal. Let us take a look at what was design, and what accident, in one single event in history: the act of violence which led to the First World War, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Este at Sarajevo on Sunday, June 28, 1914.

The composition of the historical background appears to be neat and simple enough. There is the tension, of many years' standing, between the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary on the one side, and the kingdom of Serbia, backed by Russia, on the other, over the region of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are the reported reforms in the structure of the Habsburg monarchy said to be planned by the heir to the throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand—reforms which, whether in the shape of Trialism or Federalism, might allay the discontent of the Serbs in Bosnia, and hence destroy hopes for a Greater Serbia. There is the plot to murder Franz Ferdinand, prepared in all likelihood in Belgrade by the Chief of Serbian Army Intelligence and leading member of the Black Hand, Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević. (Nearly half a century after the crime, but short of the opening of the Serbian archives, proof of Dimitrijević's involvement is still circumstantial, however, and what we are faced with is a strong possibility rather than an indubitable fact.) There are, finally, seven youths in the streets of Sarajevo on the morning of June 28, 1914. Three of them have come from Belgrade with instructions and arms, four are local recruits. All of them are waiting for Franz Ferdinand, who will visit the Bosnian capital at the end of three days' army maneuvers, accompanied by his morganatic wife, Duchess Sophie of Hohenberg. They are waiting to kill the heir to the throne as he will drive along the town's principal avenue, the Appel Quay, to a reception in his honor at the City Hall. Everything seems as inevitable as *Oedipus Rex*: One of the twentieth century's great facts of life, nationalism, against the archaic, multi-national Austro-Hungarian Empire; plans for reform that are conceived in Vienna leading to a decision in Belgrade to resort to murder; an efficient terrorist organization pitting its resources against the unsuspecting and far too easy-going Austrian authorities in Bosnia. But perhaps the pattern is so clear only because we have compressed so many facts into so few sentences. Let us therefore look more closely at the events that follow once the assassins have taken up their posts along the Appel Quay.

The first conspirator whom the archducal party, traveling in a number of open touring cars, passed on the way to the City Hall was a Moslem carpenter named Muhamed Mehmedbašić. As the car bearing Franz Ferdinand, Sophie, and the Governor of Bosnia, General Potiorek, drew up to eye level, Mehmedbašić froze and did nothing. His explanation later was that he thought he could see a policeman stepping up behind him at the precise moment when he should have brought his bomb out, and that he quickly decided that it would be wiser to let his companions further down the Quay do the killing.

Whether or not we want to believe this version of events, there seems to be little that is accidental about Mehmedbašić's inaction. Five months earlier, he had bungled an attempt on Governor Potiorek's life, planned by a group of Bosnian conspirators abroad. On his return to Austria, he thought that he saw people who looked like policemen searching his train, threw away his murder weapons in a panic, and thus finished that plot before it had got under way. Nor is it likely that Mehmedbašić owed the invitation to take part in the assassination of Franz Ferdinand to his reputation for cool nerves. It seems to have been due rather to the fact that he was a Moslem, and that the name of Muhamed Mehmedbašić was a desirable one to add to an otherwise all-Serb group of conspirators in order to create the impression of widespread discontent in Bosnia. The details thus appear to bear out the pattern: the young plotter who lost his nerve before when faced by a vision of policemen is once again paralyzed into inaction by a similar specter, and the circumstance of his being there at all is explained by a well thought out plan to have the Austrian authorities arrest, or at least look for, an assassin bearing a Moslem name.

But let us turn now to what happens only a minute later, as the cars pass Nedjelko Čabrinović, a young Bosnian typesetter, who had recently been trained in the use of bombs and guns in Belgrade. The bomb he drew out as he caught sight of the Archduke's car was ideally suited for the purpose. It was flat enough to be carried in a coat pocket and so compact that a spectator watching him from across the street thought that he was taking out a pipe. Striking the bomb's percussion cap against a lantern post, Čabrinović raised his right arm, took careful aim at Franz Ferdinand's general's helmet with its green panache, and threw his bomb.

Hearing the sharp sound being made by the bomb's percussion cap being knocked off, the owner of the car in which Franz Ferdinand was riding, Count Harrach, thought that a tire had blown out. He turned to the chauffeur, and with sad irony called "Bravo. Now we'll have to stop."

The driver also had heard the noise, and had seen a black object flying at him. More quick-witted than his employer, he disregarded Harrach's instructions. Instead, he did precisely the right thing under the circumstances, which was to press his foot down on the accelerator, and to drive on at full speed.

As a result, the bomb did not land where Čabrinović had aimed it. Instead, it passed behind Sophie, who was sitting on the right, and thus on the side closest to her would-be assassin. Franz Ferdinand, seated next to her, also had caught sight of the object that was coming at them, and raised his hand to protect his wife. With this motion, he deflected the bomb, which fell onto the folded leather roof of the touring car, and bounced off into the street. There, it exploded, injuring a number of spectators lightly, and giving Potiorek's aide, who was riding in the car following Franz Ferdinand's, a head wound that looked serious enough to require his being taken to a hospital.

Was it anything but chance that thus caused the bomb to miss Franz Ferdinand by a matter of inches? Anything but chance that he should now be totally unhurt, while the Duchess had suffered no more than a slight scratch on her face from a flying splinter? Perhaps not, or perhaps it was no more than the sort of accident which a good assassin should expect, and the thought of which had made the organizers of the crime place seven young men rather than one on the Appel Quay. But after Čabrinović had been arrested, and some of the excitement had cleared, none of the remaining assassins did in fact take any action—some because they lost courage, others because their friend's failure left them in a state of indecision.

And it is hard to imagine anything more improvised, anything more subject to the impulse of the moment rather than to considered planning, than the discussion which was to take place between Franz Ferdinand, his advisers, and the local authorities at the City Hall once the formal reception was over. The original schedule for the Archduke's day had provided for an hour's visit to the National Museum, for a farewell luncheon at the Governor's Residence, and, later in the afternoon, for the departure to Vienna. To drive to the museum through the crowded and narrow streets of the old city was obviously inadvisable after that morning's narrow escape, and two alternatives to the program were suggested. One was that the Archduke cancel the museum visit and go on directly to the Governor's Residence. The other was that, to be even safer, he drive back at high speed to his hotel outside Sarajevo. Both alternatives, as we now know, would have saved the Archduke's life. Both were rejected by him. He would, he decided, visit Potiorek's wounded aide at the hospital, and afterwards go on to the museum by a new and unannounced route.

Again, one might want to argue that the decision was in effect a foregone conclusion. Even the appearance of taking fright would ill become an officer and a Habsburg, and so would the failure to visit a man who had been wounded in his service. What is far more difficult to accept is that the outcome of the equally crucial technical arrangements for the drive to the hospital should have been similarly preordained.

At the sensible suggestion of Franz Ferdinand's chamberlain, the archducal party agreed to have the cars proceed straight down the Appel Quay, avoiding the narrower side streets of the city. But why not stay at the City Hall, someone now proposed, until two companies of troops could be brought into town from the maneuver area and orders issued to evacuate the streets? The proposal, casually made, encountered casual rejection. The troops, Potiorek answered, were not in proper uniform to be lining the streets. One more opportunity to save Franz Ferdinand was lost.

Still, considering how improvised the debate was, and how unlikely two assassination attempts on one single morning must have appeared to everyone present at the City Hall, the plan perhaps was sensible enough. Perhaps it was to be expected, too, that Sophie should insist on accompanying her husband despite his plea that she seek the safety of the Governor's Residence, and that after they had entered their car, Count Harrach should on an impulse step onto the left running board in order to protect the Archduke with his body. It was a brave gesture, and the choice of the left rather than the right running board probably was instinctive. Standing there, he would be away from the side of the street closest to the curb, but he would act as a shield against the river side of the Quay, from which Čabrinović had hurled his bomb that morning. Perhaps it was to be expected, finally, that some time before the party's departure from the City Hall, Princip should have crossed from the sun-drenched river side to the shadier side of the Appel Quay and walked a few steps down Franz Joseph Street, a shopping street that led off from the Quay, since according to the route originally mapped out for the Archduke's return—a route known to the plotters—this would bring him a good deal closer to his intended victim.

But what except the wildest sort of chance can account for what followed? In accordance with the route agreed on before Čabrinović's attempt for the museum visit, the car carrying Sarajevo's mayor, which was in the lead, turned right into Franz Joseph Street. Its driver either was unfamiliar with the revised program, or else the mayor was confused about who was to go to the museum and who was to call at the hospital. Franz Ferdinand's car, following directly behind, made the same disastrous right turn—for the simple reason that before the departure from the City Hall, no one had told its driver about the change in plans.

Again, explanations can be found why no one had. Potiorek, as a passenger in Franz Ferdinand's car, had just had a very narrow escape from an assassin's bomb, and may have been under considerable strain. The Sarajevo Commissioner of Police, who had joined in the City Hall discussion about the new route, and who should have made certain that the necessary new instructions were issued, may have been a badly preoccupied man at that moment, worrying over the failure of the police under his command to prevent an all but fatal attack on his august visitor's life. Potiorek's aide, who under normal circumstances might also have been expected to tell the driver about the new route, was in the hospital. Or, if one should seek a more sweeping and deterministic explanation in a frequently offered criticism of the Habsburg monarchy, one might blame it all on Austrian *Schlamperei,* except that in reality, the quality of Austrian administration was as far removed from the behavior of the jailkeeper in *Die Fledermaus* as the practice of British justice was and is from that of the legal profession in Gilbert and Sullivan's *Trial by Jury.*

As soon as General Potiorek realized that the car had made a wrong turn, he leaned forward and called: "What is this? This is the wrong way! We're supposed to take the Appel Quay!"

The driver put his foot on the brake, and began to back up. The maneuver put the car in a straight line with Princip. Princip stepped forward, drew his gun, and, from a distance of no more than five feet, fired twice. No amount of planning could have presented him with a better target. Count Harrach, standing on the left running board away from the curb, offered no obstacle. One bullet pierced Franz Ferdinand's neck, while the other entered Sophie's abdomen. Less than a quarter of an hour later, both were dead. The chain of events that ended in World War I had begun.

It might be said that the day's happenings have been described here from too close a vantage point, and that if it had in fact been chance that Čabrinović's bomb should have missed its mark by a matter of inches and that Princip should have profited from an unwise decision at the City Hall, the accidents which contributed to one assassin's failure and to another's success no more than canceled each other out, in a neat illustration, as it were, of the law of averages. One might add that the local authorities had taken far two few security precautions to protect Franz Ferdinand, and that their carelessness was symptomatic of a system once characterized as "absolutism mitigated by sloppiness"—*Schlamperei* once again—and that perhaps there were even some Austrians who did not at all mind seeing Franz Ferdinand dead. One might argue that with a whole bevy of assassins in the streets of Sarajevo it mattered little, as far as the crime's effects on history were concerned, if it was Ćabrinović's bomb or Princip's gun which in the end found its mark. Whether any of this really explains Princip's luck is a different matter, however. For one thing, there were no sinister motives behind the poor security measures taken; and even had they been better, the most stringent of police measures are of only limited value against an assassin who is truly willing to sacrifice his own life. For another, all of the plotters except Princip had either quietly drifted away after Čabrinović's attempt, or, if they remained in the crowd, had made up their minds not to act. Had it not been for Princip's piece of luck—luck so phenomenal that it could have figured in no one's calculations—it is highly probable that Franz Ferdinand would have left Sarajevo alive and according to schedule on the afternoon train.

Besides, what happened next was something that had very definitely not been planned in Belgrade. The three conspirators who had come to Sarajevo from Serbia—Princip, Ćabrinović, and Grabež—had brought with them not only bombs and guns, but some carefully wrapped vials of cyanide as well. After the killing, the three were under instructions to shoot themselves, and should this prove impossible, to commit suicide by swallowing the poison, so that, if any arrests were to be made, the police would have only the local youths to interrogate. What was more, both Čabrinović and Princip followed these instructions, fully intending to kill themselves. Čabrinović swallowed the cyanide he was carrying almost immediately after throwing his bomb. Princip, as soon as he had fired at his two victims, turned his gun on himself, and it was only the intercession of a spectator behind him, who seized Princip's right arm, which foiled this suicide attempt. But in the confusion that followed the shooting and his subsequent arrest, Princip again attempted suicide, managing to slip the cyanide out of his pocket and to swallow it as he was being led off toward the police station.

In both cases, the poison was ineffective. It caused Princip and Čabrinović considerable temporary pain and discomfort, but it did not prove fatal. Apparently the poison was too old.

The consequences of this bit of negligence were momentous. Let us suppose for a moment that the poison had worked, as it was meant to. Franz Ferdinand would have been dead—but so would his assassins. The Austrians would have had no clues leading to Belgrade, and no grounds for accusing anyone in Serbia of complicity in the crime. In this event, there very likely would have been no Austro-Serbian crisis, and possibly no World War, in 1914. As it was, the Austrians were to find out enough to *suspect* Belgrade, but not enough to *prove* it before the world, which was precisely the most disastrous of all possibilities.

Even as the incident grew into war, as "history" with its grand design seemed to take command, and causes which had their roots far in the past seemed to determine all that was to occur between June 28 and the first week in August, chance again played its part. Let us consider only one more event connected with the assassination: the pre-trial investigation of the conspiracy in Sarajevo.

When first arrested and interrogated, Princip and Čabrinović acted with great calm and intelligence, and revealed nothing which the police did not already know. However, a few days later, the police took into custody Danilo Ilić, the Sarajevo high school teacher and organizer of the group. The police had no idea of his true role in the plot, but made the arrest as a matter of routine, since Princip had recently been staying at his house. Ilić, badly frightened, and unaware of how little evidence there was against him, broke down and admitted that there had been seven assassins in all, and that three of them had come from Belgrade. As a result, orders went out for the arrest of the remaining plotters and, as the police proceeded to interrogate them, for that of their local helpers. But, as one reads the reports of the pre-trial investigation which daily passed from Sarajevo to Vienna, one is struck by the lack of competence with which the official in charge, Judge Leo Pfeffer, attacked his task—even if one allows that some of the criticism of Pfeffer may be based on the advantages of hindsight.

He would allow days to pass between interrogations, thus giving a suspect who had been found out in a patent untruth ample time in which to invent a new and more credible story. He was reluctant ever to confront one suspect with another, different though their accounts might be. He was even unwilling to quote incriminating parts of one suspect's testimony to another. In the end, he discovered nothing essential that went beyond Ilić's confession. About the politically crucial part, that is about the crime's preparations in Serbia, he found out no more than the names of two people who had helped the assassins in Belgrade. The names were those of Milan Ciganović, a Serbian railroad employee, and of Voja Tankosić, a major in the Serbian army. What he did not find out was that the latter was Colonel Dimitrijević's Black Hand aide. In fact, he was to remain entirely in the dark about as much as the existence of the colonel or his organization.

To realize what Pfeffer's lack of shrewdness and thus the failure of the investigation meant, consider for a moment what would have happened had he succeeded in tracing the crime to its origins. Suppose that, on the basis of information obtained by Pfeffer, the Austrian ultimatum of July 23 to Serbia, instead of making vague and sometimes erroneous allegations, had begun with the words: "The responsibility for the murder of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife has been traced to a secret Serbian society called the Black Hand, and to its leading member and head of Serbian Army Intelligence, Colonel Dimitrijević, whose immediate arrest we demand. . .", and had then gone on to substantiate these charges. On whose side would international sympathies have been in such an event—on that of Serbia, which had provided the assassins, or on that of Austria, which had provided the victims? What assistance would the Serbians have received from their allies? Would not the Austrian charge, if borne out by the words of the assassins, have forced the Serbian Government either to reject Vienna's demands, thus putting itself in the wrong before world opinion and before its allies in a fashion which the actual reply of July 25 did not, or to concede them, despite the risk of exposing the full extent to which Belgrade government officials had allowed themselves to become engaged in Pan-Serb activities? In short, might not there either have been no war at all, or else a war involving Austria and Serbia only and not a world war?

The suggestion may sound too farfetched. Are kingdoms ever really lost for want of a horseshoe nail outside the pages of Mother Goose? The Austro-Hungarian Empire, it has been argued, was doomed in any event, a moribund anachronism in an age that saw the birth of irrepressible national independence movements all over the globe; and the ultimate and violent loss of Bosnia was as inevitable as the French loss of Tunisia or Indo-China four decades later. Insofar as any individual responsibility might be assigned at all, what ultimately happened was thus the fault of the ancient occupant of the Hofburg and of his advisers, who would not translate their empire into a commonwealth or grant outright independence gracefully, as the Western powers were to do after 1945, letting people like Masaryk or Paderewski take the parts of a Nehru or a Bourguiba.

Perhaps these objections are valid; but perhaps we agree with them only after we have put a number of facts out of mind. One fact that would have to be disregarded is that, while the nationalities of Austria-Hungrary were indeed *monarchiemüde,* few demanded secession. Masaryk no more wished to play the role of Nehru in 1914 than did Paderewski or Minister of Finance Bilinski. By and large, only those nationalities thought of breaking away who had the active encouragement of a neighboring foreign power: the Italians of the Trentino and of Trieste and the Serbs of Bosnia, and even here secessionist sentiment was neither unanimous nor wholehearted. Stories of a violence-torn Bosnia, where a politician's life expectancy was of Near-Eastern uncertainty, stories of how Princip's crime was merely one in a long series of similar plots simply are not true. Talk of violence there was in abundance, but the sum total of serious action taken, if we dismiss Mehmedbašić's fiasco, amounted to one abortive attempt to kill the Bosnian governor in 1910.

Besides, no one can say with certainty how well Franz Ferdinand's reform plans would have worked had he had an opportunity to try them. We are not even sure what form they would have taken. Originally, he thought of Trialism as the answer; by 1914, he probably favored a more sweepingly federalist scheme, but his plans were still very much in flux. Quite possibly, he would have been unable to stop the dissolution of the monarchy no matter what his plans. One has reservations about any overall "solution" to Austria's problems, since any plan designed to meet the desires of one nationality was bound to disturb those of one or more other nationalities. On the other hand, perhaps Franz Ferdinand could have saved the monarchy. We know that, for all his failings, he was a man of considerable energy and talents. Moreover, we have some good reasons to believe—and this is a major point in the preparation of the Sarajevo plot—that to some people in Serbia at least his chances of success looked real enough, and hence menacing enough to their own plans, to warrant his assassination.

There remains the larger question of how much Sarajevo truly mattered as far as the coming of the First World War was concerned. Were not major wars an inescapable fact of life in the twentieth century; would not some other incident have led to war if there had been no Austro-Serbian crisis in 1914? We are, after all, familiar enough with the minor wars and major crises that preceded 1914, and with all of the long-range economic and political conflicts that lay behind them.

In answer, it is worth pointing out that none of these incidents *had* in fact led to general war—not Algeciras, not Buchlau and the annexation crisis, not the *Daily Telegraph* affair, not Agadir, not the Balkan Wars, not Zabern. It is worth pointing out, too, that although the statue of Strasbourg on the Place de la Concorde had been veiled in black for over four decades by 1914, the President of France broke with a precedent of equally long standing that spring and came to dine at the German Embassy, and that at about the same time, despite Navy League and *Flottenverein* and all that has been said about the Anglo-German rivalry, the British and the Germans initialed an agreement providing for the division of the Portuguese colonies between them.

If general conditions made war inevitable in 1914, how do we explain the circumstance that there was no general war let us say forty years after Sarajevo? In 1954 tensions were as strong as they had been in 1914, and the world was not governed with appreciably more wisdom. The press had grown no more responsible, nor the alliance system more flexible. In fact, there existed at that later date an additional source of friction in the shape of an ideological conflict that was real rather than imagined and a policy of expansion on the part of the one of the powers that was far more blunt and threatening than anything practiced or proposed by either side in 1914.

All we can really say is that the situation was one of danger in the summer of 1914. Alliances change, individuals change, nations change, and what we cannot say with any degree of certainty is what Europe's subsequent history would have been if there had been no murder in Sarajevo. Perhaps there would have been a World War in any case, perhaps there would not. The historian can no more look into God's cards than Bismarck thought the statesman could.

If things were inevitable, if God's cards were open, the historian should then logically be able to predict the future. Yet we know that he cannot. Charity forbids the citing of examples, and it might be enough to suggest that where he has done so, he has often been as wrong as the person who has never used a university library. In sum, events become inevitable only after they have occurred. It is only when we have reached its end that we know how any particular road of history ran, and one reason why this should be so is that we are never sure in advance to what extent pure chance may force a change in the route.

It has not been the purpose of these pages to propound the atomization of history. To explain history in terms of nothing but accident is an even more questionable undertaking than to write it entirely in terms of patterns and of predestination. Surely it was no accident, in terms of German history for example, that Berlin should have failed to keep its Austrian allies in check when the direction of the nation's affairs was in the hands of Wilhelm II rather than in those of Bismarck; nor was it perhaps surprising that, given the diplomatic situation of 1914, the Austro-Serbian crisis that arose over Princip's crime should have grown into general war. Surely no single accident "caused" the Revolution in France in 1789; surely only a large number of accidents could have *prevented* the Second World War in 1939. Although one might well speculate on how true the latter would have been if the Vienna Academy had decided to accept young Adolf Hitler.

But what the details about Sarajevo might show is how often historical decisions are balanced on a knife-edge, and how seldom our actions are entirely the result of our intentions, much less the result of any grand design. The First World War was an epochal event, but the fact that it destroyed an age and changed the world does not mean that its causes were as momentous as its consequences. Great events at times may have great causes; at other times they may not. And whether or not a world will go to war may well depend on how quickly a chauffeur will think, on which running board an Austrian count will choose, on whether poison is fresh or old, or on how skilfully a provincial judge, whose name will never appear in history again, will conduct a cross-examination.*

Lewis and Clark College

---

*This article was written without specific footnote references to the plot against Franz Ferdinand, but the reader who is interested in the sources is referred to the bibliography in the present author's *Sarajevo* (New York, 1959), pp. 263-294. One book which is not listed there, but which ought to be mentioned here, is Sir Isaiah Berlin's admirable Auguste Comte Memorial Trust Lecture, *Historical Inevitability* (London, 1954).

THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF AID TO RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN REFUGEE SCHOLARS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

by V. E. Andic

AMONG the problems of International significance that beset Czechoslovakia from its very inception in 1918 was the problem of refugees. They came first from the Soviet Union, later from Nazi Germany. The refugees did not trickle into the country in a well established and controlled manner as has been the case in the United States. Uprooted and penniless individuals and families were crossing the borders into Czechoslovakia in droves to escape persecution. Though this mass influx of refugees consisted of peoples of various backgrounds some common characteristics were observable.

Refugees from Russia and the Ukraine were in most cases highly educated. They represented the upper crust of Russian and Ukrainian society with better than average education and with expert knowledge in various fields of intellectual and administrative activity. Their undying love for their country would never permit them to accept the idea of permanent residence away from their homeland. Like most refugees, those from the Soviet Union never for a moment accepted the idea of "no return," and of course they expected to return to a homeland freed from Communist domination and in a capacity and with a status approximately that to which they had been accustomed in the past.

Czechoslovakia, inspired by the American ideals of democracy as reflected in her socio-economic institutions and constititional government, did not recognize the prerogatives and privileges of her own nobility, not to mention those of the refugees from Russia. But Czechoslovakia did recognize her responsibility for the humane treatment of refugees whether they came from the East—as it happened in the early 'twenties in the case of Russian refugees, or from the West—as in the mid 'thirties in the case of refugees from Nazi Germany. Those from Germany included such outstanding personalities as Thomas Mann and Albert Einstein, both of whom taught, even if only for a short time, at the German University in Prague.

Considerable discussion ensued as to the number of Russian and Ukrainian refugees. Professor James Marvor, of the University of Toronto, an authority on the economic history of Russia, estimated the emigration of Russian refugees "after the main exodus," i.e., after the fall of southern Russia into the hands of the Bolsheviks, as "between two and a half and three million."[1]

On the other hand, Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who headed the League of Nations' great humanitarian work on behalf of refugees, viewed the scope of the refugee problem as less extensive. "Nansen estimated in 1929 that there were one and a half million Russian refugees in Europe, plus those in the Far East."

---

[1] James Marvor, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1928), p. 224.

Other estimates, including those of Russian emigrant and Soviet authors, have put the total at from 2,000,000 to 2,500,000. H. Von Rimscha, basing his estimates on Red Cross data, put the total at 2,935,000. Sir John Hope Simpson, author of *The Refugee Problem,* estimates the number of unassimilated Russian refugees at 863,000. Eugene M. Kulischer also feels that most estimates tend to be exaggerated. He concludes that "the volume of emigration, (including nonreturned prisoners of war) can be put at 1,500,000."[2] Mr. Kulischer concludes that, if we add genuine foreigners who left Russia during the Revolution and the Civil War, we may estimate the migratory loss at 1,750,000.[3]

Of this mass of refugees a relatively small percentage lived in Slavic and Baltic countries. Alexandra Tolstoy writes that "about 35,000 Russian refugees who fled from Russia during the Revolution lived in different European countries: Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Rumania and the Baltic states."[4]

A question of status for refugees was imminent from the very beginning. On December 11, 1922, Czechoslovakia recognized the Identity Certificate System for Russian refugees as recommended by the League of Nations Governmental Conference on the initiative of Dr. Nansen. It was reported that this recognition was granted to 30,000 Russian refugees and 200 Armenian refugees.[5]

Official Czechoslovak statistics give the number of persons without a country or not listing their citizenship as 24,882 (the total population of the Republic of Czechoslovakia in 1930 was given as 14,729,536, of which 568,941 gave as their nationality Russian, Ukrainian and Ruthenian, living mostly in Carpathian Ruthenia, and the easternmost part of the state). Interestingly enough, Russian refugees did not live in Carpathian Ruthenia (only 744 of the total number of Russian and Ukrainian refugees lived there in 1930). This is evidenced in the distribution of the Russian refugees, who were Russian citizens, emigrants, (not including the Ukrainians, Armenians, etc.) without a Soviet passport:[6]

Russian citizens living in the region of:	1921	1930
Bohemia	8,498	9,771
Moravia-Silesia	1,524	2,188
Slovakia	3,326	2,481
Carpathian Ruthenia	2,233	744
Total	15,581	15,184

---

[2] Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move, War and Population Changes, 1917-47* (New York, 1948), p. 55.

[3] *Ibid.,* p. 56.

[4] Alexandra Tolstoy, "The Russian DP's," *The Russian Review,* Jan. 1950, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 54f. Alexandra Tolstoy here also states that "most of these refugees succeeded in adjusting themselves" as professors, doctors, engineers and other professionals, and moved further west when the Red Army occupied these countries.

[5] *Armenian and Russian Refugees,* League of Nations Document A. 44, 1926, Geneva: League of Nations, Sept. 3, 1926.

[6] *Annual Statistical Report of the Republic of Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Orbis, 1936), pp. 5-8.

Only a small number of refugees moved from Czechoslovakia, before the arrival of the Red Army in 1945. Only 138 refugees, for instance, moved from Czechoslovakia into agricultural and urban settlements of other countries during the year 1929.

The refugee scholars and students from the Soviet Union posed serious international problems. There is no need to discuss the persistent pressure of the Soviet Union upon the small nation trying scrupulously to maintain correct relations with its impatient big neighbor to the East.

The precarious relationship of Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union is suggested by the fact that she was unique in having troops fighting the Communists inside Russia[8] as well as inside Czechoslovakia[9] in 1919, when the Hungarian Communists, led by Moscow-trained Béla Kun, invaded eastern Czechoslovakia. There was considerable ill-feeling in the Soviet Union about the Czechoslovak Legion fighting its way through Siberia and then travelling thousands of miles around the globe in order to return home to Czechoslovakia from Russia, only a few hundred miles away.

Due to the influence of the calm and mature leadership of Thomas Garrigue Masaryk and to Czechoslovakia's scrupulous adherence to her Versailles Treaty obligations, democratic conditions were extended not only to German and Hungarian nationals in Czechoslovakia but to Russian and Ukrainian minorities as well. But the problem of refugees was a different one. It was not only an economic problem. Refugees represented to the Czechoslovaks human tragedy calling for immediate effective help. Czechoslovakia accordingly treated refugees as a humanitarian obligation; the Soviets, on the other hand, viewed such treatment as an unfriendly act, a political issue.

Refugees were not citizens of Czechoslovakia, nor did they originally entertain plans to become citizens, even if they may have done so later. They had no roots or financial resources to sustain them, let alone to afford them an education. Neither did the Russian and Ukrainian scholars have teaching opportunities on any scale. There were no courses in the Russian language in the secondary schools as was the case with German or French; there were more English courses and American clubs and institutes than Russian ones in Czechoslovakia. True, Russian language courses were gradually being introduced in the schools of higher learning, but teaching opportunities were limited.

Czechoslovakia, in order to provide educational opportunities for Russian and Ukrainian nationals, had to establish schools at all levels. Books had to be printed to be used in these schools. Not only teachers but students as well had to be financed. Thus the Russian and Ukrainian youth

---

[7] Excerpt from the *Statistical Manual of the Republic of Czechoslovakia* (Prague: Melantrich, 1925), p. 357.

[8] George F. Kennan, "The Czechoslovak Legions," Part I, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 16, No. 4, Oct. 1957; and Part II, *The Russian Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Jan. 1958.

[9] Peter A. Toma, "The Slovak Soviet Republic of 1919," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, Vol. 17, No. 2, Apr. 1958.

could continue their education in their mother tongue. The schools concentrated on economic fields so that the graduates could prepare for and serve in the development of their homeland.

Refugees from Russia had many problems, the most pressing being those of physical existence. Yet as early as 1920 émigré schools began to be organized. The most valuable financial aid the Russian refugees received in this effort was that of the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav governments. "At one time Czechoslovakia was maintaining thirty-five hundred Russian students and Yugoslavia twelve hundred," writes Huntington.[10] In the school year 1924/1925, 60 per cent of all Russian students in exile were studying in Czechoslovakia, 20 per cent in Yugoslavia, 8 per cent in France, and 2 per cent in the United States. Yet it was the United States by offering scholarships to 58 Russian exiled students that first provided such aid.

Slavic countries were ready and willing to provide financial aid in setting up schools for émigrés from Russia. Huntington writes:

> It is possible to speak of the "System" of Russian emigre schools in Europe . . . What is called the school network of Russia-out-of-Russia comprises day-nurseries, kindergartens, asylums, primary and secondary schools, day-schools and boarding schools . . . half (of the pupils) attend schools maintained by the governments of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, and to a small extent, a few privately supported institutions.[11]

The secondary school, called Pan-Russian Grammar School, was in many respects a unique school. For while there were numerous separate colleges and faculties for Russian émigré students, the Gymnasium at Moravská Třebova was the only secondary school established for the purpose of preparing young Russians for university studies. As reported by Dr. Nansen[12] and Huntington many of the students were transferred from Constantinople to Czechoslovakia in 1923. The buildings gave the school the air of a temporary institution, later recalled by the American Vetvilles (temporary housing for veterans), clustering around the colleges to provide housing for a new type of student.

The Gymnasium at Moravská Třebova was located in the complex of military barracks set up by the Austro-Hungarian Government for prisoners of war and constituted a self-contained isolated village. "There are more than thirty buildings in this school village, schoolrooms, hospitals, dormitories, a church and workshops line its streets," writes Huntington, and adds: "It is a Russian oasis set down in Moravia, surrounded by a Czech population."[13]

---

[10] W. Chapin Huntington, *The Homesick Million, Russia-out-of-Russia* (Boston: The Stratford Company, 1933), p. 123; the citation includes the following statement: "It is estimated that sixteen thousand students, whose studies had been interrupted by war and revolution, were among the refugees of 1920-21. About half of these were enabled to go on with their studies and finish, chiefly in Czechoslovakia. The others had to fit themselves into life as best they could."

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 123.

[12] *Report on the Work of the High Commission for Refugees,* presented by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen to the Fourth Assembly of the League of Nations, Geneva: League of Nations Document A. 30, 1923, XII., p. 7; the reports account for 173 Russian refugees moved from Constantinople to Czechoslovakia between September 1, 1922, and September 1, 1923; besides the student body teachers also were moved.

Dr. Textor, author of *Land Reform in Czechoslovakia* and other works on Czechoslovak and Russian history, visited the Moravská Třebova School and gave the following account:

> About six hours journey to the south and east of Prague in a charming little Moravian town there is a school for Russian boys and girls which must challenge the admiration of the world. (Moravská Třebova) . . . This school began in Constantinople in December, 1920 . . .
>
> . . . The Czech government is proving itself a generous host. It pays all expenses. There are more than thirty Russian professors . . . The government provides whatever equipment is absolutely necessary and cannot be obtained elsewhere, such as textbooks and apparatus for the laboratory, it provides food, a limited supply of clothing, and such service as is needed in addition to the teaching force.
>
> . . . I was greatly impressed with the personnel of the faculty, extraordinarily fine men and women and able teachers. They have planned a course of study which equips the graduate of the school for the university. Great stress is laid upon the languages. Every student must study Latin and two of the three languages, English, French and German. Czech is compulsory at the request of the government and is begun in the second grade. Mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, history, geography and literature all receive due emphasis. There is a good deal of experimental work in the laboratories . . .
>
> There were, in August 1922, four hundred and twenty boys and about one hundred and forty girls in this school.[14]

Even greater strides were made in the organization of Russian and Ukrainian institutions of higher learning. Student aid was quickly mobilized in England and in the United States.

In an appeal entitled "University Relief to Central Europe and Russia," Mr. Maurice de Bunsen, Chairman, Universities Committee, Imperial War Relief Fund, London, England, stated:

> Dr. Nansen has issued a personal appeal to the universities of the world to help to save from extinction the rapidly diminishing numbers of men in Russia who have been able to go through the ordeal of suffering to which many of them have been subjected during the past few years.[15]

There were the following Russian schools in Czechoslovakia, with instruction given by displaced teachers and professors:

1. Pan-Russian Grammar School at Moravská Třebova, which had, at the end of the school year 1922-23, 595 pupils in attendance.
2. The Russian Reform Secondary School in Prague-Strasnice, founded in October 1922.

---

[13] W. Chapin Huntington, *The Homesick Million, Russia-out-of-Russia,* p. 112f.

[14] Lucy E. Textor, "Young Russia in Czechoslovakia," Philadelphia: *The Historical Outlook,* Vol. XIV, No. 5, May 1923, pp. 165-166.

[15] *Nature, Journal of Science,* London, December 1, 1921, p. 436.

3. Russian Faculty of Law, established May 18, 1922, which had 568 students in the school year 1922-23.
4. The Russian Comenius Pedagogical Institute in Prague, founded in August 1923.
5. The Russian Institute for Agricultural Cooperatives in Prague, founded in October 1921.
6. The Russian Automobile and Tractor School, founded in August 1921.
7. The Russian College of Railway Engineers, founded in Prague, 1923.
8. The Russian Commercial Bookkeeping School, founded in January 1923.[16]

The Ukrainian schools were organized by the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian Committee with the Czechoslovak Government taking full responsibility for all expenses. In the period 1921-24 the following Ukrainian schools were established in Czechoslovakia:

1. The Ukrainian Free University at Prague, founded in October 1921.[17]
2. The Ukrainian Economic Academy at Poděbrady, May 1922.
3. The Ukrainian Institute of Pedagogy of M. Drahoman, Prague, July 1923.
4. The Ukrainian Studies of Plastic Arts, Prague, December 1923.
5. The Ukrainian Real School (Gymnasium), Prague, 1925 (Transferred in 1929 from Prague to Revnice and again in 1937 to Modrany).
6. Extension program, on Adult Education level: Lectures and courses, some of which lasted for a period of six months.
7. Societies of graduates of Ukrainian and Czechoslovak Universities (Medicine).[18]

Most students who escaped from the Soviet Union to Czechoslovakia came not only without funds but in most cases even without proper documents. All of them had to be cared for. Many continued their education in Russian or Ukrainian schools while others were integrated within regular Czechoslovak schools. In October 1921 the "Commission for enabling Russian students to study in the Republic of Czechoslovakia" was established.[19] On January 1, 1922, the Committee cared for 1183 students in Prague, 58 in Brno, 42 in Bratislava, in 44 in Příbram.[20]

---

[16] Based on *Czechoslovak Help to the Russian and Ukrainian Emigration* (Prague: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1924).

[17] Hryhorij Denysenko, Faculty staff member of the Ukrainian Technological-Economic Institute of Poděbrady, Czechoslovakia, in letter of Feb. 10, 1953. Information based on Simon Nariznyi's Ukrainian Emigration (Prague, 1942).

[18] Supported by Charles University, Universities of Education and Foreign Affairs and Organizations, See also *Czechoslovak Help. . . .*

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

[20] Professor Textor reported that the Czechoslovak Government provided each Russian student with tuition and lodging besides 300 crowns a month for food and about 125 crowns for other expenses. She writes: "The students in Prague live in three dormitories. By far the best of these is that known as Svobodarna. Hudobice is an old building and the dining room accomodations are inadequate. Strasnice is made up of four new barracks built by the Czech government especially for the Russian students." Lucy Textor, "Young Russia in Czechoslovakia," *The Historical Outlook,* May 1923, pp. 168, 170.

Number of Russian Students in the Czechoslovak Republic: 1922[21]

February	1457
March	1575
April	1786
May	1833
June	1928
July	1959
August	1991

Number of Russian Students December 31, 1922

	Female	*Male*	*Total*
Prague	284	1705	1989
Brno	19	347	366
Příbram		80	80

The Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs reported that support was provided for a total of 6,341, of whom 4,663 were university students and 1,678 students in secondary schools:[22]

Great Russians	3,595
Ukrainians	2,328
White Russians	47
Kalumeks	34
Armenians	37
Czechs*	
Total	6,341

*Foreign citizens—Czechs who migrated to Russia in the past and became Russian citizens.

The Ukrainian students attended, besides their own language schools, the Czechoslovak schools. In the year 1922-23, there were 306 Russian and Ukrainian students studying in 60 Czechoslovak secondary schools. At Charles University in Prague there were the following Russian and Ukrainian students in 1921-22 (Winter session):[23]

Number of Students	Theology	Law	Medicine	Natural Sciences	Total
Russian		53	163	36	289
Ukrainian[24]	2	171	161	35	438

At the Polytechnic School of Prague in 1921-22 (Winter session) there were 279 students from the Ukraine, 1113 from Russia, 51 from Eastern Galicia, and 6 from Georgia (USSR).

During the decade 1921-31, altogether 1062 Ukrainian emigrants graduated and received degrees at different schools of Czechoslovak universities. 781 graduates with academic degrees of Engineers and Doctors, and with Teachers' diplomas graduated from the Ukrainian institutions of higher learning in Czechoslovakia, namely from the Ukrainian Economic Academy in Poděbrady, the Ukrainian Free University in Prague, and the

---

[21] *Ibid.*

[22] The Government of Czechoslovakia has generously assumed the entire support of the Russian Schools. Huntington, *The Homesick Million,* p. 107.

[23] *Ročenka Československé Republiky* (Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Republic) (Prague, 1923), p. 184f.

[24] S. Postnikov states in "Separatist Tendencies among the Russian Emigres," *Slavonic and East European Review,* London, Vol. 17, No. 50, Jan. 1939, p. 351 that "Altogether there are about 100,000 emigrants [from Ukraine]."

Ukrainian Institute of Pedagogy in Prague. It can be estimated that in the period between 1921 and 1939, there were about 2,000 graduates of Czechoslovak and Ukrainian universities.[25]

> In addition hundreds of specialized Ukrainian experts and intellects were graduated from secondary and specialized schools. There were some 200 graduates from the Real School of Prague (Revnice, Modrany). The Ukrainian Academic Committee states in its own publication that in the Ukrainian gymnasium there were, up to the year 1931, 56 graduates.[26]

The Ukrainian émigré students received during the period of university studies, both at the Czechoslovak as well as the Ukrainian universities, 400-500 Czechoslovak crowns a month. Scholarships were given to the Ukrainian students through the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian Committee in Prague. For these subsidies the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave the Czechoslovak-Ukrainian Committee on the average one million Czechoslovak crowns a month. From the 1992 students supported by this Committee through the years 1921-31, altogether 1128 graduated and received their degrees, 566 did not finish their training, 270 left school, and 28 died.[27]

Although there were Ukrainian student organizations in all European countries outside the Soviet Ukraine and the Soviet Union—Prague was chosen for the headquarters of the Central Association of the Ukrainian Students—*"Centralnyi Sojuz Ukrainskich Studentiv."*[28]

The Ukrainian Free University offered a four-year course. Students were admitted on the basis of a maturity certificate from a Gymnasium. The University had two faculties, Law and Social Science, and Philosophy.

Professor S. Nariznyi writes that at the Ukrainian Free University there were 30 Professors and 15 Docents and Lectors.[29] In a semester, on the average, there were 385 students. In the period between 1921 and 1939, altogether 109 graduates received doctorates in Law and Philosophy.[30] The Czechoslovak Government subsidized the school with 50,000 crowns a month (average), in addition to the student scholarships. As indicated above, practically every student received a scholarship of 500 crowns a month (average).

The Ukrainian Economic Academy had the following departments: (1) Agronomy-Forestry, (2) Economics, with field work in Commerce and Industry, Cooperatives, Statistics, Self-Government, and (3) Engineering. Hydrotechnology and Chemical Engineering. There were 118 members on the Faculty, of whom 92 were Ukrainians and 26 were Czechoslovaks. The School had at its disposal 2 school farms, 14 laboratories, 33 cabinets (demonstration rooms), 1 meteorological station, 1 foresty demonstration farm, and 28,845 volumes of books, as well as other facilities. 698 works were published by the Ukrainian Academy. 786 students graduated, from whom 556 received Engineering diplomas.

---

[25] Denysenko, *op. cit.*

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Simon Nariznyi, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

[28] Denysenko, *op. cit.*

[29] S. Nariznyi, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 131.

When pressure from the Soviet Union became too great, the Academy changed its name on December 31, 1935, and functioned under the name of Ukrainian Technology-Economic Institute as a correspondence school. It functioned under the leadership of its original staff and with the financial support of Ukrainian organizations in Czechoslovakia and contributions from Ukrainians in all of Europe and in the United States. Despite the danger of termination of activities, the school continued to function, primarily due to the limitless sacrifices of sponsors and the teaching staff, and to the sympathetic support of the population—up to March 1945. In the Ukrainian Institute, 8020 students participated.[31] This school was evacuated into the American Zone of Germany and resumed its activities in Regensburg, Bavaria. The Ukrainian Technology-Economic Institute resumed activity through regular classes and through correspondence with three faculties in Regensburg (Agronomy-Foresty, Economics, and Engineering) and two additional faculties in Munich (Pharmacy and Veterinary). This School in Germany functioned up to 1951 when most members of the faculty as well as students moved overseas, mostly to the United States.[32]

The Ukrainian Institute of Pedagogy functioned for ten years (1923-33) and was liquidated only when Czechoslovakia was hit by an economic depression, and was exposed to increased pressure from the Soviet Union.[33] There were three faculties at this Institute: Literature-History, Natural Sciences-Mathematics, and Music-Pedagogy. Of the 92 member faculty, 80 were Ukrainians, 12 were Czechoslovaks. Out of 178 students, 116 received diplomas. The Czechoslovak Government provided financial support of 400,000 to 500,000 crowns a year.

The Ukrainian Studies of Plastic Arts, established in 1923, had three departments: Graphic and Practical Painting, Sculpture, and Architecture.[34]

Among the Ukrainian learned societies, the most eminent was the Ukrainian Institute of Sociology in Prague, founded in 1924 by Dr. Mykyta Sapoval and Professor Nikyfor Hryhorijov. Members of the Institute concentrated on the social and political aspects of problems in the Ukraine, on the problem of nationalities and on the study of the economic and political structure and development of the Soviet Union.[35]

There are, of course, a number of questions that may be considered in analyzing the generous financial help given by Czechoslovakia to the Russian and Ukrainian refugee scholars.

First of all, the humanitarian motivation is attested to by such historians as Sir Bernard Pares, W. Chapin Huntingon, and Lucy E. Textor; the last two studied both Russia and Czechoslovakia; both visited Czechoslovakia, where they followed the story of the Russian and Ukrainian scholars for years.

---

[31] Denysenko, *op. cit.*

[32] *Ibid.*

[33] S. Nariznyi, *op. cit.*

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] Denysenko, *op. cit.*

Significant, therefore, is the following statement made by Professor Textor:

> It is certainly a remarkable thing that the Czech government should be supporting alien men and women who could earn their livelihood in one way or another. There is nothing like this recorded in all history. It has been said that the nearest approach to it is the return by the United States of a part of the Boxer indemnity with the provision that it be used in educating Chinese students. But that seems to me hardly a parallel case. The United States returned this money because it was left over after claims had been satisfied. The Czech government is educating these students out of its own pocket. . . . the generosity of the Czech government stands out unique. One tenth of what it has done for the Russians has not been told in these pages. In proportion to the number of its people and its wealth, it has outstripped every other country in the world in its gifts to this unfortunate people. Let us recognize it while the deed is in full flower.[36]

W. Chapin Huntington's comment written ten years later, with distance and reflection intervening, expresses an equally appreciative view of the dignified treatment of refugee scholars.

> The case of Czechoslovakia is an even more striking page in history: although not a numerous people, the Czechs have spent more on the Russian refugees than all other European nations taken together. Up to 1929, the government had expended half a billion crowns and was continuing to appropriate ten million crowns a year for this purpose. But the Czechs are a practical people and President Masaryk is a great statesman. Hence, all this expenditure was according to a plan based on humanity compounded with a farsighted policy. . . . Believing that Bolshevism was too extreme to endure, and that eventually the emigres would return and play an influential role in Russia, the Czechoslovakian government sought to preserve the valuable cultural forces contained in the emigration—the intellect, the traditions, the scholarship, the professional skill—and at the same time to prepare the younger generation for useful work in their motherland in the future. Once Russia found herself, the Czech leaders reasoned, she would need trained men and women. Those who had been sheltered and educated in the progressive atmosphere of Czechoslovakia would carry back with them democratic ideals and a life-long sympathy for the nation which had so befriended them in their hour of need. This would be of greatest value to the future relations of the two peoples. . . . Foreign Minister Beneš summed it up thus: "We need a new democratic Russia, whose ideals are like our own."
>
> Therefore, from the beginning, when the great wave of refugees swept toward her, Czechoslovakia held it back and deliberately filtered it, giving preference to students, scholars, writers, agricultural experts and other trained minds. Prague became the most important Russian cultural center. The list of academic and scientific institutions, libraries, high

---

[36] Lucy Textor, "Young Russia in Czechoslovakia," *The Historical Outlook*, p. 170.

schools, primary Russian schools, many maintained outright, others subsidized by the Czechoslovak government, would fill a page. Every emigre child has had the opportunity of free education from elementary school to university. In the past ten years, over three thousand Russian students have finished Czech universities and technical schools.[37]

In an article, "Russia Abroad," the well-known observer of the Russian scene, Sir Bernard Pares, gives the following account of Prague as one of the centers of scholarly activity for Russian exiles:

> I have just visited the principal centers of the Russians abroad. In Berlin one finds very large numbers [of Russian exiles] . . . But Germans are chiefly interested in studying Russia for themselves. . . and, as President Masaryk has recently noticed, there are some eighteen centers of Slavonic study for Germans in Germany. In Poland, too, the Russians seem rather to be isolated groups or individuals. . . . Very different is the Russian Center in Prague. There was no greater consolation to friends of Russia than that Czechoslovakia should have come up just when Russia went down. . . . The statesmen of Czechoslovakia have well understood this connection. They have created a Russian university with Russian teachers in Prague, with the single condition that when Russia is restored, this university shall still work there. The students receive not only free instruction but free maintenance. Some of the best and ablest of Russian minds are entrusted with their education and rejoice, after the necessary excursions which all of us have made into politics, to be back at their true work which is at the same time the only real solution for all the political questions of their afflicted country. The excellent arrangements of Czech generosity have produced already a corporate body of Russian students—mostly engineers, doctors and chemists—happy in the consciousness that Russia can only be rightly restored by Russian students and that they are receiving the proper preparation for their great and peaceful mission. To the great School of Prague the friends of Russia in Paris, where there is now an Institut d'Etudes Slaves attached to the University, and in London, where we have our own organization to the same end, will act as auxiliary Schools bringing to this task the active sympathy and help of France and England.[38]

The Russian and Ukrainian émigrés in scholarly pursuits differed from the Oblomov[39] type of Russian aristocrat or bureaucrat of the past. They did develop a working discipline and a remarkable ability to face and overcome hardships. In many fields they contributed substantial advancement to the sciences, technology and art. Their talents and energies proved to be just as useful as if they had been working in their respective fields in their native countries, to which, originally, they hoped to return.

The Czechoslovaks may not have expected the Soviet Union to develop capacity for survival and for training its own professional experts, doctors, engineers, scientists, teachers and leaders in different fields on such an unprecedented scale. The statement of the London publication, *The Contemporary Review,* loses none of its value:

---

[37] W. Chapin Huntington, *The Homesick Million,* p. 108f.

[38] *The Spectator,* London, No. 4, 914, Sept. 2, 1922, p. 297.

[39] Character of an apathetic and idle representative of a declining nobility in Gontcharov's novel *Oblomov,*

> The young Czechoslovak State has startled the world by many innovations. But, it has done nothing more startling than the almost simultaneous creation of the two Russian Universities, one strictly Russian, the other Ukrainian. . . . It was surely a noble gesture for a small Government with encumbered finances, and faced with countless domestic problems to contribute so generously to the needs of such vast numbers. . . .[40]

The record of Czechoslovakia in aiding the Russian and Ukrainian refugees will forever remain a credit to the Republic. It was well worth the cost. In fact, the economic sacrifices of the country's taxpayers were actually small compared with the great purpose served by the program. Since World War I the Russian and Ukrainian refugees have been followed by millions of other uprooted people. Among these there are, in a number of countries, scholars from Czechoslovakia, students and teachers, who could not have made the adjustment wthout being similarly aided.

University of Pittsburgh

---

[40] Charles Sarolea, "The Tragedy of the Russian Diaspora," *The Contemporary Review,* London, Vol. CXXVI, July-Dec. 1924, p. 302.

THE KINDERMANN WOLSCHT INCIDENT: AN IMPASSE IN RUSSO-GERMAN RELATIONS 1924-26

by Lamar Cecil

IN THE chaos of the early 1920s Russia and Germany found themselves not only beset by postwar and post-revolution problems of insecurity and internal reorganization but isolated from the other great powers of Europe as well. This common inheritance of unfortunate circumstance and ostracism led to speculation that these two pariahs shared a common destiny, a *Schicksalsgemeinschaft,* and were therefore natural allies. And indeed, by 1926 Germany had succeeded in effecting an ostensible rapprochement with Soviet Russia. Superficially, a basis of friendship and cooperation had been established by the two powers at Rapallo and bolstered by the Treaty of Berlin.[1] Military and economic negotiations were in progress between the Weimar Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the same time.[2] This *mariage de convenance* was, however, rather more brittle than the verbose preamble of the Treaty of Berlin would lead one to believe. An influential segment of the German Government feared that an Eastern orientation of Germany's foreign policy would alienate the Western powers and was therefore reluctant to negotiate with Russia. Similarly, Germany's military relations with Russia were condemned by a number of Government officials and by an articulate bloc of Social Democrats.[3]

The opposition on the ground of policy was paralleled by one based on prejudice. In spite of the ingenious explanations and assurances of the Russian Foreign Commissar, Grigori Chicherin, the *Auswärtiges Amt* blamed the Russian Government for fomenting the short-lived Communist revolutions in Thuringia and Saxony in the fall of 1923.[4] The distrust and suspicion thus engendered was intensified by an unending series of arrests of German nationals living or traveling in Russia. Ordinarily, such matters were settled by consular negotiation. Some incidents, however, because of their protraction, dramatic nature or egregious indefensibility, caused a swell of outrage in Germany and necessarily attracted the attention of the highest officials of both governments. These graver episodes were largely responsible for the mounting wariness of Soviet statecraft, characterized—then as now—by a tortuosity at variance with the traditional canons of European diplomacy. Of these incidents, the Kindermann-Wolscht affair of 1924-26 was the most significant, threatening, as it did more than once, to sever diplomatic relations between Germany and Russia. It was, moreover, altogther the most dramatic contretemps in Russo-German relations since the sensational assassination in 1918 of Ambassador Mirbach in the ballroom of the German embassy in Moscow.

---

[1] The Rapallo and Berlin treaties are reprinted in Johannes Hohlfeld, ed., *Dokumente der deutschen Politik und Geschichte von 1848 bis zur Gegenwart . . .* (Berlin, n.d.), III, pp. 126, 153.

[2] For Russo-German military relations see Hans W. Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Collaboration During the Weimar Republic," *American Historical Review,* LXIII (Apr., 1958), 565-97. There is unfortunately no survey of Russo-German economic relations in the Weimar period.

[3] See Philipp Scheidemann's (SPD) speech in the Reichstag on 16 Dec., 1926, in which he fiercely condemned Germany's military relations with Russia: "We wish to be Moscow's friend, but we do not wish to be Moscow's fool." Germany, *Verhandlungen des Reichstags . . . Stenographische Berichte* (Berlin 1871-1938), vol. 391, p. 8585. Cf. Hans W. Gatzke, *Stresemann and the Rearmament of Germany* (Baltimore, 1954), p. 72ff. For the opposition of government officials to an Eastern orientation of German foreign policy see Gustav Hilger and Alfred G. Meyer, *The Incompatible Allies: A Memoir-History of German-Soviet Relations 1918-1941* (New York, 1953), pp. 128-34; Herbert von Dirksen, *Moscow Tokyo London: Twenty Years of German Foreign Policy* (Norman, Okla., 1952), p. 47; Gerald Freund, *Unholy Alliance: Russian-German Relations from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk to the Treaty of Berlin* (New York, 1957), pp. 114, 120, 169; Hans W. Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin: Stresemann und die deutsche Russlandpolitik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* I (Jan. 1956), 10.

The opening of the German *Auswärtiges Amt* files has made it possible for the first time to trace the course and the repercussions of the Kindermann-Wolscht incident.[5] Karl Kindermann, a young German Jew, had been unable to find a job following his graduation from the University of Berlin owing to the inflationary crisis then paralyzing Germany.[6] Late in 1923 Kindermann heard that a group of German students were planning a trip to Russia to write articles for German newspapers. Kindermann decided to accompany them inasmuch as he had taken an "intense interest in Russia for a number of years, without, of course, developing any Communistic tend-

---

[4] Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin," 5; Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies,* p. 125.

[5] This examination of the Kindermann-Wolscht incident is largely based on the captured German *Auswärtiges Amt* documents, microfilm copies of which are available at the National Archives, Washington, D. C. Of particular interest are the files of Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann. These *Reichsminister, Auswärtiges Amt* files should not be confused with Stresemann's private papers, which are to be found in the Stresemann *Nachlass.* The files of Secretary of State Karl von Schubert are also very valuable. Supplementary material can be found in the *Nachlass* of Count Ulrich von Brockdorff-Rantzau, German ambassador to Russia from 1922 to 1928, as well as in the *Geheimakten 1920-1936* file. Several published works proved indispensable in reconstructing the incident, especially Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies.* It should be carefully compared with Gustav Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml: Deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1918-1941, Erinnerungen eines deutschen Diplomaten* (Frankfurt/Main, 1955). Of particular importance is Karl Kindermann's own account of his experiences: *In the Toils of the OGPU* (London, 1933). Originally appearing *Zwei Jahre in Moskaus Totenhäusern: Der Moskauer Studentenprozess und die Arbeitsmethoden der OGPU* (Berlin and Leipzig, 1931), the German edition contains appendices not found in the English translation. A work patently aiming at sensationalism, it is nevertheless invaluable as the only account of Kindermann and his companions' activities prior to their arrest. Ruth Fischer appears to be the only writer on this subject who is aware of the existence of Kindermann's book. See Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism: a Study in the Origins of the State Party* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 325 n. 12. Other memoirs which should be noted are: Theodor Seibert, *Red Russia,* Eden and Cedar Paul, trans., 3rd ed. (New York, 1932); Jan Valtin, *Out of the Night* (New York, 1941); Vladimir Brunovsky, *The Methods of the OGPU* (London, 1931). The best general account of the period is Freund, *Unholy Alliance,* which unfortunately was written before the *Auswärtiges Amt* documents had been made available.

[6] *Akten betr. Russland, Büro des Reichsminister, Auswärtiges Amt* (hereafter cited as Russland-RM), container 1408, serial 2860, frame 554834. All documents hereafter cited are from the German *Auswärtiges Amt* collection and will be cited in the following manner: Russland-RM, Wallroth to German Embassy Moscow (hereafter abbreviated GEM), 19 Feb., 1925, 1408/2860/554834. See also Seibert, *Red Russia,* p. 273; Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU,* p. 11.

encies."[7] A friend and fellow student, Theodor Wolscht, agreed to join Kindermann on the trip. Meanwhile, the two German students were approached by a third student, Max von Ditmar, previously unknown to them, who expressed a desire to go along. Ditmar, a Balt, was a member of the Communist Party and had contacts at the Russian embassy in Berlin. Accepted as a traveling companion, Ditmar was instrumental in obtaining visas for the two Germans. Officials at the Russian embassy advised Kindermann and Wolscht that they would be able to move through Russia much more freely if they were members of the Communist Party and suggested that they join. At first protesting his unwillingness to make such an affiliation, Kindermann did in fact join the party, while Wolscht, for some reason unable to follow suit, registered himself as a student with Communist sympathies. The Russian embassy, furthermore, provided the students with letters of introduction to Lunacharsky, Commissar for Education, and Krupskaya, the widow of Lenin and a leader of the Communist youth movement. Kindermann maintains that to finance the trip he "secured a commission from a big German firm to collect the hitherto unpublished folktales of the aboriginals of Northern Siberia."[8] Theodor Wolff, editor of the *Berliner Tageblatt,* gave Kindermann a commission to write articles on the Soviet universities, while German firms extended advances to the students to send back information on the "economic outlook in Siberia."[9]

Kindermann and Wolscht left Berlin in October 1924, while Ditmar, who was detained, joined them later in Moscow. Gustav Hilger, a close friend of the German ambassador to Russia, Count Rantzau, and a member of Rantzau's staff, was on the same train part of the way. The students met Hilger, who later declared that Kindermann and Wolscht had told him that they were going to Central Asia and Cape Chelyuskin and were financing their trip by serving as "traveling agents for a German machine factory."[10] Hilger, himself later to figure conspicuously in the ramifications of the incident, asserts that he was alarmed at the "frivolous devil-may-care attitude and puerile stubbornness" of the two young men, and was "firmly determined to restrain them from rash steps."[11] According to Kindermann, Hilger's reaction to the proposed trip was quite otherwise: "He [Hilger] took a great interest in our trip, and gave us a lot of good advice. . . . When he heard of our Siberian project, he assured us of his readiness to help us in every way. . . ."[12] There is, however, no evidence, other than Kindermann's generally unreliable account, that Hilger encouraged the students or gave them any helpful counsel. Yet Hilger, in spite of his protestations, took no real measures to prevent the students' trip through Russia.

---

[7] Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU,* p. 11. There is no mention of this group of students in the subsequent course of the affair.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 12. It should be pointed out that Kindermann, by his own admission, knew no Russian at this time, to say nothing of the dialects of the provincial aborigines.

[9] *Berliner Tageblatt (Abend Ausgabe),* no. 79, 16 Feb., 1925; Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU,* p. 19.

[10] Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies,* p. 139.

[11] *Ibid., loc. cit.;* Hilger, *Wir und der Kreml,* p. 141. Cf. *Geheimakten 1920-1936, Russische Handakten, Russland Ehrenerklärung* (hereafter cited as *Geheimakten*), Rantzau to *Auswärtiges Amt* (hereafter abbreviated AA), 8 Aug., 1925, 3028/6698/106492-93.

[12] Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU,* p. 24.

On the arrival in Moscow the students were cordially received by the Soviet authorities. Heinz Neumann, a young German who headed the German branch of the GPU, secured accommodations for the young men at a Communist immigrant hostel. Here the trouble began. While at the hostel Kindermann, the Communist by convenience and a braggart by nature, appears to have made several stentorian criticisms of the Soviet regime which angered the young Communists quartered in the building. They in turn reported Kindermann's diatribe to GPU agents planted in the hostel.[13]

The three students were pulled from their beds by agents of the GPU on the night of October 26, 1924, and imprisoned in the Lubianka. The German embassy was informed of the arrest two days later, not through official Russian channels, but by an American *"Studentenhilfe"* organization.[14] Over two weeks later, on November thirteenth, the Russian Government informed the German embassy that Kindermann and Wolscht were charged with violating two articles of the Russian criminal code which referred to "suspicion of political and economic espionage."[15] These charges were made more specific and others added during the course of the students' imprisonment. The German embassy was confident that the affair would be quickly settled and the two German students released.[16] However, the attitude of the Narkomindel, at first cooperative, soon became noncommittal if not intransigent.

In January 1925, three months after the students' arrest, the Russian Government made its first elaboration of the charges against them. Chicherin told Rantzau confidentially that the "adventurers" were also under suspicion of having entered Russia on false KPD passports. All three were alleged to be members of the *Orgesch* and of other groups standing in alliance with the anti-Bolshevik White Guards.[17] On January thirty-first *Izvestia* published an article entitled "Economic Expedition in the Soviet Union" in which these charges were repeated and the additional accusation made that the students had brought revolvers and poison to Russia with them. Furthermore, the article went on to say, one of the three had openly admitted "terrorist designs."[18]

---

[13] Jan Valtin, himself a GPU agent at one time, holds this view, and also animadverts to Kindermann's alleged homosexual tendencies as being a pretext for the students' arrest. See Valtin, *Out of the Night*, p. 67f. Cf. Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU*, p. 37ff.

[14] Russland-RM, Rantzau to AA, 7 Feb., 1925, 1408/2860/554806. This organization was probably a group of American Communists also quartered in the hostel. Kindermann, suspecting that something was wrong, had asked the Americans to inform the German embassy in the event that anything should happen to him.

[15] *Ibid.* See also *ibid.,* Rantzau to AA, 19 Dec., 1924, 554653. Several months after the arrest had taken place Alexandrowsky, head of the Western desk of the Narkomindel, told Rantzau that the students had "behaved themselves so shockingly that they had excited suspicion." See *ibid.,* same to same, 24 Jan., 1925, 554750.

[16] *Ibid.,* Rantzau to AA, 19 Dec., 1924, 554653. The German Government restricted its efforts to secure the release of its citizens, Kindermann and Wolscht, and had nothing to do with Ditmar's case. Cf. *ibid.,* 5471. There is some evidence that Ditmar may have been a communist spy, a suspicion Rantzau harbored. He gave false testimony against Kindermann and Wolscht at their trial and in general appears a mysterious character. If Ditmar was a Soviet spy, the opinion of the Reich Commissioner for Public Order that the arrest had been arranged even before Kindermann and Wolscht had left Berlin would appear to have some basis in fact. See *ibid,* 554899.

[17] The *Orgesch (Organization Escherich)* was formed in 1920 by Forstrat Escherich as a national organization of the *Einwohnerwehr*. See Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism: the Free Corps Movement in Postwar Germany* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952), p. 198f.

In February the charges against Kindermann, Wolscht and Ditmar were once more revised. Now all three students were accused of belonging to German fascist leagues which had sent them to Russia with "political orders." In addition, the young men were alleged to be agents of German firms formerly operating in Russia and empowered to do business with Russian concerns.[19] Three days after these charges were made, Chicherin and his deputy, Maxim Litvinov, triumphantly announced to Rantzau that Kindermann had signed a confession in which he had declared that he and Wolscht belonged, not to the *Orgesch,* but to the *Konsul* organization. As agents of the *Konsul,* the two Germans had come to Russia with the intention of murdering Stalin and Trotsky.[20] According to Kindermann's confession, Wolscht was a former naval officer and had sunk a hospital ship during the first World War, for which he had been tried and imprisoned by the Allies. The allegations raised in this "confession" were included in the final formal charges made in court against the German prisoners.[21]

A check by the German police on the particulars alleged in Kindermann's confession soon proved it to be a compound of Soviet imagination and mendacity. Wolscht, far from being a sadistic submariner, was only a boy of seventeen at the conclusion of hostilities and therefore was hardly old enough to have been a naval officer in 1918.[22] In fact, Wolscht's police dossier contained only one item, and that an innocuous one—an arrest for sleeping in the *Tiergarten.* This investigation by the German Police made it clear that Kindermann and Wolscht were not guilty of the charges raised except for those regarding violations of the Soviet trade laws. Yet it was precisely these economic charges on which the Russians did not seem anxious to base their case. The Russian accusations centered squarely and persistently on Kindermann and Wolscht's alleged terroristic designs against the leaders of the Soviet Government. The question remained for Germany to determine *why* Russia was so insistent on making a cause célèbre of these three, hitherto unknown students, especially at a time when she was involved with Germany in trying to negotiate military and economic agreements.[23] To find the answer we must leave Moscow for Leipzig, where a criminal case which had occasioned great excitement in Germany as well as in the Kremlin had just begun.

---

[18] Russland-RM, Rantzau to AA, 31 Jan., 1925, 1408/2860/554775.

[19] *Ibid.,* same to same, 7 Feb., 1925, 554807. According to Soviet law, all business negotiations regarding foreign interests had to be handled by the state through official channels. Kindermann, by his own admission, had gone to Russia in an unofficial capacity to represent German firms.

[20] The *Konsul* was a right-wing terrorist organization founded in 1921 by Hermann Ehrhardt, a naval officer. After its members murdered Walter Rathenau in 1922, its name was changed to the *Wiking-Bund.* Membership in the *Konsul* was a far more serious charge than that in the *Orgesch,* a respectable organization. The constitution of the Konsul contained anti-semitic articles. Kindermann's being a Jew made his membership in the Bund unlikely if not impossible, a fact which he pointed out to his Russian inquisitors. See *ibid.,* same to same, 10 Feb. 1925, 554814. See also Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism,* pp. 185-91, 203-05, 212-20. Cf. Egon Erwin Kisch, "Kriminalistisches zum Moskauer Prozess," *Das Tagebuch,* VI, no. 28, 11 July, 1925, pp. 1008ff.

[21] Kindermann maintains that this "confession" was extorted from him while under hypnosis. See Kindermann, *Toils of the OGPU,* p. 129f.

[22] A German submarine officer, Boldt by name, had sunk an allied hospital ship during the World War. Apparently the Russians seized on this charge because of the assonance between Boldt and Wolscht. In any case, it is indicative of the general shabbiness of the Soviet charges. See Russland-RM, Wallroth to GEM, 16 Feb., 1925, 1408/2860/554833.

This trial, which was being held before the heavily guarded State Court for the Protection of the Republic, was the celebrated German Cheka trial. There is some confusion as to what to call the leader of the Cheka and the principal defendant in the case. Known variously during a colorful career in international Communism as Comrade Rose, Gorev, Wolff, Hermann, Hellmuth and Krylof, we shall refer to him by a seventh alias, Peter Skoblevsky. A Lett by birth, a friend of Stalin, he had been designated by Trotsky to go to Germany in 1923 to help plan the Communist revolution scheduled for October of that year.[24] Thanks to an informer, the entire Cheka had been discovered and its members arrested in 1924. Skoblevsky and his fellow Chekists were accused of having entered Germany illegally for the purpose of plotting the violent overthrow of the Weimar Republic, and more particularly of having tried to assassinate General Hans von Seeckt, the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, and the great industrialists Konrad von Borsig and Hugo Stinnes.[25] Felix Neumann, the informer through whose disclosures the Cheka had been unearthed, and himself a member of the group, furthermore declared in his testimony that he had received money for arms and ammunition to use in the coming revolution from the Russian embassy. Neumann also stated the Skoblevsky had "figured" in the embassy.[26]

Even before the Cheka trial began Krestinsky, the Russian Ambassador to Germany, told Stresemann that the trial would only imperil Russo-German relations and repeatedly asked Stresemann to keep court proceedings out of the press.[27] The German statesman was evasive, maintaining that he had no control over the German press.[28] The trial itself received great publicity and the verdict against Skoblevsky *et al.* was handed down on April 22, 1925. Skoblevsky and two other Chekists were condemned to death. In the oral verdict a résumé of the charges made was given and mention made of the fact that the testimony had disclosed that Skoblevsky had found entrée at the Russian embassy in Berlin. Krestinsky immediately protested to Stresemann and expressed the hope that in the published verdict all references to the Russian embassy would be deleted. Stresemann refused, and the published verdict pointed out that Skoblevsky had been in communication with the Russian embassy in Berlin but that no member of the embassy had been directly implicated.[29]

---

[23] Stresemann expressed his bewilderment at this peculiar Soviet sense of timing. See Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin," 12.

[24] For Skoblevsky's history see Paul Scheffer, *Sieben Jahre Sowjetunion* (Leipzig, 1930), p. 439; Edward H. Carr, *The Interregnum 1923-1924,* vol. II in *A History of Soviet Russia* (New York, 1954), p. 209; Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics: an Autobiography* (New York, 1941), p. 502f.

[25] Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* pp. 325 n. 12, 315, 371, 682. Scheffer and Louis Fischer are both of the opinion that the fact that Skoblevsky was a personal friend of Stalin was responsible for the Russian insistence that he be returned to Russia.

[26] Russland-RM, Wallroth to Rantzau, 12 Feb., 1925, 1408/2860/554822-23.

[27] *Ibid.,* memo by Stresemann, 3 Feb., 1925, 554783-85. Chicherin also pointed out the bad effect the trial might have on Russo-German relations. See *ibid.,* 554838.

The trial in Moscow against Kindermann, Wolscht and Ditmar did not begin until June 1925, some two months after the conclusion of the Skoblevsky trial. Shortly before the trial opened Russia declared that investigations showed that Hilger had aided the two students in their terrorists acts by giving them advice and encouragement.[30] Hilger was particularly close to Rantzau and thus his implication was a personal insult to the ambassador.[31] The trial was perfunctory. The two students were not allowed German counsel nor was Hilger permitted to testify in his own behalf.[32] In the course of the trial Kindermann repudiated the confession he had previously made and declared that he was completely innocent. Ditmar, however, confessed that all three were guilty as charged and the Russian case was based on his testimony. The verdict against the three students was delivered on July 4, 1925, and all three were condemned to death. In spite of the accusations made at the trial, neither Hilger nor the German embassy in Moscow was mentioned in the final verdict.[33]

This similarity is too obvious to be accidental. There is no evidence that Kindermann and Wolscht were guilty of anything more than an infringement of the Soviet trade monopoly regulations. There is, moreover, every indication that the Russian case against Kindermann and Wolscht was an artificially constructed affair conjured up to provide a bargaining position for the embarrassing Cheka trial in Leipzig. Kindermann and Wolscht had been held initially only on the vague charge of "suspicion of economic and political espionage." It was only as the magnitude of Skoblevsky's guilt became manifest by the investigations and revelations made before and during his trial at Leipzig that the charges against Kindermann and Wolscht were gradually elaborated. The trial of the two German students was delayed so that it could be held after the decision of the Skoblevsky trial was made known. If this peculiar chronology were not enough, it need only be noted that the charges made, and the punishment meted out, by the Russian court were identical to those in the Skoblevsky case.

---

[28] *Ibid.*, memo by Stresemann, 3 Feb., 1925, 554784. It appears, however, that the *Auswärtiges Amt* did make an unsuccessful effort to restrain newspaper publicity of the affair. See *Akten betr. Rückwirkungen der Garantiepaktverhandlungen auf die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen.* Büro von Staatssekretär v. Schubert (hereafter cited as *Garantiepakt-SS)*, Schubert to Rantzau, 23 Feb., 1925, 2313/4562/154977-78; Russland-RM, Stresemann to Krestinsky, 24 Feb., 1925, 1408/2860/554879.

[29] Russland-RM, Dirksen to GEM, 22 Apr., 1925, 1408/2860/555108.

[30] An earlier Russian attempt to implicate Hey, *Botschaftsrat* at the German embassy in Moscow, had been abandoned. See *ibid.*, 554899. See also Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies,* p. 137ff.

[31] Rantzau regarded Hilger's implication as such, caustically reminding Chicherin that "if the Russian government thanks its best friends in such a way it will soon, and indeed through its own fault, be completely isolated." *Ibid.*, Rantzau to AA, 1 July, 1925, 1409/2860/555366.

[32] Two student friends of Kindermann and Wolscht's were brought to Moscow to testify and were promptly arrested by the GPU. Rantzau threatened to break off diplomatic relations if they were not released at once. The students were allowed to testify and then "deported" to Germany. For this peripheral crisis see *ibid.*, 1409/2860/555328-83.

[33] *Garantiepakt*-SS, Stresemann to GEM, 4 July, 1925, 2314/4562/155537.

Rantzau immediately protested the verdict against Kindermann and Wolscht and announced that if an explanation for the entire proceeding were not forthcoming he would break off the economic negotiations then in progress between the two nations.[34] This threat had the desired result, for two days later the Narkomindel advised Rantzau that the death sentences against Kindermann and Wolscht had been commuted to life imprisonment. The Russians declared that they were ready to settle the case in a "friendly manner" provided that Germany would continue the economic negotiations.[35] Rantzau refused to be pressured and rejected the Russian overtures.

Far more important than any of the other issues involved was the fact that Russia steadfastly refused to make an apology, which Germany had demanded, for the implication of Hilger in the proceedings against Kindermann and Wolscht. Even though Hilger's name had not been mentioned in the final verdict, Stresemann felt that Germany's honor had been impugned, while Rantzau considered the whole affair to be a personal affront. The German viewpoint was, therefore, that no final settlement concerning the prisoners could be effected, nor the economic negotiations resumed, until Russia had formally exonerated Hilger. The Hilger problem became an *Ehrenfrage,* or question of honor.

Neither government showed any inclination to back down. Rantzau, exasperated by the obstinacy of the Russians and by Chicherin's continuing accusations against Hilger, finally broke off the economic negotiations and threatened to leave Moscow if an explanation of the *Ehrenfrage* were not made at once.[36] The ambassador wired Stresemann for authorization to leave Moscow at discretion, as well as to send the economic delegation home. Stresemann replied that it was essential to leave no chance for a solution untried, and therefore directed Rantzau as well as the economic delegation to remain in Moscow.[37] After a seemingly endless series of conferences between Rantzau and the Narkomindel a solution was found. On August 8, 1925, *Izvestia* published a statement by the German embassy categorically stating that Hilger had not been mentioned in the final verdict and that, "on the basis of negotiations conducted since, both governments consider the matter to be closed."[38]

---

[34] *Ibid.,* Rantzau to AA, 7 July, 1925, 155556-60.

[35] *Ibid.,* same to same, 9 July, 1925, 155568-69.

[36] *Garantiepakt*-SS, Rantzau to Stresemann, 15 July, 1925, 2314/4562/155591; *ibid.,* Dirksen to Schubert, 11 July, 1925, 155617. The economic negotiations were being conducted by a special delegation sent from Berlin for that purpose.

[37] *Ibid.,* Rantzau to Stresemann, 22 July, 1925, 155642; Stresemann to Rantzau, 25 July, 1925, 155642; Stresemann to Rantzau, 25 July, 1925, 155655.

The solution of the *Ehrenfrage* was clearly a compromise. Rantzau boasted that only his repeated threats to leave Moscow had forced Russia to exonerate Hilger, and certainly there was some justification for his pride. The critical issue from the Russian point of view was the continuation of the economic talks.[39] Chicherin feared that if Rantzau left Moscow the economic delegation would surely follow him and thereby end all hope of an economic treaty. Therefore, Chicherin had agreed to permit the publication of the German statement in *Izvestia* and its confirmation by the Narkomindel. But Rantzau, too, had made large concessions, having surrendered his initial demand that the published exoneration of Hilger proceed from the Russian Government rather than from the German embassy. More importantly, he had failed to keep the economic talks separate from the *Ehrenfrage*. Although the statement regarding Hilger made no mention of the economic talks, the negotiations were resumed shortly thereafter and led to a Russo-German economic treaty signed in October 1925. The compromise concerning the *Ehrenfrage* removed the greatest obstacle to reaching the logical, and long expected, solution to the entire incident itself: an exchange of Kindermann and Wolscht for Skoblevsky.

Krestinsky made the first official proposal for such an exchange in a conversation with Stresemann in May 1926, proposing that Russia free fourteen Germans, including Kindermann and Wolscht, provided that Germany reciprocate by pardoning Skoblevsky and two other Russian citizens then imprisoned in Germany.[40] Rantzau and Stresemann were favorably disposed, and the Krestinsky proposal became the basis for further negotiations. The German prisoners, in addition to Kindermann and Wolscht, included four consular officials and their wives and two other German civilians, all but one of whom had been indicted for political and military espionage under the same articles as Kindermann and Wolscht.[41] In addition to Skoblevsky, the Russian exchanges included one Ozol, and Georg Lossin and his wife.[42]

There were, however, some redoubtable obstacles which had to be surmounted before any exchange could be effected. The German courts, although eventually persuaded to surrender the prisoners, were at first reluctant to agree to pardon Skoblevsky, so recently found guilty of grave crimes against the republic. Secondly, the Reichswehr was firmly opposed to freeing a man who had not only attempted to subvert the German state but to assassinate the Reichswehr's commander as well.

---

[38] *Ibid.*, Rantzau to AA, 8 Aug., 1925, 155730-31. It is interesting to note that Rantzau advised Berlin to have the German press announce the settlement tactfully and to avoid mentioning any "yielding" or "capitulation" on the part of Russia. See *ibid.*, 155728. For the negotiations leading to this compromise see *ibid.*, 155665-718.

[39] See *ibid., Dirksen to Schubert,* 23 July, 1925, 155643-46, and n. 35, p. 195 above.

[40] *Akten betr. militärische Angelegenheiten mit Russland deutsch-russischer Gefangenenaustausch*, Büro von Staatssekretär v. Schubert, AA, Stresemann to Rantzau, 22 May, 1926, 2330/4564/163539-41; *ibid.*, Rantzau to AA, 13 June, 1926, 163550. The number of Germans to be exchanged was subsequently reduced to 10.

[41] *Ibid.*, Wallroth to Oberreichsanwalt Geheimrat Werner, 22 May, 1926, 163561-62. Cf. Hilger and Meyer *Incompatible Allies,* p. 148f.

[42] *Ibid.*, 163550, 163559. Ozol and the Lossins had been convicted of betraying military secrets and sentenced to four years in prison. See 2331/4564/163723.

On July 3, 1926, the matter was put to a vote in the Cabinet. The majority declared itself opposed to any pardon for Skoblevsky because such an act would jeopardize Germany's internal security and, besides, would appear to sanction Russia's hostage-diplomacy (*Geiselpolitik*). Rantzau was markedly upset by this decision and wrote to both Schubert and Stresemann expressing his irritation at what he considered the Cabinet's exaggerated attention to the technical, legal considerations involved in the matter. To Rantzau this was no time for such picayune qualms, since Germany's whole relationship with Russia hung in the balance. He argued that if Germany refused to carry out the exchange, the recently concluded treaty of Berlin and the economic talks then in progress would be endangered. Rantzau's real fear—and his earnest conviction—was that if Skoblevsky were not exchanged Russia would expose her military cooperation with Germany, thereby disrupting Germany's relations with the West and endangering her entry into the League of Nations.[43]

Otto Gessler, Minister of Defense, totally disagreed. Quite unlike Rantzau, Gessler did not believe that Russia would dare to expose the military collaboration existing between the armies of the two nations if Germany declined to exchange Skoblevsky for Kindermann and Wolscht.[44] Russia, he observed, had more at stake in the Russo-German military partnership than did Germany.[45]

On July 20, 1926, the Cabinet, yielding to Schubert and Rantzau's warnings, agreed to a tentative compromise. The Cabinet voted by a large majority to request the Reich President to pardon Skoblevsky, provided that the Minister of Justice was allowed to draft the request and, secondly, that Gessler was satisfied and would let himself be overruled.[46] As soon as the Cabinet had concluded its deliberations Gessler telephoned Chancellor Marx that he could not accept the decision.

Stresemann was in Bad Wildungen during this Cabinet crisis but Schubert had kept him informed of the divergence of opinion within the Cabinet. Stresemann was in complete agreement with Rantzau, declaring to Chancellor Marx that "our whole foreign policy . . . . may be at stake" in the Skoblevsky question.[47] Stresemann's insistence that Skoblevsky be exchanged proceeded from his fear that, if he were not, Russia would bring to trial one Scholl, a German employee of the Junker firm in Russia who had been arrested and charged with having bribed high officials of the Russian air force.[48] Such a trial would have led to embarrassing revelations concerning Russo-German military cooperation. At Stresemann's request, Schubert telegraphed Rantzau to inform the Soviet authorities that the Cabinet was attempting to find a solution and to ask for a delay in bringing Scholl to trial.[49] Also at the foreign minister's request, Rantzau returned to Berlin to present his views to President Hindenburg, who alone could pardon Skoblevsky and thus make the exchange possible.[50] Stresemann then asked Chancellor Marx to call an extraordinary session of the Cabinet in order to force the issue of Skoblevsky's exchange.

---

[43] *Ibid.*, Rantzau to Schubert, 5 July, 1926, 163597-98; *ibid.*, Rantzau to Stresemann, 5 July, 1926, 163601-09. Dirksen and Schubert both agreed with Rantzau's analysis of the danger inherent in a German refusal to exchange Skoblevsky. See *ibid.*, Dirksen memo, 10 July, 1926, 163615-17; *ibid.*, Schubert to Rantzau, 11 July, 1926, 163618. Cf. *ibid.*, Dirksen memo, 14 July, 1926, 163632ff. Schubert represented Rantzau's point of view in the Cabinet discussions.

[44] *Ibid.*, 163632-33ff.

[45] *Ibid.*, unsigned memo, 19 July, 1926, 163662. Cf. also Gatzke, "Russo-German Military Cooperation during the Weimar Republic," 582f.

[46] *Ibid.*, Schubert to Rantzau, 20 July, 1926, 163671-74.

[47] *Ibid.*, Stresemann to Marx, 22 July, 1926, 163689.

This session met on August 12, 1926, and once again the majority favored the exchange. On this occasion, however, Gessler's opposition was not allowed to overrule the majority decision. The request for pardon was forwarded to Hindenburg, who granted it. A month later, Skoblevsky returned to Russia, and Kindermann and Wolscht sailed for Stettin, coming home to Germany almost two years to the day on which they had so eagerly begun their journey. Ditmar had died of a "heart seizure" in the Lubianka the preceding March. He was only twenty-five.

The policy of Russia throughout this whole protracted episode was one of improvisation. We have noted how the charges against Kindermann, Wolscht and Ditmar were contrived as Skoblevsky's guilt became increasingly obvious. The carelessness with which the Russian charges were drawn up and the vacuity of the accusations themselves—the charge brought against Wolscht of torpedoing a hospital ship is doubtless the most fantastic—indicate the extemporizing nature of the Russian Government's handling of the entire incident. Russia wanted Skoblevsky back and saw in Kindermann and Wolscht the means for accomplishing that end. Moreover, the *Auswärtiges Amt* documents show that, as Gessler feared, in one respect at least Russian policy towards Germany in the 1920's was indeed a *Geiselpolitik*. Even while the Kindermann-Wolscht negotiations were underway, several German merchants and engineers in Russia had been seized and imprisoned. When one incident was cleared up another took its place.

The documents dealing with the Kindermann-Wolscht incident throw light not only on one aspect of Russian policy towards Germany but also on the relationship between Rantzau and Chicherin. In many ways similar in temperament and habits, the rapport between these two aloof aristocrats was put to the test by the Kindermann-Wolscht incident. Rantzau never doubted that Chicherin was working earnestly for a solution and blamed the GPU, the Communist Party or the Comintern for the impasses which developed. Rantzau described the incident as a "trial of strength" between the GPU and the Narkomindel in which, he sadly noted, Chicherin was losing.[51] Exasperated as he was by the course of the negotiations, Rantzau realized that Chicherin was in an impossible position. If, yielding to his own desire for cooperation wth Germany, Chicherin was receptive to the German demands, he would be condemned by the GPU and the Comintern.[52]

---

[48] *Ibid.*, 163690.

[49] *Ibid.*, Schubert to Rantzau, 24 July, 1926, 163697. Cf. the original draft of this telegraph, *ibid.*, 163693.

[50] *Ibid.* Cf. memo by Schubert, 10 Aug., 1926, 2331/4564/163720.

It was difficult, if not impossible, to meet such a disingenuous and irrational policy with the traditional forms of continental diplomacy. The Kindermann-Wolscht incident taxed Rantzau's well-known desire for cooperation with Russia to the breaking point and disillusioned Stresemann and other German diplomats.[53] Throughout the negotiations Rantzau tried hard to effect a fair compromise with Chicherin and continued to preach the necessity of Russo-German friendship. But Rantzau clearly believed that this friendship must give way when Germany's, or more particularly Rantzau's, honor was called into question—as it was in Hilger's implication. Rantzau, feeling that his honor as well as that of his country had been offended by the implication of Hilger, risked everything, even the cessation of diplomatic relations, to obtain satisfaction for Germany's good name and his own wounded pride. Stresemann's gentle and persuasive counsel, in addition to his support of Rantzau in Berlin, were decisive factors in Rantzau's remaining at his post. This trust and confidence, together with Rantzau's own determination to preserve the Russo-German partnership, induced the weary ambassador to remain in Moscow and to persist in negotiation until a final solution was achieved.

THE JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY

---

[51] *Garantiepakt*-SS, Rantzau to Schubert, 21 Mar., 1925, 2313/4562/155132. See also *Geheimakten,* Rantzau to Stresemann, 2 Aug., 1925, 3028/6698/106452; *Garantiepakt*-SS, Rantzau to AA, 22 July, 1925, 2314/4562/155635; Russland-RM, Rantzau to AA, 1 July, 1925, 1409/2860/555366.

[52] *Garantiepakt*-SS, Rantzau to AA, 7 July, 1925, 2314/4562/155559.

[53] For the disillusionment which the Kindermann-Wolscht affair produced see Gatzke, "Von Rapallo nach Berlin," p. 12; Dirksen, *Moscow Tokyo London,* p. 156; Hilger and Meyer, *Incompatible Allies,* p. 143f.

THE DELIMITATION OF CZECHOSLOVAK-GERMAN FRONTIERS AFTER MUNICH*

by Theodore Procházka

THE MUNICH Agreement, by which it was decided to sever from Czechoslovakia the areas inhabited by Germans (and to settle later the fate of other minorities), ruled that the evacuation of these areas was to take place between the 1st and the 10th of October. On the map attached to the Agreement were marked four territories to be occupied by German troops from the 1st to the 7th of October.[1] The choice of the remaining territory to be ceded was to be made by an International Commission comprised of representatives of Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy and Czechoslovakia. According to the Agreement, the Commission had to lay down in detail the conditions governing the evacuation of the four territories fixed by the Munich conference to ascertain "the remaining territory of preponderantly German character" to be occupied by German troops by the 10th of October, then to determine the territories in which a plebiscite was to be held and to fix the date of the plebiscite, not later than the end of November. Finally, the Commission was to make the final determination of the frontiers and to recommend to the four Powers in certain exceptional cases minor modifications in the strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which were to be transferred without plebiscite.

The principal members of the International Commission, the British, French and Italian Ambassadors[2] together with German State Secretary von Weizsäcker, arrived in Berlin from Munich (where they had attended the Conference of Four) in the afternoon of September 30. The Czechoslovak delegate, Minister Vojtěch Mastný, flew from Munich to Prague in the early morning to report on the outcome of the Conference, and left the Czechoslovak capital for Berlin only in the afternoon. Accompanied by Minister Rudolf Künzl Jizerský from the Foreign Ministry, by General of Division Husárek and by three other military advisors, he landed in Berlin before 6 P.M. and went directly to join the Commission, which was already in session. The other Czechoslovak representative on the International Commission, Minister Arnošt Heidrich,[3] visited the three ambassadors, members of

---

*The present article is based on a chapter of my thesis "La Tchécoslovaquie de Munich à Mars 1938" presented to the University of Paris in 1954. Its main sources are the *Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945,* Series D. Volume IV. "The Aftermath of Munich 1938-1939" (hereafter cited as G.), and the *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939,* Third Series, Volume III, 1938-9 (hereafter cited as *Br.*). The problem of the Czechoslovak-German frontier delimitation after Munich is also dealt with by R. G. D. Laffan in the *Survey of International Affairs 1938,* Vol. III, pp. 9-25, 34-40. See also Boris Čelovský, *Das Münchener Abkommen* (Stuttgart, 1958).

[1] Territory No. I in south-western Bohemia to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of October; No. II, two salients in northern Bohemia (Oct. 2 and 3); No. III, western Bohemia (Oct. 3, 4 and 5) and No. IV, northern Moravia-Silesia (Oct. 6 and 7).

[2] Sir Nevile Henderson, André François-Poncet, Bernardo Attolico.

[3] Mr. Heidrich was summoned to go to Berlin directly from Geneva, where he had been attending the meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations.

the International Commission, and found them reserved. The presence of the German generals and the Sudeten German representatives did not augur well for a moderate solution of the frontier problem.[4]

The Commission opened its first session at 5:20 P.M.,[5] some time before the arrival of the Czechoslovaks. According to the presiding officer, German State Secretary von Weizsäcker, the most urgent task was to organize the evacuation of the first zone. This area was a narrow strip in south-western Bohemia which was—according to the Munich Agreement—to be evacuated during the next two days, the 1st and 2nd of October. To this end, Weizsäcker proposed the immediate formation of a military subcommittee.[6] On this subcommittee the German Wehrmacht was originally represented by Lieutenant General von Stülpnagel, and later by Major General Hansen. According to the British military attaché in Berlin, who was also a member of this subcommittee, the decisive influence was, however, exercised by Oberst von Warlimont, chief of the "Abteilung-Führung" in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht. "All German decisions were made in accordance with Oberst von Warlimont's opinion. It was clearly he and not the general who had been entrusted with the German brief."[7]

The subcommittee had to work very rapidly to give the instructions in time for the movement of troops into the four zones. The Czechoslovak delegates[8] endeavored to obtain as many concessions and alleviations as possible. "The Germans were very polite, but very firm, and in almost every case refused to give an inch."[9]

The subcommittee reported its first decisions before the closing of the first session of the International Commission. After some minor changes, it was decided that the German troops would cross the border on October 1st at 2 P.M. Between the two armies, the advancing Germans and the retreating Czechs, there was to be maintained a neutral zone of at least three kilometres.

The evacuation began on Saturday, October 1st at Klein Philipsreuth. It started in the Bohemian Forest (Šumava) in the region where the ancient frontiers of Bohemia, Austria and Germany met. The occupation of this inaccessible and isolated mountain area was terminated on October 2nd, as prescribed by the Munich Agreement. On the same day the Czechs started the evacuation of the second zone in northern Bohemia including both banks of the Elbe, and the industrial area adjacent to the two northern salients of Bohemia. The occupation of this second zone was not yet finished

---

[4] Communicated by Mr. Heidrich.

[5] According to G., No. 2; at 5 P.M. according to *Br.*, Nos. 79, 165.

[6] *G.*, No. 2 .

[7] Colonel Mason-MacFarlane in his report to British Ambassador Henderson (*Br.*, No. 191, Enclosure, p. 162).

[8] General Husárek, the military attaché in Berlin Colonel Hron, and three other officers.

[9] Mason MacFarlane, *Br.*, No. 191, p. 164.

[10] The geographical names are given in their Czech form. When they are mentioned for the first time their German equivalent is added.


Rychnov n.Kn.
Králiky
Šumperk
Ústi n.O.
Lanškroun
Č.Třebová
Zábřeh
Mohelnice
Svitavy
Polička
To Olomouc
Konice
To Brno
Brodek
Old frontier
Line of Nov.20,1938
Railroads
5 10 15 20 Km

SVITAVY AREA

when the German troops marched into the third zone containing the towns of Cheb (Eger) and Aš (Asch),[10] and the spas of western Bohemia. This operation took three days. At last, on October 6 and 7, the German troops occupied the fourth zone, the northern part of Moravia-Silesia with the towns of Krnov (Jägerndorf), Bruntál (Freudenthal) and Frývaldov (Freiwaldau).

In the meantime the International Commission held its sessions in Berlin. The military subcommittee was in charge of the technical preparations for the occupation. In addition, it dealt with the difficult problem of the evacuation of military material from the fortifications which the Czechs had to surrender. At the second session of the Commission it was agreed to divide its work among three subcommittees marked by the letters of the alphabet: A. the military subcommittee which already had been in session since the beginning, B. the financial and economic subcommittee and C. the subcommittee for plebiscite and frontiers.[11]

The inaugural session of this last body was called for October 3, at 9 A.M. It immediately became a center of dispute. The subcommittee had little time at its disposal and its progress was almost immediately deadlocked. According to Czechoslovak Minister Mastný the assistance of the French and British Ambassadors proved weak and ineffective and the Munich Agreement was continuously interpreted to Czechoslovakia's disadvantage.[12]

The Commission did not meet on Sunday, October 2. Hitler used this occasion to call the German members of the International Commission in order to brief them on the residuary German zone to be occupied between October 7 and 10 (the "fifth zone"). According to him, its line had in principle to coincide with the Godesberg line. Hitler admitted only "some small revisions" in favor of the Czechs. He was especially interested in the north Bohemian industrial center of Liberec (Reichenberg), and in the region of Svitavy (Zwittau) in western Moravia. He was ready to renounce plebiscites in the language enclaves in Jihlava (Iglau), Brno (Brünn), Olomouc (Olmütz) and Konice (Konitz) in Moravia (as demanded in the Godesberg memorandum) provided that the Czechs would not insist on a plebiscite in the area with Czech population separating the German enclave of Svitavy from the German territory in Silesia. For this whole territory should—according to Hitler—fall to Germany in any event, even if the remaining German language enclaves were to be renounced.[13] The area in question was, however, of vital importance to Czechoslovakia, for it was crossed by two important railroad lines connecting Bohemia with Moravia and the eastern part of the State (Praha—Brno, and Praha—Moravská Ostrava).

Subcommittee C started its work the next day, and its Czechoslovak members, though unaware of the instruction given the preceding day by

---

[11] *G.*, No. 10.
[12] The report of Mastný quoted by E. Táborský, *Pravda zvítězila* (Prague, 1947), p. 12.
[13] *G.*, No. 12.

Hitler, sensed the stiff atmosphere on the German side.[14] During October 3 and 4, the subcommittee held five sessions.[15] The former German Minister to Brussels, von Richthofen, presided. Originally it was hoped that the subcommittee would have a neutral chairman, for which office the British representative intended to propose the Italian delegate, Count Magistrati.[16] Czechoslovakia was represented by Minister Heidrich and by General Husárek, of whom the British report says that he did "most of the talking."[17] The British delegates were ready to make large concessions, but they were shocked by the atmosphere of the meetings. "The proceedings of the subcommittee were confused and frequently noisy, and the chairman was quite incapable of maintaining order," says British Ambassador Henderson in his report. "It was not uncommon for four or five Sudeten Germans and the Czech representatives all to be shouting at once."[18] Makins speaks of a "shouting match."[19]

From the first session the Germans declared the Godesberg line to be the only possible basis of discussion, whereas the British and French opposed it. Czechoslovakia, Great Britain, France and Italy proposed the proportion of 75% as a base for the German majority. The German representatives, however, referring to article 3 of the Franco-British proposal to the Czechoslovak Government of September 19, asked for 51%. The discussion started with the help of a large-scale map.[20] In its German copies the Godesberg line and the ethnographic frontier of 1910 were already marked. According to the British report,[21] the discussions were adjourned to enable the Czechoslovak representatives to draw the line which they proposed on this map. It was agreed to deal first with the territory in south-western Bohemia along Zone 1 of the Munich Agreement. At the second session of the subcommittee the Czechs submitted a line based on the 1930 census. The Germans declared the line unsatisfactory and maintained that the criterion should be a simple German majority. General Husárek and the Sudeten German delegate, Gauleiter Krebs,[22] then agreed on a compromise line. The line was drawn in a "rough and ready" manner, taking account, however, of communal boundaries. When the subcommittee considered this proposal, a dispute arose about the town of Prachatice (Prachatitz).[23] The Sudeten Germans were almost ready to allow the Czechs to retain it, when a German staff officer got up and—according to the eye-witness Makins—"barked a lot of orders."[24] The question of Prachatice was therefore referred to the plenary session of the International Commission.

---

[14] Communicated by Mr. Heidrich.

[15] According to the British member of the International Commission, R. M. Makins, no official minutes of the discussions were kept. "The Germans circulated some in German after the first meeting, but they were so obviously cooked that they did not try again," states Makins in his report (*Br.*, No. 150).

[16] *Br.*, No. 165, p. 131f.

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 132.

[18] *Ibid.*

[19] *Br.*, No. 150, p. 117.

[20] François-Poncet (*Souvenirs d'une Ambassade à Berlin,* (Paris, 1946), p. 344) indicates that the Czechoslovak delegates had with them no ethnographic maps. According to Mr. Heidrich (as communicated to the author of this article) the maps were forwarded to the Czechoslovak delegation by the Delimitation Commission of the Czechoslovak General Staff. Upon their arrival the German Legation in Prague protested, however, against their distribution among the members of the International Commission. The maps were then withdrawn.

[21] *Br.*, No. 165, p. 132.

[22] Hans Krebs, former deputy of the Czechoslovak Parliament in Prague, an honorary Gauleiter and one of the leaders of the National-Socialist movement in Czechoslovakia.

The same day, October 3, Hitler received a report from Krebs. He approved the compromise line in south-western Bohemia and examined the question of the plebiscite to take place between this line and that of Godesberg. He decided not to advocate a plebiscite where its outcome would be completely hopeless. Krebs observed that in the areas which the Germans had renounced that day the result would be entirely unfavorable. As to Prachatice, he assured his leader that a German minority there would be certain. Hitler then decided that the German delegates had first to claim Prachatice, but that later, "on account of the sentimental value of the town to the Czechs as the home of Huss," it could be exchanged for Znojmo[25] (Znaim). On the whole, Hitler reaffirmed his previous instructions: no deviation from the Godesberg line, "except in the case of two or three villages which are undoubtedly Czech;" no concessions over Svitavy; plebiscite in Hlučín (Hultschin) and Moravská Ostrava (Mährisch Ostrau). Břeclav (Lundenburg) had to be given up.

It is therefore not surprising that on the following day, October 4, the atmosphere was still less favorable to agreement than before. In the first session the subcommittee examined the line for southern Moravia. As for the controversial cases, the Germans used the statistics for 1910, except in individual cases where the Czechoslovak statistics of 1921 were more favorable for their claims. The Czechs referred to the 1930 census and, in certain instances, even to that of 1900.[26] The Germans were generally in agreement with the Austrian census of 1910. According to them, the Czechoslovak census of 1921 and 1930 was biased from the national point of view. On the other hand, the Austrian census was to their advantage. To increase the influence of the German population in Austria's western part, the "Cisleithania," the Habsburg monarchy had based its census on the principle of the *Umgangssprache,* i.e. the language used in daily life. Thus the Czechs in the mixed regions who spoke German in their contacts with the Austrian authorities or their German employers were registered as Germans.[27]

---

[23] *G.,* No. 17, par. 2.

[24] *Br.,* Nos. 150, 165, pars. 17-18.

[25] *G.,* No. 17. In the election of 1935 there was in Prachatice a German majority of 51.8%. As to Hitler's mention of Prachatice as "the home of Huss," the neighboring market-town of Husinec, where Hus was born, had more sentimental value to the Czechs than Prachatice, where he only went to school. These arguments on behalf of Prachatice were, however, of no avail. Eventually Germany occupied Prachatice as well as Znojmo. Husinec remained, however, on the Czech side of the border.

[26] *Br.,* No. 165, par. 20.

[27] Concerning the Austrian census of 1910 see the remark in H. W. V. Temperley's *A History of the Peace Conference in Paris* (London, 1921), IV, 269, where the British historian R. W. Seton-Watson stated that its figures could not be taken "as an exact index

The negotiations were deadlocked. The plenary session of the Commission held during the evening of October 4 was fruitless. Nothing came of the discussions, although they lasted three hours. It was impossible to reach an agreement on the two controversial questions: the percentage of the German majority, and the date of the census. The president of the Commission, von Weizsäcker, suggested therefore that a restricted committee composed of the five heads of the delegations could perhaps deal better with these intricate problems. Even this intimate gathering led to nothing. The Germans remained intransigent and Mastný declared that he would break off the negotiations and leave if there was no will to compromise on the German side.[28]

French Ambassador François-Poncet proposed as a basis for discussion the figures of 1918, to which the statistics of 1910 and 1921 were to be compared. As to the German majority, he suggested the proportion of two thirds. Neither Mastný nor Weizsäcker accepted this proposal, but the Czechoslovak Minister sent one of his subordinates to Prague to submit the French formula to the Government.[29]

Meanwhile, in Prague, President Beneš telephoned to British Minister Newton late in the evening of October 4. He declared that it would be quite unjust to use the 1910 census, which was old and unfair to the Czechs, and he "earnestly begged for British support in resisting injustice." Newton's answer was elusive. He said that "it would be difficult to go back on decisions taken at Munich" and asked the President to supply "any further valid arguments which there might be for interpreting rather than disputing the Munich decision." According to Newton, Beneš did not mention any.[30]

At this moment Hitler himself took action behind the scenes. The dragging pace of the negotiations and the unwillingness of the Western Powers and of Czechoslovakia to accept the German demands were in his eyes but manoeuvres to deprive him of the gains of Munich. He got the news of the Berlin deadlock while he was on tour in western Bohemia. On October 4, in the evening, he was in Karlovy Vary. From Löbau in Saxony he returned to Berlin to pronounce the speech inaugurating that year's *Winterhilfe* campaign and to urge the laggards on the International Commission to produce some results. That same night Ribbentrop expressed to the French Ambassador the discontent of Hitler. François-Poncet was awakened in the middle of the night and called to the German Foreign Minister.

---

of racial distribution." Another British expert on Austria-Hungary, the journalist Wickham Steed, published on October 10, 1938 (in a letter to the Editor of the *London Times*) an account of the 1910 census. During his stay in Vienna in 1910 he had been registered by the Austrian census official as a German. The Austrian point of view is set forth by the President of the Austrian General Commission for Statistics, Dr. C. Th. Inama-Sternegg, in the work *Der nationale Besitzstand in Böhmen*, published by Dr. Heinrich Rauchberg (3 vols., Leipzig, 1905), Inama-Sternegg stresses the importance of the "*Umgangssprache*" in indicating the real distribution of languages: "These conditions, not the historico-ethnographic impulsions of the mother-tongue or the political aspects of the nationality, are decisive for practical politics in the field of the language question." I, 14.

[28] *G.*, No. 25.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Br.*, No. 123.

Ribbentrop told him excitedly that Hitler had charged the British and French delegates on the International Commission with going back on the Munich decisions. According to him, the French obstruction might cause the reopening of the crisis which—as was thought—had been settled in Munich.[31] If Czechoslovakia did not agree before midday to the German demands (i.e. 1910 statistics and over 50% German majority), Hitler was going to order German troops to occupy the Godesberg line.[32] Francois-Poncet protested against this attempt at intimidation and proposed to ask in London and Paris for the official interpretation of the Munich Agreement. Thus the peace restored in Munich was suddenly troubled and the diplomats had to strive with all their energy to avert a new crisis in Central Europe.

On the morning of October 5 all meetings were adjourned at the German request and the delegations looked hurriedly for instructions from their governments.[33] Henderson saw François-Poncet, who told him about his talk with Ribbentrop. The two diplomats then met Italian Ambassador Attolico, and Henderson suggested that the Italian try to intervene by seeing Ribbentrop.[34] The French Ambassador telephoned French Prime Minister Daladier for his opinion on the two controversial points. Daladier replied that, according to his recollection and understanding of the Munich Agreement, the proportion of Germans ought to be 51 per cent and the population figures of 1918 were to be used as a basis.[35] The British Embassy telephoned to London, and Henderson described the tension created by Ribbentrop's ultimatum at 10:45 A.M. At the same time, the first Secretary of the Embassy, Kirkpatrick, informed the chief of the department for Central Europe, William Strang, about the answer concerning the two controversial points which François-Poncet had received from Daladier. At 12:45 P.M. Strang replied that Prime Minister Chamberlain and Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax had considered the question, and that Chamberlain agreed with Daladier.

Such was the situation at midday. Paris and London were in favor of 51 per cent based on the 1918 figures. Lord Halifax confirmed his standpoint by a telegram in the afternoon. He asked Henderson to support his French colleague strongly in order to secure some compromise between the 1910 and 1921 figures. The Munich Agreement was to be interpreted as meaning that 1918 was to be taken as the standard year. "To take figures so out of date as those of 1910 seems grossly unfair," wired Halifax.[36]

This telegram, dispatched from London at 3 P.M. and delayed by transmission and decipherment, arrived *post festum.* For, in the early hours of the afternoon, Ribbentrop called the three Ambassadors and persuaded them to yield to the German demands. Attolico and Henderson were without express instructions. Although Henderson disliked the methods used by the Germans on the International Commission, and though he protested against "the indecent haste," he accepted the German point of view because in his opinion the 1910 map was "at least better" than the Godesberg line.[38] It was agreed to adopt the 1910 figures and—for the German preponderance—the proportion of over 50 per cent. The participants of the meeting, to which Czechoslovakia was not invited, signed a brief protocol and a map with the line demanded by the Germans. Ribbentrop intended to use this document, signed by the representatives of all the four Munich participants, as an instrument of pressure on the Czechs in the event they wished to procrastinate and refer the matter back to Prague.[39]

---

[31] A. François-Poncet, *Souvenirs,* p. 335.
[32] *Br.,* Nos. 125, 135.
[33] *Br.,* No. 165, par. 24.
[34] *Ibid.,* No. 127, note 2.
[35] *Ibid.,* No. 127, note 2.
[36] *Br.,* No. 127.

Later in the afternoon, after the signature of the protocol, a Czechoslovak delegation—still unaware of its existence—attempted to save what could be saved. Two of its members, Minister Vavrečka and General Husárek, called on Weizsäcker to inform him that the resignation of President Beneš was only a matter of a few hours away. By drawing attention to the imminent departure of the man who was the chief object of Hitler's ire, they apparently hoped to moderate the German demands. They stressed that the Prague Government fully realized that Czechoslovakia, with her new restricted frontiers, could pursue only a policy of close cooperation with Germany. At the same time the two Czechs asked for considerate treatment of their people.[40]

At 5:30 P.M. the three ambassadors, Henderson, François-Poncet and Attolico, met with the Czechoslovak and German delegates.[41] The map with the new frontier was presented to the Czechs. Their disappointment was great and they raised several objections. They objected that the new frontier would make the connection between Bohemia and the eastern regions of the state very narrow and economically intolerable. It was just at that very point where there could be no tampering with the frontier line, replied the German representative. An exchange of population could be carried out but no amendment could be considered. The Italian Ambassador tried to soften the blow by proposing that certain railroad lines which were to be cut by the new frontiers should be crossed by the German troops as late as possible, but not later than October 10. The German delegate asked for the Czechoslovak answer to the demands in the evening or, at latest, by midday of October 6.[42] To break the Czech opposition, the Czech representatives were "at a suitable moment" confronted—on the instruction of Ribbentrop—with the protocol showing that even France and Great Britain had already adopted the German standpoint. At 7 P.M. the International Commission held a short, formal meeting. Weizsäcker reported the decision. There was no discussion.[43]

---

[38] *Br.*, No. 128. See also Sir Nevile Henderson, *Failure of a Mission* (New York, 1940), p. 175.

[39] *G.*, No. 32.

[40] *G.*, No. 36.

[41] In Prague, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister Syrový announced at 6 P.M. the resignation of the President and at 7 P.M. Dr. Beneš delivered his farewell address over the radio.

[42] *G.*, No. 31.

The Czechoslovak delegates then reported to Prague. The Czechoslovak Cabinet examined the new situation in a session from 1 to 5 A.M. No less distressing than the territorial losses was the way in which the Ambassadors of the two Western Powers had yielded ground to the German demands. Nevertheless Czechoslovakia still tried to avert the blow, and in spite of past experiences solicited the help of the other three signatories of the Munich Agreement. At the order of the Prime Minister, the Foreign Ministry turned their attention to the fact that Germany had, in principle, forced the Godesberg line upon Czechoslovakia. Summoned to the Ministry in the morning of October 6, the British Minister, Newton, advised direct negotiations between Prague and Berlin. The French and Italian Ministers promised to refer the Czechoslovak view to their Governments.[44]

The Czechoslovak delegates returned to Berlin in the morning of the same day, October 6. At 12:30 another session of the International Commission opened and Minister Mastný declared that his government accepted with profound sorrow the new line.[45] The occupation started the next day and was completed on October 10.

* * * * *

There remained still two problems: first to determine the territories in which a plebiscite was to be held, and second the final delimitation of the frontiers.

Czechoslovakia was against the plebiscites. In his instructions of September 30 to Minister Mastný, President Beneš mentioned expressly the danger to the integrity of Czechoslovakia represented by the plebiscites in Brno, Jihlava and other German enclaves.[46] On the German side, Hitler dealt with the above problems first on October 2, when he received the German members of the International Commission. He was ready to dispense with a plebiscite in several German enclaves, provided that the Czechs would not insist on a plebiscite in the region between the Svitavy enclave and Silesia.[47] When the British Ambassador saw Weizsäcker in this connection on October 10, he derived from him the impression that there were forces at work in favor of the plebiscites with the view to including in the Reich further territories presumably in the Olomouc–Brno and Moravská Ostrava area. At this point even Henderson lost patience and warned the State Secretary against new radical territorial demands. He said that personally he would never agree to such plebiscites. "Germany got all she wanted and if she could not behave with decency it would be useless to go on negotiating," declared the British diplomat.[48] On the same day his colleague,

---

[43] *G.*, No. 33.

[44] Microfilm of the Czechoslovak diplomatic documents in German translation, National Archives, Washington, D.C., serial 1039, frame 411969.

[45] *G.*, No. 41. For the "fifth zone" see sketch map published in *Br.*

[46] Czechoslovak documents, ser. 1040/412729-30.

[47] *G.*, No. 12.

[48] *Br.*, Nos. 177, 179.

French Ambassador Francois-Poncet, declared himself also against the plebiscites.[49]

We do not know precisely the evolution of Hitler's ideas at that time. The fifth zone was so favorable, Czechoslovakia was so paralyzed, that he probably thought it would be useless to complicate the situation further with the plebiscites. Maybe the outburst of Ambassador Henderson and the French démarche also had their effect. While, on October 2, he did not entirely give up the plebiscites, on October 11, in his conversation with Ribbentrop, he declared himself against them.[50] Accordingly, on October 13, at the meeting of the International Commission Weizsäcker announced that Germany was giving up the plebiscites, and the Commission decided unanimously to dispense with them.[51] The final delimitation was to be settled by bilateral negotiations between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The International Commission adjourned, leaving the Czechoslovak negotiators facing the Germans alone.

Berlin first drew up a summary of all German claims for frontier rectifications. It was so exaggerated that the Germans themselves acknowledged that it far exceeded what could be advocated or achieved. The demands were given a second reading, still without any satisfactory result. Numerous desiderata of an economic and military nature and concerning questions of transport were apparently excessive: Germany would have annexed only 37,000 Germans, but at the same time more than 200,000 Czechs.[52]

On October 21 or 22 the German negotiators were given new directives: The Reich territory was not to be increased further by the inclusion of non-Germans.[53] At this preparatory stage one of the strategic desiderata had, however, support in the highest German places. The German General Staff with the full approval of Hitler presented to the Foreign Ministry its wishes for frontier modification in south-western Bohemia between Domažlice (Taus) and České Budějovice (B. Budweis). Hitler admitted, however, that these modifications must be achieved, if possible, by normal negotiation. If this entailed too great difficulties, the present frontier was to be retained.[54]

A new version of the German propositions dates from November 3. The chief German demands of a strategical or transport character concerned the above-mentioned region of Chodsko near Domažlice in south-western Bohemia, several areas in northern and eastern Bohemia (Liberec, Český Dub/Böhmisch Aicha, Jablonné) and Brodek, south-east of Svitavy in Moravia. According to the German calculations Germany would have thus acquired 26,000 Czechs and 6,000 Germans. In Slovakia, the Germans demanded Devín (Theben) near Bratislava.

---

[49] *G.*, No. 52.
[50] *G.*, No. 53.
[51] *G.*, No. 56.
[52] *Br.*, No. 234. Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes, on his talks with Minister Heidrich.
[53] *G.*, No. 101.
[54] *G.*, No. 88.

These demands were submitted to Hitler by the representative of Foreign Minister Hewel on November 6 and 7. They did not seem to him radical enough and he enlarged their scope. The Chancellor decided that, in principle, no territories which had been occupied by Germany were to be returned to Czechoslovakia. To Hewel's objection that some areas claimed by Germany were entirely Czech, Hitler remarked that a large number of Germans were still in Czechoslovakia, so that an exchange was not justified. The only concession, on a small scale, could be made in the case of territories which were purely Czech and whose population desired to return to Czechoslovakia. For this there would have to be at least a 90% Czechoslovak population. The areas of Břeclav and Moravský Krumlov (Mährisch Kromau) and the environs of Jindřichův Hradec (Neuhaus) were not to be given back. In the neighborhood of Brodek the Germans should take as much as possible. Hitler did not, however, appear to desire particular pressure in this matter. He ascribed special importance to the extraterritoriality of a future *Autobahn* which he projected, and which was to connect Breslau and Vienna across Moravia.[55] In return for this concession he was ready to accord Czechoslovakia the extraterritoriality of certain railroad lines which were cut by the new frontiers. According to Hitler's orders, it was to be intimated to the Czechs that Germany had been very modest in her demands, having, moreover, abandoned the claim to Brno and its surroundings. Hitler ended his instructions with a threat: Should the Czechs make difficulties, they were to be given to understand that they would do well to accept the proposals. "Otherwise the Führer would take up the matter personally and they might then fare far worse."[56]

Czechoslovakia presented her proposals for final delimitation on November 2. According to Weizsäcker,[57] some of them seemed reasonable, others impracticable. The Czechs asked for facilities on the Brno-Břeclav railroad and in the last report the return of Břeclav, for extension of Czech territory around Plzeň, the return of Český Dub and the railroad line Stará Paka (Alt-Paka)—Dvůr Králové (Königinhof)—Jaroměř, which had been cut on October 5 in several places by spearheads of German territory. They also asked for the spur at Ústí and Orlicí (Wildenschwert). The most important of the Czechoslovak demands presented to Berlin concerned, of course, the area of Svitavy.[58] However, according to the German Foreign

---

[55] Concerning the *Autobahn* see G., Nos. 53, 55, 103, 108, 116 and 117. Hilger seems to have devoted great attention to his favorite idea of extraterritorial highways in those days. He mentioned the possibility of an *Autobahn* across Czechoslovakia on October 11 to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop. On October 24 Ribbentrop made a similar proposal in connection with the Polish Corridor to Polish Ambassador Lipski.

[56] *G.*, No. 108.

[57] *G.*, No. 100.

[58] Czechoslovak documents recently published (*Mnichov v dokumentech*, Prague, 1958, vol. II, No. 231) sum up the desiderata of the delimitation commission of the Czechoslovak General Staff. According to a memorandum of November 10, 1938, the surrender of the Jihlava region with its 16,490 Germans could not be compensated for by the German occupation of the purely Czech compact areas of Opava, Bílovec, Zábřeh, Šumperk, Šternberg, Lanškroun and Moravský Krumlov, with 111,465 Czechs. The commission suggested the demand for return of all these purely Czech areas as well as of the areas which

Ministry, any request for discussion of this area as well as of the railroad between Hranice (Mährisch Weisskirchen) and Moravská Ostrava was to be refused.[59] For the time being the Germans refused to discuss the most difficult and delicate zones of delimitation, maintaining that they should be reserved until the end of the negotiation.[60]

The meeting of the German-Czechoslovak frontier committee opened on November 10. Minister von Richthofen presided. The Czechoslovak delegate, Minister Heidrich, had the difficult task of defending the Prague demands and facing the new German desiderata. The session was painful from the beginning. At the opening von Richthofen read a categorical statement according to which the decisions of the International Commission of October 5 and 13 awarded the Sudeten territory to Germany "once and for all." The Czechoslovak requests would lead to a complete alteration of these limits and their presentation—continued the German delegate—"caused the greatest surprise to the Reich Government." Germany not only did not intend to give up any part of the occupied areas, but still had certain claims to put forward. And Richthofen submitted to Heidrich a map with a red line marking the new German claims. According to Hitler's orders, he stressed that it meant "a great sacrifice for the Reich Government" to abandon several towns with a German population. Concluding, he asked the Czechoslovak delegation to give its assent to the projected frontier demarcation in a day or two.

Heidrich in his reply tried to refute the German arguments. He observed that the line of October 5 was from the beginning intended as a demarcation line, not as a final settlement of the frontier. The Czechoslovak desiderata were based on the ethnographic conditions and did not contain any deviation from the ethnographic frontier. All his objections were, however, in vain. Richthofen asked for an answer by Saturday, November 12. Accordingly, Heidrich decided to leave the same day for Prague to consult with his government.[61]

For Czechoslovakia, these new German demands were like "a bolt from the blue." These words, indeed, were used by Mastný when he appeared the next day at the German Foreign Ministry to protest, on orders from Prague, against Richthofen's ultimatum. His intervention was in vain. Under State Secretary Woermann, who received him, confirmed the German standpoint and declared that the German demands "admitted of no bargaining."[62]

In Prague, Foreign Minister František Chvalkovský, personally offended, did not dare to communicate the German demands to the Cabinet and

---

had importance for the national economic life, especially in the region of Plzeň, Jindřichův Hradec, Dvůr Králové and the coal basin of Most—Duchcov. This proposal, drawn up probably in the first days of November, is dated November 10, i.e., the day when the new radical demands of Germany became known in Prague.

[59] *G.*, No. 102.

[60] *Br.*, No. 234.

[61] *G.*, No. 110.

[62] *Ibid.*, No. 113.

to the political leaders until the following day, November 11, in the evening. He delayed his presentation in order not to prejudice negotiations on internal politics which were to take place in the afternoon, and which dealt with the presidential election, the dissolution of political parties, and the new constitution.[63]

The evening session of November 11 the Government accepted the German demands. Shortly before midnight, Chvalkovský's *chef de cabinet,* Hubert Masařík, and Minister Heidrich appeared at the German Legation to communicate the answer. Having taken note of the fact that the German Government renounced the intention of making further demands, Prague expressed the hope that Berlin would not turn down certain modifications of its demands where consideration for Czechoslovak national feeling appeared possible without disadvantage to German ethnic interests. Moreover, the Czechoslovak Government stated that it had met the German demands "on the assumption that henceforth nothing more stands in the way of a German guarantee of the new and final frontiers of the Czechoslovak State."[64]

However, when Ribbentrop received the Prague answer he felt offended by the inference that Berlin had renounced further demands. He telephoned immediately[65] to make certain that no such declaration had been made by Germany, for he intended to present other demands concerning especially the project of the Breslau-Vienna *Autobahn,* crossing Czechoslovakia.[66] Accordingly, on November 13 the Czechoslovak delegation was told that the question of new demands remained open, that the modifications asked by the Czechoslovak Government could not be conceded, and that the frontier guarantee referred to by Prague could not be linked with the question of the frontier delimitation as Prague had suggested. The delimitation agreement could be signed only when the pending transportation problems (e.g. the *Autobahn* question) had been settled. According to Ribbentrop's orders everything must be ready in three or four days.[67] Later, Ribbentrop decided that the occupation of the new territories was to take place on November 24.[68]

If there was at the beginning a discussion—though unsatisfactory for Prague—about the delimitation of the fifth zone, the negotiations for "minor modifications" mentioned in the Munich Agreement turned into a pure "Diktat." The protocol about the final demarcation of frontiers was signed at the German Foreign Ministry on November 20. Its chief part was a map with the final corrections.[69] On November 21, in the morning, the acting president of the International Commission, Ambassador Karl Ritter, informed British chargé d'affaires Sir G. Ogilvie-Forbes that the Commission had been summoned to meet at 6 P.M. in order to sanction the new line agreed upon by the Czechs and the Germans. Ritter invited the British diplomat to call on him at 1 P.M. to see the map of the proposed line.[70] Ritter justified this haste by the fact that the new frontier was to come into force on November 24. Besides—certainly a welcome explanation—he hinted about the impending departure for Berchtesgaden of the French representatives on the Commission, accompanying the new French Ambassador Robert Coulondre, who was to present his credentials to Hitler.[71]

---

[63] *G.,* No. 115.

[64] *G.,* No. 114.

[65] Probably from Berchtesgaden. See *G.,* No. 116, note 2.

[66] *G.,* No. 114.

[67] *Ibid.,* No. 116. The *Autobahn* Treaty was signed on November 19.

[68] *Ibid.,* No. 125.

[69] To be exact, there were two maps. One on the scale 1:300,000, and another, more detailed, on the scale 1:75,000. A map based on the first of these was published in the *British White Paper,* Cmd 5908 of 1938.

Forbes consulted his French and Italian colleagues. The agreement had been signed on the preceding day, and there was no alternative but to endorse the *fait accompli*. In his report to Foreign Secretary Halifax, Forbes declared that "the case would have been different," had the Czechs protested and appealed to the International Commission.[72] Nevertheless a few days earlier he himself had been very skeptical about obtaining territorial adjustments from the Germans.[73] The session of the International Commission was short and formal. It started at 6 P.M. and ended at 7:30 P.M. Ritter read the memorandum signed on November 20. Mastný stressed the feeling of deep grief which filled the hearts of the Czechoslovak people and expressed the hope that the sacrifices made by Czechoslovakia would contribute to good neighborly relations with Germany. The Commission approved the minutes of November 20 and declared that the frontier marked on the annexed maps was "the final frontier within the meaning of paragraph 6 of the Munich Agreement."[74]

* * * * *

There were few sectors where the final line was changed to the profit of Czechoslovakia. The border line was altered in general to her disadvantage and only accentuated the bizarre sinuosities of the border fixed on October 5. Twelve new salients penetrated into Czechoslovak territory.

Czechoslovaks had to abandon territory east of Domažlice in order to make possible the railroad connection between the region of Cheb and the Šumava (said the communiqué of the German Press Agency), the area between Český Dub and Hodkovice (Liebenau), a strip between Tanvald and Vrchlabí (Hohenelbe), to construct a double track railroad which was to connect Liberec, Trutnov and Vrchlabí, and a strip east of Jablonné to make possible the railroad connection with the area of Lanškroun and Svitavy. Near Plzeň a new salient gave to Germany the coal mines of Litice. In Moravia a long salient appeared in the area of Litovel. In Slovakia the German territory encircled Bratislava by occupying Devín at the confluence of the Morava and the Danube. Of all these projected lines of communication, which served Germany as a pretext for occupation, not a single one materialized because of the war, which limited all important investments in the civil sector.

---

[70] *Br.*, No. 264.
[71] *Br.*, No. 266.
[72] *Ibid.*, No. 265.
[73] *Ibid.*, No. 261.
[74] *G.*, No. 135.

The fundamental objections of Czechoslovakia were not heeded. The border in the area of Svitavy was not revised in her favor. Břeclav was not returned. Jindřichův Hradec remained surrounded by German territory on three sides. Only a little over fifty Czech localities with 23,000 inhabitants were returned.[75] On the other hand Czechoslovakia had to cede to Germany 110 localities and villages in Bohemia, 17 in Moravia-Silesia, one in Slovakia. According to German calculations Germany got 39,443 Czechs, whereas in the localities returned to Czechoslovakia there were only 263 German inhabitants.[76] These modifications were implemented on November 24, according to the wishes of Ribbentrop.

The changes wounded the national feelings of both Czechs and Slovaks. The "Chod" country west of Domažlice, as well as Devín near Bratislava, is rich in historical traditions and reminiscences, and their loss was painfully resented. The story of the Chod rebellion in the seventeenth century against a foreign nobleman into whose bondage this region fell after the battle of the White Mountain formed an important part of Czech national tradition; the loss of the Chod villages was considered an offense to the whole nation. In the eight Chod villages even in 1910 the German population formed only one per cent.[77] Only in a few parts of the Chod region was the frontier eventually corrected for the benefit of the Czechs. One of these parts, containing the hill Hrádek with the statue of Jan Kozina, hero of the seventeenth-century Chod revolt, remained in Czech territory.

The German annexation of Devín, an important strategic point near Bratislava, had the same effect on the people as the loss of the Chod country. In prehistoric times, this site was Celtic; in Roman times, it was a Roman station near the "limes" and the town of Carnuntum. In the tenth century A.D. it became a bastion of Greater Moravia and the residence of its princes. It was surrounded with legends which were revived by the literary romanticism of the last century. In the middle ages a castle was built there, the ruins of which have been preserved until the present day.

On the German side, Devín was mentioned at the beginning of October. On October 7 Weizsäcker, in a memorandum to Hitler, stated that the community of Devín had in 1910 a German majority, that it was, however, separated from German territory by two rivers and that there was no bridge. One day later, Hitler decided not to demand a plebiscite for Devín. In his opinion Devín had to go to Slovakia.[78] At the end of October he visited the Danube bridgehead of Petržalka (Engerau), recently annexed by the Reich, and saw on the spot the situation on the other bank of the Danube. Probably at this moment he resolved on annexation. The German proposals of November 3 placed Devín on the list of German territorial demands.[79] One week later, when the Slovak Minister Ďurčanský called on Goering in Berlin, a démarche was made on behalf of the Slovaks, and the chief of the "Carpathian Germans," Karmasin, intervened asking that Devín should remain in Slovakia. "All Slovak history books would have to be burnt," he said to Goering, "if the Slovaks were to lose the castle." In his opinion German military requirements could be met by special agreements without the cession of the territory. Goering answered that these arguments were new to him and probably to Hitler also, and he promised to submit the matter once more to the Führer.[80] The German consul in Bratislava, von Druffel, also recommended that Devín should be left to the Slovaks. Although he believed the historical background of the Devín legends to be based only on a very weak historical foundation, he nevertheless emphasized that the German claims to Devín would doubtless contribute to driving the Slovaks into closer reliance on Prague and that the psychological effect of the loss of this place on the Slovaks would be very serious. According to Druffel, Devín was of importance to Germany only in view of the future Danube-Oder canal which Germany intended to build across Czechoslovakia. Also the undeniably natural character of the frontier justified, in his opinion, the abandonment of this demand.[81]

---

[75] A. Boháč, *Páté a šesté pásmo, Přítomnost,* (Prague, 1939), No. 9.
[76] G., No. 121.
[77] *Mnichov v dokumentech,* No. 226.

All these arguments were in vain. The annexation of the new bridgehead onto Czechoslovak territory was sufficiently enticing to Hitler to overcome psychological considerations, and Devín was eventually occupied. Besides the community of Devín, the ruined castle and several installations important to Bratislava, Czechoslovakia lost the Kobyla hill, of strategical importance at the confluence of the Morava and the Danube. At the beginning of December Germany decided to return to Slovakia the Danube island of Käsmacher with the pumping station of the Bratislava aqueduct. At the same time, however, Germany occupied a small area near Karlova Ves and a part of the northern slope of the Kobyla hill.[82]

* * * * *

Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia lost to Germany about 30,000 sq. kilometres (11,600 sq. miles), i.e., about 38% of its area. Before Munich, the Czech lands had 79,000 sq. kilometres (30,500 sq. miles); the later Protectorate of Bohemia-Moravia had only 49,000 sq. kilometres (18,900 sq. miles). In 1930 the Czech lands had 10,674,000 inhabitants. After Munich they lost 3,869,000 inhabitants (of whom 200,000 went to Poland), i.e. about 34% of the whole population. Some 2,806,000 Germans went to Germany (along

---

[78] *G.*, No. 46.
[79] *G.*, No. 102, annex p. 131.
[80] *Ibid.*, No. 112.
[81] *G.*, No. 119.
[82] *Lidové Noviny*, Dec. 11 and 17, 1938.

with *ca.* 720,000-750,000 Czechs). About 234,000 Germans remained after Munich in Bohemia and Moravia-Silesia.[83]

Germany thus achieved the maximum of her territorial demands. Hitler pushed the ethnographic principle to the extreme in order to undermine the viability of what remained of Czechoslovakia, and to remove the potential threat to Germany's right wing in the event of future undertakings in the East. With the exception of the German enclaves in Czech territory, he reached the Godesberg line. For the abandonment of the German islands in Brno and Jihlava, he was amply compensated by the occupation of the vital Svitavy region, where he could dominate the communications between the western and eastern part of the Czechoslovak State.

The two Western European Powers represented on the Berlin International Commission followed the amputation of the Czechoslovak Republic on the whole as passive onlookers. They assisted at the proceedings of the Commission with apparent disgust, but achieved practically nothing on behalf of Czechoslovakia. At the most they may have influenced Hitler's decision against the plebiscites. On the other hand, the British representative, Ambassador Henderson, reminded Lord Halifax on October 7 that "it would be as unwise as it would be misleading to encourage the Czechoslovak Government to believe they have much to hope from the International Commission."[84] And on October 11 he warned that Czechoslovakia "by making difficulties over lost causes" risked losing still more.[85] According to the British sources, even the French attitude in this respect was to "do nothing to spoil the effects of Munich."[86]

Under these circumstances, the Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin, Mastný, was perhaps right when he declared that it would have almost been better had Czechoslovakia not been represented on the International Commission at all.[87] For Germany remained intransigent in her demands regardless of who happened to be in power in Prague. In the Czechoslovak capital rumors circulated during the first days of October 1938 that it was only the fact that Dr. Beneš still remained President which incensed Hitler and impelled him to increase his territorial demands. These rumors proved, however, unfounded. The protocol about the fifth zone was signed in Berlin at the very moment when the Prague radio announced Beneš' resignation. A few weeks later Berlin refused the slightest "prestige success" even to the new Czechoslovak Foreign Minister František Chvalkovský, who did not spare his assurances of loyalty to Germany.

The detailed protocol dealing with the final frontier delimitation was to be signed in January 1939 in Dresden. All the documents were ready, but eventually the German delegation refused to sign them. It was apparent that Germany wanted to elude the promised guarantee of Czechoslovakia by thwarting the final action on frontiers.[88] For, in the meantime, Hitler had already issued his directions concerning the final dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the settlement decreed in Munich and implemented by the Berlin International Commission was thus destined to be only an interlude of brief duration.

---

[83] *Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Protektorat Böhmen und Mähren* (Prague, 1941), p. XXX. See also *Br.*, No. 255; *Prager Presse*, Nov. 27, 1938; *L'Europe Centrale* (Prague, 1938), p. 737; *Československo v mapách* (Prague 1954), map No. 9. The population figures quoted in these sources differ slightly.

[84] *Br.*, No. 157.

[85] *Ibid.*, No. 180.

[86] *Ibid.*, No. 157.

[87] L. Feierabend, *Memoirs*, manuscript p. 42.

WASHINGTON, D.C.

---

[88] Communicated by Mr. A. Heidrich.

NOTES

The Far Western Slavic Conference held a most successful annual meeting at San Francisco State College April 29-30, 1961. The separate panel sessions on April 29 were: Eastern Europe in the Fifteenth Century, Anatole G. Mazour, presiding; Soviet-American Rivalry, Hugh G. J. Aitken, presiding; The Needs of the Russian and East European Field in North America, Raymond H. Fisher, presiding. On April 30 two morning panels were held: Soviet Communism and the East, H. H. Fisher presiding; Twentieth Century Slavic Literature, Victor Erlich presiding; and two afternoon panels: Russian Philosophy and Social Thought, Cyril Bryner presiding; the Soviet Regime in the Khrushchev Era, Julian Towster presiding. The total attendance was around 150, from the Midwest, the Rocky Mountain and Pacific Coast states and Canada.

* * * * *

The Ukrainian Institute of America (2 East 79th St., New York 21) held, March 17-20, 1961, a Congress of Free Ukrainian Scholarship, commemorating the 100th anniversary of the death of Taras Shevchenko. There was an exhibition of the various editions of the works of Shevchenko, a memorial service at St. George's Ukrainian Catholic Church, several scholarly sessions and a commemorative concert at Carnegie Hall.

* * * * *

From May 24 to May 27 the Arbeitsgemeinschaft Ost (Vienna I, Josefplatz 6) held a plenary session on the general theme of *Die Volkskultur der südosteuropäischen Völker* under the patronage of the Austrian Minister of Education, Dr. Heinrich Drimmel. The meetings took place in Salzburg. There were exhibits of folk art, illustrated lectures, lectures on folk poetry, readings, films of folk dances, and bus rides. There were also several *gemeinsame Abendessen.*

* * * * *

The Canadian Association of Slavists held its annual meeting at the University of Montreal, June 12-14, 1961. The public sessions were about evenly divided between philology in the broadest sense, and literature. There was one administrative session which was concerned with publications of the Association, reports of international meetings, and election of officers for 1961-62. Another session was joint between the Association of Canadian Slavists and the East Canadian Association of Slavists and East European Specialists. The Slavic Department of the University of Montreal announced a Summer Course in Slavistics and Training School for Teachers of Russian to be held July 3 to August 15, 1961. Early registration is recommended.

* * * * *

A new periodical of great interest to all Central Europeanists needs to be mentioned. The *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der deutsch-slawischen Beziehungen und Geschichte Ost- und Mitteleuropas* has begun to appear. Volumes I (1956) and II (1958), under the editorship of E. Donnert, have already come out. The journal is published under the auspices of the Institut für Geschichte der europäischen Volksdemokratien an der Karl-Marx Universität, Leipzig. The history of Poland, Czechoslovakia and the

Balkans in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the history of Russia's great friendship for these peoples was the theme of these first two volumes. The third volume (1960) had a somewhat different title: *Jahrbuch für Geschichte der UdSSR und der Volksdemokratischen Länder Europas,* and its contents reflect accurately the amended title. This annual contains valuable historiographical and bibliographical articles.

* * * * *

Interest in Joachim Lelewel, the liberal Polish historian and geographer of the early nineteenth century, has been especially noticeable in Poland since 1945. A number of biographies have appeared, and a major edition of his letters from the emigration (1948-1956), has reached its fifth volume, plus a separate index. A bibliography of his writings from 1807 to fragments or letters discovered as late as 1951, was published in 1952. A survey of research on Lelewel, "Badania nad Joachimem Lelewelem w Polsce współczesnej (1945-60)" by Andrzej Feliks Grabski appears in the last number of the *Kwartalnik Historyczny* (LVIII/1, 1961), pp. 184-90. The article announces the projected new and critical edition of the works of Lelewel, to be completed in 10 volumes. Two volumes, *Materiały autobiograficzne* (1957) and *Wykłady kursowe z historii powszechnej* (1959) have already appeared. Several others are in press or ready for the press, and all the rest are in preparation. The *opera omnia* in a critical edition will be a lasting and useful monument to a great historian.

* * * * *

The Institute of International Education announces competition for fellowships for graduate study in Poland and Romania offered by the respective governments for the academic year 1962-63. There will be fifteen Polish fellowships, to be spread over the various universities and technical schools of the republic. The number of Romanian fellowships is not stipulated but may be in any field of study. For detailed information application should be made to the Institute, 1 East 67th St., New York 21.

Droz, Jacques, *L'Europe Centrale. Evolution historique de l'idée de "Mitteleuropa."* Paris: Payot, 1960. Pp. 285. NF 16.

Using the history of the Habsburg dynasty in Austria since the Congress of Vienna as his framework, Professor Droz of the University of Clermont-Ferrand here investigates the idea of a Central Europe. The historical approach allows the author to examine the many suggestions that have challenged the attention of statesmen, publicists and historians intended to rationalize the organization of this multi-national area. Metternich had his ideas, the implementation of which was effective for some decades, yet not without tension and frustration. Friedrich List, out of Metternich's reach, based his thinking on the success of the *Zollverein* and assumed that economic motives were powerful enough to override political factors. 1848 took care of that dream. The Prussian-Habsburg tension, and the struggle between the *kleindeutsch* and *grossdeutch* concepts occupied thinking Europeans until the *Ausgleich*. The Compromise satisfied only the two ruling peoples, the Magyars and the Austrians. All others, unhappy at being relegated to positions of inferiority, joined eagerly in all discussions that assumed that the present situation was unacceptable. The rising tide of national awareness supported hopes for a federalism that would recognize the equality of all the peoples of the empire. The future shape of a federalized Danubian empire was never clearly proclaimed. The nearest anyone came to envisaging such a federal state was the work of Friedrich Naumann in his *Mitteleuropa* published in October 1915. To this work Professor Droz devotes a substantial section of his work, analyzing its strengths and weaknesses with great care.

The last chapter, "L'Europe Centrale balkanisée (1918-1945)," is used to demonstrate the futility of breaking up the Habsburg Empire into small, non-viable and mutually distrustful "national" states. The Little Entente is represented as the institutionalization of petty revenge by successor states against Hungary. The various efforts in the inter-bellum period at commercial collaboration failed to have any great effect because of rampant political nationalism. The Anschluss was likewise no answer to the problem, because it brought Germany into the Danubian basin as master, not colleague, thus violating principles both of balance and of geopolitical focus. The present "solution," control by Soviet Russia, is equally to be rejected, and for the same reason. Droz points out that the only uninhibited thinking about the most desirable future for Central Europe has had to be done by émigrés now living in the free world, but at the same time he points out that thus far no plan has been advanced which offers any really new hope.

At the end of his long and disappointing journey through the forest of ideas and suggestions for a solution of the problem of this variegated area, Professor Droz is willing to accept Naumann's basic thesis: that the area has a logical unity, a bond, as it were, of its own complexity and that it is and should be regarded as an integral society of peoples, a sort of league of nations, united by their proximity, their relative individual smallness, and, if so accepted, capable of serving as a model for national symbiosis for the larger nations of the world. The book is persuasively written, and the author has the basic facts and much of the relevant literature in the western languages under adequate control. On the other hand there is no evidence that the discussions of the fate and future of this area in which the scholars native to the area have been engaged for a century or more, still remaining in their own tongues, has been consulted. The literature on the subject by western Slavic, Magyar and Roumanian scholars is prodigious in mass and at least based on familiarity with the issues. It would be quaint to discuss Professor Droz' France without consulting French sources. To limit oneself to German and French works in any discussion of Central Europe, past, present or future, is to accept a very limited and biased point of view. In this respect the book is half a century out of date.

University of Colorado S. HARRISON THOMSON

BUCSAY, MIHALY, *Geschichte des Protestantismus in Ungarn.* Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1959. Pp. 227, 3 maps.

The author of this new history of Hungarian Protestantism is Professor of Church History at the Reformed Academy and also minister of the former Swiss Church in Budapest.

The Hungarian people, especially the Christians, have a strong sense of history. They "live with their history" even more than the Western Europeans; but not as if they were escaping from the present into the past; rather, they try to understand the present situation in the light of the past. It is against this background that Dr. Bucsay's new book must be understood and appreciated.

The book has appeared in West Germany and was written at the request of a Western theologian. The present book is a careful, chronologically constructed history of the two major denominations in Hungary, the Lutheran and the Reformed Church. The history of the Unitarians and of some small free churches is mentioned, since developments after the Reformation are described. The complicated political history, intimately interwoven with the life of the churches, is objectively described and evaluated. An excellent bibliography and a map of the old Hungary of 1606 facilitate the reading and understanding of material which may be unfamiliar to many.

The reviewer wishes to state some general impressions which, in his opinion, will strike the Western reader as particularly important:

(1) The history of Hungary is the history of the continuing failure of a people to reach national independence. The Turks and the Habsburg monarchy in its various forms constantly humiliated the Hungarian people. The music and poetry of this great people reflect a humiliated self-consciousness.

(2) Internal developments in the life of the church, as well as in the political life of the *Landtag,* remained surprisingly unknown to other European countries. This ignorance is certainly the cause for typical Western opinion about modern Hungary, which separates the new Communist Hungary from the "good old times," thus equating the relatively liberal and tolerable situation of the nineteenth century in Western Europe with the corresponding era in Hungary.

(3) It may be news to some readers to hear about many genuinely Hungarian aspects of the Reformation and its theology. The influence of the Germans was undoubtedly strong, but it is surprising to find how many Hungarians—peasants, *Bürger,* and aristocrats—developed their own rational ideas and not as a copy of Western Protestantism. However, this had its unfortunate aspect, since the social structure of the country did not allow the development of "presbyters" or "church sessions" until a surprisingly late date. Thus the life of the church depended much on civic leaders and on the attitudes of the land-owners.

(4) The chapters on the Counter-Reformation convey the darkest aspects of the story to the modern reader. The sufferings of the church surpassed anything which an anti-Communist news report may say or invent about the limitations of

the freedom of the church under Communism. Moreover, this time of unbelievable sufferings and persecutions lasted for over two centuries! When Western Protestantism had long enjoyed the status of equality, at the latest after 1803, the Hungarians were still experiencing the effects of the Counter-Reformation.

(5) Many eras of history appear to be "repeated": in past centuries theological books were sent to Hungary, scholarships were given to students who studied abroad, the Swiss and Dutch collected money for the churches, the British and Prussian ambassadors intervened for the freedom of the Protestants, etc.

Prof. Bucsay's chapter on the present situation of the churches is rather short; he rightly believes that the time for writing this part of history has not yet come. But those who know the present situation will admit that it is much more favorable for the people, including the Christians, than at almost any time in the past. (It is interesting to note that the Reformed Church now has 1.7 million members, the Lutheran Church has 0.4 million.) The limitations which the church must now accept are understood by the Christians as a retribution for the past; moreover, the Government may limit the activity of the Christians, but at least does not do it in the name of Christ! There were times in the past when ministers were arrested and killed or sold as slaves by Christians, when Christian monarchs forbade Protestant worship for centuries except in specially designated places which they kept under control, when the censorship in Vienna held back books and Bibles sent to the Hungarians by Western churches. Certainly, mistakes of the past do not justify those of the present. But we must see the present time in the light of the past if we want to understand why the churches in Hungary now try actively to participate in building up a new society, although they confess again and again that they cannot make any compromises with regard to atheistic ideology. Prof. Bucsay's book helps greatly to promote a correct and helpful understanding of these grave questions of our generation. It should be taken as one more invitation to trust the Christians on the other side of the Iron Curtain, rather than to keep telling them what they have long known: that they should not become Communists. The Hungarian church has gone through many ordeals in the past; it knows that the church must not exist for its own sake and its own protection, but for the world in which it lives.

DIETRICH RITSCHL

KANN, ROBERT *A., A Study in Austrian Intellectual History from Late Baroque to Romanticism.* New York: Praeger, 1960. Pp. xxii, 367. $6.00.

It is a difficult task which Professor Kann sets himself as the subject of this book; it is also difficult, but certainly not equally so, to review his attempt to accomplish that task. The problems of definition, scope, balance, and interpretation are usually serious ones for the scholar presenting the fruits of his research and thought. The scholar of intellectual history finds these problems more than usually difficult to resolve.

Is intellectual history an examination of the attitudes and values of the intellectuals? If so, who are the intellectuals? Rulers, officials, preachers, demagogues may or may not be men concerned primarily with the life of the mind, but they may nevertheless be powerful forces in shaping the thought of their societies. Or is intellectual history a study of the mental temper of a whole society? Here one is confronted with an undertaking of enormous proportions, one which mocks the powers of the historian, for the vast majority of men leave no records of their thoughts. The act of setting limits to such an inquiry must perforce be arbitrary, for the emanations of the mind are too subtle, too complex, or too nebulous to be clearly separate one from the other. That same subtlety and complexity also render difficult an interpretation and assessment of the vigor and *Nachwirkung* of a given corpus of ideas.

Kann has not explicitly defined intellectual history in this work, but implicitly he accepts the near impossibility of writing the history of the thought of all men. He is here concerned with men of prominence and influence, including statesmen, clerics, teachers, men of letters, patrons and artists of the formative arts, and musicians. Yet he does not treat all these and their various representations in the intellectual climate of Austria; rather, he selects for study two figures whom he considers to be significant, Abraham a Sancta Clara (1646-1709) and Joseph von Sonnenfels (1732-1817). Such a device has obvious limitations, recognized by the author, but it has the advantage of affording a point of departure, a center of attention for what might otherwise become a too massive or too nebulous treatise.

The work begins with the reign (Kann calls it the "Age") of Leopold I, the Austrian Baroque, and terminates at 1835 with Romanticism. It is characteristic of the Austrian eclectic that a Bavarian preacher, Abraham, and the son of a Prussian Jewish immigrant who had converted to Catholicism, Sonnenfels, should be central subjects. Within the established scope of the work, Kann devotes over half his book (177 out of 302 pages) to these two men, their ideas and their influences. The remainder of the book is devoted to short chapters of about equal length on the Baroque (1657-1705), late Baroque through Enlightenment (1711-1790), and Conservatism and Romanticism (1792-1835). The balance, then, favors the biographical approach to an understanding of intellectual Austria of these periods.

Abraham a Sancta Clara rose from humble origins to consort with the mighty and win a place in history. He took advantage of the preacher's court jester-like immunity to present a kind of *Hanswurst* morality at court and at large. He preached a religious, social, and political conservatism befitting his times with a flare for demogoguery, the sum of which he bequeathed to later Austrian Christian Socialism. Kann writes that there is more than parallelism connecting Abraham and Karl Lueger.

Sonnenfels, with no touch of Harlequin, nor even a trace of humor, acted in a quite different way as conscience prodder and secular preacher. He was a student of Riegger and Martini and an ardent exponent of Enlightened Absolutism—without failing to give due honor to the second word of the term. The late Professor Valjavec wrote that the Enlightenment was a lineal ancestor of liberalism and democracy, but Sonnenfels was not of that line of the family. He advocated censorship, put his trust in educating the aristocracy to rule, and sought to use the despot to accomplish the enlightened program. He was no proto-democrat. But with the favor of Maria Theresa to shield him from his enemies (and sometimes his friends in principle who were personally alienated by his acerbity), he labored long and energetically, if rather tactlessly at times, to insure rational justice and civil administration for Austrians. Less knowledgeably, he was a critic of literature and drama. His voice was the better heard in that he occupied the chair of political science at the University of Vienna and held advisory posts in government.

Of the two men, Abraham belonged to the stronger era. The conservative has as his allies the forces of time, inertia, and greater cultural strength (which comes from reflection and meditation, by nature denied to the reformer). These he couples with a capacity to compromise in matters of practice. The period of enlightened reform could not match conservatism in strength or longevity because the reformers had to be hasty, overcome passivity and indifference, could not afford to compromise in practice for fear of injuring principle, and were embarrassed by the intemperance of the French Revolution, which was held to be a blood relation to enlightened reformism.

This latest work of Professor Kann is an interesting, informative, oftentimes provocative first attempt in English to discover the nature of Austrian intellectual history of the eighteenth century and therefore deserves happy recognition. But if the ideas are provocative, the style is sometimes provoking. Sentences are often too heavily laden to be immediately and gracefully clear. On the other hand, at least one sentence is so unburdened as to be without a subject. Colloquialisms such as ". . . this philosophy was again given its walking papers" are too numerous. The conjunction of the anglicized and German forms of the names "Frederick Wilhelm" jars the reader, as does the term "Kossuthianism."

These criticisms are not meant, however, to obscure the judgment that this is indeed what the publisher claims, a "book that matters," which can be used with profit, if not always with aesthetic pleasure, by students of Austrian history.

University of Minnesota WILLIAM E. WRIGHT

SCHULTE, FRITZ, *Die Entwicklung der gewerblichen Wirtschaft in Rheinland-Westfalen im 18. Jahrhundert*. Cologne: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv zu Köln, 1959. Pp. 135.

ENGELS, ALFRED, *Die Zollgrenze in der Eifel*. Cologne: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv zu Köln, 1959. Pp. 127.

BEAU, HORST, *Das Leistungswesen des frühindustriellen Unternehmertums in Rheinland und Westfalen*. Cologne: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv zu Köln, 1959. Pp. 79.

ESTERHUES, ELISABETH, *Die Seidenhändlerfamilie Zurmühlen in Münster i.W.* Cologne: Rheinisch-Westfälisches Wirtschaftsarchiv, 1960. Pp. 71 and 5 appendices.

The four books under review are doctoral dissertations, completed in the faculty of economic and social sciences of the University of Cologne under the direction of the late Professor Ludwig Beutin. Obviously, they fulfill the requirements established for the doctor's degree at Cologne and, presumably, at German universities in general. In evaluating them, one should not seek a common denominator with their American counterparts. The topics of these dissertations are very narrow, and, above all, they deliberately do not include interpretation and general background—elements usually expected in American dissertations. Their contributions to historical knowledge consequently are frankly modest. They are essentially exercises in synthesizing available printed material, occasionally flavored by reference to some archival sources when an author chooses to elucidate a special topic. In so far as they concentrate on one particular area, they do offer insights and appraisals that might easily escape the notice of the historian.

The Esterhues study, to be sure, is wholly based on archival sources. It gives an insight into the operations of the Zurmühlen family business, a purveyor of silk goods, during the period 1685 to 1749. This merchant house operated at a fairly prosperous but quite ordinary level, and ultimately went the way of so many other family businesses: some of the heirs became government officials and others lost interest in the business world. The author composed some meticulously worked maps, showing exactly where the upper class clientele was located, indicating every castle and monastery where a customer resided. For a business analysis, however, time series of the firm's purchases, sales, and financial condition should have been appended, if at all possible. This omission is all the more deplorable since the body of the study leads one to surmise that such material apparently is available.

The use of archival sources is less apparent in the Engels and the Schulte studies. Both attempt to describe in some detail the economic activities of an area in the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Rhineland. The two studies are similar in spite of the fact that their titles differ considerably. Engels' work covers a mountainous area including the Taunus, Hunsrück, Eifel, Westerwald, and Ardennes regions and concentrates on the tariff borders of the sovereignties that were located there during the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. As might be expected, he finds no uniformity and on the contrary, demonstrates how Jülich Berg, the Austrian Netherlands, the archbishoprics of Cologne and Trèves, etc., followed separate principles. Engels describes the development of this area to the take-over by Prussia and shows that for a long time the central administration in Berlin gave this region rather cavalier treatment. Though concentrating on the tariff problem, Engels also traces the industrial development of his area, where the cloth industry (especially in Aachen, Montjoie, and in Eupen) and, to a lesser extent, the iron industry were the most important. Schulte, in his study, takes up primarily the area north of that covered by Engels, though in the Aachen-Montjoie area the two overlap. His is, of course, a region that showed great development in the nineteenth century, a trend, which as demonstrated in this study, was clearly foreshadowed in the eighteenth century. Undoubtedly this is true but the author relies all too heavily on eighteenth-century statistics for his proof—all too heavily, because eighteenth-century statistics in general are highly unreliable. They must, of course, be used for none better are available; but they should be used with great caution.

Probably the most interesting work of the four is Beau's analysis of the educational and social background of early nineteenth-century entrepeneurs in the Rhineland-Westphalia area. By drawing together pertinent information on a number of men, Beau attempts to establish some of the factors necessary for entrepreneurial studies. One may hope that the author continues his interest and will someday produce a monograph on Rhenish and Westphalian entrepreneurs, certainly a group of men that deserves careful analysis.

These four small books are, in short, what they purport to be: German doctoral dissertations. They are reasonably good exercises in advanced historical work. The Rhenish-Westphalian economic archives at Cologne, of whose series, *Schriften zur Rheinisch-westfälischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte,* they make up the first four volumes, is to be complimented for the encouragement that these publications represent to young scholars.

Montana State University HERMAN FREUDENBERGER

BIRKE, ERNST, and KURT OBERDORFFER, eds., *Das Böhmische Staatsrecht in den Deutsch-Tschechischen Auseinandersetzungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts.* Marburg/Lahn: N. G. Elwert-Verlag, 1960.

Ever since the Czech national revival of the early nineteenth century the issue of Czech state rights has figured most prominently in Czech-German political discussions. Justifying their claims mainly on historical grounds, but later also by consideration of natural rights, Czech spokesmen pressed ever more relentlessly for the nation's right to statehood, first within the framework of a reformed Austrian Empire and subsequently on the basis of full national independence. On the other hand, both the Sudeten and Austrian German spokesmen, guided mainly by fear for the fate of the Sudeten Germans in a Czech-dominated state, contested the Czech claims with equal determination. Although the two world wars of the twentieth century settled the matter in favor of the Czechs, the verdict has not been accepted as final by a great many Sudeten Germans expelled from their Sudeten homeland at the end of World War II. Under these circumstances, the interest of the Historical Commission of the Sudeten Lands, which has sponsored the publication of the present volume, in the matter of Czech state rights is understandable.

The volume consists of four papers presented at a session of the Historical Commission of the Sudeten Lands in October 1958 and subsequently published in the *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* in 1959. Appended to them is the substance of the discussion by the participants in the Commission's session. The contents of the book are well indicated by the titles of the respective papers: "The Bohemian State Right as Seen by the Czechs," by Richard Plaschka, Vienna; "The Attitude of the Germans from the Sudeten Lands to the Historical State Right," by Helmut Slapnicka, Linz; "The Concept of the People and the State Ideology of the Czechs," by Eugen Lemberg, Wiesbaden; and "The Historical State Right and the Right of Self-Determination in the Creation of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1919," by Kurt Rabl, Munich.

Although all four contributors to the volume are German and their interpretation is at times somewhat pro-German, the study is conceived in an objective and scholarly fashion, and the Czech viewpoints are, on the whole, fairly and adequately presented. All the contributions are amply documented from both German and Czech sources and show their authors' thorough grasp of the topics with which they are concerned.

The most controversial of the four papers is Professor Lemberg's discussion of Czech ideology concerning the state and the people. While much of what he says about the Czechs' over-emphasis on the people (*Volk*) and their rather negative attitude toward the state (*Staat*) is essentially correct, some of his conclusions are rather far-fetched. It certainly is a gross over-simplification to assert that the real cause (*eigentliche Ursache*) of the downfall of the Czechoslovak Republic was the Czech concept of the state as a "protective organization and power instrument of the Czech-speaking population" which had prevented "the deological integration of the Germans and the other national minorities" (p. 50). Nor is it quite correct to designate the Czech people as "a sort of sect, a communty of faith . . . to belong to which is a moral performance and not to belong to which means a moral stain" (p. 58). Similarly exaggerated and unduly doctrinaire s Professor Lemberg's thesis that the Czech "lack of a theoretical penetration of the nationality problems" caused " the state which the Czechs obtained in 1918 to be from its very beginning an old-fashioned thing that remained behind the spiritual development of the European nationalities, their legal concepts, and behind the existing . . . models for the solution of nationality questions" (p. 57).

In spite of these and a few other similarly sweeping overstatements the book provides students of Central European problems with much useful information on an important aspect of Czech-German relations.

University of Texas **Edward Taborsky**

Pöls, Werner, *Sozialistenfrage und Revolutionsfurcht in ihrem Zusammenhang mit den angeblichen Staatsstreichplänen Bismarcks. (Historische Studien, Heft* 377). Lübeck and Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag, 1960. Pp. 103.

Bismarck has been the subject of a number of special studies in recent years. The Germans, whose history in the past half century has not been a happy one, have cause to cherish the memery of the Chancellor who raised Germany to greatness and knew how to guard that greatness through a policy of limited aims commensurate with the international realities of the European continent. But the repeated examination of a historical figure usually leads to an apology for the whole man, with a growing stress on the more questionable aspects of his career. So may it be with Bismarck.

The present monograph examines the role which the fear of a Social Democratic and proletarian revolution occupied in Bismarck's calculations in connection with the thought of a possible *coup d'état* which would have altered the constitutional foundations upon which the second *Reich* rested, foundations which he himself had helped to lay.

It is recognized that Bismarck in 1890 suggested a constitutional interpretation which explained the German union as the product of an agreement among the German princes. Theoretically, it therefore followed that the union could be dissolved if the princes and the senates of the free cities decided to withdraw. In this way, if election results continued to be unfavorable, it would be possible to eliminate the *Reichstag,* which in the opinion of the Chancellor had not evolved in accordance with initial expectations. In a reconstituted empire the powers and functions of the *Reichstag,* as well as the electoral system, could be altered in a manner calculated to guarantee the desired result.

Werner Pöls makes a critical survey of the conflicting interpretations with respect to the gravity of the *coup d'état* idea in Bismarck's calculations. He rejects the views of Erich Eyck and Zechlin that the latter represented a set policy during the last years of Bismarck's chancellorship, influenced by the consideration that such a policy would make him more indispensable to the young emperor, William II. While not completely discounting the above possibilities, Pöls takes the view that a forceful constitutional change represented only an ultimate tactic which the resourceful Chancellor held in reserve if the *Reichstag* refused to continue and stiffen the anti-socialist legislation which Bismarck considered vital for the domestic security of imperial Germany. Nor was the fear of a Social Democratic upheaval just a convenient red herring.

The author, citing from the *Reichstag* debates, the memoirs of various political leaders, and the literature of the age, makes a strong case for the reality of this fear—in the public at large as well as in Bismarck. The Social Democratic platform was a negation of virtually everything which the German state and society represented. It might have been noted also that the Marxians were in a very confident mood at this time, especially after the elections of 1890 in which the Social Democrats had the largest popular vote. Friedrich Engels believed that a triumph in ten years was possible.

The work includes a bibliography of the major published and unpublished sources which have a bearing on the various aspects of the problem. Included is a list of contemporary works and articles dealing with the Social Democratic threat and the danger of a proletarian revolution.

Montana State University **Oscar J. Hammen**

Gonda, Imre, *Bismarck és az 1867-es osztrák-magyar kiegyezés* (Értekezések a történeti tudományok köréből). Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1960. Pp. 169 Ft. 20.

This volume is a part of the monographic series on Central Europe with emphasis on Hungary issued by the Historical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences under the editorship of István Barta. In the Introduction (pp. 5-15) Mr. Gonda makes a critical survey of German- and Hungarian-language bourgeois as well as Marxist historiography, dealing primarily with the Iron Chancellor's contribution to the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise. The rigidly dogmatic views of the once leading Marxist theoreticians, József Révai and Zs. P. Pach, having no relation to the primary sources, are also dealt with, while significant writings of Erich Eyck, Friedrich Darmstaedter, Chester Wells Clark, etc., are omitted.

In further chapters on the Austrian-Prussian-Hungarian interactions focused on the *Ausgleich* of 1867, the author has also failed to make use of the most recent German literature, excepting a few such as the Austrian Fritz Fellner's periodical article.

It is a well-established fact that the cordial Prusso-Hungarian relationship dates back to as early as 1860, when Bismarck already envisaged Hungary's role in his founding of a Prussian-dominated German Empire. Mr. Gonda has carefully followed this line of development through the Compromise to the outbreak of the Franco-German War of 1870.

The author's theses in general are well based on published and, in a few cases, unpublished documents housed in the Vienna and Budapest archives. But it is not understood why he did not fully utilize the unpublished records of the Vienna and Budapest Cabinet sessions held on the eve of the Franco-German War. I refer chiefly to the sudden change in Count Julius Andrássy, the leading statesman of the Danube Monarchy, from an essentially pro-French to a strongly pro-German attitude. In the reviewer's judgment this was an epoch-making turning point in diplomatic affairs and affords a long-sought clue to a more realistic interpretation of the later so fruitful German-Hungarian collaboration against the Russian-led Slavs up to the end of World War II. Gonda should have centered his otherwise many-sided research on this particular issue in order to reveal the foundations of the historic German-Hungarian ties within the framework of European diplomacy. For this purpose, it would have been necessary to give a more detailed account of the events leading so consistently towards the break-up of the Austrian-Russian-Prussian alliance. Without elucidating this background the decisively pro-Hungarian approach of Bismarckian diplomacy cannot be thoroughly examined.

It is worth mentioning that the author has tried to make a quite acceptable analysis of the multinational character of the Habsburg Empire, which had been unable to realize the idea of the *Gesamtreich* as it had appeared in the minds of such contemporary statesmen as Joseph Eötvös, whose relevant train of thought is well treated by Gonda. In this respect, he has also successfully pointed out the main differences which had existed between the progress of the Western national unities and that taking place in the Dual Monarchy.

But, unfortunately, some conspicuously improper statements have arisen from the author's stubborn use of the Marxist-Leninist interpretation of history. In line with it, he has uncritically accepted the unhistorical views of Marx and Engels according to which Germany's war against France in 1870-1871 was "progressive" (p. 132); Gonda has, at least theoretically, neglected its most direct product, Prussian militarism and all its well-known consequences. In the course of reevaluating his data the author has gone so far that the history-making factors of the nineteenth century have been rejected for the simple reason that all-important decisions were not made on the grounds of the twentieth-century Marxist-Leninist theory of class warfare. This anachronistic approach is always present when the author tries to draw final conclusions from historical occurrences. Otherwise his careful research has contributed several new insights to the historiography of Bismarckian diplomacy and the 1867 Austro-Hungarian Compromise.

If Mr. Gonda's well-footnoted volume were revised and enlarged with more archival material, it could, undoubtedly, shed even more light upon the significant early phase of German-Hungarian-Slavic relations and thereby elucidate some unclear problems relating to the history of the two world wars.

Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. **FRANCIS S. WAGNER**

KOSZYK, KURT, *Zwischen Kaiserreich und Diktatur: Die sozialdemokratische Presse von 1914 bis 1933.* (Deutsche Presseforschung, Band I) Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1959. Pp. 275. DM 23.

Scholarly studies of the European political press are rarer than they ought to be considering the importance of the subject and the availability of material. This monograph by Kurt Koszyk is almost, if not quite, a model study of the press of one of the most important and politically potent parties in Germany during the World War I and Weimar periods. The author has woven it in two thick strands: one, the role of the press in publicizing Socialist party policies and reactions to national and international developments; and second, the SPD press as an institution—its organizational economics, journalistic strengths and weaknesses, and political potency. No other German party possessed such a highly developed, extensive and tightly controlled publicity machine. The party press and the party organization were twin pillars of the Social Democratic Party.

In an introductory chapter the author covers the founding period of the SPD press. Following this is a detailed presentation of the dissensions and difficulties that troubled the party and its press during World War I. Philipp Scheidemann's explanation of the party leadership's endorsement of the war—"We defend the Fatherland in order to conquer it"—did not satisfy all party members and leaders. Disagreement and criticism appeared almost immediately in the press. Editorial staffs were divided and local press committees were at loggerheads with the central executive authority. Purges of editorial staffs to enforce uniformity were not uncommon occurrences and added to the bitterness and strife within the party. Finally, in 1917, the conflict between patriotism and Socialist principles split the worker's movement into majority and independent Socialist parties. These chapters complement in a significant manner Carl Schorske's study, *German Social Democracy, 1905-1917*.

The political upheavals in the party during the war were reflected in the decline in circulation and number of SPD papers. From 91 in 1914, the number declined to 80 in March 1917, with a loss of 48 per cent of circulation. For the party press, the war ended in a "year of chaos." However, despite the defection of the Independent Socialists, inflation, newsprint shortage, and scarcity of experienced journalists, the Socialist press made a remarkably rapid recovery and underwent considerable expansion, although not in proportion to the number of new SPD voters. By the end of 1924, the number of papers had increased to 169, the party owned 104 printing establishments, and thirty additional plants were in the hands of party members. The year 1924-25 saw the beginning of a transformation of the Socialist press from a political party instrument with narrow objectives to a modern press with popular appeal. This was accomplished by adding features responsive to the interests of the worker and his family—the political cartoon, news photos, sports news and reporting, economic and financial sections, local news and consumer advertising. Mode and fashion, the serialized novel, and home economics were frequently added for the women, greatly to the disgust of the old line doctrinaire Socialists. Modernized in content and make-up, to compete with the middle-class newspaper for the worker's subscription, the SPD press was also re-structured and given a firm financial foundation and a greater degree of centralization. This was accomplished through the establishment of the *Konzentration AG*, in effect an operating trust organized by the central party committee to provide centralized purchasing, capital funds and operating loans, responsible auditing of all business and publishing offices, and the means for establishing additional papers where needed. Thus modernized, the SPD press reached its highest point of expansion in 1929: 203 newspapers with nearly a million and a half circulation. Substantial losses and contractions came with the great depression, but the physical assets which the Hitler Reich seized and converted to the use of the Nazi party are estimated conservatively at between 120 million and 150 million marks. An extensive bibliography and thirty-five pages of documentation and notes add to the value of this sound and informative monograph.

University of Virginia ORON J. HALE

GEISS, IMANUEL, *Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-1918. Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Kriegszielpolitik im Ersten Weltkrieg.* Historische Studien Heft 378. Lübeck, Hamburg: Matthiesen Verlag. Pp. 188. DM 18.

Among several works on Polish history, published recently in Western Germany, the little volume by Imanuel Geiss deserves special attention. The author, presumably a young historian, set out to examine secret German plans of annexation of Polish territories during the First World War. His objective was to seek for truth and to present facts irrespective of whether they may be embarrassing for the Germans or not. Geiss undoubtedly has achieved this aim. His wide use of hitherto unexplored archives, his intellectual honestly and imagination make this work a valuable contribution to the history of German-Polish relations.

Der polnische Grenzstreifen fills an important gap in our knowledge of Germany's eastern policy from 1914 to 1918, a gap which resulted largely from the inaccessibility of sources and from the silence maintained by those directly involved. Geiss' work brings a revision of the prevalent expositions which minimized German annexation plans, attributed them to a handful of extremists, and generally distorted their nature.

His well-documented book presents a new picture. Plans for annexation and possible germanization of wide strips of ethnic Polish territory—parts of Congress Poland—enjoyed the support of practically all leading political and military figures in Germany from December 1914 to August 1918. Even the parliamentary majority seemed to favor them until mid-1917. While important differences of opinion existed with regard to actual borders and population transfers, annexation plans were meant in all seriousness. Only the military defeat of imperial Germany prevented their actual application.

Geiss' book is divided into four parts. In the first part he presents the historical background of Prussian-German eastern policy up to 1918. It is a fair presentation and the author rightly insists that old Prussia was by nature inimical to the Polish nation and constituted a bulwark both against democracy and national self-determination. Geiss analyzes German policy toward Poland during the First World War, and deals with the three proposed solutions: an Austro-Polish arrangement, a fourth partition, or a German-dominated Polish buffer state. This last solution prevailed, as shown by the two Emperors' manifesto of 1916, but the author points out that this was hardly a solution at all. Germany, burdened with Prussian heritage, could not achieve a real reconciliation with the Poles. Poland's fate was conditioned by Berlin's determination never to allow a Polish irredenta, and it was linked with the *Mitteleuropa* scheme which crippled Poland in the east. Berlin's Polish policy moved in a vicious circle, and the annexation plans which would have further reduced the rump Polish state prevented any genuine cooperation.

The second part of the book deals with the annexation plans and German public opinion. The author produces a great deal of evidence, pointing to the wide support which the annexation plans commanded. He discusses the views of the *Alldeutsche* and the *Ostmarkverein,* the opinions of scholars, officials, industrialists, *Mitteleuropäern,* and political parties. He concludes that in spite of a variety of attitudes, ranging from the extremists who advocated large territorial acquisitions and the complete removal of Poles and Jews, to more moderate advocates of territorial expansion, real anti-annexationists represented only a handful of people in Germany.

The third and fourth parts deal with the origins and evolution of the annexation plans up to 1918. Using new material, Geiss shows that these plans originated with the government without too much outside pressure. He demolishes the thesis that German projects for vast population transfers came up only after the Russians' moves against their German subjects in 1915. The author then stresses the importance of the Schwerin memorandum which proposed extensive annexations and a removal of over three million people from the annexed areas. This memorandum had great influence on German policy during the war. After the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland in 1916, the general picture became more complex. Several leading politicians showed more flexibility concerning the annexation and transfer program, and from 1917, the Army command—*OHL*—began to overshadow the whole issue. Ludendorff became the most outspoken protagonist of eastern expansion. But in the strife between the politicians and the *OHL,* the former were not as anti-annexationist as some historians have tried to show. It was the collapse of Germany and not the opposition of the government that had put an end to all schemes for annexations in Poland.

In his conclusion Geiss places the annexation plans within a wider framework, indicating clearly his awareness that the topic transcends the bounds of Germany's war aim during the 1914-18 conflict. The author feels that his study, in bringing a revised picture of German annexation plans, provides for a better understanding of German-Polish relations in 1919 and in the years which followed. He also shows that many supporters of annexations exhibited a pre-Nazi way of thinking. Terms such as "living space," "purity of race," "colonizing mission," *Herrenvolk,* which are generally not associated with imperial Germany, found their way into the various memoranda of the period. Geiss remarks that the Nazis who annexed territories in Poland, established a truncated *General Gouvernement,* brought in German settlers, and engaged in vast deportation schemes, could claim that they were putting into practice some of the ideas of William II's government. The bestiality and the ruthlessness of the Nazis differed greatly, of course, from the methods used or contemplated by imperial Germany, where there was some respect for law and human life; but many of the ideas were strangely similar. Finally, Geiss rightly emphasizes that expansionist policies, justified on the ground of demographic pressure in Germany, were based on wrong premises. Industrialization and transformation of social structure are the ways in which a modern society deals with population problems and moves toward greater democracy. Imperial Germany and the Third Reich chose other methods which resulted in a suicidal policy of conquest and expansion.

Der polnische Grenzstreifen is an important book. It cannot be overlooked by historians of the First World War and by those interested in twentieth century German-Polish problems. The author's courage in presenting facts and interpretations which are likely to displease German nationalists deserves respect. His scholarship and objectivity are impressive.

Indiana University Piotr S. Wandycz

Gottlieb, Manuel, *The German Peace Settlement and the Berlin Crisis.* New York: Paine-Whitman Publishers, 1960. Pp. 275. $8.50.

The Versailles treaty was certainly not a satisfactory settlement for a long period of European peace. But it was still a settlement which safeguarded a minimum of national independence for the defeated. The head-on clash of two divergent ideologies in the heart of Europe precluded in the last analysis a German peace settlement through a compromise of national interests. The victors proceeded to make their own settlements with the two halves of a partitioned country.

There is a tendency in the extant literature to neglect this overriding ideological conflict and to seek the causes of failure in the handling of negotiations over specific issues. Depending on the selection of factors and political bias, one or the other side receives a greater or lesser degree of blame, either for lack of determination or political wisdom, or even for treachery. In the present study, Prof. Gottlieb seeks to avoid "personalized categories of blame or guilt," but he readily admits that subtle forms of bias may have persisted even after the original doctoral dissertation had to pass the muster of competent critics.

This is an understatement. By painstakingly tracing the minute details of inter-allied negotiations, the author appears to be fixing the blame on both sides. But he never escapes the consequences of his first proposition: "The study was written on the assumption that the relative ability of any given society to handle large-scale overhead political organization and directive mechanisms, successful societal response to impoverishment, dislocation and developmental needs will generate collectivism and controls." The instances of proof for this assumption that are cited (such as the early speedier recovery of the Soviet Zone) are not convincing. Before 1948, collectivism and planning were virtually absent in the Soviet zone. When they were introduced, its recovery fell quickly behind that of western Germany.

But the major, unstated bias lies in the onesidedness of the author's approach. As an economist, Prof. Gottlieb quite naturally proceeds from the assumption that the German peace settlement rested primarily on agreement about specific economic problems that seemed at least in principle solvable, with the wartime alliance against Germany providing the necessary political community of interests and even an "ideological overlap." This could presumably be carried over into the postwar period, because the only conceivable threat to the peace would be a renascent Nazi Germany. In Prof. Gottlieb's view the Control Council regime would rest on the "unity of the occupying powers set against a rather apathetic and submissive German world."

Having reduced the whole German problem to specific economic questions, the author marshals sufficient empirical evidence to show that these could have been met by solutions acceptable to both sides. To make a politically acceptable case, the author has to show, however, that Soviet economic policies had intrinsic merits or were at least genuine measures of denazification (such as the nationalization of industry). On the basis of his rather superficial selection and uncritical treatment of sources on the early Soviet zone regime, he accepts the myth of a "real turn in policy" by the communist leaders in 1945/46. He thereby overlooks the real turn of policy that contributed so much to allied disunity. From the very beginning the Soviets had decided to collaborate with reliable and controllable "democratic" Germans against their former "ambivalent" allies. At a time when the West despaired of finding "good" Germans, the Soviets had begun to shape them in their own image.

Prof. Gottlieb's preoccupation with economic solutions leads him to believe that their failure resulted in the cold war. In the same curious inversion of cause and effect we find other peculiar judgments. The insistence of the U. S. on its right to stay in Berlin in order to prevent a further expansion of the Soviet sphere becomes thus part of U. S. cold war strategy. Is it difficult to perceive why this should not equally apply to Germany as a whole, or even to Europe?

Prof. Gottlieb has utilized a great wealth of unpublished manuscripts and not easily accessible Control Council documents. But his citations from German sources in the original language reduces their value to the average reader, especially since the incredible amount of spelling errors (in the footnotes to Chapter III alone there are about 60!), and the meaningless syntax produced by running part sentences in English and German together, are an added annoyance.

University of California, Berkeley Horst Duhnke

Orlando, Vittorio Emanuele, *Memorie (1915-1919). A cura di Rodolfo Mosca*
Milan: Rizzoli, 1960. Pp. 639. L. 3500.

Among the allied leaders of the first World War and the makers of the subsequent peace in Paris, the Italian Prime Minister, Orlando, was for a long time the last survivor; he died in 1952 in his ninety-third year. Men in such positions have generally displayed great readiness in writing their memoirs, defenses of the roles which it fell to their lot to play. Not until now has Orlando's contribution been made available; such as it is, it is highly sketchy and incomplete, the notes he set down for the purpose during the Second World War and after having been edited by Professor Mosca.

These recollections cover only four years, the most important to be sure o Orlando's career. They naturally fall into two parts, the war period and the peacemaking. As in Britain and France, it was the stresses of war that brough Orlando to the Prime Ministership of Italy; his assumption of it in Novembe 1917 took place under especially difficult circumstances, when the Caporetto disaste put in the balance the ability of the country to continue in the war at all. It was without a doubt an act of courage. Orlando has much to say on the score, and to the student of Italian affairs his strictures on the wartime organization and functioning of his country hold considerable interest. These have to do mainly with the too great autonomy of the military command, more specifically the personality and methods of the Commander-in-Chief, General Cadorna. Cadorna's laying the blame for the disaster on the deficient morale, to use the kindest word, of the rank and file, was, at the very least, bad taste. His removal was also an act of daring, for which full credit should be given Orlando; yet it would have been just as well to acknowledge that Caporetto remains a somewhat less than creditable performance in Italian military annals.

But Orlando's own field of operation was the domestic scene; the foreign field had greater importance in Paris. That he was the smallest as well as the weakest among the Big Four is rather borne out by these recollections. They are a very disappointing record, full of regrettable reticence. Thus, one looks in vain for enlightenment on how Italy came to obtain with such ease the frontier of the Brenner when the Istrian and Dalmatian sectors proved such insoluble issues. Her position was, no doubt, a most difficult one, for the discrepancy between the 1915 Pact of London and any possible interpretation of Point IX of Wilson's Fourteen Points was too great and too clear for easy compromise. The Pact of London was a valid treaty—for the British and French—but Wilson was not bound by it; the story of the Italo-American clash is a familiar one.

To it Orlando adds little, defending, as one might expect, his actions and contending that, in the circumstances, he managed successfully to defend his country's interest. The power of the United States and Wilson's arbitral position he fully recognized, but one can only express profound disappointment at his interpretation of things. Wilson, the key to whose character lay in the word hypocrisy (according to Orlando), was moved by *a priori* prejudice, induced by dark mysterious forces, vaguely hinted at Yugoslav contacts, and more clearly stated feminine (Mrs. Wilson's) influence. This is not helpful, and the depth of misunderstanding is best revealed by a quotation: "The world settlement in Paris, during the first six months of 1919, was wholly dominated by a central issue from which the outcome of all others depended; this was the Adriatic question, or more precisely, that of the frontier between Italy and Yugoslavia" (p. 414). This can only be called aberration and fantasy; the Adriatic was but one, and hardly *the* most important, issue of the peacemaking, except for the Italians.

There is sounder appraisal of the general peace and its shortcomings, the great unknowns of the more distant future that Germany and Russia represented; but the failure to appreciate and exploit, through intelligent adaptation to unexpectedly altered circumstances, the consequences of the Habsburg demise, confirms the view that the directors of Italian policy in 1919 showed inability to rise to the occasion. The trying verbosity of the writing aggravates the disappointment at what might have been a valuable historical contribution.[1]

Istituto per gli Studi di
Politica Internazionale, Milan RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

---

[1] A more valuable contribution may be expected from the messages that passed between Orlando and the King, the publication of which, also under the care of Professor Mosca, is shortly forthcoming.

Borys, Jurij, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine: A Study in the Communist Doctrine of the Self-Determination of Nations.* Stockholm, 1960. Pp. 374.

This volume deals with the theory of national self-determination and its practical application by Russian Communists in the Ukraine up to 1923. The first of its six chapters deals briefly with the attitude of Marx and his early followers (Russian and non-Russian) towards the question of national minorities. Chapter II examines at considerable length and with remarkable clarity the complex social and economic conditions in the Ukraine on the eve of and during the Revolution, basic beliefs and organization of various Russian, Ukrainian, Jewish and Polish political parties in the Ukraine, and Ukrainian national aspirations. Chapter III analyzes, likewise at considerable length, various Russian Communist attempts at sovietization of the Ukraine, the difficulties these attempts encountered and Lenin's re-evaluation of the nationality policy in the Ukraine. Chapter IV discusses relationships between the RSFSR and the UkSSR. Chapter V treats the formation of the USSR and Ukrainian objections to that centralizing move. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes the methods used by the Russian Communist Party in implementing its nationality policy. A useful bibliographical essay in the beginning and an extensive bibliography at the end of the study round out the volume.

This case study of a highly important problem of Soviet affairs (but one still somewhat neglected by scholars)—the national problem—bears the imprint of erudition and impressive integration of complex but interrelated developments. It is based on extensive use of source materials found in this country and abroad. These in turn are supplemented by secondary works pertinent to the problem. Much of the information this volume contains can be found in other studies, though perhaps not in as great detail. Some, however, like the author's treatment of the organization, membership and ideas of various political parties in the Ukraine, is new to English-speaking readers and will be appreciated by all those interested in the problem.

The author maintains, and in the opinion of this reviewer rightly so, that the architect of the Communist nationality policy was not Marx but Lenin, who, having grasped the historical and revolutionary role of the nationality problem in Russia, decided to utilize it in the proletarian revolution. To win Russia's minorities to his cause Lenin "supported" minority rights (including their right of secession from Russia). Once in power, however, the Communist Party, under Lenin's leadership, forgot its promise and began to combat the idea of secession and self-determination within the Communist orbit as counter-revolutionary. The author is correct in his assertion that the "example of the Ukraine shows that the Russian Bolsheviks declared war on the Ukrainian Central Rada not so much for its being counter-revolutionary and for its support to Kaledin, but mainly because the Central Rada began to carry out self-determination in earnest and proclaimed the Ukraine an independent state." The desire to gain control of vital resources of the Ukraine was another factor. The Ukraine, in other words, (as well as other borderlands of Russia) was brought back into Moscow's orbit primarily by the force of the Red Guards, with the help of a small but determined group of local Bolsheviks. In the final analysis the same holds true of all other territorial gains made by the Communists.

Readers accustomed to the Library of Congress transliteration of Slavic names may here raise some objection. There are also some inconsistencies in identifications of various individuals. On the whole, however, this study is a valuable contribution to the slowly growing literature on the national problem.

Portland State College, Oregon **Basil Dmytryshyn**

Fiedler, Heinz, *Der sowjetische Neutralitätsbegriff in Theorie und Praxis, Ein Beitrag zum Problem des Disengagement*. Köln: Verlag für Politik und Wirtschaft, 1959. Pp. 302. DM 24.80.

This careful and informative study investigates some of the most crucial aspects of present-day international law and of the diplomatic relations between the Communist orbit and the rest of the world. The only reproach which can be made to the author is that, excellent though the different parts of his doctoral thesis are, he has not succeeded in integrating them. Hence repetitions and a general looseness of his argumentation.

He is most convincing when he develops, on the basis of Soviet writings from Lenin to the latest articles in the *Sovjetskoe Gosudarstvo i Pravo* the general Communist outlook on international law. There is in fact agreement between East and West on the ultimate nature of such law. A valid legal order must be based on a community of interests. Since Communism denies the existence of such a community between the socialist and capitalist nations, in the Soviet view, international law, like coexistence, has all the characteristics of a provisorium.

This does in no way preclude that while this provisorium lasts—and it has lasted now for more than forty years—international law and such a central concept as neutrality, guaranteed by treaties or tacit agreements, have fulfilled a variety of changing functions in Soviet theory and practice. That the author found it necessary to separate his analysis and to give us first an almost exhaustive description of the modifications of the Soviet theory of neutrality before reviewing the fluctuations of Soviet policy, is regrettable. In every country concepts of international law have changed with the country's position in the struggle for power and peace. But for a country presumably guided by Marxism, the unity between legal theory and political practice is so indissoluble that to separate them even for purposes of exposition disturbs the perspective.

The description of the changes which the Soviet viewpoint on neutrality has undergone since the end of the war is excellently done. One might disagree with the author's contention that the "re-evaluation of neutrality by Stalin's successors is one of the most significacnt political events of the post-war period" (p. 221). It is difficult to concede that any legal concept developed by the Soviet Union in its intercourse with other nations can have such significance. Nevertheless, the use of neutrality as a working tool of diplomatic conduct and long-term national goals in Central and Northern Europe, and now in regard to the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa, is penetratingly analyzed. The study has no need to indulge in moralist indignation to contrast the denial of a neutrality status to Hungary with general Soviet praise of neutrality. The contrast is stark enough but explained entirely by the dual standard of international law which Soviet Marxism applies to the Communist and the non-Communist camps. Any attempt at non-alignment by a country that belongs to the Soviet orbit violates the objective laws of history and thereby shakes the foundations of "peace." Hence an intervention against such a nation is legalized by the higher norms of socialist international law. Should, in such or a similar situation, a war ensue, this would be a *bellum justum* according to Leninist revision of Grotian thought.

That a German author should examine the value of the proposed policies of disengagement in Central Europe in the light of the lessons of the past is understandable enough. His judgment is sober and balanced throughout, which makes the book all the more valuable.

University of Colorado **Henry W. Ehrmann**

Schenk, Fritz, *Magie der Planwirtschäft.* Cologne: Kiepenheuer und Witsch, 1960. Pp. 286. DM 16.80.

Defections of responsible state and economic officials from the Soviet bloc have been quite rare. Fritz Schenk, the author of this book on planning and economic integration among the countries united in the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (C.M.E.A.), was a high-ranking member of the East German Planning Commission from 1952. As personal secretary to the planning chief, Bruno Leuschner, and as head of the East German liaison to the C.M.E.A. he had access to a wealth of information on the major economic problems of the area. Schenk fled East Germany in 1957 after a brief arrest on suspicion of having disclosed "state secrets."

Schenk has not written a systematic economic treatise. But he reveals in interesting narrative his personal observations and impressions of the inner workings of the planning mechanism and the ways and means of Soviet control over the bloc economies. Among these observations are many details which are likely to be new even to the closest Western observers.

It would be difficult to find a more severe indictment of Communist planning and coordination methods than is offered in this book. But the author warns the West not to expect any collapse of the Soviet bloc economies, in spite of chronic material shortages and the planning system's inherent functional shortcomings. In East Germany, where the situation has frequently been critical and chaotic, the regime's political controls are sufficient to offset—at least for the moment—any popular discontent.

Schenk believes, nevertheless, that in the long run there are chances of economic reform "from above." He confirms the existence of opposition and the latent conflict between economic and state administrations and the party ideologues, and his discussion indicates that many attempts of Western Kremlinologists to rank the one or other person with either group are oversimplified. It is not too easy to draw proper lines as it frequently happens that former Party bureaucrats become susceptible to rational economic thinking once they are entrusted with the solution of specific economic tasks. The fate of the East German Fred Oelssner is cited as a good case in point. Schenk places high hopes in the arguments of the Soviet bloc's economic experts, who judge the economic situation of the area much more pessimistically than most Western observers.

Soviet bloc economic planning is completely subordinated to political goals. It is not designed to satisfy consumer needs but to yield a maximum of political strength and propaganda value for Soviet ambitions. This is as true of Soviet rocketry as it is of aid programs to underdeveloped areas. But these crash programs and the huge buildup of armaments (which Schenk believes is due more to internal bloc instability than real fear of outside aggression) continue to strain the economy to the breaking point. It is during ensuant crisis periods that the experts are able to raise their voices, thus exercising a moderating and liberalizing influence. It is therefore in the interest of the West, the author argues, to do anything in its power to induce and prolong the Soviet bloc's economic difficulties, and this means the imposition of the most stringent embargo measures on materials in critical supply. This vindication of U. S. policies from a former communist may come as a surprise to some. Paradoxically enough it will probably be challenged by the strangest group of bed-fellows in the West: the businessmen "as usual," and the pacifists who decry all Western defensive actions as "cold war" measures.

This book deserves to be read by the specialist and the general public. For those unable to read it in the original German, it might be pointed out that, on the basis of Schenk's observations, a series of three articles co-authored by Richard Loewenthal appeared in the *New Leader* (New York) in January 1959.

University of California, Berkeley HORST DUHNKE

FEIS, HERBERT, *Between War and Peace. The Potsdam Conference.* Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 367. $6.50.

FAUST, FRITZ, *Das Potsdamer Abkommen und seine völkerrechtliche Bedeutung.* Frankfurt am Main, Berlin: Alfred Metzner Verlag, 1959. Pp. 201.

Herbert Feis has enriched his scholarly record with another volume, testifying to his research skills, analytical perception, and engaging style. His last work is a most valuable contribution to the growing literature on political achievements (and blunders) during and after World War II.

Mr. Feis leads us skillfully through the maze of events and documents, establishing first in a review a background knowledge of the war and postwar problems which were discussed at the Potsdam Conference. Once again, as others have done, he points to the eagerness of the American leaders to settle controversial issues with the Soviet Union by demonstrating their good will and spirit of friendliness and refusing to heed frequent warnings on the part of Winston Churchill. However, once the Allies agreed to withdraw their troops from advanced positions in Germany into their respective zones of occupation they deprived themselves of the element of power which would have given additional weight to arguments at the Potsdam Conference.

Mr. Feis does not present a detailed account of the negotiations at Potsdam; rather he focuses on the crux of each problem and characterizes the attitudes of Truman, Churchill, Attlee and Stalin towards these problems. So he describes such intricate negotiations as the question of the Polish boundaries, of Tito's drive to establish himself in power and extend it over Venezia Julia, of Austria's and Germany's postwar political and economic problems, of reparations, Iran, the Turkish Straits, and Italian colonies. Much of this is known from the vast memoir literature and from some scholarly books, but Mr. Feis, having access to the still unpublished Potsdam Papers, throws a new penetrating light on various facets of these problems and the Big Powers' attitude towards them. Most interesting are his chapters on the protracted negotiations on the Polish boundary and on the diplomatic activities concerning the Straits of Bosporus and Dardanelles.

Mr. Feis writes with restraint but with a discreet criticism of American policy. His characterization of the main actors at Potsdam is revealing and probably accurate. He does not allow the pedantry of scholarship to becloud a masterly presentation; he paraphrases important documents, thus taking some license in matters for which other scholars might be open to criticism. Yet one does regret that here and there some documents are not quoted at length or that their paraphrasing is not provided with references. But one understands, of course, that access to unpublished documents also imposes certain limitations on their usage.

Fritz Faust's book deals to some extent with the same subject as Mr. Feis'. However, the nature of his study is fundamentally different. It is basically an attempt to analyze the juridical meaning and validity of the Potsdam Agreement. Ignoring entirely the political aspects of various postwar settlements, Mr. Faust tries to prove by quoting from a respectable number of authorities, mostly German, that they were, from the point of view of international law, ill-conceived and left in their wake chaos and confusion. Most of them carry no legal obligation as far as Germany is concerned. Thus, for example, the capitulation of May 8, 1945, was strictly a military act, acceded to by the German High Command and not by the German Government. What ensued was a legal vacuum (according to Lauterpacht) in which the international personality of Germany floated in suspension until an independent German Government was established. According to the author, the Potsdam Agreements have no legal validity for Germany, as she did not take part in their negotiation; however, they should still be considered, even to this day, as an important document to serve as a basis for Germany's appeal to the Allies, upon which they are binding, to fulfill their Potsdam obligations.

Mr. Faust further contests Poland's legal claim on her newly acquired western territory, whether for historical reasons or as a compensation award for the loss of territories to the Soviet Union. He considers the Oder-Neisse boundary as a violation of the Atlantic Charter, of the United Nations Charter, and, indeed, of the Yalta and Potsdam Agreements themselves. Transfer of the German population was untenable from the point of view of international law. On the other hand, the incorporation of the Sudetenland by Germany was juridically perfectly valid and it can be finally settled only as part of a peace conference.

Mr. Faust's theorizing is undoubtedly correct in some cases but one cannot refrain from wondering how far can pure jurisprudence carry a legal argument which bears no relationship to political realities.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

HEIDENHEIMER, ARNOLD J., *Adenauer and the CDU. The Rise of the Leader and the Integration of the Party.* The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960. 19 guilders.

This book is an extremely interesting documentation of how Adenauer rose to power in Western Germany through his control of the CDU. It focuses on the vital period from 1945 to 1950, giving summary treatment to the years that followed The author has been able to draw upon party archives and various personal archives, and has thus produced a work of originality and authenticity.

A graphic chart of Adenauer's ascendency, showing an almost unbroken rising line, would be misleading, since it would not indicate the many obstacles which he had to overcome. Certain continuities of course stand out in the political life of Adenauer: his authoritarianism, his administrative talent trained by long tenure as Lord Mayor of Cologne, his European horizon, his Christian faith. Otherwise his political course was modified by the East-West split, by the varying policies of the occupation powers, by the clashes with the SPD and, last but not least, by the rivalries and conflicting interests within his own party—a party developed from disparate groups within what were originally isolated zonal enclaves Only a statesman of Adenauer's stature could surmount such obstacles.

Heidenheimer compares the concrete situation which Adenauer confronted in 1945 to the political and social disintegration that attended the fall of the Carolingian Empire. The new "feudalism" of 1945 was clearly partitioned Germany the new "Church" or "religion" which emerged as the new authority was represented by the new political parties. This comparison is suggestive and apt, and i sheds light on Adenauer's political genius. While the SED benefited from th "religious" (Communist) temper of the Russian occupation zone, and while the SPD in the Western zones, as was to be expected, cut itself loose quickly from any "feudal" hindrances to emerge as early as May 1946 as a centralized party, the CDU carefully balanced the "feudal" and "religious" elements. Adenauer turned both into sources of strength. Unification of all four zones, the author argues, would in all likelihood not have allowed the CDU to play a dominant role. Partition of Germany into *Länder*, as initially envisaged by the French, would have reduced Adenauer to a "feudal" chieftain in his own party. The third alternative, culminating in the division of Germany into two, was most suitable to Adenauer's and his party's rise to leadership. "The political structure which the Occupation Powers finally imposed on Germany was precisely the kind which would allow a maximum return" for Adenauer's policy. In the matter of party ideology (or, to follow the author's analogy, "religion"), the CDU was slow to commit itself. There was of course its basic and obvious Christian and pro-Western orientation. Otherwise, on as vital an issue as socialism versus economic liberalism, the party settled for the latter only after many years of internal debate, and, as the author maintains, largely for tactical reasons. "The significant point is again the masterly husbanding of resources."

Heidenheimer's analogy is suggestive indeed, but its relevance stops right there. After all, in twentieth-century Germany, in spite of catastrophe and destruction, we are faced with a highly developed industrial and economic situation. In other words, the ascendancy of the CDU under the leadership of the British zone might not be exclusively reducible to Adenauer's tactics; it would be legitimate to inquire, as Gerhard Schulz does briefly ("Die CDU: Merkmale ihres Aufbaus", *Parteien in der Bundesrepublik*, p. 125f.), into the connection between industry and banking and the rise of the CDU. Heidenheimer skirts this issue.

Unfortunately, the introduction detracts from the quality of the book. The historical background sketch on the Center Party and on European Christian Democracy is thoroughly unsatisfactory and misleading. In particular, a just assessment of the forces of Christian Democracy is vital for an understanding of Adenauer.

The cited conclusion, ably weighing the achievement of Adenauer, might have considered the danger of "petrification" (Sigmund Neumann) of the CDU through its official power position. Also it might, in fair criticism of Adenauer, have discussed the question, recently raised by Karl Jaspers: when will the old man who has restituted (Western) Germany to a position of power and prosperity proceed with the political education of the Germans? When will he "tell the Germans the truth"?

Smith College KLEMENS VON KLEMPERER

FALTAN, SAMO, *Partizanska Vojna na Slovensku*. Bratislava, 1959. Pp. 281

FALTAN, SAMO, *Slovaci v partizanskych bojoch v Sovietskom Svaze*. Bratislava, 1957. Pp. 208.

KROPILAK, MIROSLAV, *Učast Vojakov v Slovenskom Narodnom Povstani*. Bratislava: Slovenska Akademia Vied, 1960. Pp. 163.

It is a truism that no one, not even the General Staffs concerned, certainly not the minor field commanders, who are occupied with an *à pied* situation, can see a modern war in its uttermost and stark reality. Such total vision must surely escape them, since the enormity and fluidity of the operations are on such a gigantic scale that even the imagination is dwarfed. It is thus the historian, coming much later, painfully, objectively piecing together the action on many fronts, who alone can truly record the procession of events in their grim entirety.

These three books are not concerned only with the mechanics of warfare—formidable no doubt in the rugged terrain of Slovakia—but also with ideological issues, without which the war on the Russian front might indeed be difficult to understand. They are written not only with a feeling of pride in Slovak exploits, rooted deeply in patriotism, but also with overtones of social, economic, and political conflicts inherited from the difficult days before 1838, and still earlier. In them there is a sustained admiration for the achievements of the Red Army, its exploits and its liberating power, without which there would have been no Slovak uprising, and no cause for Slovak pride. It must further be noted that there runs through this material a strain of special pleading, i.e. a justification of the present Communistic status quo in Czechoslovakia, and an implied as well as direct credit claimed for "liberating" the country from the Nazi terror.

By their very character these books can record but a mere segment of the drama of a major front, since they concern themselves with the activity of a small people—the Slovaks—in the grand theater of the Eastern Front. The briefest, by Mr. Kropilak, describes the background and incidence of the popular as well as military revolt in late summer of 1944. Given the will to strike at the enemy, either by Slovak soldiers or partisan civilians, it is obvious that much was at stake in the precise timing of such an event. Even in their general retreat, the Germans were capable of delivering great blows, and the wrong occasion could be very costly to a small people. Regarding the two divisions organized by the Nazi *Wehrmacht* among the Slovaks, it seems that hardly a man could have remained loyal to them or been oblivious to the issues of the war in which they were involved, in which their very freedom was at stake. Mr. Kropilak traces the overall military situation in Europe in the first half of 1944 as a preliminary to the discussion of the growth of the National Liberation Movement. Since there are many points of dispute in this phenomenon, he takes issue with other writers on the character and course of this uprising. From the tone of the controversy, it seems that it will endure, like many another military and political dispute, for some time. However, it must be noted that the account is in general in harmony with Soviet military and political theses and ideological pretensions.

Mr. Samo Faltan's two books are written in an engaging style, the more pretentious being the *Partizanska Vojna na Slovensku* (The Partisan War in Slovakia), which is plentifully supplied with maps, so that amateur generals may vicariously follow at their leisure the travail of a people. There are also many photographic reproductions, grim reminders of the unpleasant character of war. Fervently patriotic, Mr. Faltan is deeply concerned with the Great Betrayal, by a "handful" of "Clerico-Fascist traitors" who misled Slovakia, and thus brought her to the brink of the Grand Decision, i.e. either passively to wait out the war to the end, or heroically to fight beside the "valiant soldiers of the Soviet Union." As responsible for this decision and this endeavor stood, according to Faltan, the Communist Party of Slovakia.

The "clerico-fascist" leadership of Slovakia was a basic betrayal of the inherent and fundamental interests of the people, which even the early divisions of soldiers sent to fight against the Soviet Union were soon to perceive. The 'animalism' of the Nazi troops, the tactics of terror applied to the civil population, and the plain murder of innocent inhabitants soon turned the Slovak soldier against the 'Nazi bestiality'. And then the people rose. Neither promises nor threat of punishment deterred them from the necessity and obligation of resistance. In his description of the Slovak soldier as a partisan in the Soviet Union, Mr. Faltan brings up the very interesting point of the stake of Slavonic Brotherhood, which brings to mind echoes of Jan Kollar. He infers that were this test of Brotherhood to fail on the anvil of the Eastern Front, the Slovaks must inevitably prepare themselves for a harsher life under their erstwhile masters, the Magyars. Chickens come home to roost?

After the event all battles and wars look different, and it is not uncommon in history to attribute an ideology or purpose *ex post facto* which did not exist or profoundly move people. But one thing seems to be certain: the failure of the Hitlerites to subdue the defenders of Stalingrad was a turning point of the war, and pointed the way for an accentuated activity on the part of both Russian and Slovak partisans within the Soviet Union. Guerrilla warfare, the hit-and-run tactics of such piecemeal war, the breathless danger of such activities is eloquently carried in Mr. Faltan's two books.

All of these books are meant for popular consumption. The eager student of the purely military art will not find here the studied detachment of the craftsmanship of war characteristic of such writers as Liddell-Hart, or General Fuller. Perhaps this is too much to ask of people who were most sorely tried. Nevertheless they do cast some light on the intricacies of the military and political issues in this aspect of contemporary history. It is interesting to note for example that the Slovak partisan groups in the Soviet Union were largely concentrated in the Minsk-Mogilev-Zitomir region; whereas the Slovak volunteers found themselves in the Ukraine, that is in the vicinity of Odessa-Krasnodar and in the Crimea. It is also here that many Slovaks joined up with the Soviet Army.

There are some useful bibliographies.

Hunter College of the City of New York GEORGE WASKOVICH

BAIN, LESLIE B., *The Reluctant Satellites: An Eyewitness Report of East Europe and the Hungarian Revolution.* New York: Macmillan Co., 1960. Pp. 233. $3.95.

American born (of Irish and Hungarian parentage) and European educated (in Budapest, Vienna, and Cluj), Leslie B. Bain is one of the most experienced reporters of Central European affairs on the American journalistic scene. Readers familiar with his reporting will find in this book a detailed presentation of his views on the Hungarian revolution (which caused quite a stir four years ago in American propaganda quarters) as well as a less detailed (and less controversial) summary of his observations on Tito's Yugoslavia and Gomulka's Poland.

In addition to drawing on his first-hand knowledge of recent developments in satellite Europe and on his long familiarity with the problems of that area, Mr. Bain casts himself in this book in the role of a moralist—and muckraker. The Hungarian revolution, a brilliant example of man's "essential morality," evokes in him moral indignation over the betrayal of that revolution by both East and West. In his own words: "No event in recent history has been so much lied about, distorted, and besmirched as the Hungarian Revolution. Greece in 1944 comes to mind as a comparison. But there the lies were all one-sided. The Hungarian Revolution was distorted on both sides of the East-West fence. The real tragedy lies in the fact that the essential beauty and greatness of that gallant uprising have been buried by ignorant partisan interpretation and observers, by cheap political trickery and wishful thinking; but, above all, they were buried by the concerted action of government agencies on both sides." Both the Soviets and the Western democracies "shifted into high gear to smother the basic issue of the Hungarian Revolution." What was that basic issue?

Certainly there was no name for Imre Nagy's program, Mr. Bain remarks. Nevertheless, the revolution intended to secure national freedom for Hungary, and to give the Hungarians a chance to evolve toward a free, democratic political structure—something they had never had before; it called for free election and an economy divided between public, cooperative, and private ownership—something of a combination of the features of Swedish, British, and American democracy. This vision of a new Hungary shared by non-Communists and Communists alike, Mr. Bain believes, appealed neither to the West, which was interested solely in the "anti-Communist" aspects of the revolution and offered the revolutionaries only a handful of backward-looking discredited émigrés, nor to the Kremlin, which branded the revolution as a "counter-revolution" because "the truth" would have hurt the basic structure of Communism.

Mr. Bain castigates in particular the evil influence of "Fascist infiltrated" Radio Free Europe for denouncing Imre Nagy after October 23, thus contributing "most importantly" to the inability of Nagy to control events and avert the catastrophe of November 4. But he censures Western policy-makers at large, too, for missing the opportunity (following the Russian withdrawal from Budapest) to invite Russia to join in an international effort to consolidate the Nagy regime. Among the Hungarian leaders of the revolution, Mr. Bain blames General Maléter for his failure to discipline "a new armed force largely made up of roving bands." Mr. Bain suspects General Maléter of Fascist leanings; he stresses, however, that there was no real menace of Fascism during the revolution, for "there just wasn't any room for Fascism in Hungary then." Nonetheless, he deems it worthwhile to register a rumor according to which "Pál Maléter was being groomed as a dictator of Hungary with the backing of the Christian Front."

It is regrettable that lack of judiciousness here and there tends to impair the over-all effectiveness of Mr. Bain's views. For, on the whole, his book is a useful thought-provoking report and analysis reminding everyone concerned that much research and information work remains to be done in order to achieve a balanced public view of the glorious and tragic events of the Hungarian revolution.

Chatham College STEPHEN BORSODY

MICHAL, JAN M., *Central Planning in Czechoslovakia.* Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 274. $5.75.

This study, published with the assistance of the Ford Foundation, analyzes the internal and external changes in Czechoslovakia's economy in the decade following the seizure of power by the Communists in 1948. Despite Czechoslovakia's high level of industrialization doubts arise with respect to the appropriateness of designating this economy "a mature economy" (the volume is subtitled "Organization for Growth in a Mature Economy"). Important changes within the planned economy of Czechoslovakia are revealed and significant comparisons are made between this economy and those of Western Europe and the United States, in industry, construction, agriculture, transportation and foreign trade. Comparisons with Russia's Soviet economy are included in the study but lack of statistical data is given as the reason for only occasional comparative references to other Eastern European economies.

Discussing the industrial production in Czechoslovakia the author uses official Czechoslovak indices to show that in the first part of the decade, Czechoslovakia was ahead of Western European economies in total industrial production; in the second part the market economies in Austria, West Germany, and France achieved a greater yearly rate of growth (pp. 37-38). The per capita production of crude steel in 1957 (387 kg) was higher than in France (320 kg), but lagged behind the United Kingdom (429 kg) and West Germany (476 kg) as well as the United States (597 kg).

Manpower problems in the centrally planned economy of Czechoslovakia are acutely felt. Agriculture especially is affected as young men and women (particularly men) leave for better paid manufacturing occupations. Slovakia, for instance, was able to acquire only one-third of the 15,381 boys and girls needed for work in agriculture and cattle breeding in July 1958.

Agriculture is beset by other problems: 1) Investment fails to cover current depreciation; 2) new building investment in 1957 constituted only 10 percent of the total investments in construction. This however was an improvement over 1948 when building investment constituted only 3.6 percent; 3) production at the end of the decade, even according to the official index which may show considerable marginal error, remained below the pre-war level (1936); 4) private and personal production is still formidable—in 1958 it provided 40.1 percent of the market.

Exports accounted for as much as 18 percent of the national income in 1948, yet total exports rose 80 percent in the period of 1948 to 1958. Per capita exports in 1958 were $112 and imports $100; comparative figures in the United States are $100 and $72, in the Soviet Union $21 and $21. Machinery and equipment represented 43.3 percent of the total exports in 1958. Complete factories, shops, tractors and cables were delivered to Eastern Europe, including Russia. In exchange Russia supplied manganese ore, pig iron, ferroalloys, copper, zinc and tin. The Czechoslovaks aim to step up exports of machinery to a per capita level twice as high as in the Western countries.

Czechoslovakia did not voice a complaint of losses suffered from trading with the Russians as did the Hungarians who exported bauxite to the Soviet Union for less than half the price charged to other countries. The Poles, who in the period of 1946 to 1953 supplied six million tons of coal to the Soviet Union at about one-third of the price charged internally, also complained. The Soviet Government consequently agreed to deliver goods to the value of $2 million in compensation to Poland for the loss sustained up to 1953. No such compensation was offered to Czechoslovakia. The author cited a case where the Czechoslovaks had to pay 44.50 Krowns per kilogram of cotton from Russia at the time when the internal transaction price was 41.50 Krowns per kilogram (p. 127).

The author calls the scope of economic aid granted by Czechoslovakia to developing countries amazing. In the two year period 1956-1957 some $40 per Czechoslovak citizen were granted in long-term credit; in the same period the United States granted $16 per capita credits, and the Soviet Union $14. However, this statement (on p. 3) is accompanied by a footnote that the actual utilization of Czechoslovak and Soviet credits were much lower than the United States grants and credits. This is bound to cast doubt on the original statement. Total foreign economic aid for the two years 1956-1957 approximated $47 per capita in Czechoslovakia, $20 in the United States and $14 in the Soviet Union (p. 135).

The author contends that the time is too short to evaluate the operation of the centrally planned economy, and adds: "It took the market economy more than a century to discover the course of business cycles and to try to counteract economic depressions and unemployment" (p. 242). While this appears to be a logical conclusion one shudders at the sacrifices involved in so many areas: in errors and wastes of the new bureaucracy, in terror and economically unwise transfers of workers from white-collar to manual jobs and vice-versa, in shortages of consumer goods and needless privations, breadlines, poor housing, frequent separations of families and above all in denials of basic human rights.

University of Denver **Josef Korbel**

SHORTER NOTICES

Jahrbuch d. Schlesischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Breslau. IV/1959 Würzburg/Main: Holzner Verlag, 1959. Pp. 316.

The present number of the *Jahrbuch* covers a wide grouping of subjects from the Reformation to the present, yet with an emphasis on the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The first articles, "Die Eigenart der christlichen Verkündigung in Schlesien" by Wilhelm Knevels, attempts to make a case for a specific and peculiar *Schlesisches Christentum.* Another paper, "Der schlesische Stil" by Hans Wegener, portrays the history and rationale behind Silesian art and architecture. Other articles on genealogy, education, local history, and library acquisitions follow. The correspondence of Gustav Freytag, acquired by the Prussian State Library in 1920, is of particular interest. Brigitte Reinicke presents a detailed analysis of "Die Reichstagswahlen in Schlesien 1871-1932." Statistics are fine. How informative they are depends on who does the interpreting. What does come clear here, however, is that Silesia did not vote Prussian in the period from 1871 to 1912. The Silesian Conservatives remained steady at around 15%-17% of the electorate, while the Deutsche Reichspartei, the Zentrumspartei and the National Liberals declined. The Social Democrats, on the other hand, gained susbtantially. The period from 1912 to 1932 gave no clear picture of Silesia; it was hardly a period of political calm. The last paper, "Polnische Presse-Berichte über die Lage in den Oder-Neisse-Gebieten" by the Göttinger Arbeitskreis is a collection of abstracts and translations from Polish papers which describe the frightful condition in the western territories of Poland. Everything is apparently in decline. If this goes on much longer existence will no longer be possible in this area. The only thing about this regrettable situation is that it remains difficult to explain how production continues to mount, more land is under cultivation, the population is increasing and the per capita income is steadily improving. The fact that the government allows open criticism of what the administration does is of some minor significance.

S. H. Thomson

Henderson, W. O., *The Zollverein.* Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1959. Pp. 375. $7.50.

Anyone who has scanned dealers' lists in quest of a used copy of W. O. Henderson's *The Zollverein* will rejoice in the appearance of this second edition. The first was published in 1939, was quickly sold out and relegated to the background by the Second World War. Despite these handicaps, the book has become a little classic, not only because it is the only complete history of the Zollverein in any language, but also because it is a work of sound scholarship and easy to read. With disarming simplicity the author cuts his way through the thickets of tariff schedules, navigation conventions, and excise taxes, through the intricacies of middle-state politics and Austro-Prussian rivalry, to arrive at a sane, moderate, and impartial account of the economic unification of Germany. He does these things, moreover, with a comprehensive knowledge of the enormous monographic literature, the printed sources, and some archival materials of his own discovery—a knowledge which excited the admiration of German reviewers on the eve of the war.

Except for a brief new introduction, which calls attention to the lessons the Zollverein might have for the European Common Market (notably the fact that economic integration does not automatically lead to political union), the new edition is an exact duplicate of the previous one. Here again is the excellent treatment of the three regional economic unions of the 1820's; the superb blending of economic and political elements in such episodes as the Zollverein crises of the early 1850's and 1860's; and the fine sense of fairness which accords sympathetic treatment to the Prussians Friedrich Motz and Rudolph von Delbrück as well as the Austrian Anton von Bruck. Even Metternich is presented as a man who understood the significance of the Zollverein though he could do little about it. The trade experts who were the architects of the Zollverein, in their patient and diligent ways, contributed, so Henderson concludes, much to German unity that is often obscured by the spectacular politics of a Schwarzenberg or a Bismarck.

And yet it is characteristic of Henderson's sense of proportion that he never exaggerates the importance of his subject. The Zollverein, he holds, was only one of several causes of Germany's rapid industrial growth, railroad construction and capitalistic enterprise being the others. Above all he recognizes the primacy of politics, especially in the war of 1866, though he makes the intriguing suggestion that the war of that year was, in part at least, a desperate revolt by the middle states against their economic bondage to Prussia.

Since the appearance of the first edition the main contribution to Zollverein literature has been Arnold Price's *The Evolution of the Zollverein* (Ann Arbor, 1949), which elaborates the point that tariff integration, at least until 1828, was not exclusively or even mainly a Prussian idea. For the rest, the only additions have been more sophisticated treatments of political episodes which involved the Zollverein, particularly in the period of the North German Confederation. As institutional history, however, Henderson's work stands almost alone, as valuable today as it was in 1939—and now far more accessible.

University of Kentucky ENNO E. KRAEHE

MACEK, JOSEF, ed., *25 ans d'historiographie tchécoslovaque 1936-1960.* Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1960. Pp. 494. Kčs. 62.50.

For some years before Munich the late Professor Josef Šusta published periodical surveys of Czech and Slovak historical writing in the *Revue Historique.* No effort to publish such serious and helpful resumés has been made since 1939. The profession has felt the gap keenly. The present *sbornik,* published in French, is the answer of the present generation of Czechoslovak historians to a natural desire of their western colleagues for an account of what has been produced since before World War II.

The result is most impressive. The method of presentation follows essentially Šusta's lines of treatment. Each discipline or area of history is surveyed by a prominent producing scholar. The names of Jan Filip, Jaroslav Šebanek, František Roubik, L'udovit Holotík, František Graus and Josef Macek, are guarantee enough of the high quality of the presentation. Perhaps the most interesting areas of historical research from the point of view of non-Slavic historians is the earlier period—proto-history, the medieval and early modern centuries. The land was apparently heavily populated from the very earliest ages. Archeological fieldwork has made enviable progress in settling many previous doubts as to the exact extent of primitive settlements. The approach of Professor Graus to the economic history of the land in the feudal and Hussite centuries presents many new insights. Much very solid work on 1848 has been done in the past two decades, but the treatment of the post-1848 period is less convincing. It gives an inevitable impression of being somewhat forced. When we come to the Czechoslovakia of 1918 to 1938, the reader gains an idea which is strangely different from my memory of those years, as I walked the streets and read all the historical literature of all sorts I could get my hands on. It is, naturally, desirable for the Marxist historians to learn all that is humanly possible about the rise of their movement even though it has little history. This need may explain the impression one gets that the search for data is likely to put the facts out of proportion. The most recent period, 1938 to the present, is interim history and closely involved in political ideology. It cannot yet be treated historically.

Several chapters are given over to surveys of research in literary and linguistic history, the history of science and technology, and the history of art. They are informative and useful. Taken all in all this is an encouraging and imposing record of historical work accomplished under generally difficult circumstances.

S. H. THOMSON

OMRČANIN, IVO, *Istina o Draži Mihailoviću*. Munich, New York: Logos, 1957. Pp. 316.

The growing literature on the bloody and controversial events in wartime Yugoslavia still generally falls into one of two categories: the defamatory and the lyrical. The book under review belongs to the former and is a good specimen of its kind.

The Truth about Draža Mihailović begins with a description of the Serb character through the ages. The introductory chapters contain subsections on "Cannibalism among Serbs," "Slaughter and genocide among Serbs," "The first Serb Quislings," "Serb Quislings in the days of the Turks," etc. The reader who has waded through this catalogue of Serb wickedness and cowardice will hardly be surprised to learn that the Serbs are "not fighters, because they never won a battle in history, except when they treacherously attacked the Bulgarians in 1913." Their record during the Second World War was in keeping with their past. "Milhailović is the greatest collaborator of the last war" and one of the "worst" war criminals. Whenever he was not busy murdering Croats or planning large-scale genocide, he cooperated very closely with the Germans and the Italians against Tito's partisans. The American military mission to Mihailović in the summer of 1944 was not an official one. Americans of Serb origin sent it to the Četnik headquarters. According to the author, the head of the American mission, Colonel MacDowell, is also a "collaborator," because he negotiated with the German army to help Mihailović. The Četniks are responsible for the victory of Communism in Yugoslavia, which is run today by Serbs. A sovereign Croat State is essential.

Most of the evidence used in support of Omrčanin's arguments is culled from sources which scarcely inspire confidence in the absence of some more reliable authority. Few students of Yugoslav affairs would base their study of the Četnik movement on the "Grey Book" of Četnik and Communist iniquities, which the puppet Ustaši government published under the German occupation, or on the edited accounts of the proceedings of the show trials which preceded the liquidation of some Četnik leaders in Communist Yugoslavia in 1945 and 1946. Omrčanin's reliance on documents of Communist and Fascist origin does not extend to those that would destroy his thesis of Mihailović the traitor, the murderer, and the pan-Serb. He makes no mention of, let alone attaches any importance to the fact that the Commander-in-Chief of the Germany army in Serbia offered, on July 21, 1943, a hundred thousand Reichmarks in gold to the person "who brings in dead or alive the bandit leader Draža Mihailović;" the fact that the Ustaši massacred several hundred thousands Serbs and many Jews in the "Independent State of Croatia" set up by Hitler and Mussolini; and that Mihailović's closest collaborators were Serbs who had refused to support successive Yugoslav governments in the interwar period because they believed first and foremost in cooperation with the most representative Croat group, the Croat Peasant Party led by Radić and Maček.

University of Manitoba, Winnipeg IVAN AVAKUMOVIC

ASPATURIAN, VERNON V., *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy. A Study of Soviet Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy*. Geneva: Institut Universitaire des Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1960. Pp. 232.

Reaction in the West was swift and varied when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decreed on February 1, 1944, the two amendments to the Stalin constitution which permitted the Union Republics to set up their own foreign offices and defense establishments. Many observers seized upon them as further evidence of the democratization of the Soviet Union and anticipated, as a result, closer cooperation between East and West. Time has revealed their ignorance of Communism. Others viewed the amendments solely as a crude strategem for gaining sixteen votes in the proposed United Nations and for assuring, thereby, Soviet domination of the new international organization. In the study under review Professor Vernon V. Aspaturian of Pennsylvania State University shows that this view is far too restricted; he explains the various motives behind the amendments, describes the extent to which they have been implemented, and presents a penetrating analysis of their real significance.

Among the motives for the amendments was Russia's determination to annex Eastern Poland. She adorned Byelorussia and the Ukraine with foreign offices and then cunningly employed these Republics as the cats-paw to snatch the territories of "Western Byelorussia" and the "Western Ukraine." Interestingly enough, the whole question of Poland's eastern frontier assumed for a while the character of a family affair when Alexander Korneichuk served as Foreign Commissar of the Ukrainian Republic while his wife, Wanda Wasilewska, was a leading member of the Polish (Communist) National Council.

Of the fifteen Union Republics only the Ukraine and Byelorussia maintain foreign ministries. They do so because of their membership in the United Nations and their participation in numerous U. N. organs and commissions. No Union Republic has dared to create a Defense Ministry of its own.

What is perhaps most important about Professor Aspaturian's study is that it reminds the reader of the existence of the two amendments. While the degree of their implementation has thus far been very small indeed, future developments might be quite otherwise. Professor Aspaturian points out that the diplomatic inactivity of the Union Republics is due exclusively to "Moscow's calculated refusal to stimulate their diplomatic muscles." Should the Kremlin's policy change in this regard, he believes the Union Republics possess great potentiality for "diplomatic mischief" as agents of the Soviet Government.

Clearly and interestingly written, Professor Aspaturian's study provides a unique and refreshing approach to the subject of Soviet diplomacy.

Ohio State University CHARLES MORLEY

ŘIHÁČEK, VÍTĚZSLAV, *Základní struktura nákladů oběhu a vývoj její proporce na socialistickém organizovaném trhu.* (The Basic Structure of Circulation Outlays and the Development of Its Proportion in the Socialist Organized Market). Prague: State Paedagogical Publishing House, 1959. Pp. 145. Kčs 15.

This monograph published by the school of philosophy of Brno University in Czechoslovakia is interesting in several respects: it illustrates the difficulty of a student of social science operating in the strait jacket of a monistic and monopolistic theory; it enables the reader to obtain insights into the actual operation of a Communist economy; it points out that problems of a non-socialist and of a socialist economic system converge, if not coincide, at a certain level of organizational and analytical refinement.

Even though he takes a swipe at the "dogmatic idols in the theory of political economy" which kept on falling after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, the author carefully observes all the proprieties of Marxist economics. His first chapter consists of an exegesis of Marx. Inner contradictions in his theory of value are solved by differentiating between the author's interpretation and "vulgarizing viewpoints," the core problem being the question of distinguishing between productive and non-productive costs of distribution. Some of it requires truly scholastic hairsplitting.

Next he has to show that distribution costs in advanced Western countries have kept on advancing. This is an easy task since he can quote any number of

Western economists who have shown precisely that. He then quite interestingly analyzes costs of distribution in an economy with socialist production as well as distribution, only to conclude that theoretically all cost factors are present in both systems. "As the basic content of the reproduction process is identical under all the social systems, the basic content of the category of circulation outlays must be in general identical both in the socialist and in the capitalist systems."

Since such a position is fundamentally inadmissible in the context of Marxism-Leninism, the rest of the book is spent in attempting to trace differences and concluding that the proportion of non-productive to productive costs must decline under socialism and that presently 55 percent of distribution costs in Czechoslovakia falls in the "productive" category. Unfortunately the figures given are highly selective and do not permit any comparisons between the costs before and after nationalization of the entire wholesale and retail trade in the country. All they indicate is a progressive refinement in cost accounting under various central agencies. Naturally, he gives a highly optimistic picture of future reductions in distribution costs.

Two general comments. First, it is perfectly possible that the rise in costs of distribution in this country, and elsewhere under capitalism, is simply due to the shift from primary and secondary to tertiary industries, and the growing importance of taste, style and sophistication resulting from high standards of material well-being. The same will probably happen when socialism will be able to provide more than basic necessities. Secondly, Czechoslovakia with its industrial tradition and organizing ability provides the best case study of a socialist system somewhat more successful in purely economic terms than either the other satellites or its model, the Soviet Union.

Reed College **FRANK MUNK**

DUDA, HERBERT W., *Die Protokollbücher des Kadiamtes Sofia* (Südosteuropäische Arbeiten 55). München: R. Oldenburg. Pp. x, 462.

In 1942 Herbert W. Duda, Professor of Turkish and Persian and Director of the Oriental Institute in the University of Vienna, during his stay in Bulgaria established a scientific organization with the object of disclosing and publishing the Ottoman Turkish documents extant in that country, which furnish information about the five-hundred-year Ottoman domination of Bulgaria. In coöperation with Bulgarian experts he collected the records of the Ottoman qâdî-office in Sofia. The essential part of the work, the summaries of the documents, was done by Galab D. Galabov, a former interpreter of the Bulgarian Legation at Istanbul, today a faculty member of the University of Sofia. The work was checked and prepared for publication by Professor Herbert W. Duda. The publication of this work is all the more important because it contains the very early qâḍî-office register Nr. 313, the original of which perished in 1944 owing to war actions.

The book contains the German summaries of 1192 documents dating from 1542 to 1647. They include 1) documents of civil law (especially of family, inheritance, and commercial law), 2) copies of *farmâns* of military and civil administrative character. For this reason the book is an indispensable work of reference for the students of the history of Ottoman administration as well as the history of the Ottoman occupation of Bulgaria.

Two registers (names of persons and places, enumeration of topics and technical terms) in alphabetical order make the quick finding of the data possible.

The South East Institute of Munich, which by the publication of its very thoroughgoing periodicals and serials has distinguished itself as the most competent European center for South Eastern research extending to the Danubian and Balkan countries, has done a signal service to Oriental scholarship by publishing this important collection of document summaries.

Harvard University **JOSEPH DE SOMOGYI**

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Arias, L. C., "El entierro de la politica de 'coexistencia' en la non nata Conferencia de Alto Nivel de Paris," *Polit. Intern.* (1960) /52, 49-94.

"Battle for Belief," *East Europe,* IX (1960) 10, 3-11.

Bilinsky, Y., "The Totalitarian Challenge to American Democracy," *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVI (1960), 308-320.

Bobr-Tylingo, S., "La France, la Russie et la Pologne en juin 1867," *Slav & E. Eur. Studies,* V (1960), 28-37.

Carsten, F., "Rosa Luxembourg," *Contrat Social,* V (1961), 32-37.

Caulais, J., "Est et Ouest: perspectives de la coexistence pacifique," *L'Anneé Polit. et Écon.,* (1961), 159-160, 138-152.

Edwards, R. G., "Amistosas relaciones norteamericanas con Silesia y Prusia," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 41, 369-371.

Fillitz, F., "Die Entwicklung der Donauschiffahrt seit 1955," *Donauraum* 6 (1961), 50-63.

Frick, H., "Die militärpolitische Lage am Jahresanfang 1961," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* 11 (1961) 40, 1053-1064.

Friedrich, J., "Politische Autorität u. Demokratie," *Zft. f. Polit.,* 8 (1961) 1, 1.

Gross, H., "Wirtschaftspolitische Reformbestrebungen der Donauländer," *Donauraum* (1961) /1, 35-49.

Halasz, P., "Sentenced to School," *East Europe,* IX (1960) 10, 19-31.

Hinshelwood, C., "Nauka i historia," *Kultura* (1961), 9-21.

Hoszowski, S., "Rewolucja cen we środkowej Europie w XVI w.," *Kwart. Hist.* LXVIII (1961), 297-315.

Kamenda, E., "Marx, Marxism, and Ethics," *Sov. Surv.* (1961) 35, 106-13.

Klocke, H., "Die Landwirtschaften Osteuropas heute," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961), 93-101.

Labin, S., "In letzter Stunde," *Polit. Meinung,* 57 (1961) 6, 17-27.

Lamberg, F. F., "Der Ostbericht," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 67, 78-82.

Lopatka/Gralla, "Die führende Rolle der KP im Verhältnis zum sozialistischen Staat," *Politische Studien,* XII (1961) 131, 163-167.

May, A. J., "R. W. Seton-Watson and British Anti-Hapsburg Sentiment," *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.,* XX (1961), 40-54.

"Memorandum rzadu NRD na XV Sesje Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ w sprawie rozbrojenia (podał J. Ptasinski)," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 327-332.

Mieroszewski, J., "Rosja—Niemcy—Ameryka (11)," *Kultura,* Mai (1961), 45-53.

"Mutamenti negli Schemi del Potere," *Relazioni Intern.,* XXV (1961) 9, 265.

"The National Committee for Productivity," *Italian Affs.,* IX (1961) 6, 3241-3247.

Patri, A., "Saint-Simon et Marx," *Contrat Social,* V (1961) 1, 18-24.

Pundeff, M., "Communism vs. East European Traditions," *Amer. Bul. Rev.,* XI (1961) 1, 7-10.

Raschofer, H., "Verfälschte Neutralität," *Polit. Meinung,* 57 (1961) 6, 53-66.

Rechberger, W., "Zur Gesch. d. Orientbahnen II," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961), 102-112.

Renard, A., "The Objectives of Socialism," *The Rev.,* III (1961), 68-73.

Revesz, L., "Legal Aspect of the Connection Between the Communist Party and the State in the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies," *The Rev.,* III (1961), 34-67.

Samsonowicz, H., "Nowe kierunki badań nad dziejami Hanzy," *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVIII (1961), 403-422.

Schram, S., "Christian Rakovskij, et le premier rapprochement franco-soviétique (II)," *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique,* I (1961), 584-629.

Seebohm, H.-C., "Right of Self-Determination," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961), 109-116.

Silvester, A., "Agriculture—the Achilles Heel of Communism," *Christian Dem. Rev.,* XI (1961) 66, 7-10.

Skilling, H., "People's Democracy and the Socialist Revoultion," *Soviet Studies,* XIII (1961), 241-262.

Souvarine, B., "Khrouchtchev et Mao," *Contrat Social* V (1961) 2, 75-80.

Stolte, S. C., "Collectivization Today and Tomorrow in the Communist-Controlled Areas," *Bltn., Inst. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961), 3-13.

Strausz-Hupé, R., "Satellite Empire—Achilles Heel," *ACEN News* (1961) /70-71, 6.

Tinbergen, J., "Do Communist and Free Economics Show a Converging Pattern?," *Soviet Studies,* XII (1960-61), 333-341.

Tomlinson, A. K., "War Crimes and the Law," *Poland & Germany,* V (1961), 18-28.

Weltmann, S., "Germany, Turkey and the Zionist Movement 1914-1918," *Rev. of Polit.*, XXIII (1961), 246-269.

Wessely, K., "Die Verkehrswirtschaft des COMECON," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 1, 64-99.

Whelan, J. G., "Khruschev and the Balance of World Power," *Rev. of Polit.*, XXIII (1961), 131-152.

Wszelaki, J., "Economic Developments in East Central Europe," *Orbis,* IV (1961), 422-451.

Xydis, S. G., "Greece and the Yalta Declaration," *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961), 6-24.

v. Zathureczky, G., "The Two Faces of Europe," *Sudeten Bltn., IX* (1961), 81-83.

AUSTRIA

Alvarez, G., "El Sud Tirol o Alto Adige en su proceso de problema europeo," *Polit. Intern.*, (1961), 85-104.

Benedikt, H., "Der deutsche Zollverein u. Osterreich," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 1, 25-34.

Danielski, S., "Das osterreichische Schulproblem," *Wissenschaft u. Weltbild,* I (1961), 26-35.

"Dokumente: Die Südtiroler Frage," *Osterr. Zft. f. Aussenpol.* L (1960), 25-73.

"Dokumente: Osterreich und die Europäische Integration," *Osterr. Zft. f. Aussenpol.*, I (1961), 186-205.

Erhard, L., "Konjunktur u. Wirtschaftspolitik," *Osterr. Zft. f. Aussenpol.*, I (1961), 173-185.

d. Haan, H., "Was war 'Vorderösterreich'?", *Schweizerische Zft. f. Gesch.*, X (1960) ,291.

Hauswirth, K., "Osterreich im Proporz," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 58, 32-41.

Kitzinger, U. W., "Wahlkampf in Osterreich," *Polit. Vierteljahresschrift,* Marz (1961), 36-55.

Kolb, E., "Das Oktober-Diplom," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 1, 1-11.

v. Krannhals, H., "Zur öffentlichen Meinung," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 67, 83-91.

Veiter, T., "Südtirol als rechts-u. staatspolitisches Problem," *Donauraum,* VI (1961), 12-24.

Zywczyński, M., "Metternich w świetle nowszej historiografii," *Kwart. Hist.*, LXVIII (1961), 423-434.

BALCANICA

Benditer, J., "Contributions pour connaitre la situation de la Moldavie a la veille du 23 août 1944," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960), 97-112.

Boicu, L., "De l'étape manufaturière de l'industrie en Moldavie," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960) 1, 127-138.

Buchholz, E., "Das neue Naturschutzgesetz der RSFSR," *Osteuropa,* II (1961) 2, 130-133.

"China's Ally in the Balkans—Albania's Party Congress," *East Europe,* X (1961) 4, 1-5.

Cihodaru, C., "La création de l'Etat féodal moldave et la lutte pour réaliser son indépendance," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960) 1, 61-82.

Davicu, S., "Actions des masses populaires de Moldavie, sous la conduite des organisations du Parti Communiste de Romanie," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960) 1, 19-40.

Esanu, L., "La lutte des ouvriers de la Société des trams de Iassy en juillet 1911," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960), 139-144.

Flaningam, M. L., "German Economic Controls in Bulgaria," *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961), 99-108.

Otetea, A., "The Unification of Rumanian Principalities," *Ist. Casopis* (1961/1, 114-124.

Pall, F., (S.J.), "La Compania de Jesus en Rumania," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 41, 317-322.

Pistarino, G., "Nella Romania genovese tra i Greci e i Turchi: l'isola di Chio," *Riv. Stor.*, LXXIII (1961), 69-84.

Reiter, W., "Die Nationalitätenpolitik d. Rumänischen Volksrepublik im Spiegel ihrer Statistik," *Osteuropa,* 11 (1961), 189-197.

"Rumänien," *Osteuropa,* 11 (1961), 137-143.

Rusu, D., et al., "Quelques aspects du développement économique de la region de Iassy sous le régime de démocratie populaire," *Studii și Cercetari Stiintifice,* XI (1960) 1, 41-60.

Scharndorff, W., "Dreimal Satellit," *Polit. Meinung,* May 1961, 85-93.

Schwanke, R., "Albaniens Parteikongress beschliesst den III. Fünfjahrplan," *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961), 113-120.

Sonevytsky, L. C., "Bukovina in the Diplomatic Negotiations of 1914," *Annals of Univ. Acad.*, VII (1959) 1-2, 1586-1629.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Balaz, O., "Vyvoj polnohospodarstva na Slovensku v rokoch 1949-1960," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 1, 3-28.

Danilov, A. J., "Teoreticko-metodologicke problemy historickej vedy v zapadonemeckej buržoaznej historiografii," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961), 104-128.

Dresler, J., "Tomáš Garrigue Masaryk a komunisté," *Svědectví,* IV (1961) 13, 17-25.

Gajan, K., "Spoluprace cs. buržoazie s. něm. reakci po první světové valce," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* VIII (1960) 6, 843-855.

Heymann, F., "Kutná Hora—Malešov. Dva problémy topografie Žižkových bitev," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* IX (1961), 75-81.

Holotikova, Z., "K činosti a ideologii ludackých odborov na Slovensku v radoch slovenskej robotnickej triedy," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 1, 50-67.

Joblonowski, H., "The Upper Silesiań Plebiscite," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 5, 119-120.

Kalvoda, J., "Czechoslovakia's Socialist Constitution," *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.,* XX (1961), 220-236.

Karlik, S., "Československo a jého lid—situace a výhledy na prahu nového desetileti," *Svědectví,* IV (1961) 13, 39-66.

Kolejka, J., "Polská otazká za druhé světové valky a vznik západni hranice na Odře-Niše," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* VIII (1960) 5, 735-754.

Koralka, J., "Über die Anfänge der sozialistischen Arbeiterbewegung in der Tschechoslowakei," *Zft. f. Gesch.,* IX (1961) 1, 111-143.

Lapteva, L. P., "The Hussite movement in the interpretation of the newest U.S. historical literatures" (in Russ.), *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitetu* (1961), 57-77.

Mika, A., "Rozwój gospodarki dworskiej na ziemiach czeskich od XIV wieku," *Annales d'Hist. Soc. et Écon.,* XXII (1960), 11-30.

Mlynarick J., "Ku kritike buržoaznej statistiky strajkov," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 1, 94-103.

Oswald, F., "Czechoslovakiets Tredie Revolution," *Fremtiden,* 16 (1961) 1, 35-43.

Pachman, Vl., "Boj o odborovou jednotu v letech 1945-1948," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* VIII (1960) 6, 793-813.

Pfaff, W., "Tschechoslowakei," *Osteuropa,* II (1961) 3, 228-231.

Polak, E., "K otázce rozpadu všenárodní koalice a nastolení vlády mezinárodni buržoazie v Československu v letech 1925-1926," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* IX (1961) 1, 17-41.

Rubcov, B. T., "K otázce některých zvláštností vývoje feudální renty v Čechách ve 14. a na počátku 15 stol.," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* VIII (1960) 6, 856-863.

Šádova, V., "Eksport czeskiego zboża do Niemiec a rozwój produkcji towarowej w Czechach w okresie przedbiałogórskim," *Annales d'Hist. Soc. et Econ.,* XXII (1960), 31-52.

Solc, J., "Cesta slovenských partizanov od celonarodného protifašistického k februaru 1948," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 1, 29-49.

Strhan, M., "Problematika spracovania dejin priemyselných zävodov." *Hist. Časopis,* VIII (1960) 4, 571-576.

Strobel, G. W., "Czechoslovakia's Economic Planning," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 4, 90-93.

Tomasic, D. A., "Regimen Comunista y Nacionalismo en Checoeslovaquia," *Estudios sobre el Comunismo,* IX (1961) 32, 51-61.

Vartiková, M., "O vývoji robotníckej triedy na Slovensku v l'udovodemokratickom období (1945-1960)," *Hist. Časopis,* VIII (1960) 4, 469-481.

Vietor, M., "Príspevok k objasneniu fašistického charakteru tzv. slovenského statu," *Hist. Časopis,* VIII (1960) 4, 482-508.

Vlachovič, J., "Stredoslovenské baňské mestá a protihabsburské povstania v prvej tretine 17. stor.," *Hist. Časopis,* VIII (1960) 4, 526-556.

Vomáčková, V., "K národnostní otázce v buržoazní revoluci 1848 v českých zemích," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* IX (1961) 1, 1-16.

Yanin, A. A., "From the History of Co-operation in Czechoslovakia's Agriculture," (in Russian) *Nov. i Nov. Istoria* (1961) /2, 7-22.

GERMANY

Anderle, A., & S. Quilitzsch, "Georg v. Rausch—ein Ideologe des faschistischen 'Dranges nach Osten' und Verfechter der antisowijetischen NATO-Politie," *Zft. f. Geschichtswissensch.,* VIII (1960) 7, 1525-50.

Barycz, H., "L'université de Koenigsberg au service de l'idée prussienne," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* VIII (1961) 1, 8-23.

Beger, B., "Das Rote Rathaus," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 58, 9-13.

Beger, B., "Wahlkreise 1961," *Polit. Meinung,* 57 (1961) VI, 7-10.

Bergsträsser, L., "Heinrich v. Gagern u. der vormärzliche liberalismus," *Zft. f. Polit.,* VIII (1961) 1, 139.

Bielfeldt, H. A., "Materialen u. Begriffe d. Gesch. der Slavistik in Deutschland mit besonderer Berucksichtigung der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik," *Wiener Slav. Jahrbuch* (1961), 28-41.

Braun, M., "Zur Gesch. der Slavistik in der Deutschen Bundesrepublik," *Wiener Slav. Jahrbuch* (1960), 112-116.

Conze, W., "Deutschlands weltpolitische Sonderstellung in den zwanziger Jahren," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* April (1961), 166-177.

Derlatka, T., "The granary of the East—myth and reality," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa* (1951) /3, 31-45.

"Die Historiker-Kommissionen d. 'Friedenslagers'," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 65-66, 12-18.

Dietrich, V., "Alfred Hugenberg—Das Leben eines Managers," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 132, 236-243.

Drozdzynski, A., "The life of Adolf Eichmann," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* XI (1960) 5, 21-37.

Edinger, L. J., "Continuity and Change in the Background of German Decision-Makers," *Western Polit. Qy.,* XIV (1961) I, 17-36.

Eisymont, V. S., "Falsification of Polish-German Relations by West German Historians," *Ist. Časopis* (1961) /, 125-137.

Epstein, K., "Shirer's History of Nazi Germany," *Rev. of Polit.,* XXIII (1961) 2, 230-245.

Eustachiewicz, L., "L'Allemagne et les thèmes allemands dans la littérature polonaise d'après-guerre," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* VIII (1961) 1, 42-48.

Fleming, D. F., "The Future of West Berlin," *Western Polit. Qy.* XIV (1961) 1, 37-48.

Fricke, D., "Die Affäre Leckert-Lützow-Tausch u. die Regierungskrise von 1897 in Deutschland," *Zft. f. Geschichtswissensch.,* VIII (1960) 7, 1579-1603.

Galkina, A. D., "The Struggle of the German Communist Party for Drawing the Peasantry into the Anti-fascist Movement in 1930-1932," *Ist. Časopis* (1961) /1, 79-113.

Galos, A., "Kleska cesarskich Niemiec w oczach Dunczyka," *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 539-548.

Gintsberg, L. I., "The Falsifying of Current History by a West German Journal," *Nov. i Nov. Ist.* (1961) /2.

Gooch, G. P., "Abschnitte über Deutschland aus 'Under six reigns'," *Welt als Gesch.,* XXI (1961) /1, 1-7.

Günzl, H. C., "Freiheit u. Ordnung in der Wirtschaft," *Wissenschaft u. Weltbild,* I (1961) 4, 15-25.

Hacker, J., "Inventur d. Ostforschung," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961), 15-20.

Hacker, J., "Ist die Bundesrepublik ein Provisorium?", *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 130, 76-83.

Hacker, R., "Hitlers Weltanschauung," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* 11 (1961) 40, 1065-1072.

Halperin, S. W., "Bismarck and the Italian Envoy in Berlin on the Eve of the Franco-Prussian War," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.,* XXXIII (1961) 1, 33-39.

Hamerow, T. S., "The Elections to the Frankfurt Parliament," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.,* XXXIII (1961) 1, 15-32.

Heinsdorf, H., "As the Germans See It," *Poland & Germany,* V (1961) 1, 8-17.

Hennis, W., "Verfassungsordnung u. Verbandseinfluss—Bemerkungen zu ihrem Zusammenhang im politischen System der Bundesrepublik," *Polit. Vierteljahresschrift,* March (1961), 23-35.

Kohn, H., "Nationalgefühl in der Bundesrepublik?", *Polit. Meinung,* May (1961), 29-36.

Kolanczyk, K., "Kryzys szkolnictwo wyzszego w Niemieckiej Republice Federalnej," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 267-287.

Kowalewski, J., "Two Tendencies in West Germany," *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 4, 10-13.

Kołowski, S. W., "Przegląd niemiecki," *Kultura* (1961) 162, 67-70.

Kraus, H., "Consideraciones ético-estatales en torno al problema de los territorios de Alemania Oriental," *Oriente Europeo,* X (1960) 40, 195-202.

Kren, J., "Revanšiste s protinacistickou minulosti," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* IX (1961) 6, 52-59.

Lavergne, B., "L'Allemagne fédérale et ses revendications territoriales," *L'Année Polit. et Econ.* (1961) /159-160, 73-108.

Lehmann, H., "Graf Berchtold u. d. Weihnachtsaufruf Papst Benedikts XV," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* April (1961), 178-181.

"Le projet de budget fédérale pour 1961 en Allemagne occidentale," *Statistique & Études Financières* (1961) /146, 188-200.

Loewenstein, B., "K charakteru německého liberalismu 1830-1831," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, VIII (1960) 6, 814-842.

Menzel, E., "Der Sozialstaat des Bonner Grundesetzes," *Gesch. in Wissensch. u. Unterr.*, XII (1961) 5, 298-312.

Morsey, R., "Hitlers Verhandlungen mit d. Zentrumsführung am 31 Januar 1933," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* April (1961), 182-204.

Müller, H., "Mit dem Verkehr fertig werden," *Polit. Meinung,* 57 (1961) 6, 28-36.

Neumann, R., "Die Ukrainer in Ostdeutschland," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 68, 122-127.

Neumann, R. J., "Polnische Hochschulen in Ostdeutschland," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 65-66, 3-11.

Opitz, G., "Vor 15 Jahren entstand die SED," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 132, 216-221.

v. Pfeil, S. G., "Heinrich v. Treitschke u. das Judentum," *Welt als Gesch.*, XXI (1961) 1, 49-62.

Pikart, E., "Berufsbeamtentum u. Parteienstaat," *Zft. f. Polit.*, VIII (1961) 1, 225.

Reeg-Rupprecht., E., "Das Rechtswesen in der SBZ," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 132, 222-231.

Rothfels, H., "Zur Stellung Bismarcks im deutschen Geschichtsbild," *Gesch. in Wissensch. u. Unterr.*, XII (1961) 4, 209-219.

Rowen, H. H., "The Peace of Westphalia Revisited," *Jl. of Mod. Hist.*, XXXIII (1961) 1, 53-56.

Schiller, H., "Erinnerungen an die Deutsche Zeitungen im Ostland," *Baltische Hefte,* VII (1961) 3, 148-155.

"Schrifttum über die deutschen Siedlungsgebiete im östlichen Mitteleuropa," *Gesch. in Wissensch. u. Unterr.*, XII (1961) 4, 253-268.

Sobczak, J., "Polityczne i militarne konsekwencje piecioletniej przynależności NRF do NATO," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVI (1960) 6, 338-342.

Strauss, F. J., "Germany's Role within NATO," *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX (1961) 3, 53-59.

Vogelsang, T., "Neuere Literatur z. Gesch, d. Weimarer Republik," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgeschichte,* April (1961), 211-223.

Vogelsang, T., "Deutschlands Aussenpolitik 1919-1939. Ein Bericht über die Literatur seit 1945", *Schweizerische Zft. f. Gesch.*, X (1960) 4, 557.

Wagner, W. "Wenn Erhard Kanzler würde", *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 59, 21-29.

Wagner, H., "Karl Jaspers et la question allemande", *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* VIII (1961) 1, 54-67.

Wiewióra, B., "Zagadnienia rewizjonizmu zachodnioniemieckiego na XV Sesji Zgromadzenia Ogólnego ONZ", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 227-244.

Zieliński, A., "Niemcy i zabór pruski w publicystyce powstania listopadowego", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 302-306.

Zygulski, K., "The German Conception of Fatherland and Social Reality", *Pol. West. Aff.,* I (1960) 2, 290-321.

Zygulski, K., "Die Sociale Eingliederung der Umsiedler in der Deutschen Bundesrepublik im Spiegel der deutschen Sozologie," *Pol. West. Aff.*, I (1960) 2, 345-351.

HUNGARY

Andics, E., "A Habsburgok es a forradalmak elleni cari segitség kerdese", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 4, 556-594.

Belenyesy, M., "La culture permanente et l' évolution du système biennal et triennal en Hongrie médiévale", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 311-326.

Belgrage, L., "Die schwedische Neutralitätspolitik in einer Welt d. Blockbildungen", *Osterr. Zft. f. Aussenpol.,* I (1960) 1, 11-24.

Bong, O., "Das baltische Katenbild", *Baltische Hefte,* 7 (1961) 2, 83-91.

Borbándi, Gy., "György Lukács", *E. Eur.,* X (1961) 5, 28-32.

Byözö, E., "Magyarorszag XVI. századi külkereskedelmének torténetéhez", *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 1, 1-46.

Endre, V., "A magyar jogszolgáltatás átszervése II. József korában", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 5-6, 736-749.

Gadolin, A., "Finland und die EFTA", *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 132, 232-235.

Hollander, A. N. J., "The Great Hungarian Plain—a European Frontier Area (II)", *Comp. Studies in Soc. & Hist.,* III (1961) 2, 155-169.

Jaszay M., "Ludovico Frapolli e gli emigrati ungheresi nel Risorgimento", *Rassegna Stor. d. Risorgimento,* XLVII (1960) 4, 531-566.

Kammari, M. D., "V.I. Lenin a nemzeti fejlödés alapvetö törvenyszerúségeirol", *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 1, 154-167.

L., L., "A Károlyi-és Berinkey-kormány pénzugyi politikája", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 5-6, 812-834.

Markus, L., "A leninizmus hatása a szociáldemokrata törtenetfelfogásra a Tenácskoztársasag idéjen", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 4, 626-646.

Marta, S. L., "Egy osztrak röpiratiro utja a negyven nyolcas forradalom fele", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 4, 595-625.

Ney, G., "Meine Vaterstadt Reval Ende des vorigen Jahrhunderts", *Baltische Hefte,* 7 (1961) 2, 69-82.

Ochmanski, J., "La grande réforme agraire en Lithuanie et en Ruthénie Blanche au XVIe siècle", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 327-342.

P., I., "Az 1956. ëvi ellenforradalom falun", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 5-6, 835-377.

Politisz, J., "Az osztályok szerepe az 1821. évi görög nemzeti felkelésben", *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 1, 118-137.

Prorok, L., "Elementy polski w dramatach bałtyckich Zachariasza Wernera", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 307-314.

Puskás, A., "Adatok Horthy-Magyarorszag kulpolitikájához a második világháború éveiben", *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 1, 83-117.

Rintala, M., "Väinö Tanner in Finnish Politics", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.,* XX (1961) 1, 84-98.

Somlyai, M., "Adatok a mezogazdasagi termeles magindulasanak törtenetehez 1945-46-ban", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 4, 646-660.

Stegman, H., "Aus meinen Erinnerungen II. Im sterbenden Parlament, der Saeima (1933-34)", *Baltische Hefte,* 7 (1961) 2, 156-178.

Sztaray, Z., "Birth Control in Hungary since 1956", *The Rev.,* III (1961) 1, 1-22.

Toma, P. A., "Revival of a Communist Party in Hungary", *West. Polit. Qy.,* XIV (1961) 1, 87-103.

Zsolt, T., "Wesselényi Miklós fogsága", *Szazadok,* 94 (1960) 5-6, 794-811.

POLAND

Baranowski, B., "Próba obliczenia rozmiarow produkcji rolniczej i jej konsumpcji w czaszch Księstwo Warszawskiego i Królestwa Polskiego (1807-1830)", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 209-228.

Babinicz, W., "Współpraca inteligencji terenowej", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* V (1961) 1, 173-182.

Barbag, J., "New Look for the Schools", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 3, 15-19.

Bartosik, J., "Zmiany w strukturze agrarnej Ziem Zachodnich", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 1, 37-56.

Batowski, H., "Wesen u. Aufgaben d. Gesch. d. polnischen Slavistik (slavischen Philogie) seit 1945", *Wiener Slav. Jahrbuch* (1960), 49-58.

Berezowski, Z., "Overtures to Poland", *Poland & Germany,* V (1961) 1, 1-7.

Berlinczyk, "Polska-Niemcy 1961", *Kultura,* (1961) 3, 91-101.

Boldirev, Z., "Staat u. Kirche in Polen", *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 1 13-28.

Borucki, A., "Z badań nad sytuaćhą społecznozawodowa inteligencji dwudziestolecia w Polsce Ludowej", *Przeg. Socjologiczny,* XIV (1960) 2, 93-104.

Chmielewska, B., "Badania socjologiczne na Pomorzu Zachodnim w ubiegłym 15-leciu", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* IV (1960) 4, 238-247.

Czaplinski, W., "Polska wobec początków wojny trzydziestoletniej 1618-1620", *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 449-478.

"Démarches szefów polskich przedstawicielstw dyplomatycznych w krajach NATO (podał J. Muszyński)", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 322-326.

Dopierała, B., "Tendencje rozwojowe portu szczecińskiego i szczecińskiej żeglugi w dwudziestoleciu miedzywojennum (1919-1939)" *Annales d' Hist. Soc. et Econ.,* XXII (1960), 53-108.

Drozdowske, M., "Przeslanke ewolucji polityki gospodarczej rzadu polskiego lat 1936-1939", *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVIII (1961) 2, 345-381.

Druski, I., "Offences Against the National Economy", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961), 14-17.

Dziewanowski, M. K., "Stalin and the Polish Communists", *Sov. Surv.,* (1961) /35, 61-64.

Fiszer, H., "The extermination of Jews in Poland 1939-1944", *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* XI (1960) 5, 5-20.

Garyga, B., "Narzedzia uprawy ziemi w górskich terenach na pograniczu Czech i Slaska", *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 515-538.

Griffith, W. E., "Warsaw Notebook", *Sov. Survey,* (1961) 35, 26-30.

Grzeszczyk, T., "Społeczno-ekonomiczne aspekty alkoholismu. Proba badań w województwie łódzkim", *Przeg. Socjologiczny,* XIV (1960) 2, 110-116.

Grzybowski, K., "The Polish Parliament", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 3, 3-7.

Grzybowski, K., "Z rozwazan nad historią", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* IV (1960) 4, 47-62.

Hensel, W., "L'archéologie et le caractère polonais des Terres Occidentales", *Polish West. Aff.,* 8 (1960) 2, 322-344.

Herok, F., "Scientific Inst. on the Polish Western Territories", *Pol. West. Aff.,* I (1960) 2, 385-399.

Holzer, J., "Preliminary results of the general population census", *Zachod. Agencja Prasowa,* (1961) /3, 26-30.

Holzer, J., "Rozmowa Piłsudskiego z hrabia Kesslerem", *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVIII (1961) 2, 447-450.

Ikopien, J., "Wokól kryteriów polityki wydawniczej", *Kultura i Społeczeńtswo,* IV (1960) 4, 182-187.

Jebinski, K. A., "White Eagle Today and Yesterday", *Sov. Surv.,* (1961) /35, 12-25.

Jordan, Z., "O sytuacji w nauce polskiej", *Kultura,* (1961) /3, 22-54.

Kaczmarczyk, Z., "Polska granica zachodnia w perspektywie tysiąca lat historii", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 245-266.

Kaczmarek, W., "Materiały z badań etnograficzynch prowadzonych przez Muzeum Pomorza Zachodniego na Pomorzu Zachodnim", *Materiały Zachod.-Pomorskie,* V (1959), 447-486.

Karłowska, A., "Bibliografia sztuki Pomorza Zachodniego za lata 1945-1958", *Materiały Zachodnio-Pomorskie,* V (1959), 495-508.

Kijowski, A., "Prose Writing Since the War", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 1, 12-24.

Klafkowski, A., "The Polish-German Frontier in the System of Intern. Agreements", *Pol. West. Aff.,* I (1960) 2, 213-245.

Kipeć, B., "Stan aktualny produkcji rolnej Ziem Zachodnich", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 1, 57-88.

Kokot, J., "Flight from the East", *Poland & Germany,* V (1961) 1, 29-39.

Komarnicki, T., "Poufne Rozmowy Polsko-Niemieckie na Przełomie 1920-21 r", *Bellona,* XLII (1960) 3, 201-213.

Komoroczy, G., "Przegląd badań z zakresu wegierskiej historii gospodarczej opublikowanych w latach 1938-1958", *Annales d'Hist. Soc. et Econ.,* XXII (1960), 167-190.

Kormanowa, Z., "Irena Pietrzak-Pawłowska, O nowej syntezie dziejow polskich II-ej pol. XIX w", *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVIII (1961) 2, 381-402.

Krannhals, H., "Der polnische Brotkorb", *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 68, 128-134.

Krannhals, H., "Die Fischerei Polens", *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 65-66, 29-42.

Kubacki, W., "Das Werk Juliusz Słowackis u. seine Bedeutung f. die polnische Literatur", *Zft. f. Slawistik,* V (1960) 4, 545-565.

Kutrzeba-Pojnarowa, A., "Kazimierz Moszynski jako historyk kultury materialnej Polski i Słowiańszczyzny", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 171-182.

Kwilecki, A., "Rozwój miasta a świadomosc jego obywateli", *Kultura i Społeczenstwo,* V (1961) 1, 145-164.

Kwiłecki, A., "Z badań nad przemianami społeczno-kulturalnymi wsi na Ziemiach Zachodnich", *Przeg. Zachod.,* XVII (1961) 1, 108-125.

Łach, W., "Rozwój wsi trzebnickiej w okresie piętnastolecia w swietle badań ankietowych", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 1, 89-107.

Labedz, L., "The Polish Intellectual Climate", *Sov. Surv.,* (1961) 35, 3-11.

"La industria de la patata en Polonia", *Oriente Europa,* X (1960) 40, 229-236.

Leskiewicz, J., "Aperçu de travaux sur l'histoire rurale de la Pologne", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 343-360.

Leszcynski, J., "Struktura społeczna i stosunki demograficzne na wsi kłodzkiej w XVII wieku", *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 479-496.

Libiszowska, Z., "Gospodarstwo wiejskie w Polsce w XVII w. w opinii cudzoziemców", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 3, 277-298.

Lubojanski, J., "What do the Poles think of the Germans?", *Zachod. Agencja Prasowa,* (1961) /3, 2-7.

Lukas, R. C., "The Seizure of Vilna, October 1920", *Historian,* XXIII (1961) 2, 234-246.

Maczek, S., "Brygada Pand. Mot. Francji", *Bellona,* XLII (1960) 3, 214-224.

Majewski, J., "Struktura i rola urzędow rozjemczych do spraw majatowych posiadączy gospodarstw wiejskich w latach 1932-1939", *Annales d'Hist. Soc. et Econ.,* XXII (1960), 109-166.

Malowist, M., "Polska a przewrót cen w Europie i XVII w", *Kwart. Hist.*, LXVIII (1961) 2, 215-320.

Manusevich, A. Y., "The Lenin Iskra and the Polish Socialist Press", *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961) 2, 99-104.

Meyer, E., "Polen (Literaturbericht)" *Gesch. in Wissen. u. Unterr.,* 12 (1961) 3, 205-208.

Miedzinka, J., "Social Policy under Gomulka", *Sov. Surv.,* (1961) /55, 39-45.

Pabisz, J., "Z działalnosci niektórych organizacji antyrobotniczych na Śląsku Cieszyńskim", *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 549-560.

Panczyk, H., "Maria Konopnicka a walka z polityką germanizacyjną władz pruskich", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVI (1960) 6, 288-301.

Pawełczynska, A., "Z pracy Ośrodka Badań Opinii Publicznej przy Polskim Radio", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* IV (1960) 4, 188-201.

Piatowski, H., "Bitwa nad Wkrą w ramach opeacji Warszawskiej 1920 r.", Bellona, XVII (1960) 3, 191-200.

Quentin, P. A., "Paris, Moscow and the Oder-Neisse Line", *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 4, 89-90.

Romaniukowa, F., sprawie udziału Polaków w 1 Międzynarodówce", *Kwart. Hist.,* LXVIII (1961) 2, 321-344.

Rosset, E., "Starzenie sie ludności produkcyjnej w Polsce i w świecie", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* V (1961) 1, 39-66.

Samsonowicz, H., "Materiały do dziejów żegługi morskiej w XVII w.," *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 3, 299-312.

Sasse, H. G., "La prehistoria de las deportaciones y de la linea Oder-Neisse, 1939-1945", *Oriente Europeo,* X (1960) 40, 221-228 and XI (1961) 41, 287-304.

Secomski, K., "The New Five-Year Plan", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 1, 7-11.

"Self-government in consumer co-operatives in Warsaw", *Pol. Co-op. Rev.,* (1960) /4, 16-21.

"Seminar on the Co-operative Housing Estate", *Pol. Co-op. Rev.,* (1960) /4, 36-41.

Siemieński, M., "Z badań nad działalnoscia kulturalno-oświatowa w Nowej Hucie. Budżet wolnego czasu robotnika a możliwości upowszechnienia kultury", *Przeg. Socjologiczny* XIV (1960) 2, 117-122.

Smerda, M., "Między polską a czeską kulturalną", *Kwart. Hist.,* XV (1960) 4, 497-514.

Sobczak, J. "Głosy opinii zachodniej o granicy na Odrze i Nysie", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 1, 126-130.

Sobanski, W., "On the fortieth anniversary of the plebiscite and third uprising in Silesia", *Zachod. Agencja Prasowa,* (1961) /3, 8-25.

Soldenhoff, S., "Socialist Transformations and Human Personality", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 2, 3-10.

Sroga, A., "Rolnictwo Ziem Zachodnich po czterech latach", *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 1, 19-37.

Starewicz, A., "The Poles Have Good Reasons to be Satisfied", *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 1, 3-6.

Stawar, A., "Brzozowski", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* V (1961) 1, 3-24.

Super, D. E., "Psychologia a użytkowanie kadr ludzkich", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* V (1961) 1, 25-38.

Szwankowska, H., "Wnętrza warszawskich domów w XVIII w.", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 3, 313-336.

Taniewski, L., "Postęp techniczny na tle warunków społecznych", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* IV (1960) 4, 63-80.

"Third Congress of the supply and purchase co-operation", *Polish Co-op. Rev.,* (1960) /4, 10-15.

Tomašić, D. A., "Political Leadership in Contemporary Poland", *Jl. of Human Rel.,* IX (1960) 2, 191-207.

Trawkowski, S., "W sprawie roli kolonizacji niemieckiej w przemianach kultury materialnej na ziemiach polskich w XIII wieku", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 183-208.

Waligórska, K., "Konstrukcje statków pływających po Sanie i Wisle w XVIII w.", *Kwart. Hist.,* VIII (1960) 2, 229-242.

Waszak, S., "The Number of Germans in Poland in years 1931-1959 against the Background of German Losses in the Second World War", *Pol. West. Aff.,* 1 (1960) 2, 246-289.

Wesołowski, Wł., "Marksistowska teoria panowania klasowego a teoria władzy grup interesów", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* V (1961) 1, 67-106.

Wojcik, M., "Kalendarz robocizny pańszczyźnianej w jednym z folwarków ziemi żydaczowskiej w 1640 r.", *Kwart. Hist.*, VIII (1960) 3, 337-342.

Wołagiewicz., R., "Uwagi do zagadnienia stosunków kulturowych w okresie lateńskim, na Pomorzu Zachodnim", *Materiały Zach.-Pomorskie*, V (1959), 121-144.

Zajchowska, S., "Geograficzne czynniki integracji Ziem Zachodnich", *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961), 3-18.

Zygulski, K., "Badania nad prestiżem zawodów inteligencji dwudziestolecia w Polsce Ludowej", *Przeg. Socjologiczny*, XIV (1960) 2, 105-110.

U.S.S.R. and the UKRAINE

Aleksandrov, K., "Sino-Soviet Differences over War and Peaceful Co-existence", *Bltn. for Study of USSR*, VIII (1961) 1, 41-45.

Ambler, E., "The Soviet Boarding School", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961) 2, 237-252.

Angelus, O., "Der Kreml im Kampf gegen Flüchtlinge" *Baltische Hefte*, VII (1961) 3, 145-147.

Apremont, B., "La politique pétrolière de l'U.R.S.S.", *Polit. Etrangère*, (1960) /6, 572-583.
Sov. Studies, XII (1961) 3, 273-287.

Ballis, W. B., "Political Significance of Recent Soviet Economic Reorganizations", *Rev. of Polit.*, XXIII (1961) 2, 153-171.

Bakounine, M., "Les Conquêtes Coloniales de la Russie", *Contrat Social*, V (1961) 2, 101-103.

Beerman, R., "Gosbank Procedures in the Case of Economic Difficulties of Enterprises",

Brown, E. C., "A note on Employment and Unemployment in the Soviet Union in the Light of Technical Progress", *Sov. Studies*, XII (1961) 3, 231-240.

Chikalenko, L., "Ukrainian-Russian Negotiations in 1920", *Annals of Ukr. Acad.*, VII (1959) 1-2, 1647-1655.

Churchward, L. G., "Contemporary Soviet Theeory of the Soviet State", *Sov. Studies*, XII (1960-61), 404-419.

Clarkson, J., "Russia—An Essay at Perspective", *Russian Rev.*, XX (1961) 2, 103-109.

Costello, D. P., "Voluntarism and Determinism in Bolshevist Doctrine", *Sov. Studies*, XII (1960-61), 394-403.

Dacio, J., "Campesinos y obreros dentro del sistema económico", *Polit. Intern.*, (1960) 52, 119-138.

Dallin, A., "Portrait of a Collaborator: Oktan", *Sov. Surv.*, (1961) 35, 114-119.

Daniels, R. V., "Intellectuals and the Russian Revolution", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961) 2, 270-278.

Davydenko, V., "Jruschov, el verdugo de Ucrania", *Ucrania Libre* X (1960) 16-17, 32-38.

Davydenko, V., "Another Crisis of the Collective Farm System in Ukraine", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVII (1961) 1, 60-65.

Degras, J., "Sur l'Histoire du Comintern", *Contrat Social*, V (1961) 1, 5-12.

Delimars, E., "Problems of Russian Agriculture", *Contemp. Issues*, XI (1961) 41, 12-21.

Dobriansky, L. E., "The Russian Image and U.S.", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVI (1960) 4, 299-307.

Dobriansky, L. E., "Polwar's Strategic Concept", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVII (1961) 1, 24-34.

Dyachkov, Y., "The Central Committee Plenum", *Bltn. for Study of USSR.*, VIII (1961) 2, 17-25.

Elguera, E., "La Constitución de Ucrania del Siglo XVIII", *Ucrania Libre*, X (1960) 16-17, 39-45.

Ellison, H. J., "The Decision to Collectivize Agriculture", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961) 2, 189-202.

Field, M. G., "Health Services in the USSR", *Sov. Surv.*, (1961) 35, 100-105.

Gaev, A., "Soviet Celebration of the Tolstoy Anniv.", *Bltn. for Study of USSR*, VIII (1961) 2, 25-31.

Galay, N., "The Burden of Soviet Military Expenditure", *Bltn. for Study of USSR*, VIII (1961) 3, 29-33.

Garthoff, R. L., "War and Peace in Soviet Policy", *Russian Rev,*, XX (1961) 2, 121-133.

Glovinsky, E., "Devaluation of the Ruble", *Bltn. for Study of USSR*, VIII (1961) 1, 18-22.

Halperin, E., "Bucharins u. Trotzkis Schatten", *Wort u. Wahrheit*, XVI (1961) 2, 117-124.

Iasny, N., "Rentas de los Campesinos y de los Obreros en la URSS", *Estudios sobre el Comunismo.* IX (1961) 32, 62-67.

Jasny, N., "A Note on Rationality and Efficiency in the Soviet Economy", *Sov. Studies*, XII 1960-61), 353-375.

Johnson, E. L., "Planning and Contract Law", *Sov. Studies*, XII (1961) 3, 263-272.

uviler, P. H., "Interparliamentary Contacts in Soviet Foreign Policy", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961) 1, 25-39.

arpovich, M. M., "Chernyshevski between Socialism and Liberalism", *Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique,* I (1960) 4, 569-583.

ashin, A., "Two Communist Armies", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 3, 34-41.

shin, A. K., "The Moscow Declaration and the Sino-Soviet Conflict", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 1, 34-40.

ent, N., "Soviet Plans for Developing Heavy Industry in the Satellite Countries", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 2, 3-9.

irkconnell, W., "The Shevchenko Centenary", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVII (1961) 1, 50-59.

olavz, W., "Islam in the Soviet Union II", *Sov. Surv.*, (1961) 35, 90-99.

ole, J., "The Budgetary system", *Pol. Persp.*, IV (1961) 3, 8-14.

rymov, B., "Foreign Policy Crisis of Soviet Democracy", *Intern. Aff.*, VII (1961) 3, 19-25.

ungurtsev, V., "The Calculation of Gross Production in the USSR", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 1, 23-26.

urganov, I., "The Nationality Policy of Communism", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961), 12-17.

avergne, B., "Le Phénomène soviétique", *l'Année Polit. et Econ.*, 33 (1960) 158, 393-493.

avrin, J., "Kireevsky and the Problem of Culture", *Russian Rev.*, XX (1961) 2, 110-120.

eckzycke, A., "Zur Währungsreform in der Sowjetunion", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* (1961), 89-92.

ewytzkyj, B., "Die gegenwärtige Lage in den Gewerkschaften der USSR", *Osteuropa,* 11 (1961) 1, 113-119.

ichtheim, G., "Revisionism: the Great Debate", *Sov. Survey,* (1961) 35, 76-89.

itvinov, B., "Conference on the Political Warfare of the Soviets", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961), 3-11.

luov, M. I., "The main directions and the results of the development of the USSR textile industry during the post-war Five-Year Plan", *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitetu* (1961), 3-24.

ohenhill, F., "'Dr. Zhivago' and the Russian Revolution", *Contemp. Issues,* XI (1961) 41, 1-11.

anning, C. A., "The Caucasus of Shevchenko", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVI (1960) 4, 321-329.

eissner, B., "Die Sowjetunion vor dem XXII. Parteikongress der KPdSU. Die Innenpolitik Chruschtchows", *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 1, 81-97.

ontiae, J. M., "New Models and Old Dilemmas", *Sov. Surv.*, (1961) 35, 50-53.

ewth, J., "USSR 1958: Family Size and Fertility", *Sov. Studies,* XII (1961) 3, 288-291.

iedermeier, H., "Die neuen Grundlagen f. die 'Arbeitsgesetzgebung' der Sowjetunion", *Osteuropa,* XI(1961), 198-211.

utter, G., "Employment in the Soviet Economy: An Interim Solution to a Puzzle", *Sov. Studies,* XII (1960-61), 376-393.

ichler, H., "Reformen in d. Industrie d. Sowjetunion", *Osterr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961) 1, 121-131.

ortal, R., "Aux origines d'une bourgeoisie industrielle en Russie", *Rev. d'Hist. Moderne et Contemp.*, (1961) VIII, 35-60.

Pritzwald, K. S., "Die Bedeutung der Sprache f. die sowjetische Meinungssteuerung", *Osteuropa,* II (1961) 1, 98-108.

ruck, E., "Wehrpolitische Vorgänge in der Sowjetunion", *Osteuropa,* XI1961) 1, 46-49.

Pruebas de humanitarismo de los rusos con los alemanes", *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 41, 329-347.

usylewitsch, T., "Studentenleben in der Sowjetunion", *Ostecropa,* XI (1961) 1, 1-12.

Reorganization of the rural Soviets during the collectivization of the peasants in 1929-1930", *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitetu* (1961) 25-42.

eitzner, A., "Moscow's Political Offensive", *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX (1961) 4, 94-95.

itvo, H., "Twenty-First Party Congress—Before and After (Part One)", *Amer. Slav. & E. Eur. Rev.*, XX (1961), 203-219.

ogger, H., "Government and Schools in the USSR", *Current Hist.*, June 1961, 333-339.

osenfeld, G., & Stoecker, H., "Die Vorschläge der Sowjetunion f. allgemeine u. vollständige Abrüstung 1927/28", *Zft. f. Gesch.*, IX (1961), 13-27.

anta-Pinter, J. J., "La Reforma del Derecho Penal Soviético", *Estudios sobre el Comunismo,* IX (1961) 32.

cheggia, A., "Historia de Ucrania", *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 41, 351-368.

hapiro, I., "The Soviet Bar—Past and Present", *Russian Rev.*, XX (1961), 143-150.

handor, V., "Ukrainian and the Status Quo in Central and Eastern Europe", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVI (1960), 330, 342.

Simmons, E. J., "Re Origins of Literary Control", *Sov. Surv.*, (1961) 36, 78-84.

Sladek, Z., "Dějiny Komunistické strany Sovětského svazu", *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, VIII (1960) 707-709.

Slavutych, Y., "Alexander Herzen and Ukraine", *Ukrainian Qy.*, XVI (1960), 342-348

Słupperich, R., "Russisch-englische Kirchenverhandlungen in Moskau", *Osteuropa* II (1961), 123-129.

Solovey, D., "The Colonial Victimisation of the Ukraine", *Prob. of Peoples of USSR* (1961) /9, 34-40.

"Sowiecki antysemityzm", *Kultura,* (1961) /4/162, 71-76.

Stackelberg, G. A., "International Congresses and Soviet Propaganda", *Bltn. for Study o* *USSR,* VIII (1961), 42-49.

Stieger, M., "Soviet Policy Regarding World Youth", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 22-28.

Stolte, S. C., "The Moscow Declaration and the Underdeveloped Countries", *Bltn. fo* *Study of USSR,* VIII (1961), 27-33.

Swearer, H. R., "Administration of Local Industry after the 1957 Industrial Reorganization", *Sov. Studies,* XII (1961), 217-230.

Taskin, G. A., "The Soviet Northwest: Economic Regionalization", *Geograph. Rev.,* L (1961), 213-235.

Uluqtuq, A., "The Moscow Declaration and Communist Colonialism", *Prob. of Peoples o* *USSR,* (1961) /9, 3-7.

"United Nations and Soviet Colonialism", *ACEN News,* (1961) /72,4-7.

Urban, P., "Moskaus heutige Kulturpolitik gegenüber den nichtrussischen Völkerschafte d. Sowjetunion", *Osteuropa,* XI (1961), 212-225.

Uscatescu, J., "Del derecho romano al derecho sovietico", *Oriente Europeo,* X (1960) 40 203-220.

Volnov, M.A., "Some data concerning the struggle for the Ukrainian market in th second quarter of the 10th century", *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universitetu,* (1961) 43-57.

Vvedensky, G. S., "The Soviet Oil Industry", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VII (1961) 3, 14-2

Vvedensky, G. A., "The Nickel Industry of the USSR", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VII (1961) 2, 10-16.

Willetts, H. T., "The Public Image of the CPSU", *Sov. Surv.,* (1961) 35, 69-75.

Wrangell, W., "Wege u. Ende der russischen Intelligenz", *Baltische Hefte,* VII (1961) 129-144.

Zinner, P. E., "Sovétska politika ve východní Evropě", *Svědectví,* IV (1961) 13, 26-39.

YUGOSLAVIA

Bogdan, I., "'La Leyenda Negra' sobre Croacia en 'Preuves'," *Studia Croatica,* I (1961 63-80.

Draskovich, S. M., "Titos 'neutraler' Kommunismus", *Polit. Studien,* 12 (1961) 1 155-162.

Ekmečić, M., "La politique nationale de la Serbie envers la Bosnie et Herzégovine et question agraire (1844-1875)", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovin* X (1949-59), 197-219.

Hamm, J., "Register der Korrespondenz v. Vatroslav Jagić im Besitz der Universitätsbibl thek in Zagreb", *Wiener Slav. Jahrbuch,* (1960), 75-111.

Hamm, J., "Rückblick auf die Gesch. der Slavistik u. die Slavistik in Jugoslavien", *Wien* *Slav. Jahrbuch,* (1961), 61-74.

Hauptman, F., "La lutte pour le fer bosniaque à la veille de la Première Guerre Mo diale", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Hérzegovine,* X (1949-50), 121-16

Hinterhoff, E., "Is Jugoslavia moving closer to the West?" *Christian Dem. Rev.* XI (196 66, 13-15.

Humo, A., "Basic Characteristics of Yugoslavia's Plan of Economic Development f 1961-1965", *Rev. of Intern. Aff.,* XII (1961) 260.

Jovic, B., "Legal Advisory Bodies of Trade Unions", *Yugoslav Trade Unions* (1960), 39-

"Jugoslawien", *Osteuropa,* XI (1961), 144-153.

Kadić, A., "Vladimir Soloviev and Bishop Strossmayer", *Amer. Slav & E. Eur. Re* XX (1961), 163-188.

Kadic, B., "Julio Clovio Croata—Protector del greco Joven", *Studia Croatica,* I (1961 19-25.

Kapidzić, H., "La préparation de la période constitutionelle en Bosnie et Herzégovi

(1903-1910)", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 121-166.

Kapidzić, H., "Les archives et musées de Béograd butin de guerre de l'occupant austro-hongroise pendant la Première Guerre Mondiale" (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 355-363.

Klaic, N., "Les études récentes sur les questions sociales de la Croatie Médievale", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 333-363.

Kneževic, M., "Trade Unions' Proposed Social Insurance Reform", *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1960), 51-58.

Kolaja, J., "A Yugoslav Workers' Council", *Human Org.,* XX (1960), 27-31.

Marcelic, P., "La Actualidad de Boscovich", *Studia Croatica,* I (1961), 43-47.

Marinovic, M., "Trade Unions and Relaxation of World Tension", *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1960), 59-70.

Matejko, A., "Badania socjo-pyschologiczne stosunków miedzyludzkich w przedsiebiorstwach uspołecznionych w NRD", *Kultura i Społeczeństwo,* IV (1960) 4, 63-80.

Milutinovic, K., "Les socialistes sur le role des Slaves du Sud dans la solution de la Question orientale", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 87-119.

Peschaut, R., "Uber Jugoslawiens Holzindustrie", *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961), 143-152.

Petrović, R., "L'activité du Comité de Raguse pour secourir les rebelles d'Herzégovine en 1875-1878", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzegovine,* X (1949-59), 221-245.

Radja, T., "Origen, Desarrollo y Significado de la Autogestión Obrera en Yugoeslavia", *Studia Croatica,* I (1961), 25-42.

Roucek, J. S., "Education of the Yugoslav Peoples before 1918", *Slav. & E. Eur. Studies,* V (1960), 38-53.

Šarac, N., and N. Babić, "Bref aperçu du développement et de l'activité du KPJ en Bosnie et Herzégovine de 1919 à 1945" (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. de Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 11-54.

Suslova, N. M., "Concerning the Influence of Lenin's Ideas upon the Representatives of the Revolutionary Wing of the Serbian Social-Democracy", *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961) /2, 105-110.

Vasić, M., "Les 'knežina-e' et les knez de Timar dans le Sandjak de Zvornik au XVI siècle", (in Serb), *Annuaire Soc. Hist. Bosnie et Herzégovine,* X (1949-59), 247-278.

Veselinović, A., "The Trade Union Branch and the Workers' Council", *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1960) 2, 13-20.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Beck, Earl R., *The Death of the Prussian Republic,* Florida State Univeristy at Tallahassee, Rose Printing Co., 1959, $6.00.

Bognas, J., *Planned Economy in Hungary,* Budapest, Pannonia Press, 1959.

Borcherdt, C., *Fruchtfolgesysteme u. Marktorientierung als gestaltende Kräfte d. Agrarlandschaft in Bayern,* Saarbrü, Univ. Saarlandes, 1960.

Braham, R. L., *Eichmann and the Destruction of Hungarian Jewry,* New York, Twayne Inc., 1961.

Burks, R. V., *The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Europe,* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1961, $5.00.

Chalupa, Dr. V., *The Rise and Development of a Totalitarian,* Leiden, Czech. Foreign Institute in Exile, 1961, $3.95.

Comenius, J. A., *Pampaedia,* Heidelberg, Quelle & Meyer, 1960, DM 35.

Documents on German Foreign Policy, Smyth, H. M., ed., Washington, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1960.

Donohoe, James, *Hitler's Conservative Opponents in Bavaria 1930-1945,* Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1961, 32 Guilders.

Dornberg, John, *Schizophrenic Germany,* New York, Macmillan, 1961, $4.95.

Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, Dept. of State, 1960, Vol. I, $6.00 Vol. II, $6.50, Vol. III, $3.25.

Glaser, Kurt, *Czechoslovakia—a Critical History,* Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1961 $5.50.

Heppell and Singleton, *Yugoslavia,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $5.95.

Hungarian Abbreviations—A Selective List, Washington, Library of Congress, 1961, $ .45

Kaplan and Katzenbach, *The Political Foundations of International Law,* New York, Wiley and Sons, 1961, $6.95.

Kirn, P., *Politische Gesch. d. Deutschen Grenzen,* Mannheim, Bibliographisches Inst AG, 1960.

Kirschbaum, J. M., *Slovakia: Nation at the Crossroads of Central Europe,* New York Robert Speller, 1961, $5.00.

Knoellinger, D. E., *Labor in Finland,* Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Univ. Press, 1960, $6.0

Konstantinovic, Z., *Deutsche Reisebeschreibungen über Serbien u. Montenegro,* Münche Oldenbourg, 1960.

Leitsche, W., *Moskau u. die Politik des Kaiserhofes im XVII,* Graz-Köln, Böhlau, 196

Lewalski, K. F., *Mickiewicz, Konrad Wallenrod,* Cambridge, MIT, 1961.

Pavlowitch, S. K., *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Serbia,* Paris, Mouton & Co., 1961.

Pidytsk, L., *The Grand Tactician,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $6.00.

Pipes, R., *The Russian Intelligentsia,* New York, Columbia Press, 1961, $4.50.

Pogany, Andras, *Belą Estvan: Hungarian Cavalry Colonel in the Confederate Arm* New York, Kossuth Foundation, 1961, $2.00.

Rassow, Peter, *Historische Forschungen u. Probleme,* Wiesbaden, Franz Steiner, 1961, D 42.

Reynolds, R. L., *Europe Emerges,* Madison, Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1961, $7.50.

Ronnefarth, *Die Sudetenkrise in der Internationalen Politik,* I, II, Wiesbaden, Steine 1961.

Schwartz, H., *The Red Phoenix,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $6.00.

Silagi, D., *Ungarn u. d. geheime Mitarbeiterkreis Kaiser Leopolds II.* München, Olden bourg, 1961.

Sobel, R., *The Origins of Interventionism: The United States and the Russo-Finnish Wa* New York, Bookman Assoc., 1961, $4.50.

Sutter, B., *Die Badenischen Sprachen-Verordnungen v. 1897,* Graz-Köln, Böhlau, 196

International Organization in the Social Sciences, Paris, UNESCO, 1961.

Weinzierl-Fisher, E., *Die Osterreichischen Konkordate von 1855 u. 1933.* Wien, Spies & Co 1960, öS118.-

Wierer, R. D., *Föderalismus im Donauraum,* Graz-Köln, Böhlau, 1961, DM 20.

Wytrwal, J. A., *America's Polish Heritage,* Detroit, Endurance Press, 1961, $6.50.

JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOL. XXI OCTOBER, 1961 NUMBER THREE

THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN WAR SCARE, 1927

by Alfred Erich Senn

"IT IS NOT exaggerating to state," declared the American consul in Geneva, "that no other question appearing on the agenda of the Council for the last two years has aroused more intense interest in Geneva or was fraught with more dangerous possibilities."[1] The question to which the consul referred was the Polish-Lithuanian conflict which had just been discussed at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations in December 1927. The long-smoldering dispute between these two states had in the previous few months threatened to engulf Europe in a general conflagration. Now they had been brought together in what seemed to be a peaceful compromise, an event widely hailed as the League's greatest achievement yet. Events quickly showed, however, that the settlement was illusory. Actually, it had been virtually impossible for the League to resolve the conflict, and investigation of the war scare illustrates some of the problems posed to international stability by the new political order in Europe after 1920.

Open trouble had flared in October with the publication in the Polish press of an open letter purportedly written by 28 Polish teachers interned at the Varniai concentration camp in Lithuania. Addressed to the "civilized world, the League of Nations, and the Polish people," the letter claimed that the men had been imprisoned because of their refusal to teach history to Polish students in the way prescribed by the Lithuanian Government.[2] The reaction in Poland to this news was violent and immediate. On October 4 and 5 the Polish Government closed a number of Lithuanian educational institutions in the Vilna region and arrested 20 persons, including 10 priests, on the charge of plotting against the Polish state. The wojewoda of Vilna declared that the measures were taken in reprisal for the persecution of Poles in Lithuania, but he added that this was an act of self-defense in view of the hostile attitudes of the arrested Lithuanians.[3]

The wave of anti-Lithuanian feeling mounted in the next few days. On October 8 Jozef Piłsudski, the strong man ruler of Poland since May

---

[1] Report of S. Pinkney Tuck, Geneva, Dec. 15, 1927, United States National Archives, 760C.60M/200.

[2] Copy in Voldemaras's letter to the League of Nations, Oct. 15, 1927, in National Archives, 760C.60M/186.

[3] *Kurjer Warszawski,* Oct. 6, 1927.

1926, arrived in Vilna to take part in festivities there on the 9th, commemorating the seventh anniversary of the seizure of that city by the free-booting General Żeligowski. The presence of the Marshal, together with his Cabinet, members of the General Staff, and General Żeligowski, gave great weight to the numerous anti-Lithuanian demonstrations held throughout the city, which vigorously denounced the Lithuanian Government, but which at the same time carefully distinguished between the Lithuanian people, for whom the Poles professed the greatest brotherly love, and the "ruling clique," which was held responsible for the existing troubles.[4] A few days later the Polish Government expelled 14 Lithuanians from Vilna as enemy aliens.

Alarmed by these events, the Lithuanians on October 15 appealed to the League of Nations, charging that the Polish actions against Lithuanian schools in Vilna were a violation of the obligations assumed by the Poles in signing the Minorities Treaty at Versailles on June 28, 1919. Denying any persecution of Poles in Lithuania, the Lithuanians claimed that the moves in Vilna were part of a greater Polish plot "against the very existence of Lithuania," and the note also raised the question as to whether the arrest of the Lithuanian priests was not a violation of the Concordat between the Polish Government and the Vatican.[5] The Lithuanian complaint arrived in Geneva on October 18, and the issue was placed on the agenda for the next regular session of the League Council, scheduled for December.

In order to understand how these incidents developed into a general European crisis, and even to understand why the Lithuanians decided to appeal to the League, it is necessary first of all to examine the historical background and to distinguish the problems facing the Kaunas Government.

The core of the dispute between Poland and Lithuania was the Vilna territory, seized in 1920 by General Żeligowski and later incorporated into Poland. Although the Western powers at first condemned the actions of the Poles, the Conference of Ambassadors, on March 15, 1923, formally recognized the incorporation. The Lithuanians, however, refused to accept the decision of the Conference, and they insisted that a "state of war" existed between themselves and the Poles. Although there were no open hostilities, Lithuania adamantly refused to establish diplomatic relations with Poland and closed the frontier—the Lithuanians used the term "line of demarcation"—to all traffic, demanding as their price for opening relations the cession of Vilna. Since the Poles would not consider any such measure, this "state of war" drifted on through the 1920s.[6]

---

[4] *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1927.

[5] *Le Temps*, Oct. 19, 1927; National Archives, 760C.60M/186.

[6] For an analysis of this situation favoring the Lithuanian view see *Consultations de MM A. de Lapradelle, Louis de Fur et André N. Mandelstam concernant la force obligatoire de la décision de la Conférence des Ambassadeurs du 15 mars 1923* (Paris, 1928). On the Polish view see Władysław Wielhorski, *Polska a Litwa: Stosunki wzajemne w biegu dziejów* (London, 1947).

The problem entered a new phase in December 1926, when the Lithuanian army seized power in Kaunas, displacing a leftist Cabinet which it charged was leading the country to communism, and replacing it with a conservative government. The economic policies of the overthrown regime, together with its concessions to the minority nationalities and its refusal to pay priests' salaries as had been done previously, had aroused considerable antagonism, and the new government, headed by the Tautininkai (Nationalists), also had the support of the Christian Democrats. Efforts were made to give legitimacy to the coup by having the former government leaders resign and by keeping the Seimas (the legislature) in session. The new Cabinet, however, was based on a minority in the Seimas, and this very fragile aura of legitimacy could be maintained only so long as no serious issues arose.[7] But serious issues abounded, as the government faced a grave economic crisis. In the next few months the regime put down several attempts to overthrow it—both from the Left and Right—and finally in April, when it was announced that a member of the Seimas, Pajaujis, had been arrested and convicted of conspiracy, the leftist parties charged the government with violating parliamentary immunity and the Seimas returned a vote of no confidence. The Prime Minister in turn dissolved the Seimas. By the provisions of the constitution, new elections were to be called in 60 days, but the government postponed them indefinitely, since it feared that the Christian Democrats, who were becoming less and less interested in supporting a government they couldn't lead, might return a majority.[8]

The Lithuanian authorities began now to consider ways of revising the political structure of the state. Stumping the country in an effort to win popular support for the regime, the President, Antanas Smetona, asserted that political parties served only to divide the nation at a time when unity was a necessity.[9] There was some talk of making Smetona a king, in the hope of manufacturing a symbol of unity, but, on the other hand, the Prime Minister, Augustinas Voldemaras, seems to have favored a Fascist state, probably imagining himself another Mussolini.[10]

---

[7] Of the 85 seats in the Seimas, the Liaudininkai (Populist, a leftist peasant party) held 22, the Social Democrats 15, the Christian Democrats (a Catholic party based on peasant and clerical support) 14, Tautininkai 3, and other Lithuanian parties mostly aligned with the Christian Democrats, 18. There were also 13 deputies representing the various minorities—Jews, Poles and Germans. The overthrown Cabinet, headed by Mykolas Sleževičius (Liaudininkai) had been based on a coalition of Liaudininkai, Social Democrats, and the national minorities.

[8] The Government gave an indication of its ideas on the future of the Seimas in the summer of 1927 when the parliament building was turned over to the Ministry of Education to be used as a school. Report of Robert Heingartner, Kaunas, Political Review for July 1927, National Archives, 860M.00/155.

[9] *Frankfurter Zeitung,* No. 650, Sept. 2, 1927.

[10] See *New York Times,* Aug. 19, 1927; *Frankfurter Zeitung,* No. 650, Sept. 2, 1927. While visiting Mussolini in Rome on September 19, Voldemaras declared that the Lithuanians looked upon the Italians as their model in foreign and internal politics. *Lietuva,* Sept. 20, 1927.

In late spring the government announced that several constitutional amendments would be submitted to a popular referendum in the near future. One change would reduce the parliament to an advisory role, while the President would receive virtual dictatorial powers for a term of seven years. Another would proclaim Vilna, though a part of Poland at the time, as the capital of Lithuania. The proposals were to be voted on as a whole, and the expectation was that, while the plan to strengthen the President's position was of dubious popularity, the appeal to nationalist feeling over Vilna would carry the program through. Nevertheless the regime saw fit to tread carefully. Military censorship, imposed after the coup of December, prevented any public discussion of the proposals, and Voldemaras refused to publish the date of the vote, thereby limiting electioneering even further.[11]

The foreign policy of the new government had been beset with just as many problems as the domestic policy. After the coup, the new regime delayed the announcement of its program in foreign affairs. Smetona and Voldemaras were both considered friendly to Germany, but tension over Lithuanian efforts to tighten their control in Memel prevented any active German orientation in Lithuanian policy. The Russians, perhaps the Lithuanians' strongest supporters in the Vilna question, were alienated by the arrest and execution of four Lithuanian Communists immediately after the coup. Yet, both Germany and Russia, by the end of January 1927, found themselves forced to swallow their grievances and to present friendly faces to the Lithuanians.[12]

In Poland, Piłsudski watched the events surrounding the coup very closely. The Lithuanian claim to Vilna had recently received renewed support from the Soviet Union as part of a non-aggression pact signed on September 28, 1926, but since the new government was criticizing the former Cabinet as having been too sympathetic to the Communists, the fate of the pact was in doubt. On December 24 Piłsudski declared that he planned to do nothing about the events in Lithuania for the time being. Rather he would wait and see what the program of the new government would be.[13] But on January 1 he remarked to the French ambassador, Jules Laroche, that the League of Nations was apparently either unable or unwilling to do anything about the Lithuanian policy of insisting a "state of war" existed, and that therefore he, Piłsudski, having reached the end of his patience, might have to take matters into his own hands.[14] Fearing an outbreak of hostilities, France and England hastily joined with Italy to deliver a three-power note to the Lithuanians on February 19, urging the Lithuanians to avoid any provocative actions and expressing hope for the establishment of friendly relations with Poland.[15] The British and the French representatives began to pay frequent visits to Voldemaras and Smetona, apparently urging the Lithuanians to consider negotiations.[16]

---

[11] The referendum was never held. A new constitution was promulgated by decree in May 1928. On the entire problem of the constitutional basis of the regime after the December coup, see Michal Römer, *Die Verfassungsreform Litauens vom Jahre 1928* (Munich, 1930).

[12] The Russian representative in Kaunas, Alexandrovsky, attempted to intervene on behalf of the condemned Communists, but he was brusquely informed by Voldemaras that it was none of his business. Alexandrovsky then refused to attend Smetona's New Year's reception. But by the end of the month he was actively seeking out Smetona. Having been compromised, however, by his efforts to save the four Communists, he was soon recalled and replaced by Arosev.

[13] Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe* (Warsaw, 1937), IX, 63-65.

Both France and England were interested in bringing about an "Eastern Locarno," i.e. a set of agreements guaranteeing the borders of Eastern Europe in the same way as Western European frontiers had been guaranteed by the agreements negotiated at Locarno in October 1925. One of the major stumbling blocks to such an arrangement was just this controversy between the Poles and the Lithuanians. Both Western powers had come to view the Lithuanians as being responsible for the continuation of the conflict because of the latter's refusal to recognize the decision of he Conference of Ambassadors in 1923. Although Italy joined in the démarche in Kaunas, the Italians remained on the fence in the controversy, apparently torn between a certain sympathy for Voldemaras's politics and a fear of antagonizing such an important East European state as Poland.[17]

On February 25 Voldemaras finally delivered to the Lithuanian Seimas his government's program, and it was reported that Gabriel Puaux, the French Minister in Kaunas, played an important role in drafting the section on foreign affairs.[18] Voldemaras declared that the Lithuanians were ready to negotiate at any time so long as it seemed possible to reach their basic goal of regaining Vilna, but he maintained that the possibility of fruitful negotiations depended on the Poles. He called it a solemn duty or Lithuania to avoid any war, but he added that Lithuania must be ready for one.[19]

The possibility that Lithuania, under Western pressures, might make n agreement with the Poles, possibly federation,[20] proved disturbing to the Russians and the Germans, both of whom, despite disputes with Kaunas, had interests in keeping Lithuania and Poland apart. For Germany, a

---

[14] Jules Laroche, *La Pologne de Piłsudski: Souvenirs d'une ambassade* (Paris, 1953), . 56f. See also the dispatch from Berlin to Hoesch (Paris), Feb. 3, 1927, microfilmed ocuments of the German Foreign Office (hereinafter referred to as *AA*), container 1464/erial 3015H/frame 595145.

[15] The text of the note is unavailable. This and the ensuing diplomatic exchanges were secret. While known of, or at least suspected, by various diplomatic circles, they were not reported in the press; indeed, the American consul in Kaunas denied their xistence. See Heingartner, Political Review for April 1927, National Archives, 860M.00/50.

[16] There had been various previous efforts at a negotiated settlement, but they had come to naught. See Poland, Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, *Documents diplomatiques: Relations polono-lithuaniennes* (Warsaw 1928-1929), No. 4 (the conferences at Copenhagen and Lugano).

[17] When Stresemann and Briand met at Geneva in December 1927, Briand declared hat he thought the Italians were pushing the Poles. When Stresemann expressed the elief that they were supporting the Lithuanians, Briand wrily commented, "That would e the Italian way." *AA*, 1465/3015H/595568.

Polish-Lithuanian rapprochement could mean the encirclement of East Prussia and even more trouble in Memel, while for Soviet Russia, such a development threatened a vivification of the *cordon sanitaire.* Maxim Litvinov, the Soviet Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, urged the Germans to join in helping the Lithuanians, perhaps by giving them economic aid or even by settling the problem of floating timber on the Niemen (Memel) river, but always making sure that Lithuania remained independent.[22] The Germans agreed on the necessity of some action, but Gustav Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, declared that the Lithuanians were behaving so "foolishly" in Memel that perhaps nothing could be done.[23] Nevertheless the Germans did encourage the opening of talks on a commercial treaty with the Lithuanians, and they refused to take part in the collective démarche by the Western powers in Kaunas, emphasizing in talks with the French that they could not agree to any impingements on Lithuania's sovereignty.[24] Both the Germans and the Russians made a point in Kaunas of assuring the Lithuanian Government of their willingness to support and aid Lithuania's independence.[25] Although the Lithuanians seem to have done little directly to acknowledge this support, it surely must have had its effect on the development of Lithuanian policy.

On April 3 the Lithuanian Foreign Office gave its answer to the démarche of February 19, declaring that Lithuanian foreign policy was dominated by the Vilna question. Denying any idea of seizing Vilna by force, the Lithuanian Government declared that its refusal to establish relations with Poland was not an effort to preserve "a situation which would again allow the beginning of military action," but rather a move "dictated by juridical and political considerations, since so long as there are no relations between Lithuania and Poland, the struggle remains unfinished." The solution of the Vilna question was declared to be a necessary condition for the establishment of normal relations with Poland.[26] In an *aide-mémoire* of May 14, the Polish Government expressed regret that

---

[18] Koester (Riga) to Berlin, Feb. 22, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595211.

[19] *Lietuva,* Feb. 26, 1927.

[20] There was repeated talk of the possibility of effecting a federation between Poland and Lithuania, which, by giving the Poles a new outlet to the Baltic Sea, might, in turn make possible the cession of the "Polish Corridor" to Germany. See Zygmunt J. Gąsiorowski, "Stresemann and Poland after Locarno," *JCEA,* XVIII (1958), 303-4.

[21] See the speculation that the English, in the face of growing Anglo-Russian tensions were urging Piłsudski on, in Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), Feb. 19, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595200.

[22] Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, Jan. 31, 1927, *AA,* 1464/3015H/595143. It should be noted that the English had large timber interests in the Vilna region which were suffering badly from the Lithuanian refusal to allow flotage on the Niemen River. See *Frankfurter Zeitung,* No. 178, March 8, 1927.

[23] Stresemann, Aufzeichnung, Jan. 31, 1927, *AA,* 1464/3015H/595143.

[24] See the German account of their measures in aiding Lithuania, in Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), March 3, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595222.

[25] See Moraht (Kaunas) to Berlin, Feb. 21, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595206.

[26] Text in *Lithuanie et Pologne: Notes des gouvernements lithuanien et polonais relatives au conflit lithuano-polonais* (Kaunas, 1927), pp. 3-6.

the Lithuanians seemed to be showing a hostile attitude, but it greeted the Lithuanian denial of any aggressive intentions as a step forward. Nevertheless, the note concluded, the Lithuanians must make a definite declaration ending the "state of war," since such a condition is incompatible with membership in the League of Nations.[27]

Despite the unpromising positions indicated by their respective notes, the Poles and the Lithuanians conducted secret negotiations apparently through private individuals.[28] Then in June, having come to Western Europe to appear at the League of Nations, Voldemaras traveled back home by way of Paris, where he held secret talks with the Polish Foreign Minister, August Zaleski, at the home of Gabriel Puaux. Some agreement seems to have been arrived at, and there were strong hopes of peace at last in Warsaw and Paris. Word leaked out, however, that Voldemaras was secretly negotiating, and when he returned to Kaunas he was greeted by demonstrators who demanded the continuation of an intransigent policy toward the Poles. Voldemaras understood the dangers of his position, and he refused to continue talks with Zaleski.[29]

Although obviously disappointed with this turn of events, Piłsudski did nothing for the time being. The general international situation had become tense as a result of the rupture of diplomatic relations between England and the Soviet Union in May, and Polish-Soviet relations were also badly strained by the assassination of the Soviet representative in Warsaw on June 7. Consequently, Piłsudski seems to have been reluctant to take any positive actions vis-à-vis Lithuania. Rather, Poland stressed the need for international peace by advancing a proposal to outlaw wars of aggression at the League Assembly in September.

In the same month of September, however, a revolt against the Voldemaras Government broke out in the town of Taurage, on the East Prussian border. Led by a reserve army officer, the revolt quickly dissolved as government troops arrived from Kaunas. Simultaneous risings in other cities met with even less success, and the leaders of the revolt fled the country. Investigation showed that individual members of leftist parties were behind the rising.[30] While the abortive rebellion served to discredit the parties of the Left, the Kaunas Government was clearly at a crossroads.

It is against this background that the events of early October took place. As reports began to come in of the closing of Polish schools in Lithuania,[31] Piłsudski, already angered by the claiming of Vilna as the Lithuanian capital, now decided it was time to act. The letter purportedly written by imprisoned Polish teachers was apparently a forgery,[32] and the quick acts of reprisal in Vilna and the demonstrations of October 9 would seem part of a plan to weaken the position of the Voldemaras-Smetona government.[33] Besides being alarmed by the moves against Lithuanians in Vilna, the Lithuanian Government was disturbed by the fact that two of the leaders of the unsuccessful coup in September, Juozas Poplauskas and J. Plečkaitis, had fled to Poland, where they apparently enjoyed the friendship of the Polish authorities.[34] The Lithuanians feared that either the Poles would make a direct attack on Lithuania or else they would support a coup by the émigrés. Thus it was the internal situation of the Lithuanian Government, as well as the events in Vilna, that prompted Voldemaras to appeal to the League.

---

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 7f.

[28] One such go-between would seem to have been Juozas Albinas Herbačiauskas, a Lithuanian writer who was a long time advocate of Polish-Lithuanian federation and who now made several trips between Warsaw and Kaunas.

[29] See Laroche, *La Pologne de Piłsudski,* p. 58. At this time there was apparently an attempt in Kaunas to unseat Voldemaras because he was being too secretive in his actions. See the Political Review for June 1927, by the American Vice-Consul C. M. Garrity, National Archives, 860M.00/152. For a relic of Voldemaras's brief flirtation with the Poles see the denunciation of him as a Polonophile in M. T. Bakh, *Politiko-ekonomicheskie vzaimootnosheniia mezhdu SSSR i Pribaltikoi za desiat' let (1917-1927)* (Moscow, 1928), p. 128 ff.

[30] The Central Committees of the Liaudininkai and of the Social Democrats both denied any responsibility for the individuals involved in the uprising.

With the appeal to the League, the Polish-Lithuanian conflict again became a major topic of European diplomacy. Great Britain, France and Italy considered another démarche, but when the Lithuanians appealed to the League, the idea was abandoned in favor of raising the whole question in the League Council.[35] Although the Western diplomats undoubtedly had some misgivings about the possibility that the Lithuanians might try to reopen the Vilna question, which the French and the British considered losed, Aristide Briand, the French Foreign Minister, declared that the ithuanians had done just what the Poles could most have hoped for, in hat the question of the "state of war" would now be open to Great Power iscussion and would probably be rejected.[36]

---

[31] There had been strong feeling among Lithuanians against the expansion of the Polish-language school system by the Sleževičius Government in 1926, and now when 86 temporarily accredited Polish teachers took their certification examination under the auspices of the nationalist Government, 68 failed, most of the failures coming in the Lithuanian language. As a result, many of the Polish schools had to close. See *Le Temps*, Oct. 11, 1927.

[32] According to the American Minister in Warsaw, John B. Stetson, the Director of the Russian Section of the Polish Foreign Office, Stefan Litauer, admitted to him that he had written the letter at the direction of Piłsudski. See Stetson to Secretary of State, Dec. 5, 1927, National Archives, 760C.60M/195. There is no other evidence confirming Stetson's statement, but the Polish educational organization in Kaunas denied any knowledge of any interned Polish teachers (*New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1927), and the Poles soon dropped all official references to the letter. See the account of the crisis in *Materjały odnoszące się do działalności rządu w czasie od 15 maja 1926 do 31 grudnia 1927: Sprawozdania ministerstw* (Warsaw, 1928), p. 23, which does not mention any such letter; but see also Zdzisław Budecki, *Stosunki polsko-litewskie po wojnie światowej, 1918-1928* (Warsaw, 1928), p. 78, which seems to entertain no doubts about the letter's authenticity.

[33] See the account in Arnold J. Toynbee, *Survey of International Affairs, 1927* (London, 1929), p. 241f.

[34] The fugitives met with a hostile reception from the Lithuanian nationalists in Vilna, who called them traitors. Poplauskas, in turn, denounced the Vilna Lithuanians as "chauvinists who haven't the least understanding of the real situation in Lithuania." *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 740, Oct. 5, 1927.

[35] See the dispatch from Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), Nov. 18, 1927, *AA*, 1465/3015H/595402. The Western powers did, however, deliver a note urging reconsideration by the Lithuanians of their intention to declare Vilna their capital.

The Germans and the Russians joined in the general clamor for peace, ut they had rather different aims than the British and the French. Berlin nd Moscow agreed that an explosive situation should be avoided and that *modus vivendi* should be established, but that Lithuania's sovereignty nust not be impaired.[37] At times, however, they differed widely in their nterpretation of the issues. The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, G. . Chicherin, wanted the Vilna question settled as soon as possible, since e feared its continuation could only work to the advantage of Poland. n the other hand, Stresemann did not accept this view, declaring that it as impossible to settle the question immediately on terms satisfactory to ithuania, and therefore a final solution should be postponed.[38] The issue lso arose of the role to be played by Germany in the settlement, since, havng joined the League only in 1926, the Germans had not been party to the arlier decisions on the Vilna question. Chicherin felt that the Germans hould take no part in any collective action by the French and the English st they be compromised and drawn into an agreement harmful to Lithu- nia. Stresemann rejected this argument too, for, while he saw the dangers f cooperation—as indeed he had in February in abstaining from the émarche in Kaunas—he thought it would be far worse both for Germany's restige and for her general interest not to be a part of the negotiations.[39]

Voldemaras gave the Great Powers clear evidence that their job would ot be easy when the Lithuanian Foreign Office, on October 28, issued a arply worded memorandum charging that the Poles alone were respon- ble for the conflict and that it was up to them to act.[40] Voldemaras seems t this point to have been primarily concerned with exploiting an oppor- nity to improve his own position at home. Opposition to the Poles was ne point common to the programs of all Lithuanian parties, and it was a olitical axiom in Kaunas that no government which renounced Vilna ould hope to stay in power one more day. In the present crisis Voldemaras ad a great opportunity to rally nationalistic feeling behind himself, and he sought to make the most of it.[41] Some Lithuanians opposed going to the League, fearing the League Council might force them to recognize the loss of Vilna, but Voldemaras was willing to take his chances.

---

[36] Hoesch (Paris) to Berlin, Oct. 22, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595357. See also *Le Temps,* ct. 20, 1927.

[37] Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), Nov. 5, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595374.

[38] Rantzau (Moscow) to Berlin, Nov. 12, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595362; Berlin to oesch (Paris), Nov. 3, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595366; Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), Nov. 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595374.

[39] See Rantzau (Moscow) to Berlin Nov. 12, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595409; Berlin to antzau (Moscow), Nov. 14, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595412.

[40] *Lithuanie et Pologne,* pp. 9-13. The Lithuanians called this their answer to the olish memorandum of May 14. It was reported that the original communication, made rally, was so vituperative in its attacks on the Polish "bandits" that the French Minter, Puaux, persuaded the Lithuanians to reword it and submit it in written form. oleman (Riga) to Secretary of State, Nov. 17, 1927, National Archives, 760C.60M/185.

The situation was aggravated at the beginning of November when a conference of Lithuanian émigrés opened in Riga, Latvia, under the chairmanship of J. Poplauskas. A resolution was passed denouncing the Lithuanian Government as a threat to European peace and a danger to Lithuanian independence. A minority within the conference, however, strongly opposed the resolution, and one speaker, V. Vikonis, denounced the conference as a front for the Poles. He charged that the Polish Minister in Riga, Juljusz Łukasiewicz, had told him personally "If the conference decides that for the Lithuanians the Vilna question no longer exists, then Poland will offer aid in overthrowing the Voldemaras-Smetona Government."[42] Vikonis's statement threw the meeting into an uproar, and his supporters withdrew, leaving the Poplauskas-Plečkaitis group in full control.

Disturbed by these events, Voldemaras set about mending his domestic political fences, opening talks with representatives of the Christian Democrats on the possibility of admitting the latter into the government. When the two sides reached an impasse because of the insistence of the Christian Democrats on the restoration of the Seimas, which they expected to dominate, Voldemaras opened simultaneous talks with the Liaudininkai, who immediately demanded the release of all political prisoners.[43] While the talks were still in progress, the political environment suddenly changed radically

On November 22 Piłsudski went to Vilna, accompanied by officials o the Foreign Ministry. They were joined there by members of the Genera Staff and the Polish Ministers to Riga (Łukasiewicz) and Moscow (Patek) On the 23rd and 24th Piłsudski held conferences with these men and with local military leaders in Vilna. According to official reports, the chief item in the talks were the preparation of the Polish position at Geneva and th question of how to deal with the Lithuanian émigrés.[44] Some observer however, believed that Piłsudski, taking note of the unstable position o the Lithuanian Government, had decided to shake it a bit more in th hopes of bringing about a change.[45] It is doubtful that Piłsudski had anticipated the reactions which followed his trip.

The Soviet Union had been following the events in Vilna closely Since the middle of the summer, the Communist press had been trumpeting warnings that the Poles seemed to be ready to attack Lithuania a y time, and the Soviet Government now charged that the meetings in ilna indicated that the Poles intended to present the League Council with *fait accompli* in Lithuania, possibly executed by Żeligowski.[46] On Novem- er 24 the Soviet Minister in Warsaw, Bogomolov, delivered a note to the olish Government, stating that the Soviet Union could not but be alarmed the growing tension between Lithuania and Poland. While the Soviet ote declared that the U.S.S.R. was urging the Lithuanians to avoid any ovocative actions, it warned the Poles that the chief responsibilty for eping peace lay with them, the larger power. The note declared that vithout examining the basis of all the alarming information," the Soviet nion felt that various radical demands being voiced in Poland posed an mmense danger" to peace. Expressing the hope that the Poles would ew the note as a friendly one, "dictated only by the desire to see peace ntinue," the communication ended by warning that Russia would not and idly by if the Poles took any forceful action against the Lithuanians.[47]

---

[41] In his political report for Oct. 1927, the American consul in Kaunas, Heingartne declared, "It is possible that Minister President Voldemaras welcomed the Lithuanian Polish school conflict as a means of diverting public attention from domestic problems. National Archives, 860M.00/166.

[42] A detailed account is to be found in the report of Coleman (Riga) to Secretary o State, Nov. 26, 1927, National Archives, 861M.00/175.

[43] See *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 869 and 872, Nov. 22 and 23, 1927.

[44] *Kurjer Warszawski*, Nov. 23-25, 1927.

[45] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, Nos. 874-5, Nov. 24, 1927.

On November 25 Litvinov met with Stresemann in Berlin, and the two scussed, among other things, the Polish-Lithuanian question. They agreed the need to support Lithuanian independence and issued a joint com- uniqué avowing the desire of both to avoid any conflict and to work for ace.[48]

The Russian note raised the specter of a general European war, and e Polish-Lithuanian conflict immediately leaped into the headlines of wspapers throughout the world, stimulated by numerous wild rumors. tually the danger of open war seems to have been nowhere near so great the headlines indicated. In Kaunas, Voldemaras expressed the belief at the Soviet note had blown up the whole affair out of proportion. He t that in the face of the obvious German and Russian support of the thuanian cause, the Poles would not attack before the meeting of the ague Council.[49] While he did express fears that Plečkaitis might attempt subvert the Kaunas Government in some way, even the danger of action the part of the émigrés seems to have been greatly exaggerated. The mber of politically active refugees in Vilna was only about 30 or 40, d it was not clear that they could command any support in Lithuania, mpromised as they were by their own friendship with the Polish Govern- ent.[50]

The internal situation of the Voldemaras Government was strength- ed by the Soviet note. Voldemaras had already made one great concession the opposition, releasing a number of political prisoners on November ,[51] but on November 25 a new twist appeared in affairs when a half- arted army putsch misfired and the leader of the Christian Democrats,

---

[46] *Pravda,* Nov. 24, 1927.

[47] Jane Degras, ed., *Documents on Soviet Foreign Policy,* II (London, 1952), 282-283.

[48] *AA,* 1465/3015H/595491.

[49] *Lietuva,* Nov. 29, 1927.

[50] See *Frankfurter Zeitung,* No. 890, Nov. 30, 1927. *Lietuva* carried almost daily icles denouncing Plečkaitis as a tool of the Poles.

[51] *Frankfurter Zeitung,* No. 877, Nov. 25, 1927.

Leonas Bistras, had to flee to East Prussia to avoid arrest.[52] The Tautinink
had long feared the possibility that the Christian Democrats, who h
strong supporters throughout the government, might gain control of t
army and force the downfall of the Voldemaras-Smetona regime. Now t
attempt had been made and had failed. This failure, combined with t
heightened urgency of national unity in the face of the war scare, p
Voldemaras in a stronger position than ever. So long as he continued h
firm anti-Polish stand, he could count on the united support of all politic
parties for his foreign policy throughout the duration of the crisis. H
immediately broke off the talks with the representatives of the oppositio
and attention now turned toward preparing for the coming meeting
Geneva.

In their support of the Lithuanians, neither the Germans nor t
Russians meant to aid Voldemaras personally.[53] A very controversial figur
Voldemaras had few admirers or even friends among European diploma
The Germans considered him "obstinate," and their commentaries on hi
clearly indicate their dislike of him.[54] For their part, the Russians ma
no effort to hide their dislike of his policies and his personality.[55]

Numerous speculations were made in the West as to the motives
the Russians in their open intervention. What seemed most likely was t
theory that the Soviet Union, left out of the earlier decisions of the Leag
and of the Conference of Ambassadors on the Vilna question and feari
a revival of the Hymans plan for a Polish-Lithuanian federation, was an
cipating the meeting of the League Council by establishing itself as a fact
to be dealt with in any settlement. On the other hand, the fears express
by the Russians that the Poles were actually planning some sort of acti
may well have been real.[56] Chicherin had been pushing the Germans
join him in urging the Lithuanians to declare the state of war at an e
before the Geneva meeting, thereby, Chicherin hoped, taking a weap
out of Piłsudski's hands.[57] The Germans hesitated at aligning themsel
so clearly with the Russians, and when the Soviet Minister in Kaun
Arosev, delivered his government's advice to the Lithuanians, the Germ
limited themselves to merely telling the Lithuanians that the idea

---

[52] *Ibid.*, Nos. 885, 889, 890, 893, Nov. 28 and 30, Dec. 1, 1927.

[53] Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski*, II (Lon
1956), 508-9, calls Voldemaras a German agent and declares that he brought about
crisis in the fall of 1927 at the urging of Berlin and Moscow. Such a view cannot st
up to examination in the light of the German Foreign Ministry archives.

[54] On November 21 the German Secretary of State, Carl von Schubert, told a Po
Plenipotentiary, Jackowski, that he could understand Piłsudski's impatience with Vo
maras: "We too have had very few pleasant experiences with Mr. Voldemaras."
1427/2945H/573263.

[55] See *Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1927.

[56] On November 19 Rantzau reported from Moscow that Chicherin feared a "sur
operation" in the next few days. *AA*, 1427/2945H/573258.

[57] He emphasized, however, that the action should be a parallel one, and n
joint one. Rantzau (Moscow) to Berlin, Nov. 17, 1927, *AA*, 1465/3015H/595442.

worth considering.[58] Voldemaras, however, rejected the idea, maintaining that the "state of war" issue was identical with the Vilna question itself.

On November 28 the Poles presented their official position in a message sent to all the European states. Denying any aggressive intentions toward Lithuania, the note declared that the Lithuanians alone were responsible for the existing "state of war," and it called upon the major powers to support peace "with all means in their power."[59] Unofficial sources in Warsaw scoffed at the charge that the Poles were plotting aggression, maintaining that had such been the case, Piłsudski would certainly have been more discreet than to travel to Vilna so publicly.[60] From the first, the Poles tended to discount the danger of armed Soviet intervention, believing that the Soviet Union was not ready to engage in a full-scale war.[61]

The Polish message had a soothing effect on frayed European nerves, but in an interview on November 30 Piłsudski shocked all concerned by declaring that, alarmed by reports of Lithuanian mobilization, he had spent an entire night debating a countermobilization, but at the urging of the French Ambassador had abandoned the idea. At the same time, calling Voldemaras a "pathological phenomenon," who used arguments "borrowed from the mentality of an insane asylum," he declared that the Poles would continue to give refuge to anyone fleeing Lithuania.[62]

Piłsudski's assertion that he had considered mobilizing had immediate, broad, and generally unfavorable repercussions.[63] The diplomatic corps in Warsaw, which was characterized by one observer as being "painfully surprised" by the interview, buzzed with speculations as to his real meaning.[64] Some anti-Polish circles called the talk a form of diplomatic blackmail, charging that Piłsudski was threatening war unless the League Council rendered a judgment in his favor. The Lithuanians, who denied mobilizing, cited the interview as evidence of aggressive intent on the part of the Poles. In sum, Piłsudski's statements put the Poles on the defensive for the coming meeting at Geneva, and the lost ground was only partly recouped with the news that Piłsudski, as a sign of his respect for the League, would himself go to Geneva.

---

[58] There was some confusion in Kaunas between the German and Russian representatives as to their governments' policies. Arosev complained to his own government that the Germans were not properly cooperating, thus precipitating hurried communications between Berlin and Moscow. The confusion would seem to have been Arosev's fault. See Rantzau (Moscow) to Berlin, Nov. 28, 1927, *AA*, 1465/3015H/595507; Berlin to Rantzau (Moscow), Nov. 30, 1927, *AA*, 1465/3015H/595529.

[59] Text in National Archives, 760C.60M/183. The Poles declared that this note was in answer to the Lithuanian statement of October 28. They maintained that the Soviet note of November 24 was without foundation and therefore did not merit an answer. *Materjaly odnoszące się do działalności rządu*, p. 28.

[60] See *New York Times*, Nov. 27, 1927. On November 19 and 21 the Polish Plenipotentiary, Jackowski, assured Schubert that the Poles planned no aggressive actions. *AA*, 1427/2945H/573260 and 573263.

[61] See *Kurjer Warszawski*, Nov. 26, 1927.

[62] Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, IX, 98-101.

[63] Laroche makes no mention of the question of mobilization in his memoirs, but Briand repeatedly told the Germans that the French ambassador was feverishly working to restrain Piłsudski from any adventuring.

[64] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, No. 896, Dec. 2, 1927.

In the first days of December, as the diplomats began to gather at Geneva, negotiations replaced démarches, declarations and interviews. On his way to the Council session, Voldemaras stopped in Berlin for a secret talk at the German Foreign Office. According to the German memorandum of this conversation, Voldemaras was at first very confident in laying out his plan to limit the discussions in Geneva to just the issue of the closing of the schools in Vilna. He rejected out of hand the suggestion of the German State Secretary, Carl von Schubert, that the Lithuanians at Geneva unilaterally declare an end to the state of war. Under the steady pressure of Schubert's arguments, however, he came to realize that his position was untenable, and he finally indicated a willingness to agree to "peace," although he still objected to the establishment of diplomatic relations on the grounds that the Poles might then work within Lithuania to overthrow his government. Schubert stated that he hoped some sort of peaceful solution could be worked out, but he added that it would be difficult to find a formula. He urged Voldemaras to be "absolutely intransigeant" on vital issues, while Voldemaras, for his part, gave assurances that he would try to appear conciliatory. In conclusion, Schubert promised the Germans would do all they could to prevent the Lithuanians from being "ravished" (*vergewaltigt).*[65]

In Geneva, preliminary negotiations between the Great Powers were beginning to give form to a possible solution. On December 4 Stresemann met with Briand and agreed that the ending of the "state of war" was the thing most needed for peace. To Stresemann's assertion that the Lithuanians must be given the opportunity to separate the issue of the "state of war" from the question of title to the Vilna territory, Briand declared that he had no objection to the Lithuanians' reserving the border question. The major problem, he felt, would be what stand Piłsudski would take. Nevertheless, he declared, "If we agree, then the issue is settled."[66]

On the same day Stresemann met with Litvinov, who had remained in Geneva after the Disarmament Conference, and the two agreed that the state of war must be ended in order to deprive Piłsudski of any excuse for armed action against Lithuania. This should be followed by direct talks on the establishment of diplomatic relations, while giving the Lithuanians the opportunity to reserve the Vilna question. The two agreed, however, that they could not be sure Voldemaras would accept their ideas. In parting Litvinov warned Stresemann, "Remember, in this serious question you represent three countries. You must protect the German interests, the Russian interests, and you must protect Lithuania from itself."[67]

On the evening of December 6 the five Great Powers met in a secret session. They were all generally agreed that they wanted the beginning of direct negotiations for the establishment of normal relations. To work out a formula they named the Foreign Minister of the Netherlands, Junkheer Baelerts van Blockland, as rapporteur for talks between Lithuania and Poland in Geneva.[68] Orders were sent to the respective military missions in Warsaw and Kaunas to proceed to the Polish-Lithuanian frontier in order to investigate the rumors of mobilization. There was some resentment among the smaller members of the Council at having been left out of these preliminary, secret talks, but this was abated in another secret session on December 7.[69]

---

[65] *AA,* 1465/3015H/595559.

[66] *AA,* 1465/3015H/595568.

[67] *AA,* 1465/3015H/595572. Before leaving Geneva on December 6 Litvinov told reporters that he was confident peace would be preserved.

The Council opened formal consideration of the matter on the afternoon of December 7 with speeches by Voldemaras and Zaleski. Voldemaras reviewed the events of the past several months, denouncing the policies of the Poles toward Lithuania and declaring that the Lithuanians had been extremely patient. Zaleski, in reply, rejected the Lithuanian claims against Poland, maintaining that there was no campaign of subversion and that Lithuanians in Poland were better treated than Poles in Lithuania. He claimed that the Lithuanians had failed to prove their case, and he then recounted Polish complaints against Lithuania, charging that the continued Lithuanian insistence on the existence of a state of war was incompatible with membership in the League. While there was no shooting, Zaleski concluded, peace is a state of mind as well as a legal fact, and therefore the Polish Government wished to complain to the League, under the provisions of Article 11 of the Covenant, against Lithuanian actions vis-à-vis Poland.

In his rebuttal to Zaleski, Voldemaras retreated a bit from earlier Lithuanian stands. Asserting that the Lithuanians were basically not hostile toward the Poles, he declared, "The 'state of war' means nothing more than the cessation of normal relations between the two countries." He admitted that the Lithuanians might have been unwise to use the term, but he claimed that it presented no danger in itself. To which Zaleski responded: "In conclusion, I must confess that I have not understood whether Lithuania considers itself to be at peace or at war with Poland."[70]

The speeches done, the Council appointed its rapporteur and proceeded to other matters. In a private meeting in the office of the Secretary-General, Sir Austen Chamberlain made clear to Voldemaras the desire on the part of the Great Powers that Lithuania end its "state of war." The Lithuanians, of course, would consider this only if the question were detached from the Vilna question, and the Great Powers generally had already agreed to this.[71] Prospects for success in the talks remained cloudy, however, as the diplomats anxiously awaited the arrival of Piłsudski, from whom no one seemed to know what to expect. On December 9 the Polish leader arrived, and, to the happy surprise of all, offered no serious objections to the course of the negotiations.

---

[68] The Great Powers agreed that it would be best if they themselves remained aside lest Lithuania later claim that she was forced into anything. *AA,* 1465/3015H/595584.

[69] *New York Times,* Dec. 9, 1927.

[70] League of Nations, *Official Journal,* IX (1928), 144-156.

[71] *Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1928* (Boston, 1928), p. 114.

The rapporteur's report was then delivered to the Council in a secret session on the morning of December 10. Summarizing the views of both sides, he noted each declared that it wanted peace: "I think therefore that we may set aside this argument concerning a 'state of war' which is based rather upon a misunderstanding and moreover as between two members of the League is incompatible with the spirit and letter of the Covenant." He then went on to recommend that the school question be taken up by a special committee; that no control commission be set up for the border but that if incidents should arise, the Secretary-General should act as he saw fit; and that the two parties as soon as possible should enter into direct negotiations with the aim of establishing normal relations. He concluded, "The decision I have in view would not affect territorial disputes."[72]

In the debate following the report, a memorable exchange took place between Voldemaras and Piłsudski. Irritated by what he considered stalling, Piłsudski thundered, over Briand's pleas for calm, "Is it war or is it peace?" Voldemaras replied, "It is peace." Whereupon Piłsudski turned to the Council: "I take you 14 delegates as witnesses. I now intend to telegraph Warsaw to ring the bells and sing Te Deums." Voldemaras, not to be denied a last word, rejoined, "Only the Te Deum of peace, not victory." Piłsudski then declared his work was done, and the rest was up to his Foreign Minister to negotiate.[73]

The agreement was made public that evening: the state of war was declared ended, and the Lithuanians and the Poles agreed to enter into direct bilateral talks as soon as possible. Lithuanian territorial integrity was guaranteed, while this proviso was appended: "The Council declares that the present resolution in no way affects questions on which the two governments have differences of opinion."[74]

The settlement was hailed with rejoicing in Paris and in Warsaw. *Le Temps* called it a great success for the League and for the system of negotiation, and a personal triumph for Briand.[75] A few voices were heard pointing out that nothing had actually been solved, but, as the American consul in Geneva reported, the most important thing to most observers was the détente.[76] From that all else would follow in due time.

Very quickly, however, it became clear to the French and the Poles that Voldemaras held quite a different view of the settlement. The first real shock came when Voldemaras declared in Paris that the reservation of the Vilna dispute amounted to a negation of the decision of the Conference of Ambassadors in 1923.[77] The French protested that this was not so, but to no avail. On December 17 Voldemaras arrived back in Kaunas and declared that the League Council had accepted the Lithuanian view point.[78]

---

[72] League of Nations, *Official Journal,* IX, 176-178.

[73] There seems to be no authoritative record of this conversation. Accounts by men present at the session vary in detail to some extent. See report by Tuck (Geneva), Dec. 15, 1927, National Archives, 760C.60M/200; Gustav Stresemann, *Vermächtnis, Der Nachlass in drei Banden,* Henry Bernhard, ed. (Berlin, 1932-33), III, 241-2; Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe,* IX, 101-2.

[74] Text in Toynbee, *Survey for 1927,* p. 247.

[75] *Le Temps,* Dec. 12, 1927.

[76] National Archives, 760C.60M/200.

The settlement in Geneva was just the kind which Berlin and Moscow had desired, although they both had their doubts about Voldemaras's subsequent actions.[79] The Soviet press, perhaps echoing Chicherin's earlier desires to reach a solution quickly, criticized the Geneva resolution as solving nothing. It neither settled the Vilna question nor gave satisfaction to the Lithuanians on the school question.[80] It should be remembered, however, that Litvinov had played a leading role in the preliminary talks at Geneva and had agreed with Stresemann on a policy corresponding to the final solution. Therefore, the Soviet Foreign Office could not have been very unhappy with the results.

Thus, while the League Council had brought the Lithuanians to retreat from their assertions that a state of war existed, nothing had really been settled. The Lithuanians henceforth maintained that their previous position had been justified and that the Western powers had set aside their own decision. The direct talks, opening in Königsberg in April 1928, predictably came to nothing. Diplomatic relations were not established and the border remained closed.

It is not clear whether there had actually been a threat of war. Investigation showed that there had been no mobilization on either side. It has become a hard and fast statement in recent Soviet writings that the Soviet note of November 24 saved Lithuania from invasion.[81] This cannot be proved from existing and available evidence. What the Soviet note may very well have saved was the Voldemaras Government. It is probable Piłsudski was hoping to see a change in government in Kaunas, but it would seem doubtful, at least to this writer, that Piłsudski contemplated annexation or war. There were too many unfavorable circumstances.[82]

---

[77] *Le Temps,* Dec. 16, 1927.

[78] *Ibid.,* Dec. 25, 1927. Cf. E. J. Harrison, *Lithuania, 1928* (London, 1928), p. 51. The French and the British had foreseen the possibility of such an interpretation, and there had been long wrangling on the afternoon of December 10 in working out a precise formula for the resolution. Voldemaras thus knew that the Western powers had not intended such a meaning as he read into the resolution. See *Lietuva,* Dec. 16, 1927.

[79] See the memorandum on a visit to the German Foreign Office by the Lithuanian Minister in Berlin, Vaclovas Sidzikauskas, Dec. 16, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595629.

[80] *Pravda,* Dec. 13, 1927.

[81] See J. Žiugžda, *et. al., Lietuvos TSR istorija* (Vilnius, 1958), p. 358. The author of this section of the book, Žiugžda, gives the Soviet note a wrong date.

[82] It would seem that he was waging a gigantic war of nerves. After the Geneva meeting, Briand told Sir Austen Chamberlain that Piłsudski had come to Geneva with mobilization orders in his pocket. It is not clear why Piłsudski should show them to Briand, whose dedication to peace in this issue seems indisputable, unless it was a bluff. See Sir Charles Petrie, *The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain* (London, 1939-40), II, 309. On Piłsudski's possible involvement in a coup to be executed

In justice to the League Council, it must be noted that one major aspect of this crisis was completely outside its jurisdiction, namely the instability of the Lithuanian Government. Voldemaras used the situation to strengthen his own position at home. Considering his domestic position, Voldemaras could not have made any substantial concessions at Geneva and still have expected to return to Lithuania.[83]

What, then, were the real results of the crisis? First of all, both Voldemaras and Piłsudski seem to have personally profited in their domestic positions, since each claimed a diplomatic victory. The basic issues, however, continued the same as before, though now expressed in different terms. Perhaps the two greatest gainers were Germany and the Soviet Union. Briand made a great point of thanking Stresemann for his cooperation at Geneva, and Germany was one step closer to being accepted as a full partner in Europe. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had made it clear that it was now to be heard on all questions pertaining to Eastern Europe.[84] As far as Briand's "personal success" went, the Eastern Locarno was perhaps now even further away.

UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

---

by Lithuanian émigrés see Ladas Natkevičius, *Aspect politique et juridique du différend polono-lithuanien* (Kaunas and Paris, 1930), p. 101, and Pobóg-Malinowski, *Najnowsza historia,* II, 509n.

[83] At Geneva Voldemaras made a point of telling the representatives of the Great Powers, including Stresemann, that he was not sure that the settlement would be acceptable in Kaunas. See the account of the talks between Stresemann and Zaleski, Dec. 12, 1927, *AA,* 1465/3015H/595616.

[84] Cf. the view that the Soviet Union at this time was becoming more interested in cooperating with the League, in Theodore H. von Laue, "Soviet Diplomacy: G. V. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, 1918-1930," in *The Diplomats, 1919-1939,* Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds. (Princeton, 1953), p. 278.

MUNICH AND THE SOVIET UNION

by F. Vnuk

I*

THE TWENTIETH anniversary of Munich was remembered in Czechoslovakia with proper attention and improper emphasis. Several publications, not only in Czech and Slovak, but also in world languages, were issued to remind people of the folly of yielding to a bullying dictator and its tragic consequences. Among many tendentious brochures on this theme there is one official publication which, in spite of its political bias, will attract (and no doubt has attracted) the attention of Western historians: *New Documents on the History of Munich.*[1] It contains over 20 documents from the archives of the Prague Foreign Ministry and some 30 Soviet documents, previously known only to a narrow circle of historians. Thus this joint publication of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Czechoslovak Republic and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics fills some gaps in our knowledge concerning the events of Munich. An evaluation and appraisal of the booklet from the competent pen of Mr. William V. Wallace has already appeared in *International Affairs.*[2]

The present joint Czech-Soviet publication may be regarded in one way as a belated attempt to join that series of "colored" books which made their appearance in 1939-40. The French, Poles, British and even the Germans published their yellow, white and blue books. The Czechs at that time stood apart, and Sir Lewis Namier succinctly commended them for their modesty.[3] In fact, this was a virtue from necessity. "The statement of their cause" had been seriously contemplated. Already on Sept. 30, 1938, at 6:10 p.m., Legation Counsellor Kraus telephoned from London on Masaryk's behalf asking for permission to print the diplomatic correspondence of the last few days preceding the Munich decision. He was advised not to do anything of this nature in London, since the White Book was being prepared in Prague.[4] The White Book indeed was ready for print, but subsequent events in Czechoslovakia made its appearance undesirable. It contained 55 documents and covered the period from Sept. 19 to Sept. 30, 1938.[5] And, perhaps, nothing illustrates the change of political climate in Prague more strikingly than the comparison between this planned publication and the present brochure.[6]

---

*The author wishes to express his thanks to Mr. Phillips (Department of History, University of Adelaide), to the Staff of the Foreign Office Library (London) and to the Staff of the Public Record Office (London).

[1] Orbis: Prague, 1958, p. 136.

[2] *International Affairs,* Vol. 35, No. 4 (Oct. 1959) pp. 447-54.

[3] "The Czechs published none: they were weak, were wronged, and a statement of their cause would have produced irritation." *Diplomatic Prelude* (London, 1948), p. 4.

[4] Tschechoslowakische Dokumente 1809H/412167. Most of the documents are in German translations; only here and there appear a few original French and English items. When a document was translated into English in the joint Czech-Soviet publication I followed that translation. Otherwise the translations are mine.

When, in March 1939, the Germans entered Prague they seized, among other things, the archives of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry. The German Archives' Investigation Commission was charged with the screening and translation of some of the more important documents which thus found their way into the German Foreign Ministry Archives. After the war was over, some 1400 of these translations were found and duly recorded on microfilm by the joint Foreign Office/State Department German War Documents Project team. To this fact present-day historians owe the opportunity of having unrestricted access to a unique source of confidential information covering the years 1933-39. More than one third of these documents relates to the happenings of the eventful year 1938.[7]

These microfilms include 18 translations of those Czech documents which, in the preface to the joint Czech-Soviet publication, are referred to as "published for the first time."[8] They also, of course, include many other important documents about whose veracity there could not be now the slightest doubt[9] and which, for very obvious reasons, are not included in the collection sponsored by the Czechoslovak and Soviet Ministries for Foreign Affairs.

II

In the preface to this slim volume of documentary material the editors write:

> The documents included in this publication reveal the bourgeois distortion of the history of Munich and show the historical facts in their true light. Further, many of the Czechoslovak and Soviet documents which are here published for the first time, give new and convincing proof of the fact that in the tragic days of Munich the Soviet Union was the only true friend of the Czechoslovak people. The Soviet Union was ready to offer Czechoslovakia military aid even without France participating, on the condition that Czechoslovakia would defend herself and would request Soviet assistance.

---

[5] Even if the Czech White Book had never been published, the Czech point of vie was made public quite eloquently and effectively. In Nov./Dec. 1938, under the mysterious name of Petr Buk, a Czech sympathizer wrote several articles and later a book (*L tragédie tshécoslovaque,* Paris 1939) wherein he quoted many official documents—to th surprise and indignation of the French and British Foreign Offices. In 1939 H. Ripka for his book *Munich: Before and After* (Gollancz: London, 1939), drew very generousl from the files and archives of the Czechoslovak Legation in London.

[6] For the contents of the White Book see Appendix I.

[7] The documents are filmed on Serial No. 1809H (frame numbers 411885-414237). I this article any reference made to these documents is given in footnotes by the numbe of the particular frames, the serial number being omitted. The filmed translations of th Czech documents are available in U.K. at the Public Record Office, Chancery Lane, W.C 2., at a cost of a halfpenny per frame.

[8] Documents given by numbers: 1, 3, 12, 13, 18, 22, 23, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 39, 4 43, 47, 52 and 55.

[9] For purposes of comparison two documents are given in parallel in Appendix I One is document No. 42 in the Czech-Soviet publication, the other is the German tran lation of the same document prepared by the German Archives Investigation Commi sion in 1939.

> The documents are evidence of the fact that the then bourgeois Czechoslovak Government, actuated by its own narrow class interests, did not want to avail itself of the Soviet offer of help, preferring the sacrifice of the national interests of its country and a shameful capitulation[10]

Very strong words indeed, but to what extent is this borne out by documentary evidence? Are we to believe that the Soviet Union was really and disinterestedly *amicus certus in re incerta,* and—by implication—the others were not? Was the offer of military aid as well-meaning and generous as the selectors of the documents maintain? Did "the bourgeois Czechoslovak Government" of Sept. 1938 capitulate "shamefully'" and sacrifice national interests, when they could have avoided it?

The answers cannot be given in any emphatic manner. Many an unbiased historian admits that the attitude of the Soviet Union had many more commendable features than that of the Western Powers. The Soviet gestures—never put publicly to the test—had a touch of moving loyalty compared to the atmosphere of intimidation and coercion on the part of Czechoslovakia's Western allies. In the words of a Slovak proverb, "among the blind even the one-eyed is a king," and so to the historian of the Munich events even the half-hearted measures of the USSR have an aura of foresight and courage.

III

To embellish the Soviet role in the fateful days of Munich the compilers of the present collection, indignant about "the bourgeois distortion of the history of Munich," went to the opposite extreme by the exclusion of documents or omission of passages favorable to the West. It is perhaps not without interest that this is the second time in the last two decades that Czech documents have been used as a propaganda weapon against the West. In 1941 there appeared in Germany a book entitled *Europäische Politik im Spiegel der Prager Akten,*[11] containing mostly extracts from 182 Czech documents. Its editor made in the preface very much the same claim, namely that the publication was "an extremely revealing contribution to the question of responsibility for the war which the Western Powers so inconsiderately launched against Germany on Sept. 3, 1939."[12]

For many sincere admirers of the West in Czechoslovakia, the attitude of England and France was "the most unkindest cut of all." It was bitterly criticized by many prominent politicians of the day, and it has been denounced ever since. But there were forces against Munich in the West as much as in the East, and so there were sympathizers for hard-pressed Czechoslovakia. Many Czech documents bear eloquent testimony to this. The Communist selectors of the documents for the latest publication, in reading Fierlinger's report of June 6, 1938, certainly must have come across the words of the U. S. ambasador, Davies, according to whom "Czechoslovakia was the only country in Europe for which he, as a U. S. citizen, was ready to fight."[13] They could not have missed a telegram from London about Eden's confidential advice to Masaryk.[14] There is no need for a more convincing proof of genuine friendship for Czechoslovakia than that reported in Osusky's dispatch of Sept. 22, according to which Reynaud, Mandel and Champetier De Ribes reproached Daladier, declaring that "his government had been formed for the purpose of defending the treaties and since Sept. 10 had abandoned this policy shamelessly."[15] Unfortunately there was no place for documents of this kind. Thus the selection reveals only one facet of the story. It may be the truth, but it is not the whole truth. And truth which is not whole is maimed, or, if you like, distorted.

---

[10] *New Documents . . . ,* p. 5. With an equal outburst of selfrighteousness A. Nikonov also writes: "The volume of *New Documents of Munich* published at the end of last year . . . fully exposes the bourgeois falsifiers of those events, sheds additional light on them and contains materials which enable one to determine more precisely the positions adopted by various governments on this issue." (See "The Western Powers and the Outbreak of the War in Europe" in *International Affairs* [Moscow] No. 9, 1959, p. 72.)

[11] Edited by Fritz Berber, Essener Verlagsanstalt: Essen, 1941.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 15.

IV

The question of military aid is by far the most weighty and most important. Since the truth always tends to be complex, the question cannot be dealt with in one or two paragraphs and cannot be made evident from two or three precariously worded documents.

The Czechoslovak-Soviet Pact of May 16, 1935, was one of those ambitious plans of Beneš which did not come up to expectation. When it wa signed, Beneš, in a circular to Czechoslovak diplomatic missions, describe it as "a beginning of striving towards an Eastern Pact with the participatio of all the interested states, particularly of Germany."[16]

The Czechoslovak Minister in Berlin was specially instructed to infor Berlin "that this Pact does not mean a reorientation of the Czechoslova policy from its pro-Western to a pro-Eastern course. We do not want t be led to Russia unilaterally [runs the instruction] because we are aware o our membership in the West European community."[17] The assurance di not convince the Germans, who branded the Eastern Pact as a "Russia Jewish manoeuvre" at least a year before Beneš and Alexandrovsky signe the Czechoslovak-Soviet Treaty. The other neighboring states were di turbed; even Rumania, linked to Czechoslovakia by a regional pact, fe uneasy. Equally sharp was the domestic opposition. Not only the trad tionally anti-governmental parties like the Sudeten German Party and th Slovak People's Party, but also coalition parties such as the Agrarian Part were strongly against it. Early in 1938 the failure of the Treaty was obviou even to the optimistic Beneš. He confessed to the German Minister Eise lohr that "his pact with Russia was the relic of a former epoch, but he could not just throw it into the wastepaper basket."[18]

---

[13] 412562.

[14] 412474.

[15] 412118-9.

[16] 413476.

[17] 412914.

[18] Doc. Ger. F.P., Series D, Vol II, p. 132.

The pact, as is well known, was effective only in the event of France honoring her obligation.[19] However, there was a second more important technical difficulty: the absence of a common Czechoslovak-Soviet or German-Soviet boundary which made the practical side of Soviet assistance rather problematic. Without going into details one can say that out of the two possible avenues along which Soviet help could come the Polish one was out of the question, the Rumanian one, questionable. Even French intervention failed to make Poland and Rumania more amenable to Czechoslovak requests. On June 18, 1938, Fierlinger reported that in Litvinov's talk with Coulondre, the latter had said that "Poland would resist the transit of Soviet troops. In this respect Paris entertained no illusions: the Poles had already repeatedly stated it, emphasized it categorically and now repeated it again. At every Soviet plane which would try to fly over Polish territory the Poles would shoot."[20] About the possibility of transit through Rumania Coulondre stated (and Fierlinger duly reported) that it would be "too difficult and wearisome."[21] The furthest the Rumanians went was Comnène's declaration to Fabricius (reported again by Fierlinger) that "in the case of conflict in which France would be involved, Rumania would side with France."[22]

The Czechoslovak General Staff was very well aware of these difficulties. Viewing Rumania as the more likely transit country, it was nevertheless casting its eyes toward Poland which could offer more suitable transport facilities.[23] So much so that the Czechoslovak Chief of Staff wrote to Beneš on Sept. 25 (two days after the mobilization order was issued) advising him to offer Poland territorial cession in the Teschen area and to ask permission for the transit of Soviet troops in return.[24]

The Soviets, on the other hand, did not seem to be unduly worried. When asked how they envisaged rendering military aid to Czechoslovakia; Litvinov answered non-committedly that "the means would be found,"[25] or brushed aside the question with the quip that he was "not a military man."[26]

---

[19] Paragraph II of the Protocol to the Treaty runs ". . . En même temps les deux gouvernements reconnaissent que les engagements d'assistance mutuelle joueront entre eux seulement en tant que se trouveraient réunies les conditions prévues dans le présent traité et que serait prêté de la part de la France assistance à la partie victime de l'aggression."

[20] 412152-3.

[21] 412457. But on Aug. 28 a British Secretary of Legation told his German counterpart in Moscow that "the Rumanian government officially had informed the British government that they (the Rumanians) would never permit the transit of Soviet troops." (Doc. Ger. F.P., Series D, Vol II, p. 657).

[22] *Ibid., loc. cit.*

[23] The communication lines between Czechoslovakia and Rumania were indeed in a very deplorable state: one railway line and no all-weather highway.

[24] 412838. R. W. Seton-Watson pointed this out when he wrote that "Moscow never attempted to define the exact manner in which assistance would be made effective." (*History of the Czechs and Slovaks,* London, 1943, p. 364).

[25] 412647. When the famous statement by Litvinov (listed as Doc. No. 4) was delivered to the press representatives at the Press Conference in Moscow on March 17, 1938, the representative of the Polish Press Agency (PAT), Chaczynski, asked Litvinov whether the USSR in the case of aggression against Czechoslovakia would join France

The offer of Soviet military aid to Czechoslovakia, even without France participating, is not stated explicitly anywhere in the documents,[27] (except in the preface). A close observation of the Soviet diplomatic moves at that time reveals the Soviets proclaiming vociferously *urbi et orbi* their willingness to render help to Czechoslovakia when the French politicians were reluctant or hesitant. But when it came to hard facts the Soviet Union was not as keen as she sees herself in retrospect; on the contrary, she was extremely careful not to commit herself and most ingenious in discovering procrastinating means of evasion.

Among the documents omitted by the editors there is a dispatch from Moscow sent by Fierlinger on Sept. 3, at 4:37 p.m., received in Prague at 8:15 p.m., and deciphered at 9:00 p.m.,[28] which casts an interesting sidelight on Soviet behavior:

> The French Chargé d'affaires, Payart, since he could not speak to Litvinov, urgently sought out Potyomkin. He declared, in the name of the French Government, that in view of the danger of German aggression against Czechoslovakia, France wanted to know what the USSR intended to undertake; France was ready to intervene. Immediately after this Payart was received by Litvinov who suggested to France that the League of Nations should be summoned in accordance with Art. XI. of the Covenant,[29] so that the leading Powers could declare the danger of aggression. Litvinov was convinced that under such circumstances even Poland and Rumania could not hesitate to fulfil their obligations. As for the practical military side of the issue he (Litvinov) demanded an immediate convocation of the representatives of the Soviet, French and Czechoslovak Armed Forces. Without negotiations of this nature it would not be feasible to delineate the practical mili-

---

in giving assistance. Litvinov answered: "Naturally." Chaczynski further asked: "In which way?", to which the Soviet Foreign Minister answered that the way would be found. See also D. Brit. F.P., 3rd Series, Vol. I, p. 65, and D. Ger. G.P., Series D, Vol. II, p. 426.

[26] *New Documents . . .*, Doc. No. 14, p. 40.

[27] Pavel Eisler, a contemporary Czech historian, in his short booklet, *Munich. A Retrospect* (Orbis: Prague, 1958) writes: "An unequivocal statement to this effect [i.e. that the Soviet Union was prepared to go beyond her actual treaty obligations and would render aid to Czechoslovakia independent of assistance by France] was sent by Stalin to president Beneš through Klement Gottwald, leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, and a communication on those lines was also given by the official representatives of the USSR to the Czechoslovak government." (p. 41) It is most unfortunate that the editors of the *New Documents . . .* did not find such a communication in the Prague or Moscow archives. It could have settled the dispute once and for all. As for Gottwald as a direct link between Stalin and Beneš (according to Eisler's version) the documents have Gottwald answering Beneš' question with an opening sentence "that it was not his business to answer for the USSR" (Doc. No. 37).

[28] 411997-8.

[29] Article XI reads: "Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise, the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any Member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

> tary possibilities. Upon receiving this information I [Fierlinger] told Potyomkin that I was in agreement with the view of the Soviet Government; nevertheless I considered the answer as being too theoretical and I would have preferred to see the USSR in a more active role. It was also definitely necessary to examine the practical issue first with our experts . . . I asked for a talk with Litvinov before his departure for Geneva in two days' time.

Fierlinger, if he saw Litvinov at all, apparently did not convince him to the point of assuming "a more active role." In Geneva the Soviet Foreign Minister, with his overcautious utterances, drove both the French and the English to frustration. On Sept. 16, the Czech Chargé d'affaires in Berlin sent this report to Prague:[30]

> During my visit to the British Embassy I was told that to rely on Soviet help would be a tragic error. The Soviet Union—it was alleged—would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia only when it suited herself. And at the present it did not suit her at all. In Geneva, just a few days previously, on Bonnet's question as to what the USSR would do in the event of aggression against Czechoslovakia, Litvinov answered that the case would be put before the League of Nations' Council. Bonnet was dismayed by this answer, since he expected something more positive; certainly not any formal procedures behind which the USSR allegedly wanted to hide . . .[31]

Knowing Bonnet, he might not have been dismayed at all. But it is certain that such reports as this could not have lifted the 'morale' of the hard-pressed Czechs. Most of the reports reaching Prague in those days were pessimistic. Even the Moscow dispatches were discouraging. Instead of a concrete and unmistakable promise of help the Soviet officials seemed to heap their anger and abuse on the French (particularly on Bonnet), as can be concluded from Fierlinger's report of the period.[32]

Towards the end of September, when abandonment by the West was an irrevocable reality, the Soviet willingness was put to an acid test. In Fierlinger's letter of Sept. 29, one reads these very interesting lines: ". . . all General Fajfr's wishes were taken into consideration and . . . the appropriate Soviet air units were prepared to leave for Czechoslovakia in case of need."[33]

This is, in fact, the closest we come to the show of willingness on the

---

It is also declared to be the friendly act of each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstances whatever affecting international relations which threaten to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends."

[30] 412773-4.

[31] In the same report Schubert records his discussion with the Soviet Chargé d'affaires in Berlin, who voiced a veiled complaint that the Czechoslovak Government carried out lengthy discussions with England and France and ignored the Soviet Union. The report ends with more gloomy utterances of the French Embassy Counsellor Montbas about the reserved attitude of the USSR.

[32] E.g. Dispatches of Aug. 27, (412000), Sept. 19, (412092), Sept. 20, (412090) etc.

[33] *New Documents . . .*, p. 122.

Soviet side. Considering the geographical and political factors it was a gesture both brave and realistic at the same time.[34] The internal evidence of the document suggests that this happened in the early hours on Sept. 25. In Czechoslovakia the crisis was reaching its climax. Mobilization was in full swing and the Czechoslovak Government was informing His Majesty's Government that Hitler's demands were "absolutely and unconditionally unacceptable."[35]

On Sept. 28 the danger of war was imminent, and while Chamberlain was mellowing Hitler with personal messages, Beneš turned to the Soviet Union for the promised assistance of the Soviet Air Force. As evidence of this we have a short but most explicit telegram sent by Fierlinger after he had delivered the message. The telegram left Moscow at 12:26 p.m. It read: "The request of President Beneš for immediate assistance from the (Soviet) Air Force was submitted. I hope it will be considered favorably."[36]

It arrived in Prague at 3:20 p.m., and was deciphered at 4:10 p.m. Unfortunately the planes were much slower to arrive—in fact they never did, and since the Czech-Soviet publication does not give any explanation, this silence is eloquent enough.

V

In the preface the editors condemned the acceptance of the Munich agreement by the Czechoslovak Government. They are not alone in doing this. Even such a sympathetic friend of the Czechoslovak cause as Churchil blamed Beneš for having yielded.[37] However, it was left to the editors o the present brochure to brand this act of submission as "a shameful capitulation."[38] Since we do not know exactly what would have happened had the Czech Government refused to accept the terms of the Agreement,[39] ne ody is fully entitled to accuse (or excuse) the Czechs for having chosen the igger (or lesser) evil. One must not forget that the situation left very little o choose from: with enemies around and within her, with allies abrogating heir treaty obligations and with the Soviet Union uncertain (to say the east), any display of heroics could have been expected only from the Poles, ot from the Czechs.[40]

---

[34] The realism of the gesture is perhaps most bluntly summarized in Payart's remar to a member of the German Embassy in Moscow on Aug. 3, namely that "the Sovie would not scruple to fly over neutral countries" (Doc. Ger. F.P., Series D, Vol. II, p. 667

[35] British White Paper; Correspondence respecting Czechoslovakia. Sept. 1938. Cm 5847, No. 7.

[36] 412136.

[37] "I have always believed that Beneš was wrong to yield. He should have defende his fortress line. Once fighting had begun, in my opinion at that time, France wou have moved to his aid in a surge of national passion, and Britain would have rallied France almost immediately." W. Churchill, *Second World War*, Vol. I, p. 272 (Londo 1955). Churchill was also sure of "Soviet Russia's undoubted willingness to join th Western Powers and go all lengths to save Czechoslovakia," (*ibid.* p. 271). It is a pit that Churchill did not communicate his opinion to the Czechoslovak Government i Sept. 1938.

[38] From the communiqué issued by the Czechoslovak Government on Sept. 30, 193 one would conclude that the Communists were as guilty accomplices of "the shamef capitulation" in 1938 as they were severe judges of it in 1958. It is stated in the com muniqué: "After thoroughly weighing and examining from all points of view all th urgent recommendations which were communicated to the Government by the Britis and French Governments, and with a full sense of its responsibility before history, th Czechoslovak Government, *with the complete agreement of the responsible representati of the political parties*, has resolved to accept the decisions adopted by the Four Gre Powers at Munich . . . " (*Doc. Int. Affairs*, 1938, Vol. II, London, 1943, p. 326.)

[39] We know this much: that Hitler was not bluffing; in fact he was furious wi Chamberlain for having upset his plan "to smash the Czechs."

The tragedy of Munich was a very depressing experience for the people f Czechoslovakia. Some blame for it, however, must be laid at the feet of he Czechoslovak Government and especially at the feet of President Beneš. n Munich they had to pay very dearly for their errors and omissions of the ast 20 years. It is seldom realized that the events which culminated in Iunich did not start in March 1938, nor in January 1933, but in October 918. The numerous German minority included in the new state was contantly complaining about its treatment at the hands of the Czechs. In 938 it became the pretext of Hitler's intervention.

The open German interest in the Sudeten problem was stressed for the rst time on Feb. 25, 1934. On that day Neurath told Mastný in Berlin: Früher waren es die Polen, jetzt sind es—ich kann es Ihnen leider nicht erschweigen—die Tschechen, gegen welche sich die unfreundliche Gefühle n Volke richten. Es ist halt die Frage der Sudetendeutschen die uns gewiss eiderseits Sorgen macht."[41] These worries—mentioned by Neurath—grew s time passed at a greater rate on the Czech than on the German side of e frontier. Henlein became the spokesman of this discontented minority. Iaving, on his side, a sympathetic hearing in the West, especially in Engand, and moral and material support from Germany, he brought the probm to the point where it became a key issue of war or peace in Europe. Vhat started as a request for cultural autonomy grew gradually into deands for economic and territorial autonomy and ended in hysterical outs: "Ein Volk, ein Führer, ein Reich." The Czech concessions came lways "too little, too late;" the Germans always raised their demands when e Czechs were about to fulfil them.[42] As is known now from the captured erman documents, the Sudeten Germans became the tool of the Nazi olicy which, in turn, aimed not only at the cession of the Sudeten terriories but at the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia.[43] The other minorities

---

[40] Compare an interesting dialogue between Ribbentrop and Burckhardt concerning e national mentality of these two Slav nations:

Ribbentrop: "Les Polonais ne marcheront pas plus que les Tchèques."

Burckhardt: "Ils marcheront; les Tchèques sont des utilitaires raisonnables, les Polonais t leur grain de folie, ils cassent du verre après minuit, ils sont le seul peuple d'Europe sez malheureux pour désirer la bataille, ils sont glorieux et ne connaissent pas la mere . . . " (Doc. Brit. F. P., 3rd Series, Vol. III, p. 659.)

[41] 413602. Reportd by Mastný as Neurath's *ipsissima verba*.

[42] Henlein in discussion with SS-Obergruppenführer Lorenz on June 3, 1938, raised is question: "What attitude should I adopt if the Czechs, under foreign pressure, sudenly accede to all my demands?" And promptly proposes the following answer: "If the zechs yield on all points, I shall answer 'Yes,' with the demand that the foreign policy Czechoslovakia be modified. The Czechs would never accede to that." (Doc. Ger. F. P., ries D, Vol. II, p. 384.)

(Magyars, Poles) were also putting their claims with increasing insistence

But it was not only the minorities. The Slovaks and the Ruthenes were demanding autonomy for themselves as promised to the Slovaks in the controversial Pittsburgh Agreement in 1918, and to the Ruthenes in Paris i 1919. The Czech reluctance to grant autonomy and their rigid adherence to a robust centralism were detested in Slovakia. The much proclaimed national solidarity was more fictitious than real. Beneš knew it too, and thi thought was at the back of his mind when he was about to put this solidarity to its crucial test.

These facts were intentionally obscured or benevolently overlooked i the post-Munich years and Beneš was unconditionally absolved from hi past errors. He was pitied as a helpless victim of the dark unchecked force of an aggressive dictatorship. However, not without reason, Henderson approached Mastný on March 23, 1938:

> . . . In twenty years Czechoslovakia has not succeeded in solving he minority problem. The future of Czechoslovakia is seriously threatene by such a permanent burden. The Germans in Czechoslovakia hav not yet obtained their rights. England has been well informed abou this situation and he (Henderson) had seen it for himself in Karlsba and elsewhere. The Germans must obtain autonomy in some form Why not adopt the Swiss system before it was too late and eventuall change the name of the state *à la* Yugoslavia? Not only the German wanted autonomy but also the other minorities (sic) especially th Slovaks. If Czechoslovakia were really a national state the attitude c England towards her would be more decided. At the moment Czechoslovakia was the main worry of Europe . . .[44]

Against this background of internal uncertainty and external pressu one must project the Czechoslovak acceptance of the Anglo-French proposition on Sept. 21 and the terms of the Munich Agreement on Sept. 30. Th resisted to the utmost and the sorrowful details of their submission ha been described at length elsewhere.[45]

---

[43] It is not without interest to note that in 1938 the Soviet Chargé d'affaires in Berl spent his Easter holiday in the Sudetenland. In his conversation with Mastný (on Ap 26) he told the latter (pointing out how much better off allegedly an ordinary man w in Germany than in Czechoslovakia) that he did not understand why the Czechoslov Government, even at the cost of great financial sacrifice, did not attempt, by improvi economic conditions in the Sudetenland, to remove the principal grounds for the German complaints. (412749-50).

[44] 412827-8.

[45] E.g. J. W. Wheeler-Bennett, *Munich, Prologue to Tragedy,* London, 1948, pp. 12 124 and 174 f. It is, perhaps, worthwhile to quote a part of Beneš' letter to Osuský Sept. 23 (412132-3), in which Beneš gives his own version of the excruciating experie during the night of Sept. 20/21: "That which France and England asked of us, we considered outrageous. We could not conceive that France would be capable of anything that kind, but both the French and English Ministers pressed their point with unbeli able insistence; they threatened, they kept repeating that they had just recently spok with Paris, they referred to the telephone instructions repeatedly sent from their gove ments, namely that their governments would not admit any dilatory or conditional answe everything had to be accepted without reservation, otherwise they would disinte themselves in our fate. The French Minister read to me from a piece of paper a sente

VI

Only about half of the Czech documents included in the collection is given in full. Omissions—according to the statement in the preface—were made of such passages "which have no direct bearing on the subject of this publication." The claim, however, does not seem to be substantiated: some truncations give a misleading impression to the remaining torso of the document, others would put in a favorable light persons who are not popular in Prague or Moscow.

Even a superficial check reveals that the omissions are not faithfully recorded. Doc. No. 23 should end not with a full stop but with square brackets [. . .] indicating that at least four fifths of Osuský's report were left out.[46] In the same manner Krofta's telegram (No. 28) contains some additional instructions which have been omitted without acknowledgment.[47] On the other hand, Osuský's telegram (No. 13) is printed in full, but the omission marks are appended nevertheless.[48]

Some undeserved omissions have been already criticized in the above-mentioned article by Wm. V. Wallace, who at one time had a limited access

---

stating, that when, due to our declining of the French and British proposals, war broke out, the French government "ne s'y associéra pas."

Simultaneously both Ministers explained that according to their information war would break out at any moment . . . The pressure was of such a nature that it had the character of an ultimatum. The whole thing was unique in history and on that decisive night of Sept. 20/21 I told that quite openly to both ministers. This will remain always a disgrace for France and probably for England too. I showed them on a map how monstrous the conditions were, I demanded that they emphasize the necessity of modification. They declared they had an order to demand acceptance without any reser-ations or conditions. Then they pointed out . . . that war would start immediately and hat our complete destruction was at stake. At the same time, it seemed to me, that they worked on Hodža and his entourage who yielded under the weight of their threats. I just mention that de Lacroix, when I requested from him the last ultimative intervention in writing, asked Paris whether he could do that. He obtained permission, but the written text is more moderate than the oral ultimative demand. The words "La France ne s'y associéra pas," which I wrote down in the presence of both Ministers, are expressed by this circumscription: "Tchécoslovaquie assume donc un risque auquel nous avions conscience de l'avoir soustraite. Elle doit comprendre elle-même les conclusions que la France est en droit d'en tirer si le gouvernement tchécoslovaque n'accepte pas immédiatement la proposition franco-britannique." I repeat: "that which happened to us stands but unparalleled in history." Compare also Berber, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

For full text of the French statement see Appendix III.

[46] The omitted passage contains an interesting summary of a long conversation between Bonnet and Osuský. The Czechs would have preferred the French to back them in refusing the English offer. Osuský very prudently argued that it was easier to decline the nglish offer of an adviser before his mission started than to decline the suggestions and roposals such an adviser was likely to make. When France insisted on the acceptance of the English offer, Osuský asked if France would support Czechoslovakia if she found the adviser's proposals unreasonable and had to decline them. The answer was noncommittal. During the conversation Bonnet also hinted that France could possibly send similar fact-finding advisory mission to Czechoslovakia, but Osuský talked him out of it. 12676-82).

[47] The omitted passage reads: (412506-7)

To be transmitted to the Legation in London with the following addition: "The communication about the talk of the President with de Lacroix is for your personal information only."

To the Legation in Moscow with the following addition: "Only for your personal information."

[48] 412195-7.

to the less secret documents in the Prague archives. However, some furthe characteristic omissions are worth pointing out. Thus Krofta's circula (Doc. No. 1) as it stands gives the impression of resignation, meekness an defeatism, while in the relegated part Krofta exhorts the Czechoslovak missions abroad to be watchful and alert:

> Send an impartial report about your observations of local repercussions, views and other information concerning the attitude of the Wes to these events. Note specially the reaction of the Italian diplomats It is necessary that at the legations, round-the-clock telephone and ciphe services be maintained.[49]

Also the omissions of Krofta's telegram of June 12 (Doc. No. 19) contain some interesting information, especially the last paragraph. It illuminates the attitude of the Little Entente states towards Czechoslovakia: the Rumanian attitude was entirely friendly. An agreement was negotiate with Moscow regarding the eventual transit of Soviet troops in the case o an armed conflict and the discussions were proceeding in a favorable atmosphere. The decisive steps taken by Czechoslovakia on May 21 (partial mobilization) and the open sympathies of England and France wrought a change of heart also in Yugoslav governmental circles. Belgrade was afrai that the Czechoslovak concessions to the minorities would create a dangerous precedent for the Yugoslav minorities.[50]

* * *

About the Soviet contribution to this collection of documents there i less to say. Qualitatively it is inferior to the Czech contribution and betrays very little which has not hitherto been known. But even for tha little information one has to be grateful, since the Soviet archives unt very recently were kept under lock and key and consequently not very muc is known about the mechanics of Soviet diplomacy.[51] Due to our access t the German and Czech documents it is possible to cross-check some of th Soviet documents by confronting them with their counterparts in tho archives. Such confrontations bring out many interesting sidelights.

There are two documents relating to Fierlinger's discussion with L vinov on May 25 (Doc. No. 14). In his telegram Fierlinger records an i teresting fact, which reveals that the Soviet Foreign Minister hinted to hi that it might eventually be in the interest of the Soviet Union to come an agreement with Germany against England.[52] Fierlinger referred to th discussion again in his lengthy report of May 28.[53] Here he pictured Litvinov as threatening Halifax with gloomy prospects for England and with the possibility that the USSR might eventually declare herself neutral.[54]

---

[49] 412670.

[50] 411934.

[51] The Soviets usually speak out only when provoked. Thus when the U.S. Sta Departmnt published *Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-41* the Soviet Union answered with volume indignantly entitled *Falsifiers of History*, soon followed by *Documents and Mat ials Relating to the Eve of the Second World War* in two volumes. (Doc. No. 38 of t present volume can be found there.) Owing to this fact Soviet documents are usua framed in such a way as to defend the Soviet thesis, and the events are very seldom p in proper perspective.

[52] 411933. This telegram is not given in verbatim translation, only a detailed su mary of its content is given.

Litvinov's telegram to Alexandrovsky (Doc. No. 26) comes very close to the Czech report on Alexandrovsky's call on Krofta on Sept. 9.[55] Alexandrovsky repeated word for word what he was instructed to communicate, except that he referred to Paragraph 1 of Article XI of the League Covenant, where the reproduced document (probably in error) mentions Article II.[56]

The comparison of the Soviet documents with the German ones provides an interesting commentary on the Soviet attitude. Besides Czechoslovakia, Germany was the country most concerned with Soviet intentions and actions. The German Ambasador in Moscow, Schulenburg, was a skilful diplomat and keen observer. From March to September he never believed that the Soviet Union would interfere in the Czech-German armed conflict,[57] certainly not to any appreciable extent. His dispatches are worth re-reading in connection with the present volume.

---

[53] 412444-59.

[54] 412453. To a possible rapprochement with Germany Potyomkin also made an allusion in his conversation with Coulondre. When these two diplomats met on Oct. 4, Potyomkin, overcome with emotion, said: "My poor friend, what have you done? For us I see now no other way out except a Fourth Partition of Poland." (R. Coulondre, *De Staline à Hitler,* as quoted by Sir Lewis Namier, *In the Nazi Era* (London, 1952), p. 176.) What was discussed as a possibility in May and a probability in Oct. 1938, became a reality in Aug. 1939, less than a year after Munich. Litvinov's warnings about "danger that would confront Great Britain after a certain time," are perhaps to be viewed in this light.

[55] 412793-4. On this occasion Alexandrovsky delivered also the content of a telegram sent by Potyomkin which referred to a talk between Payart and Potyomkin on Sept. 1. Payart saw Potyomkin on Bonnet's instruction to inquire in which way the USSR would assist Czechoslovakia in case of an unprovoked attack. The French Government was reckoning with the possibility of an armed conflict and France was ready to fulfil her obligations. Bonnet required urgent answers in view of the Polish and Rumanian unwillingness to allow the transit of Soviet troops through their territories. Potyomkin then allegedly told Payart that the heart of the matter would rest with the behavior of Poland and Rumania. (Record of this talk is included in the collection as Doc. No. 25.)

[56] See *New Documents . . . ,* p. 62.

[57] Here are some extracts from the dispatches of the German Embassy in Moscow: Apr. 22: "The Soviet press treats the Czechoslovak question with great reserve. As a rule the Soviet press mentions only France's obligations to Czechoslovakia" (Doc. Ger. F. P., Series D, Vol. II, p. 232). May 27: "Soviet press reserved to the Sudeten German question" (*ibid.,* p. 348). May 30: "Here the view prevails that the Soviets will for the present avoid being drawn into the war at all costs" (*ibid.,* p. 363). June 22: (This is a thorough political report on the attitude of the Soviet Government during the Czechoslovak crisis) "The attitude . . . showed that in the event of a war between Germany and Czechoslovakia the Soviet Government would at the start be unwilling to commit itself or to show its hand." (*ibid.,* p. 423-6). July 5: "It can be assumed that in the event of a German-Czchoslovak war the Soviet Union will at first adopt an attitude of wait and see." (*ibid.,* p. 469). Aug. 22: (After Litvinov had stated "that the Soviet Union has promised her support to Czechoslovakia, that she will keep her word and do her best") 'My colleagues here believe that the USSR will do so as little as possible so that at the end of the war she will have an intact army at her disposal" (*ibid.,* p. 631). Sept. 21: ' 'Pravda' states Soviet Union indifferent to question which imperialist brigand falls upon this or that colony, this or that independent state, for she sees no difference between German and British brigands." (*ibid.,* p. 860). When the Munich days were over, the German Chargé d'affaires in Moscow summed up the Soviet attitude: "The Soviet Union neglected to take such preliminary measures of mobilization as were considered necessary, for instance, in Holland, Belgium, and Switzerland. Considering that the Soviet Union was under an obligation to render assistance to Czechoslovakia, this attitude must seem

The visit of the German Ambassador to Litvinov (Doc. No. 24) is dealth with in detail in German reports from Moscow[58] and the comparison, though not strikingly revealing, is very instructive. The same can be said about documents No. 53 and 54 when compared with Gamelin's account.[59]

The Soviet note to Poland (Doc. No. 50) motivated by Krofta's request (Doc. No. 49) loses much of its lustre when supplemented by information from German sources. The Poles considered it "merely a propaganda gesture,"[60] and answered accordingly. The reply is worth quoting, if only as an example of Eastern diplomacy. To the Soviet warning, the Poles retorted brusquely:

> 1. The measures taken in connection with the defense of the Polish state are the exclusive concern of the Polish Government, who are not obliged to give explanations to anyone.
> 2. The Polish Government is fully acquainted with the text of the treaties which they have concluded.[61]

Finally, a word or two must be said about Alexandrovsky's reports. They contain many errors of fact and they are not examples of precise reporting at all.[62] It seems that Alexandrovsky wrote what he thought would please his superiors in Moscow. The translators magnanimously elevated his Legation to the rank of Embassy[63] in the care of a Minister. In his telegram of Oct. 1 (Doc. No. 60) he referred to Dérer as former Minister of Internal Affairs[64] and attributed to him utterances he did not make, i. e "that the USSR was the only one who remained a loyal ally of Czechoslovakia to the end."[65] Dérer (a Social-Democrat) was, however, much less explicit. He said on the radio (speaking after Syrový and Krejčí) that the Western Powers had notified the Czechoslovak Government that in the cas

---

particularly striking. The Soviets subsequently maintained that, in view of the polic of yielding followed by France and Britain towards the aggressors, they had neve seriously believed in the outbreak of a war. It is, however, impossible to avoid drawin certain conclusions from the conduct of the Soviet Government during the Polish-Lithuanian conflict and during the Czechoslovak crisis. It should also be observed that th Soviet Government remained completely quiet on the occasion of Poland's action agains Czechoslovakia and on the occupation of Teschen by Polish troops and contented itse with the meaningless action of issuing a warning of a possible denunciation of the Polish Soviet non-aggression treaty." (Doc. Ger. F. P., Servies D, Vol. IV, p. 606)

[58] Doc. Ger. F. P., Series D, Vol. II, pp. 601, 604, 629-31.

[59] M. G. Gamelin, *Servir* (Paris, 1946-8), p. 348 f.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 922. Those were the words of the Polish Foreign Minister Beck to th German Ambassador in Warsaw.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 949 f. See also p. 897 f.

[62] Alexandrovsky's Czechoslovak counterpart in Moscow was guilty of very much th same shortcoming. His reports were too optimistic and often bordered on wishfu thinking. Schulenburg characterized him in these words: "M. Fierlinger, who was on accredited to Moscow in October 1937, is, as so many new arrivals, still strongly influence by Soviet propaganda to which, for understandable reasons, he is all too willing to giv credence." (Doc. Ger. F. P., Series D, Vol. II, p. 363.)

[63] Cf. Docs. No. 48 and 56.

[64] This error is corrected in a footnote.

of acceptance of Soviet help they would have to turn against Czechoslovakia as an exponent of bolshevism. "All was lost," he said weeping, "no responsible statesman would lead our country into such a catastrophe." (It was a patriotic fashion to weep publicly in those days.) Beran's statement, in view of his strong anti-Soviet feelings (for which he was sentenced in 1947 to 20 years' imprisonment) also has an air of improbability.[66]

VII

The tragedy of Munich (and everybody admits that it was a tragedy)—in Beneš' words—"lacerated the soul, heart, nerves and reason."[67] When the shock subsided the question of responsibility emerged. One of the most ardent advocates of the inquiry into this national catastrophe was Osuský.[68] At his instigation the Czechoslovak Ministerial Council entrusted Chvalkovský with the task of appointing an impartial Investigation Commission to look into the causes which led to the national tragedy.[69] But events marched faster than the Commission could work, and consequently an authoritative pronouncement as to the guilty and the innocent is still lacking.

The Soviets proclaimed themselves judge and jury and pronounced their own innocence. But not even the Soviet Union is exempted from the old adage: *Nemo iudex in rebus suis.*

There seems to be much truth in the words of Beneš' war-time secretary E. Táborský, who wrote that the Soviet position vis-à-vis the Czechoslovak crisis had been by no means "as straight-forward and courageous as the world was led to believe by clever Soviet propaganda and the reluctance of those who knew the full facts to speak in a derogatory way about the USSR."[70]

University of Adelaide
Adelaide, Australia

APPENDIX I.

The list of documents which were to be included in the Czechoslovak White Book:

1. Conversation between the French Minister in Prague (de Lacroix) and the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs (Krofta) on Sept. 19, 1938.

---

[65] This argument was adopted also by Ripka. Being one of those who did not want to speak about the USSR in a derogatory manner, he wrote: "The Czechoslovak Government did not ask Soviet Russia to come to its assistance . . . because it did not want to make it possible for Germany to declare a 'Crusade against Bolshevism.' The Czechoslovak Government realized that, should this happen, the Western Powers . . . might decide to adopt a passive attitude, perhaps even an attitude hostile to the Czechoslovak Republic. This attitude, we considered, might easily be adopted by Britain and France were Soviet Russia our only ally." (Ripka, *op.cit.*, p. 146.)

[66] According to *Pravda* (Oct. 4, 1938) Beran told a Czechoslovak youth delegation that "the only ally who remained faithful to Czechoslovakia was the Soviet Union."

[67] Documents on International Affairs for 1938, Vol. II, p. 329 f.

[68] For Osuský's letter to Chvalkovský requesting this see 412097-101.

[69] 412103-4.

[70] *Foreign Affairs,* Vol. 27 (Jan. 1949), p. 304.

2. Note submitted to the Czechoslovak Government by the French (de Lacroix) and British (Newton) Ministers in Prague on Sept. 19, 1938.
3. Record of a conversation of the chef de cabinet of the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Jína) with the secretary of the British Legation (Troutbeck) on Sept. 19, 1938.
4. Record of a conversation of the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Krno) with the French and British Ministers to Czechoslovakia on Sept. 19, 1938.
5. Record of the Secretary of the President of the Republic (Smutný) about the message of the French Minister in Prague for the President of Czechoslovakia (Beneš) and the Czechoslovak Government of Sept. 20, 1938.
6. Record of the President's Secretary about the communication of the British Minister in Prague for the President of the Republic of Sept. 20, 1938.
7. Answer of the Czechoslovak Government to the British and French Governments of Sept. 20, 1938.
8. Aide-mémoire about the oral démarche of the British Minister in Prague delivered to the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry on Sept. 21, 1938.
9. Report about the démarche of the French and British Ministers in Prague of Sept. 21, 1938.
10. Note of the French Minister in Prague for the President of the Republic of Sept. 21, 1938.
11. Attitude of the British Government to the solution of the Czechoslovak-German relation of Sept. 21, 1938.
12. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris (Osuský) of Sept. 21, 1938.
13. Circular of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak diplomatic missions abroad of Sept. 21, 1938.
14. Letter of the British State Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Halifax) to the Czechoslovak Minister in London (Masaryk) of Sept. 21, 1938.
15. Record of a talk of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs with the French and British Ministers in Prague on Sept. 21, 1938.
16. Information of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs for the Czechoslovak Ministers in Paris and London of Sept. 22, 1938.
17. Conversation of the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 22, 1938.
18. Conversation of the Political Director at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs with the French Minister in Prague on Sept. 23, 1938.
19. Circular of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Legations of Sept. 23, 1938.
20. Conversation of the President's Secretary with the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 23, 1938.
21. Conversation of the President's Secretary with the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 24, 1938.
22. Conversation of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs with the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 24, 1938.
23. Memorandum of the German Government delivered to the Czechoslovak Government by the services of the British Government.
24. Aide-mémoire presented by the Secretary of the British Legation in

Prague to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 25, 1938.

25. Communication of the President of the Republic for the Czechoslovak Ministers in Paris, London and Moscow (Fierlinger) of Sept. 24, 1938.
26. Note delivered by the Czechoslovak Minister in London to the British Prime Minister (Chamberlain) on Sept. 25, 1938.
27. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris on Sept. 25, 1938.
28. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Minister in London on Sept. 26, 1938.
29. Report of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris of Sept. 26, 1938.
30. Note for the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sent to the Czechoslovak Minister in London on Sept. 26, 1938.
31. Message of the British Prime Minister for the President of the Czechoslovak Republic of Sept. 27, 1938.
32. Aide-mémoire handed to the President of the Republic by the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 27, 1938.
33. Record of a conversation between the British Minister in Prague and the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 27, 1938.
34. British "time-table" delivered by the British Minister in Prague to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 27, 1938.
35. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 27, 1938.
36. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28, 1938.
37. Record of a discussion between the Secretary of the British Legation in Prague and the Head of the European Section of the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry (Čermák) on Sept. 28, 1938.
38. Letter of the German Reich Chancellor (Hitler) of Sept. 27, 1938, as an answer to the previous letter of the British Prime Minister of Sept. 26, 1938.
39. Speech of the British Prime Minister of Sept. 28, 1938.
40. Circular of the Czechoslovakian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Ministers in London, Paris, Moscow, Belgrade (Lípa) and Bukarest (Veverka) of Sept. 28, 1938.
41. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28, 1938.
42. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Washington (Hurban) to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28, 1938.
43. Answer of the Czechoslovak Government to the British "time-table" handed to the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
44. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28, 1938.
45. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 28, 1938.
46. Circular-telegram to all Czechoslovak Legations abroad on Sept. 29, 1938.
47. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister in Paris to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs on Sept. 29, 1938.

48. Conversation of the President's Secretary with the British Minister to Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
49. Record of a talk between the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
50. Letter of the British Prime Minister to the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 28, 1938.
51. Telegram of the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Czechoslovak Ministers in Paris, London and Rome (Chvalkovský) concerning the answer of the Czechoslovak Government delivered to the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
52. Record of a discussion between the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
53. Aide-mémoire delivered to the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British Minister in Prague on Sept. 29, 1938.
54. Record of a conversation between the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs and the German Chargé d'affaires (Hencke) on Sept. 30, 1938.
55. Report of the chef de cabinet of the Czechoslovak Ministry for Foreign Affairs on how the Western Powers informed the Czechoslovak Government of the Munich decision on Sept. 30, 1938.

APPENDIX II.

A Czechoslovak document in German translation as found in the files of the German Foreign Ministry is compared here with its English counterpart as given in the joint Czechoslovak-Soviet publication *New Documents on the History of Munich.* Note how meticulously the German translation records every detail of the Czech original.

(Durchschlag)
Zurück an Abt. B.
Aussenmin. Abt. B.
Adressat: Zamini Paris
Zaminilo London
Eingehändigt: 21. IX. 10.30
Zur Kenntnis: A KP MP

Abgesendet Zl. 1093-1094/38
Expediert: 21. IX. - 11.10
Sektions Zl. telefonisch
136.451/A/38[1]

Der englische und der französische Gesandte teilten mit:

I. Was England und Frankreich vorschlugen, ist das einzige, was den Krieg und die Invasion der Tschechoslowakei abwehrt.

II. Wenn die Antwort der Tschechoslowakischen Republik negativ wäre, hatte sie die Verantwortung für den Krieg.

III. Das vernichtet die französisch-britische Solidarität, weil England nicht mitgeht.

IV. Wenn unter diesen Umständen der Krieg entsteht, wird sich Frankreich nicht anschliessen,[2] d.i. es wird Vertrag nicht einhalten.

Das wurde ausdrücklich gesagt. Newton erklärte, dass er sich anschliesst,[3] dass wenn wir auf unserer ersten Antwort bestehen werden England für das, was geschehen wird, die Verantwortung nicht übernimmt

---

[1] mit Bleistift beigefügt.

[2] das tschechische Wort 'nepřopojí' mit Bleistift verbessert in 'nepřipojí.'

[3] kann auch heissen: "dass beigefügt wird."

Dabei gab er zu verstehen, das mit Rücksicht auf das Vorgehen Frankreichs das Vorgehen Englands klar ist.

(Nachtrag)

Beide fügten hinzu, dass es erforderlich ist, so bald als möglich zu antworten und dass es nötig ist, ohne Vorbehalt anzunehmen. Beide kategorisch im Namen beider Regierungen und stark nachdrücklich.

123 101 Krofta

(411988)

No. 42.

TELEGRAM FROM THE CZECHOSLOVAK MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE CZECHOSLOVAK LEGATIONS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

September 21, 1938.

The French and British Ministers communicated:

I. That which has been proposed by England and France is the only means of averting war and the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

II. Should the Czechoslovak Republic reply in the negative, she would bear the responsibility for the war.

III. This would destroy Franco-British solidarity, since England would not march.

IV. If under these circumstances the war starts, France will not take part, i.e. she will not fulfil her treaty obligations.

This was said explicitly. Newton declared that he agreed to this, that if we persisted in our original statement, England would not assume responsibility for what might ensue.

At the same time he indicated that with regard to the line followed by France England's course was evident.

(*Addendum*)

necessary to accept without reservations. Both categorically in the name of both governments and with great emphasis.

Krofta

Archives.

(*New Documents . . .* , p. 98.)

APPENDIX III.

All the literature on the Munich events refers to a statement communicated by de Lacroix to Beneš on Sept. 21, 1938. A passage of this statement was given by R. W. Seton-Watson (*Munich and the Dictators,* London, 1939, p. 68) and by H. Ripka (*op.cit.,* p. 80). G. Bonnet writes that the statement had his approval, quotes two passages from it, but does not give its verbatim text. (*De Washington au Quai d'Orsay,* Vol. I, Éditions du Cheval Ailé, Geneva, 1946, pp. 246-51.) J. W. Wheeler-Bennett (*op cit.,* pp. 124-26) and R. G. D. Laffan (*Survey of International Affairs,* 1938, Vol. II, OUP, London, 1951, pp. 356-63) describe the dramatic circumstances concerning the origin of this statement and its important part in shaping events both in Prague and in Paris.

Since, to the present author's knowledge, the full text of this statement has not as yet been published, (it was passed over in silence even by the edi-

tors of the Czech-Soviet publication) it may be of some interest to have it printed at this juncture:

Légation de France à Prague. République Française.
Prague, le 21 septembre 1938.

Monsieur le Président,

Votre Excellence a bien voulu me demander de lui faire tenir par écrit la déclaration que je lui ai faite la nuit dernière au nom de mon Gouvernement. J'ai l'honneur de Vous confirmer ci-dessous cette déclaration:

La France, d'accord avec l'Angleterre, a mis sur pied la seule procédure qu'elle a jugée en fait, dans les circonstances actuelles, propre à empêcher l'entrée des Allemands en Tchécoslovaquie.

En repoussant la proposition franco-britannique, le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque prend la responsabilité de déterminer le recours à la force de l'Allemagne. Il rompt par là même la solidarité franco-britannique qui vient d'être établie et il enlève ainsi toute efficacité pratique à une assistance de la France. Ce sont là des avertissements qui ont déjà été donnés notamment par moi-même dès le mois de juillet et le 20 septembre à M. Osuský par M. Georges Bonnet.

La Tchécoslovaquie assume donc un risque auquel nous avions conscience de l'avoir soustraite. Elle doit comprendre elle-même les conclusions que la France est en droit d'en tirer si le Gouvernement tchécoslovaque n'accepte pas immédiatement la proposition franco-britannique.

Veuillez agréer, Monsieur le Président, les assurances de ma très haute considération et de mes sentiments respectueux.

V. de Lacroix.

Son Excellence Monsieur Edouard Beneš,
Président de la République Tchécoslovaque.

(412310)

PATTERNS OF LEADERSHIP IN A COMMUNIST STATE: CZECHOSLOVAKIA 1946-1958*

by Daniel Kubát

THE CENTRAL Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia directs the work of the central State organs, the National Front and the public organizations through the instrumentality of the Party groups within these organs and organizations."[1] This section of the Party Statutes, as adopted in December 1952, clearly outlines the theoretical basis of the political power of the Party within the people's democracies and Soviet Russia itself. The Party Statutes are virtually alike for the whole Soviet orbit.

Czechoslovakia has been selected for a study of the leadership patterns in a people's democracy. This country has a long tradition of industrialization and a relatively high standard of living. The index of industrial production being approximately commensurate with the increase of technological development, the development of the economic aspects of the country can be considered approximately equal to that in Western Europe. Furthermore, there has been no radical change in agricultural production and no sweeping land reform.[2] Of course, a great number of small and medium sized farms have been fused into collective farming units, but so ar no major social change in rural living has been noticeable.

Thus, the only major change has been in political leadership. Since he end of the last World War Czechoslovakia has changed from a modertely socialized country into a people's democracy, that is an absolutely ocialized country. This change was politically effected in February 1948, when the Communist Party succeeded in seizing all political power in a bloodless coup d'état. Since then, the absolute rule of the Communist Party as been unabated. However, there have occurred some changes within he Communist leadership elite in the period since the war. These changes as well as the corresponding methods of control of state organs are the subject of the present paper.

For orientation purposes it should be stated that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, organized in 1921 as a leftist faction of the Social Democratic Party,[3] remained legal until about the date of the Munich agreement in 1938, and commanded on an average about 10% of the vote at general elections. After World War II it shared its power with five other political parties, most of them of a socialist nature.[4] In the first postwar elections it gained almost 40% of the national vote.[5] Two years later it succeeded, through shrewd politicking and tough organization of its members, in controling all of the state. Its card-carrying membership of over one million in the spring of 1946 sky-rocketed by the end of 1949 to almost two and a half million out of a total population of twelve million. Huge Party purges starting at the end of 1949 cut down the membership to about one and a half million, which is the membership today.[6]

---

*The collection of material was made mostly in Europe, under the joint sponsorship of the J. G. Herder-Institute, Marburg/Lahn, Germany, and the American Philosophical Society. Thanks are also due to the staff of the Evaluation and Research Section, Czecho-ovak Desk, Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany, for cooperation in assembling some data.

[1] Statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, Sec. V., par. 34, as printed in *Rudé Právo,* Dec. 20, 1952.

[2] Although at present most of the agricultural land is socialized, the previous holdings by *kulaks* were not enormously large in comparison with those of other farmers. Significant land reforms which affected feudal holdings in the territory of Czechoslovakia were effected after World War I.

In formal structure the Party is a body governed by the principle of representation. The Party members elect delegates to the Party Congresses every four years at a ratio of about one delegate per thousand members. The Congress delegates elect the Central Committee, which is in fact the highest authority of the Party between Congresses. The Central Committee in turn elects the Politburo and the Secretariat, which are entrusted with the business of the Party between meetings of the Central Committee every four months. In actual political power, however, the Party structure is not as democratically "representative" as this formal structure would suggest because the actual political power of these individuals and bodies is in reverse order—the Politburo having supreme power and not being responsible to the body which elected it and which it allegedly represents.

Since World War II, four Congresses of the Party have been held a Prague—namely the VIII in 1946, the IX in 1949, the X in 1954, and the X in 1958. Accordingly, four sets of members of the Central Committee hav been elected, totaling from 112 to 147 members. Since some of the member of the Central Committee were elected more than once, the total numbe of members for the period from 1946 to 1958 is 337. These 337 person mostly known and high-ranking Communists, form the subject of our stud of continuity and change in the leadership pattern throughout twelve years.

---

[3] The founding congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (on her territor took place May 14-16, 1921, after the (Sudeten) German Communists established the party in March and the Slovak Communists in January of that year. During the 23r Congress of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party in September 1920, the left factio (the future Communists) was still part of the Social Democrats and participated in t leadership of the party. Cf. *Přehled historických dat nejdůležitějších sjezdů a události me národního a našeho revolučního a dělnického hnutí* (Praha: SNPL, 1955).

[4] Actually, the following parties took part in the elections in May 1946: the Comm nist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Czechoslovak National Socialist Party, the People Party, the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, the Communist Party of Slovakia, t Slovak Christian Democratic Party, the Slovak Freedom Party and the Slovak Labor Part that is, eight political parties. Since the Communists were not in competition with the Slovak comrades and the Slovak Labor Party captured only two seats in the Nation Assembly, for all practical purposes the balloting competition was restricted to "five oth parties." All the parties were in the National Front and stood, in principle, for t socialization and nationalization of at least a part of the national economy. Cf. *Keesi Contemporary Archives,* 1946-1948, 7944C.

[5] Czech Communists gained 40.1% and the Slovak Communists 30.5% of all votes Bohemia-Moravia and Slovakia respectively. Cf. *Ibid.*

[6] For exact membership figures cf. the volume on *Czechoslovakia,* edited by V. Bus & N. Spulber (New York: Praeger, 1957), p. 70.

The results of the investigation of the social history of the 337 members of the Central Committee are presented in 10 tables. The source material comes from information which has appeared in the press in Czechoslovakia. Sometimes only the name and the information on the present position was mentioned; sometimes a short life history of the persons under study could be found in the press, especially on occasions of entering a new office or a significant birthday anniversary or death. A considerable portion of the information is contained in the research files of Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany. Complete lists of members of the Central Committees were published at the time of each Congress.[7]

There is no rule restricting re-election to the Central Committee, so that the turnover in the membership can be considered as a result of natural trends in the Party leadership. Only a small percentage of the persons involved ceased to be members of the Central Committee through old age or natural death. About two-thirds of the total of 337 were elected to only one four-year term, about one-fifth were elected to two terms, and about one-eighth of the group were elected three or four times to office. A closer look at Table I shows us that there seems to be a natural break in the overlapping of membership in the Central Committee from the IX to the X Congress. If we exclude from consideration the approximately 45 members who were continually re-elected and who are the core of the Party leadership, we see that there was little chance of being elected from the IX to the X Congress term only, whereas there was a greater chance of being elected consecutively from the VIII to the IX or from the X to the XI Congress term.

This corresponds to the natural break in the political history of the Party between the IX and the X Congresses. The death of the great Stalinist Klement Gottwald, the President of the Czechoslovak Republic and chairman of the Communist Party, occurred shortly after the death of Stalin. The mild destalinization begun in 1953 was accentuated in the spring of 1956, after the famed speech of Khrushchev. But even before the death of Gottwald very important Party purges took place in Czechoslovakia which sent to the gallows many Communist leaders, among others the first secretary of the Party, Rudolf Slánský, charged with conspiratorial practices and treason. Many of the former leaders of the Party, significantly enough of Jewish origin and of intellectual training, were thus disposed of and only the old hard-core Communists of worker origin and of some Party schooling remained in office. By 1954, the X Congress elected new men into the Central Committee, different from those old time leaders. They were necessarily younger, Party trained, and mostly possessed of economic skills. By this time the Party had been in power for five full years and had had a chance to train its new cadres.

---

[7] The elections took place the last day of the congress, that is March 31, 1946; May 9, 1949; June 15, 1954; and June 16, 1958. The lists were carried (with the exception of 946 when they were carried only by the Party press) the following day by the dailies of 1e National Press. *Nová Mysl,* the Communist theoretical monthly, usually devoted lmost a full issue to the congress.

Clarification of the research procedure used for this paper seems advisable: a file of ames was established of all persons ever elected to the CC for the covered period of four ongresses, and disregarding the two state-wide Conferences of 1952 and 1956. For each erson biographical information was sought in the newspaper items available from zechoslovakia *(Rudé Právo, Svobodné Slovo, Lidová demokracie, Práce,* and available egional newspapers). The libraries of the J. G. Herder Institute in Marburg/Lahn and f Radio Free Europe Research and Evaluation Sections in Munich, Germany, were used. urther information already available in the research files of the latter organization was tilized as far as feasible. The information was then divided into categories provided y the XI Congress of the Party in 1958: length of membership in the Party, present osition and original occupation, with sub-categories as used in our tables in the appendix. Items like biographical notes printed on occasions of promotion, anniversary, and eceiving of prizes were freely utilized. Sources for such biographical information from e current press of Czechoslovakia are so numerous and varied as to render bibliographil identification impractical. Information on each person was then analyzed according the categorical structure and the final results were computed and tabulated. The curacy of the information thus obtained cannot, of course, be guaranteed but can, I elieve, be considered as reasonably descriptive. The article intends to indicate a genal trend analysis as obtained only from the data presented.

In the present study the changes in the Party leadership were followed along three axes: the length of Party membership, the original or claimed occupation, and the position held at the time of each election to the Central Committee.

The first postwar Congress, the VIII, was held in the spring of 1946. At that time the Communist Party was legally equal to the other eight political parties, but in the first postwar parliamentary elections the Communist Party gained almost 40% of the vote and corresponding political power At least two-thirds of the members elected to the Central Committee in 194 were prewar members of the Party; about half of them were workers originally and over one-fifth belonged to the ranks of the intelligentsia. Thi category includes free professions requiring at least a college preparatio and also journalists, writers, artists and teachers. Although, in the year before the last war, the Communist Party had only about 10% intellectual in its Central Committee,[8] the increase of about 10% after the war can b attributed partly to the intellectual appeal of the Party's undergroun activities during the German occupation of Czechoslovakia; also to th fact that the intellectuals, not being an organized body throughout th nation, were easily won to the side of actual power, as witnessed by th increase of the intelligentsia in the Party ranks during the years 1948 an 1949.[9]

The members of the Central Committee elected at the IX Congress i 1949 had three distinguishing characteristics which set them apart fro the other members of the Central Committee elected at other times: firs they were mostly old timers, partly prewar Communists but also the forme leaders of the Social Democratic Party which had been fused with th Communist Party in the previous year, so that three-fourths of all th members had fought for socialist ideals for a long time. Second, signi

---

[8] Cf. "Sjezdy a konference kommunistické strany Československa (1921-1956)." Rad Free Europe News & Information Service—Evaluation & Research Section, Backgroun Report, June 16, 1958, pp. 1-10.

antly, almost one-third of them were from the ranks of the intelligentsia;
nd third, almost one-third held governmental and public administrative
ositions. We know that the year of 1949 was very significant for the Com-
nunist Party as a whole. Its membership ran up to two and a half million
nd was full of elements which actually had no real right to membership
n a party which claimed to be the party of the proletariat. Even the claim
f being a worker by social origin was at the lowest point in the postwar
istory of the Central Committee. The designation which became import-
nt later, of original occupation as compared with actual occupation, was
eveloped officially in 1952, in the toughest year of the Stalinist era in
zechoslovakia. It was adopted at the occasion of the 1952 nationwide
arty Conference, which had a function similar to a Congress. Since almost
ll of the delegates to this Conference were employed in the Party apparatus,
ney were classified according to their original occupation to give the im-
ression of internal Party democracy.

Also the representation of mass organizations in the Central Committee
f 1949 was the highest of the four Central Committees under study. The
narp decrease of teachers, scientists and artists in the membership of the
entral Committee in 1949 as compared to the previous Congress election
n 1946 can have a two-fold explanation.[10] After the coup d'état in Febru-
ry, 1948, many leaders of the opposing parties fled the country and left
acancies in the government and public offices. As these offices had to be
lled with people of at least some intellectual distinction, some university
rofessors and other free professionals were absorbed. But on the other
and, the created vacancies in the Central Committee occupied originally
y free professionals were not refilled with intellectuals. The attraction of
ne Party to intellectuals diminished strongly after the purges of the uni-
ersities in 1948 and 1949. Many professors lost their jobs and about three
o four thousand students were not allowed to finish their studies.[11] This,
f course, made the intelligentsia bitter and cut off some supply of intellec-
uals as members to the Central Committee in the years to come.

Our picture of the Central Committees of 1946 and 1949 may be con-
rmed by Tables III and IV. I regret that although the tables look rather

---

[9] The term "intelligentsia" in current Communist usage refers to a social stratum
hich possesses somewhat above average education and which works with intellectual
pacities predominantly. This intelligentsia is divided into the technical intelligentsia
ngineers, et al.); the professional intelligentsia (medical doctors, lawyers, higher admin-
rative executives, and educators); and the creative intelligentsia, the "intellectuals,"
riters, journalists, artists, musicians, and actors). The general increase of the intelli-
ntsia (representing all of the three categories enumerated) was due to their easier
timidation by the Party recruiters. On the other hand, the disappointment of certain
ofessional groups on the decline anyway, like lawyers, medical doctors, and university
ofessors in the humanities, caused their under-representation at the IX Congress. Our
tegories correspond to the categories for the classification of the membership of the
ntral Committee at the last Congress and therefore the information on the members
the CC in the previous congresses had to be adapted accordingly. It should be re-
embered that the composition of the delegates to the congresses is reflected in the
cial composition of the CC.

[10] Cf. above.

[11] There are no exact figures available. Some exile sources give a higher estimate of
mewhere around five thousand.

precise and complete, some of these figures cannot be absolutely guaranteed. Since it was not always possible to trace down all the information on individual members, a small number of the members of each Central Committee were assigned occupational positions by reasoned conjecture. The assignment of this small portion of members was done on the basis of the general knowledge of the situation within the Party. Specifically, the leading and apparently justified notion was that certain categories lead inadvertently to publicity and thus would have been mentioned sometime during the long period of time. Thus, for instance, all holders of governmental positions of any significance are known by name. The same is true for any important public or Party offices. The members of the intelligentsia are easily recognized by the academic titles or occupation. Also, if the Party membership dates from the prewar period, the likelihood of its being revealed is considerable. Actually, only the low publicity carrying jobs, like workers in industry, construction, transportation, trade, agriculture, and forestry are likely to be filled by those members of the Central Committee on whom little or no information is available. Looking at Tables III and IV, we can see that the major channels of political ascendancy in 1949 as compared to 1946 changed slightly from the Party apparatus and mass organizations, mostly Trade Unions, to governmental jobs, with the proportion of those originally from the intelligentsia being on the increase in 1949. Most of the ascendant members are Communists of long standing.

The picture changes when we come to the Central Committee elected in 1954 as shown in Tables V and VI. As already mentioned, extensive purges within the Party top leadership as well as within the rank and file membershi of the Party being reduced by a million members. The drive against th "zionistic elements" in the Party cost the Party leadership approximatel one-third of its members. Shortly afterwards, the chief executor of the purge President Gottwald, died about the same time as Stalin. The wave in th Soviet Union which brought up Malenkov with his group of economic man agers was felt in Czechoslovakia as well. The X Congress elected to it Central Committee a group of people who did not have a long-standing Part membership but who were younger managers of various industrial branch from all over the state. Their background was proletarian to a large exten and few of them could be termed intellectuals. This trend remained approx imately steady through the year 1958, when, in order to accommodate th new men who kept pushing their way into this high-prestige Party orga the size of the Central Committee was increased. And again, the type men who came in at this time were young Communists, who could not hav been in the Party before the war for reasons of their age. They seem to be t a large extent of proletarian background or from the lower echelons of whi collar workers.

After some uncertain years following the death of Stalin and the spee of Khrushchev, the channels of political ascendancy seem now to be th Party apparatus and industrial management. Public offices seem to have lo their attraction. This is born out especially by Table VII, whereas Tables VIII and IX give a picture of those members of the Central Committee who were elected for at least three terms.

Finally, Table X confirms our analysis. In this table are included all members of the Central Committee who also held some other important office or position. We see that about two-thirds of all members of the Central Committee held some important jobs at one time or another. The one-third of the members without any political importance seems to be just an appendage to the actual power elite in the Party, so that an image of inner Party democracy can be maintained. These workers and farmers serve as evidence to the rest of the nation that the Party remains true to its traditions of being a Party of the proletariat and a reminder to the other two-thirds of their humble origin.

Finally, by way of summary, we may draw the following conclusions on trends within the Communist Party leadership of Czechoslovakia for the twelve years from 1946-1958:

1. Because of the generation problem, the new younger membership of the Central Committee emerged with the X Congress in 1954, a year of general political changes in the USSR caused by the death of Stalin a year previously. This, of course, means only that the younger members of the Central Committee were already members of the Party, but because of the monopoly of the top Party positions by the old guard, they had not been able to get their placement. The purges between 1949 and 1954 created a certain vacuum among the élite which attracted the promising hard-bargain-driving Communist apparatchiks and managers of industrial establishments. It is to be noted that the Soviet Union also turned her attention to the managerial magnates at this time.

2. The intelligentsia of the old type within the Party leadership is decreasing in number and influence and is being replaced by new men who do not have a formal education but whose Party training in the respective fields seems to be equally adequate. The older intelligentsia, members of the Central Committee holding university degrees, is retaining some governmental and other public representative offices. Of course, since some of the industrial managers elected only at the X Congress also held engineering degrees and were not re-elected, this too contributed to the general decrease of the members of the intelligentsia at the XI Congress. But generally, most holders of university degrees are of the "veteran-type" members of the Central Committee.

3. Concerning the channels to political ascendancy, that is membership in the Central Committee, it is justified to say that, while governmental jobs and other public offices seemed almost essential before the X Congress, Party administration channels and industry seem to be in vogue now. This is the coming of age of the new socialist intelligentsia, which was announced so many years ago. Of course, the old guard is still powerful enough to try to establish trends in the new socialist culture in order to provide occupation for the ideologists and propagandists so useful in the old days. It seems clear

that, for a while, these two elites—the old guard and the "new" Communists—will have to split their power and live in balance until the older generation vanishes.

4. The principle of interlocking high level positions among the Communist leaders has undergone some slight change. Previously a few of the old type strong men each held a number of interlocking jobs of administrative and public representative character; whereas now more of the top leaders hold interlocking jobs but there are likely to be fewer such jobs per person, and the jobs now held are more prone to be of economic and Party administration character, the latter of course not precluding economic interests since the Party dominates the entire regional economy. This change can be explained by the system of training. The old type Communists were trained especially in the field of ideology, and their formal education, if any, was of a polyhistoric type customary in Central Europe in the past. The new men are trained specifically for their future specialized jobs and therefore any given person is likely to hold fewer interlocking jobs. Membership in the Parliament, which is sometimes added, of course does not require more than a few days a year. The wider distribution of interlocking jobs among the new type Communists has enabled the Party to gain wider control in all the state organs and organizations.

5. The changes in leadership patterns are underlined by the corresponding change in the Communist ideology concerning the theory of state and management. Management especially of economic processes of production has been within the last two years incorporated into the Marxian base so that its character of a superstructure has been annulled.[12] Thus the people taking decisive part in management are ideologically authorized to compete with members of the working class for leading Party positions. Besides, the Marxian theory of the fading away of the state has been recently interpreted to mean the decrease in significance of the public governmental apparatus which is being replaced by the increased activity of the Party. Actually, all governmental administrative positions of any significance are paralleled by similar ones within the Party apparatus.

Of course, all this does not mean that the new men in the Communist leadership are less devoted Communists than their predecessors, the militant ideologists. Rather, they are more realistic and also possess more skills necessary for governing a nation. They are likely, it would seem, to remain firmly in control, unless of course some monumental events destroy their usurped power.

CLARKSON COLLEGE OF TECHNOLOGY

---

[12] Dragoslav Slejška, *Filosofický časopis* (Praha), No. 6, 1958. Cf. Daniel Kubát, "L problème des intellectuels communistes en Tchécoslovaquie." *Nouvel Horizon* (Pari Vol. V, Nos. 44-45, p. 237.

APPENDIX

Although the highest authority within the Communist Party is formally vested in the Congress of the Party, the business in the periods between Congresses is delegated to the Central Committee. The Statutes of the Party stipulate that Congresses are to be convened at least once every four years. Thus the appointment of persons to the Central Committee (CC) is for four years but can be renewed without restriction.

The hundred or hundred and fifty members of the CC represent actually the Party and their biographical backgrounds reflect considerably the current trends within the "Party line."

Four Congresses so far have been held since Wold War II in Czechoslovakia; four sets of members of the CC have been appointed (elected) by the delegates to the Congresses, who voted by representation for a Party membership ranging from one to two and a half million people.

Information was gathered on all members of the CC elected at one or more of the following Congresses: VIII Congress (C) in 1946, IX C in 1949, X C in 1954 and XI C in 1958. The sum total of 337 members of the CC was obtained. On most of these biographical data and public office records were traced down.

TABLE I

Election and retaining of members of the CC at each Congress

III C	
Elected total	134
Not re-elected	75
Re-elected to IX C only	29
Re-elected through to X C only	4
Re-elected through XI C	23
Re-elected to X & XI C	2
Re-elected to IX & XI C	1
Total	134

IX C	
Elected total	129
Elected only once	48
Re-elected from VIII C	29
Elected from IX to X C only	6
Elected from IX through XI C	17
Re-elected from VIII to X C only	4
Re-elected from VIII through XI C	23
Elected at VII, IX, XI C	1
Elected at IX, XI C	1
Total	129

X C	
Elected total	112
Elected only once	28
Re-elected from IX C	6
Re-elected from VIII C	4
Elected from VIII through XI C	23
Elected from IX through XI C	17
Re-elected from X to XI C	32
Elected at VIII, X, XI C	2
Total	112

XI C	
Elected total	147
Newly elected	71
Re-elected from X C only	32
Re-elected from IX C on	17
Re-elected from VIII C on	23
Elected at VIII, X, XI C	2
Elected at VIII, IX, XI C	1
Elected at IX, XI C	1
Total	147

There are four cases of re-election after skipping one term of office.

TABLE II

Composition of the membership of the Central Committee between 1946 and 1948 as to length of Party membership and original and present occupation

Joined Party	Congresses: VIII	IX	X	XI
	%	%	%	%
1921 - May 1945	62.7	67.4	54.5	42.9
May 1945 - February 1948	37.3	25.6	41.9	51.7
After February 1948	x	7.0	3.6	5.4
Composition based on original occupation:				
Worker	52.2	44.2	63.4	60.6
Farmer	5.9	3.9	5.4	2.0
Member of Intelligentsia	22.3	29.4	13.4	16.3
White Collar Worker	12.7	14.7	11.6	15.0
Other	6.9	7.8	6.2	6.1
Composition based on occupation at time of Congress:				
Party administration	33.9	29.5	26.8	34.7
Industry, construction, transportation, trade	16.4	12.5	16.9	15.6
Farming and forestry	1.5	4.7	6.2	8.1
Government and local administration	22.3	27.1	26.8	19.0
Mass organizations	13.4	17.0	12.5	10.8
Education, sciences and arts	11.8	6.9	5.4	6.9
Army and police forces	0.7	2.3	5.4	4.9

The above information was obtained from Communist sources only as far as the XI Congress of 1958 is concerned. Before this the composition of the membership of the Central Committee was not made public by the Party. Thus the information on the VIII, IX, and X Congresses (1946-1954) is based on the classification of information gathered on the individual cases, and its complete exactness cannot be guaranteed.

It should be noted that the jobs presently held represent high-level positions. Within the Party administration they are positions in the Politburo and the Secretariat, the highest and most decisive positions on a statewide basis, secretaryships on the regional level (there are 19 regions of Party and government administration in Czechoslovakia) and within the central administration of the Party which are not regarded as public offices. The jobs in industry, construction, transportation, and trade are directiona positions and senior executive positions with a few exceptions. A similiar situation exists in farming and forestry, where the local executive of a kolkhoz or sovchoz (cooperative or state farms) is the lowest rank represented. Government and local administration jobs are of ministerial rank; there are several undersecretaries of state and chairmen and other high officers of regional government bodies. Mass organization positions refer to jobs with the Trade Union, the Youth Oganization, and various large scale organizations mostly of a political character. Education, science and arts jobs cover university professors, renowned artists and scientists. Army and police forces jobs refer actually to ranks of generals or very high officers. It is to be noted, however, that at the time of the VIII Congress in 1946 the general level of occupational achievement was lower than twelve years later, so that we find actual workers and other employees not receiving high remuneration or recognition among the members of the Central Committee.

TABLE III

Composition of the membership of the Central Committee as to length of Party membership and original and actual occupation

VIII Congress, 28-31 March, 1946

Original Occupat'n	Joined Party	Actual occupation Party Adm.	Indus- try	Farming Forestry	Gov't Adm.	Mass Or.	Educ. Sc.Art	Army P'ce	Subtotals –45	–48	Total orig. Occupation
Worker	–45	17	5	6	6	13	1		42		70
	–48	9	13		3	3				28	
Farmer	–45	1		2	2				5		
	–48				3					3	8
Intellig.	–45	5	1		6		8	1	21		
	–48	1			1		7			9	30
Wh. Collar	–45	6			4				10		
	–48	2	1		4					7	17
Other	–45	4				2			6		
	–48		2		1					3	9
Subtotals	–45	33	6	2	18	15	9	1	84		
	–48	12	16		12	3	7			50	
Total pres. occupation		45	22	2	30	18	16	1			134

TABLE IV

IX Congress, 25-29 May, 1949

Original Occupat'n	Joined Party	Actual occupation Party Adm.	Indus- try	Farming Forestry	Gov't Adm.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc.Art	Army P'ce	Subtotals –45	–48	48+	Total orig. Occup'n
Worker	–45	14	6		10	11		1	42			
	–48	1	7	3	1	2	1			15		57
	48+										0	
Farmer	–45	1		1					2			
	–48	1		2						3		5
	48+										0	
Intellig.	–48		2		4		1			7		38
	–45	7	1		10		6	2	26			
	48+	1			2	1	1				5	
White Col.	–45	6			2	2			10			
	–48	2			5	2	-			7		19
	48+					2					2	
Other	–45	5				2			7			
	–48				1					1		10
	48+				2						2	
Subtotals	–45	33	7	1	22	15	6	3	87			
	–48	4	9	5	11	4	2	0		33		
	48+	1	0	0	4	3	1	0			9	
Total pres. occupation		38	16	6	35	22	9	3				129

TABLE V

X Congress, 11-15 June, 1954

Actual occupation

Original Occupat'n	Joined Party	Party Adm.	Industry	Farming Forestry	Gov't Adm.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc.Art	Army P'ce	Subtotals —45	—48	48+	Total orig. Occup'n
	–45	15	1		13	9		1	39			
Worker	–48	4	18	5	4					31		71
	48+					1					1	
	–45	1			1				2			
Farmer	–48	1		2				1		4		6
	48+										0	
	–45	3			2	1	3	1	10			
Intellig.	–48				1		2			3		15
	48+				2						2	
	–45	3			2				5			
Wh. Collar	–48	2			3	1	1			7		13
	48+				1						1	
	–45	1				2		2	5			
Other	–48				1			1		2		7
	48+										0	
Subtotals	–45	23	1	0	18	12	3	4	61			
	–48	7	18	7	9	1	3	2		47		
	48+	0	0	0	3	1	0	0			4	
Total pres. occupation		30	19	7	30	14	6	6				112

TABLE VI

XI Congress, 12-16 June, 1958

Actual occupation

Original Occupat'n	Joined Party	Party Adm.	Industry	Farming Forestry	Gov't Adm.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc.Art	Army P'ce	Subtotals —45	—48	48+	Total orig Occup'
	–45	18	2		7	10		2	39			
Worker	–48	10	19	11	5	2				47		89
	48+		2		1						3	
	–45	2							2			
Farmer	–48			1						41		3
	48+										0	
	–45	4			2		3	2	11			
Intellig.	–48				4		6			10		24
	48+				2		1				3	
	–45	7			2				9			
Wh. Collar	–48	8			3	1				12		22
	48+					1					1	
	–45					1		1	2			
Other	–48	2			1	1		2		6		9
	48+				1						1	
	–45	31	2	0	11	11	3	5	63			
Subtotals	–48	20	19	12	13	4	6	2		76		
	48+	0	2	0	4	1	1	0			8	
Total pres. occupation		51	23	12	28	16	10	7				147

TABLE VII

Composition of the membership of the CC *newly* elected at the XI Congress, length of Party membership, original & actual occupation

		Actual Occupation										
Original Occupat'n	Joined Party	Party Adm.	Industry	Farming Forestry	Gov't Adm.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc.Art	Army P'ce	Subtotals –45	–48	48+	Total orig. Occup'n
	–45	5	2		1			1	9			
Worker	–48	10	14		1	1				26		37
	48+		2								2	
Farmer	–48			8						8		8
	–45	1							1			
Intellig.	–48		1		2		5			8		9
	–45	2							2			
Wh. Collar	–48	8			2	1				11		13
	–45							1	1			
Other	–48					1		2		3		4
Subtotals	–45	8	2		1			2	13			
	–48	18	15	8	5	3	5	2		54		
	48+		2								2	
Total actual Occupation		26	19	8	6	3	5	4				71

TABLE VIII

Composition of the membership of the CC elected at *all* four Congresses

Original Occupation	Joined Party*	Party Admin.	Gov't Admin.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc. Art	Total orig. Occupation
Worker		6	1	8		15
Intellig.**		1	2		2	5
Wh. Collar			1			1
Other			1	1*		2
Total actual occupation		7	5	9	2	23

*All but one joined the Party before May 1945.

**3 hold university degrees

TABLE IX

Composition of the membership of the CC holding their positions since the IX C

		Actual Occupation					
Original Occupation	Joined Party*	Party Admin.	Farms Forest	Gov't Admin.	Mass Org.	Educ. Sc.Art	Total orig. Occupation
Worker		3	1	2			6
Farmer					1		1
Intellig.**				5	1	2	8
Wh. Collar					1		1
Other				1			1
Total actual occupation		3	1	8	3	2	17

* 7 joined Party before May 1945; 3 before February 1948; 7 after February 1948

** 3 hold university degrees

TABLE X

Occupancy of top level positions by Members of the CC of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 1946-1948

Positions:	Elected to Central Committee at VIII and/or IX* no.	%	VIII and/or IX** no.	%	X and/or XI no.	%	X and/or XI* no.	%
Ministerial rank	40	26.3	68	33.0	27	20.6	55	28.9
Parliament	56	36.8	99	48.0	32	24.4	75	40.5
Regional government	8	5.2	11	5.3	9	6.8	12	6.4
Central Party Adm.	14	9.2	39	18.9	21	16.0	46	24.8
Regional Party Adm.	20	13.1	35	16.9	24	18.8	39	21.0
Industrial Management	19	12.5	25	12.1	23	17.5	29	15.6
Army (major up)	6	3.9	8	3.9	5	3.7	7	3.8
Journalism	16	10.5	21	10.1	4	3.0	9	4.8
Writing and Arts	2	1.3	3	1.4	1	0.7	2	1.0
University degrees***	24	16.1	31	15.0	10	7.7	17	9.2
Total positions represented	181		309		146		274	
CC members not represented above	52		52		42		42	
Elected total	152		206		131		185	
Members represented in above table	100		154		89		143	

* elected only at these two Congresses.

** elected at these two Congresses but also elected at some other Congress.

*** Not a position as those above. Not included in totals given below.

Notes on meaning of above positions:

Ministerial rank: prime minister, deputy prime minister, minister, deputy minist chairman of state office of ministerial rank, deputy chairman of state office ministerial rank, trustee for the land of Slovakia, deputy trustee, chairman trustees, chairman and deputy of Slovak land offices, diplomatic services (a bassador, minister).

Regional government: chairman of regional national council. At present there a 19 regions—state administration districts.

Central Party Administration: members of Politburo and Secretariat elected by t Central Committee and non-elected division chairmen of Central Party apparat (comparable in importance to ministerial portfolios).

Regional Party Administration: secretaries of the 19 regions.

Industrial Management: directorship of any economic establishment—individual pla or combines—including industry, construction, transportation, trade, agricultu and forestry.

University degrees: doctorates or engineering degrees with regular university traini

THE RUMANIAN SCHOOLS OF GENERAL EDUCATION*

by Randolph L. Braham

WITHIN A FEW months following the establishment of the people's democratic regime in January 1948 the Rumanian Government began a well-concerted program aiming at the complete transformation of the country's economic, political, social and cultural life along "socialist" lines. In this endeavor, the reorganization of the primary-secondary schools was given paramount importance. With the purging of Fascist and other unreliable elements from almost all governmental and educational institutions completed, and with the various acts relating to the nationalization of production, banking and transportation enacted, the government was ready to tackle the problem of education in order to ensure the Communist upbringing of the new generation. The Educational Reform Act of August 3, 1948, called for the radical overhauling of the educational system by providing for the reorientation of pedagogical principles in conformity with the Marxist-Leninist ideas of "scientific-realism" and for its reorganization along Soviet pedagogical lines. Conceived as an instrument for the formation of a Communist society, education was necessarily subordinated to the interests of the regime.

Structure and Functions

In the implementation of the basic provisions of the Act perhaps no other educational sector was altered as radically as the one encompassing the primary and secondary school units.[1] Among the functions regarded by the regime as basic to Communist education at the primary-secondary level are: the preparation of graduates required "for the construction of socialism;" the instilling of a spirit of "socialist patriotism and proletarian internationalism;" the development of a scientific conception of life and society; the fostering of an atheistic attitude toward unexplained natural phenomena; the acquisition of basic scientific principles and the development of a socialist attitude toward labor and work through polytechnical education; and, the well-rounded development of the mind and body. These functions of the schools are carried out, among other things, through the teaching of the various subject matters in conformity with the prevailing interpretation of Marxist doctrine favored by the Communist Party.

The results of the first few years following the enactment of the Educational Reform Act seem to have been mixed. In terms of new schools built or old ones renovated and of the increase in enrollment and in the number of teachers the regime has been relatively successful. However, the quality and ideological orientation of the teachers left much to be desired from the regime's point of view as have the various programs and curricula prepared by the educational authorities. Harsh criticism was directed against the frequent revisions of the syllabi and textbooks, against the lack or unsatisfactory equipping of laboratories, the lack of agricultural experimental lots and the overcrowding of the school programs. These criticisms found ample expression during the Second Congress of the Rumanian Workers' (Communist) Party which was held in December 1955. Convened to discuss general problems relating to the adoption of the second Five-Year Plan, the Congress called for a reorganization of the schools along polytechnical lines so as to bring about a closer relationship between theoretical-academic studies and industrial and agricultural production. It called for a "closer-to-life" educational system in which the students were to become familiar with both manual labor and intellectual pursuits.[2] In addition to emphasizing the requirement for practical work, the implementation of the directives of the Congress involved the need of revising the entire complex of the primary-secondary school system. Plans were formulated early in 1956 calling for a reorganization of these schools and of the school programs. These were debated and discussed in great detail in the course of a great number of teacher-parents meetings and of many national and local pedagogical conferences. The end result of these meetings was the adoption on July 20, 1956, of Decision No. 1380 issued jointly by the Central Committee of the Party and by the Council of Ministers.[3] While it retains the basic educational principles outlined in the Educational Reform Act of 1948, it calls for the fundamental revision of the operation and network of the primary-secondary schools which now constitute the so-called "schools of general education."[4] Placed, like most other educational institutions in Rumania, under the guidance and control of the respective Education Committees of the People's Councils, the schools of general education aim at bringing about the polytechnical education of youth through emphasizing the mathematical, physical and natural sciences and by an extensive program of practical work in industrial or agricultural production both in the course of the regular academic year and during a part of the summer vacation period. This is supplemented by the "patriotic" education of the pupils through the teaching of all the subjects provided for in the curriculum and especially through the ones dealing with "scientific socialism" or "political economy." The increased load of studies necessitated an extension of the schooling period from ten to eleven years. In accordance with this extension of the schools of general education into eleven grades, the following types of schools were provided for: (a) elementar schools including grades one to seven; and, (b) secondary schools includ ing grades eight to eleven. Beginning with the tenth grade, two special sections may be formed: (1) the scientific or *réal* section in which emphasis is placed on physics, mathematics and the natural sciences and in which Latin is no longer a required subject, and (2) the humanities section in which emphasis is placed on Latin, Rumanian language and literature, Russian language and literature, English, German or French, and elements of Marxism-Leninism. While grades one to four are exclusively day schools, evening sessions and correspondence courses are also offered for grades five to seven of the elementary schools and for grades eight to eleven of the high schools.[5] The network of the day schools of general education is composed of the following categories of school units: (1) The "general schools of general education" containing all eleven grades; (2) the seven-year elementary schools encompassing the first seven grades of the schools of general education; (3) the four-year elementary schools encompassing the first four grades of the seven-year schools; (4) gymnasiums, roughly corresponding to the American Junior High, which include only grades five to seven of the schools of general education; and (5) lyceums or high schools encompassing grades five to eleven or eight to eleven of the schools of general education.

---

*Based on a chapter from a forthcoming book.

[1] See particularly Arts. III, VI-XV of Act No. 175/1948, in *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest), Part I A, No. 177, Aug. 3, 1948, pp. 6322-6324.

---

[2] For the text of the Directives of the Second Congress see *Directivele congresului* *II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Romîn cu privire la cel de-al doilea plan cincinal de de* *voltare a economiei naționale pe anii 1956-1960* (Bucharest: Editura de Stat, 1955), p. 43

[3] For text of Decision No. 1380/1956 see Ministerul Justiției: *Colecție de legi, decret* *hotărîri și dispoziții. 1956 1 Julie - 31 August* (Bucharest: Editura Stiințifică, 1956), p 58-69.

[4] Though the Rumanian term "școală de cultură generală" is literally translated "school of general culture" it is here rendered as "school of general education."

As was the case in prewar Rumania, the elementary and high schools until recently were separate for boys and girls. In accordance with the provisions of the 1956 Decision the first eight grades of the schools of general education became co-educational beginning with the 1956/1957 academic year. The other grades were expected to follow suit gradually. The directives of the Second Congress envisaged that by 1960/61 the fifth grade would enroll 90 percent of the graduates of the four-year schools, and that by the third Five-Year Plan the seven-year school would be general and obligatory.[6] While only the first four grades are obligatory at present in most localities, the villages and rural communities having seven-year schools were required to enforce the generalization of the seven-year schooling period beginning with the 1958/59 academic year.[7]

Like their counterparts in the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies, pupils of the schools of general education, like those of the pedagogical and special technical schools, wear special school uniforms. These were introduced gradually beginning with the 1956/57 academic year.[8]

Curricula and Syllabi

In the highly centralized educational system of Rumania, the curricula and syllabi for all schools and all grades are established by the Ministry of

---

[5] See Section "Evening and Correspondence Schools" below.

[6] See footnote 2 above.

[7] See Decision No. 1035/1958 of the Council of Ministers in *Colecție de hotărîri și dispoziții ale Consiliului de Miniștri al R.P.R.* (Bucharest), no. 30, Aug. 2, 1958.

[8] See Decision no. 1128 Relating to the Gradual Introduction of School Uniforms, in Ministerul Justiției: *Colecție de legi, decrete, hotărîri și dispoziții, 1956 1 Iulie - 31 August,* p. 41.

Education and Culture. In its directives and instructions, the Ministry fo lows the principles outlined in the various decisions of the Communis Party and of the Council of Ministers.

Each course has its detailed syllabus outlining the material to be co ered and the various teaching aids to be used during the school yea Teachers and school officials are expected to abide strictly by the progran outlined in the syllabi and to report on whatever flaws they find in them This they usually do during the national and local pedagogical conference which are held regularly in the course of the academic year. At these con ferences the teachers and school administrators report on their experience with the programs and syllabi and later they may actually witness the in corporation of some of their "positive" views in the new plans.

In line with the new "realist-scientific" principle followed in education as in all the other fields of culture, the curricula and syllabi reflect the eve greater emphasis placed on the physical and natural sciences as against th humanities. This can be seen in Table I, comparing the percentage of tim allotted to the study of humanities, the natural sciences and other subject like calligraphy, drawing, music, and physical education, as outlined in th Educational Law of 1910—reflecting the pre-World War I system, the Edu cational Act of 1928—reflecting the interwar system, and the Educationa Reform Act of 1948 on which the present educational system is based.

TABLE I[9]

School Reform of	Type of Secondary School	Percentage of Hours Allotted to the Various Disciplines		
		Humanities	Natural Sciences	Other Disciplines
	Classic	83.0%	7.1%	9.9%
1910	Modern	65.1%	25.0%	9.9%
	Réal	50.8%	36.6%	12.6%
1928	—	59.8%	26.4%	13.8%
1948	—	44.7%	45.3%	10.0%

But while an ever increasing emphasis was being laid on the physic and natural sciences since the reform of the educational system in 194 the general foundations underlying the schools of general education can under severe criticism. The Decision of 1956 provided, among other thing for the reconstruction of the curricula and syllabi not only in accordan with the extended period of schooling but also with the application of th new ideas of polytechnic education. Accordingly, the four-year elementa schools aim at teaching pupils to read and write effectively and to develc their thinking and speech. The subjects taught in the first four grad include Rumanian, Russian, history, geography, mathematics, elements physical, chemical and biological sciences, calligraphy, drawing, singin physical education and shop. In the next three grades of elementary educ tion emphasis is placed on developing the pupils' ability to express themselves orally and in writing through an intensified teaching of the subjects outlined for the first four grades. The pupils in these latter grades, however, are expected to supplement their program by another modern language such as English, French, German, etc. They are also taught social and natural sciences "in the spirit of materialist-dialectical conceptions." Mathematics is emphasized by providing for the teaching of arithmetic, plane and solid geometry, trigonometry and elementary algebra.

---

[9] Stanciu Stoian, "Principiile școlii democratice și realizarea lor in Republica Po lară Romînă," *Revista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), vol. 7, no. 9, Sept. 1958, p. 9.

High school pupils have an even more intensified program, including the compulsory study of the following subjects: Rumanian and Rumanian literature, Latin, national and world history, philosophy (elements of Marxism-Leninism, psychology, logic), elements of political economy, mathematics (elementary algebra, theory of equations with a single unknown, elementary and analytical geometry, trigonometry, differential and integral calculus), astronomy, physics, chemistry, natural sciences, physical geography, economics and political geography, national geography, drawing, music and history of music, physical education, practical shop work and practice work in production.

The principles guiding the construction of the new curricula were intended:

> (1) [to encompass] the volume of theoretical knowledge and habits of practice work required for the multilateral preparation of the pupils; (2) to observe the general principles of education; (3) to divide the subjects in accordance with the method of concentrated teaching and with the students' capacities for understanding; (4) to contribute to the formation of the scientific conception of the world; (5) to aid pupils in their dialectical-materialistic interpretation of natural phenomena and social life; (6) to develop the pupils' education in the spirit of patriotism and proletarian internationalism; (7) to assure a correlation between the assigned subjects; and (8) to be in concordance with the textbooks.[10]

The measures adopted immediately after the enactment of the Decision of 1956 affected the substance of the curricula of the upper grades to a larger extent than that of the lower ones. This was particularly true of grades X and XI which are divided into a *réal* and a humanities section. The percentage of time allotted to the natural sciences has been considerably increased, as can be seen from the following Table:

TABLE II[11]

Section	Natural Sciences	Social Sciences	Other Fields
Réal Section	47.0%	40.6%	12.4%
Humanities Section	42.5%	46.1%	11.4%

---

[10] *Revista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), no. 9, Sept. 1957, pp. 52-56.

[11] Stanciu Stoian, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

The results of the first two years seem to have been somewhat disappointing, especially with respect to the regime's desire to bring about a closer connection between the school and life and to strengthen the "patriotic" education of the pupils. The lengthening of the schooling period and the concomitant overloading of the curricula led to the overburdening of the students and of the teachers as well as to a general decline in the standard of instruction and learning. To eliminate these shortcomings the Ministry of Education and Culture established a Special Commission in May 1958. It was entrusted with the task of studying the various causes of the deficiencies and proposing measures for their remedy. In the light of its findings and of the decisions of the plenary meetings of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party of June 9-13 and November 26-28, 1958, the curricula and syllabi of the schools of general education were revised and applied for the first time during the 1959/60 academic year. Special consideration was given to the seven-year schools, which were supposed to become free and obligatory by the beginning of the third Five-Year Plan (1961/1965). The majority of the graduates of these schools are no longer expected to continue their schooling in high schools but to enter the field of production. As such, while the number of hours has been reduced and a series of minor subjects de-emphasized, the new curricula provide for the systematization of practical work in industry and agriculture. The new curriculum for the seven-year schools is given in Table III.

TABLE III
Curriculum for the Rumanian-Language Seven-Year Schools of General Education.[12]

Subjects	Grades							Observations
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII	
Rumanian Language and Literature	12	12	9	7	5	5	4	
History								
a. Ancient	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	
b. Middle Ages	—	—	—	—		—	—	
c. Modern and Contemporary	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	
d. Rumanian	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	
Constitution	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
Russian	—	—	—	—	2	2	2	
English (French or German)	—	—	—	—	—	(2)	(2)	Elective
Mathematics	5	5	5	5	—	—	—	
a. Arithmetic	—	—	—	—	4	2	—	
b. Elementary Algebra	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	
c. Elementary Geometry	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	

---

[12] *Gazeta Invățămîntului* (Bucharest), Apr. 24, 1959, p. 2.

hysics	—	—	—	—	—	2	2	
hemistry	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	
atural Sciences	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	
a. Botany	—	—	—	—	2(3)	—	—	In villages 2 hours per week; in the cities 3.
b. Zoology	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	
c. Anatomy, Human physiology and Hygiene	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	
. Agricultural Subjects and Practical Work (Villages)	—	—	—	—	4(3)	4	4	
Elementary Subjects on Industrial Production and Shop (Cities)	—	—	—	—				In grade V in the cities, only 3 hours shop.
eography	—	—	1	2	—	—	—	
a. Elements of Physical Geography and of the Continents: Africa, Oceania and the Antarctica	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	
b. Geography of Continents: Europe, Asia, America	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	
c. Rumanian Geography	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	
awing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
lligraphy	1	1	1	1	—	—	—	
usic	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	In grades I-IV emphasis is on singing
ysical Education and Sports	2	2	3	3	3	3	2	Carried out within the framework of the 3 hours allotted per class
actical Work	1	1	2	2	—	—	—	
idance	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	
orus	—	—	—	—	1	1	1	2 hours once in 2 weeks for all 3 classes
Total	23	23	24	26	28	30	30	

This new curriculum aims primarily at bringing about a greater cor-
ation between the school and the various industrial and agricultural pro-
ctive units, and at eliminating the overburdening of the pupils through
ubstantial reduction in the number of hours devoted per week to aca-

demic and extracurricular activities. In the new seven-year schools th pupils are gradually trained for labor and perform a number of tasks con sistent with their age and capacity in the fields of industrial and agricultu al production, depending upon the location of the school. In the villages the pupils devote one hour, and those in grades III and IV 2 hours, per wee in agriculture; in the cities, they receive their training in the field of indus trial production. Pupils in grade V have 3 hours of shop per week; thos in grades VI and VII have 4 hours each. In addition, all pupils of grade V to VII devote two weeks of their summer vacation to agricultural work i the villages and to industrial labor in the cities. Those in the first fou grades have a less extensive program in practical work. In grades I and II the pupils devote 1 hour, and those in grades III and IV 2 hours, per wee to simple manual work aiming at developing their respect for, and thei inclination toward, labor. The new syllabi provide for the teaching o physics, chemistry, mathematics, biology and drawing, in close cooperatio with the pupils' practical work in industry and agriculture.

Compared with the number of hours which the primary school childre had to devote in the past to academic and extracurricular activities pe week (see Table IV), the new curriculum for the seven-year schools is greatl reduced. In grades I and II, the number of hours was reduced from 24 t 23; in grade III from 26 to 24; in grade IV from 28 to 26; in grade V fro 37 (villages) and 35 (cities) to 28; and in grades VI and VII from 3 (villages) and 35 (cities) to 30, respectively.

TABLE IV[13]

Grade	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Villages	24	24	26	28	37	36	36
Cities					35	35	35

The reduction in the number of school hours despite the intensific tion of the practical work program was made possible, on the one han through the incorporation in the regular curriculum of a number of act ities previously considered extracurricular, and, on the other, through (emphasizing subjects not necessarily related to production or deemed consistent with the mental capacities of the pupils. Thus, for example, t new curriculum includes a number of hours to be devoted to guidance, t sports circles, and chorus, and eliminates or reduces the teaching of histor of some of the natural sciences and geography. This is particularly tr with respect to grades I to IV. In these grades, history is taught under t auspices of the course in Rumanian language and literature in the form stories and explanatory lectures. Emphasis is no longer placed on ancie and medieval history, but on the "fundamental problems relating to understanding of societal development."[14] The natural sciences, geograp athematics, as well as most of the other disciplines, are taught in close orrelation with the pupils' practical work in industry and agriculture.

---

[13] Anghel Manolache, "Despre planuile de învățămînt pentru școala de 7 ani." *vista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), no. 3, Mar. 1959, p. 25.

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 27.

While in the seven-year schools the natural and physical sciences are ressed primarily in combination with the practical work requirement of e students, in the upper, high school level of the schools of general educa-
on they receive a continually increasing importance. Students in the *réal* ction of grades X and XI have an intensive program in most of the sci-
nces. All high school students (grades VIII through XI) must also devote number of hours weekly to practical work in agriculture or industry, de-
ending upon the location of the schools.[15]

Russian is a required course from the fifth grade on, with 2 hours de-
oted to it weekly. This means that all graduates of the future general and oligatory seven-year schools will have had at least 3 years of Russian. A cond foreign language—either English, French or German—is offered om the sixth grade on as an elective.

The social sciences in general and their individual fields in particular e stressed primarily in the upper grades. While the "patriotic" education the children in the lower grades is pursued through the teaching of all e subjects and especially through that of Rumanian language and litera-
re, Russian, history and the study of the Rumanian constitution (grade I), the high school curriculum provides for the introduction (since 1956) two new required subjects. They are "elements of Marxism-Leninism," d "elements of political economy." Both are intended to "raise the theo-
ical level of the students" and to inculcate in them a feeling of "socialist triotism" and "proletarian internationalism."[16] A new project relating the teaching of "scientific socialism" in grade XI calls for a yearly pro-
m of 62 hours. Of these, 51 hours are devoted to the following topics:

> 1. The aim and significance of the course in Marxism-Leninism, the revolutionary theory of the working class (2 hours); 2. Dialectical materialism (11 hours); 3. Historical materialism (3 hours); 4. Classes and the class struggle, the historical role of the proletariat (3 hours); 5. Social consciousness and its forms (4 hours); 6. Marxist-Leninist teachings on the revolutionary party of the working class, the Rumanian Workers' Party as a Marxist-Leninist Party (4 hours); 7. Socialist revolution. The historical-international significance of the "Great Socialist October Revolution" and the people's democratic revolution in Rumania (5 hours); 8. Marxist-Leninist teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The people's democratic state as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat (5 hours); 9. The alliance of the working class with the working peasantry under the leadership of the working class (3 hours); 10. Marxist-Leninist teachings about the national and he national-colonial problem and the Marxist-Leninist solution of the ational problem in the Rumanian People's Republic (4 hours); 11.

---

[15] For details on practical work in general and on polytechnic education in particular
Section "Polytechnization" below.

[16] For details on political education and ideological indoctrination see *Captive Ru-*
ia, Alexandre Cretzianu, ed. (New York, 1956), pp. 204-256.

Socialist patriotism as the driving force in the development and consol dation of the socialist order in Rumania (2 hours); 12. Marxist-Leni ist teaching about war and peace (2 hours); and, 13. The inevitab victory of socialism in the entire world (3 hours).[17]

While the natural and physical sciences and social studies receive par mount importance in the education of the school children, the minor su jects are not neglected. The curriculum provides for a number of hours i calligraphy, drawing, music, chorus singing, guidance and in physical ed cation and sports. The latter are especially encouraged by providing i the curriculum for 2 hours each in grades I-II and VII-XI, and for 3 hou in grades III-VI. Physical education is a required course in all grades, i cluding the higher ones.[18] In addition to calisthenics and gymnastics an such popular sports as swimming, soccer, and skating, ever greater attentio is being paid to hiking and excursions. At the end of the academic yea special sports competitions are organized under the auspices of the Ministr of Education and Culture, with the winners and the ones excelling in an sport receiving coveted prizes and medals.[19]

Guidance and counseling attain increasing importance in the uppe grades of the primary schools. Discipline plays a very important role i educating the children of Rumania for the "building of the new sociali society." They are taught conformity at a very early age and are expecte to abide strictly by the instructions emanating from the various school an governmental authorities. To govern their conduct in and out of schoo the Ministry of Education has issued a "code of behavior for elementary ar high school students." According to this code, it is the duty of every scho child:

1. To acquire in a thorough and conscientious manner the body knowledge offered by the school in order for him to become an enlig ened and conscious citizen useful to the working people and the R manian nation.
2. To attend school regularly and not arrive late at classes.
3. To walk carefully in the streets, streetcars, busses, etc., observing the traffic rules.
4. To be clean when he comes to school and to take care of his clot and books.
5. To maintain cleanliness and order on the bench, in the classroom a the school.
6. To enter the class as soon as the bell rings, to take his place on t bench and not to leave it except with the permission of the teacher professor.
7. To sit upright during the lesson, to listen attentively to the teach

---

[17] *Gazeta Invăţămîntului* (Bucharest), Sept. 11, 1959, p. 6.

[18] See Decree No. 1146; Regarding the Requirement to Include in the Curricu of all the School Grades a Number of Hours in Physical Education. In *Bulet* *Oficial* (Bucharest), no. 107, Oct. 30, 1951, p. 1080 f.

[19] Decision No. 59: Regarding the Organization of Certain Activities in Physical F cation and Sports Within the Framework of the School Units. In Ministerul Justi *Colecţie de legi, decrete, hotărîri şi dispoziţii, 1957 1 Januarie - 28 Februarie,* pp. 114-

explanations and the other pupils' answers, and not to talk or let his attention stray to other things.
8. To have a notebook in which the assignments given by the teacher or professor for the next lesson should be carefully entered.
9. To prepare the lessons with care.
10. To salute the teacher or professor and the director by standing up when they enter or leave the classroom.
11. To stand at attention when he is questioned and to sit down only with the permission of the teacher or of the professor; to raise his hand if he wishes to answer or ask a question.
12. To listen always to the advice and suggestions of the teacher or professor and to that of his counsellor or school director.
13. To pay respect to the director of the school, to the teachers or professors by greeting them upon meeting them.
14. To behave modestly and in a respectful and disciplined manner in the school, at home, on the street and in public places.
15. To use no coarse or offending expressions that belittle others as well as the ones that use them. To commit no act that would lower his dignity as a student.
16. To protect the property of the school, and to respect public property—the wealth of the working people.
17. To be attentive and considerate of old people as well as of the younger ones and be ready to give aid to the aged, the sick and the invalids.
18. To help the parents around the house and take care of younger brothers and sisters.
19. To have a comrade-like behavior towards his colleagues, to be friendly and sincere, to take part in collective life being ready to support the collective and to seek, on his part, the aid of the collective.
20. To request the approval of the school administration for participation in any sport competitions or excursions not organized by the school or in the event of leaving the locality.
21. To attend only those shows, institutions or public demonstrations which were recommended by the school administration or for which permission was given.
22. To abide by the rules of the dormitories.
23. To uphold the honor of his school, of his class as well as his personal honor.[20]

Misbehaving or delinquent children are punished severely. For one ing, pupils receiving a grade of below "5" in conduct cannot be prooted and must repeat the entire year irrespective of the grades received in ther subjects.

"Polytechnization"

The problem relating to the transformation of education along polychnic lines had been one of the main preoccupations of the Communist

---

[20] Decision No. 22,065/1950, signed by Minister of Education N. Popescu-Doreanu. *uletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), no. 16, Feb. 22, 1950, p. 249 f.

Party and government during the past few years.[21] In Rumania, as in the USSR and the other people's democracies where the idea of "polytechnization" has been introduced,[22] the demands of the national economy seem t have outweighed the pedagogical requirements for a well-rounded development of the individual. Having set ambitious programs of industrialization following the nationalization of the means of production (1948) and the gradual collectivization of the land, the Rumanian Communists found themselves greatly hampered by the backwardness and primarily agricultural nature of the economy and by the chronic shortage of skilled labor. The idea of solving this latter difficulty, among other things, through the transformation of the educational system along polytechnical lines came from the Soviet Union. The problems confronting the educational system o that country were discussed at length during the Nineteenth Congress o the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (1952), which called for the adoption of polytechnical secondary education based upon the Leninis concept of "unity of theory and practice."[23]

While certain elements of polytechnical education were introduced in the Rumanian schools of general education soon after the enactment of th Educational Reform Act of 1948, the basic transformation of the educational system along polytechnical lines came after the conclusion of the Second Congress of the Party (1955) and especially after the implementation o Decision No. 1380 of 1956, relating to the reorganization of the school of general education.

Communist educators contend that the basic principles underlyin polytechnical education were laid down by Marx and Engels.[24]

---

[21] The idea of manual labor and practice work in the field of industrial and agr cultural production is not entirely novel in Rumanian education. But while, in the pr 1955 period and especially before the war, such laboring pursuits were considered supplements to the process of learning and education, they have now assumed paramou importance. Prior to the implementation of the new "polytechnization" program, th practice work requirements were established by Regulation No. 1283/1954 of the Cou cil of Ministers. For text, see, *Colecția de hotărîri și dispoziții ale Consiliului de Mi istri al R.P.R.* (Bucharest), no. 42, July 31, 1954.

[22] For information on the "polytechnization" of the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian ed cational systems, for example, see *East Europe* (New York), vol. 8, no. 6, June 1959, p 46-48. On that of the East German schools consult *Education in the Soviet Zone Germany* by Paul S. Bodenman (Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education an Welfare, 1959) 162 pp. Regarding the Soviet schools, see *Education in the USSR* (Was ington: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1957), 226 pp. and *Sov Commitment to Education. Report of the First Official U.S. Education Mission to th USSR* (Washington: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1959), 135 p

[23] The polytechnical system of education was first introduced in the Soviet Unio on an experimental basis in June 1955. Revised in May 1956, it again came under cri cism in 1958. Motivated primarily by demographic and economic considerations, th Soviet leadership decided upon the radical transformation of the ten-year schools general education along totally new lines. Khruschev's memorandum entitled "On t Strengthening of the Ties Between School and Life and on the Further Development Public Education in the Country"—originally submitted to the Central Committee Pr sidium in September 1958—was published in November 1958 together with the ne Seven-Year Plan proposals. With minor changes it was enacted into law on Decemb 25, 1958. For greater details see Nicholas De Witt, "Upheaval in Education," *Proble of Communism* (Washington, D. C.), vol. VIII, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 1959, pp. 25-34.

[24] See, for example, an article by Stanciu Stoian in *Contemporanul* (Bucharest), Fe 22, 1957.

According to them, polytechnical education forms an integral part of the Communist education of youth and aims to equip the students with a knowledge of the scientific foundation of the principal branches of production. The general objectives of polytechnical education, according to a resolution of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education and Culture,[25] are expected to be achieved through

> the understanding by the students of the scientific basis of production, through the teaching of physics, natural sciences, geography and drafting; the organization of laboratory work, field measurements, and other practical applications within the framework of teaching; the teaching of manual work (shop) in grades I through IV, and of practical work in shops and experimental lots in grades V through VII; the organization of practical work with electrotechnical machines and in the foundations of agriculture in grades VIII through XI; the organization of field trips and visits in order to familiarize the students directly with the work in industrial and agricultural enterprises; the organization of practice and productive work in industry and agriculture; the equipping of students with knowledge, understanding and practical habits within the framework of technical matters.

The first experiments in the field of polytechnical education were conducted during the 1955/56 academic year in eight schools selected by the Ministry of Education and Culture, of which three were under the supervision and guidance of the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences of Bucharest. Further experiments were conducted in 100 schools during the 1956/57 academic year, 50 more schools having again been selected by the Ministry of Education and Culture and 42 participating voluntarily.

Initial results revealed that many teachers confused the principle of polytechnical education with the idea of manual labor and shop work "as practiced in the past," or identified it with the principle of "poly-vocationalism."[26] It was discovered that the instructors teaching the scientific foundations of, and the theoretical elements relating to, the various branches of production failed to secure the cooperation of the master craftsmen entrusted with developing the habits required for handling tools and for carrying out the various processes of production. Furthermore, in their drive for achieving practical results in production, many of the teachers seem to have forgotten "that the principal aim of such labor was the Communist education of youth."[27]

Many of the schools, on the other hand, were found to be insufficiently equipped for the technical program, both because of an inadequate supply of laboratories and workshops and because of the hiring of poorly qualified teachers.[28]

The blame for the poor outcome of the experiments was placed primarily upon the educational institutions and controlling organs of the various enterprises.[29] The General Directorate of Elementary and Secondary Education and the Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, for example, were blamed for insufficient interest in explaining the aims and functions of polytechnical education, and for failing to elaborate precise methodological instructions to guide faculty members in applying the new polytechnical approach to the teaching of the various subjects. Fault was found with the organization of field trips to the various industrial and agricultural enterprises, and with the organization of the technical circles within the schools and the Pioneer homes. The controlling organs were accused of failing to follow up on how polytechnical education is brought about and of not cooperating sufficiently with local enterprises for the support of the schools of general education in the respective localities.

---

[25] The Collegium discussed the general problems relating to "polytechnization" of the schools during its meeting of January 29, 1957. For the text of its conclusions see *Gazeta Învăţămîntului* (Bucharest), Feb. 22, 1957.

[26] Stanciu Stoian, *op. cit.*

[27] *Revista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), no. 3, Mar. 1959, p. 6.

[28] Stanciu Stoian, *op. cit.*

Serious efforts are being made at present to strengthen cooperation between the schools of general education and the various industrial and agricultural units. The latter, together with the educational sections of the People's Councils and the school principals, are expected to cooperate more closely in the equipping of the schools with shops, audio-visual aids, laboratories and experimental lots.

The establishment of the agricultural experimental lots is a responsibility of the Executive Committees of the urban and communal People's Councils.[30] Theoretically, they are to be set up at all the schools of general education as well as at the kindergartens and pedagogical schools. In reality, however, relatively few schools have the experimental lots with the dimensions and equipment prescribed by the educational authorities. Most of them seem to be ill-equipped and quite small. The fundamental purpose of these agricultural lots is to provide for experimental opportunities in the natural sciences and to stimulate the development of constructive habit in the growing of plants and the raising of animals. The produce from an the animals raised on the experimental lots of the schools are exempte from taxation and produce-delivery requirements and are used primaril for improving the nutrition and health of the children.

The adoption of polytechnic methods of education received added impetus beginning with the 1958/59 academic year. According to an instruction of the Ministry of Education and Culture, all pupils from the secon grade on must, over and above their regular weekly assignments in sho and practical work, devote a part of their summer vacation to practice wor in industrial or agricultural production. Such summer practice work i usually performed from June 15 to 26. It is intended to supplement an complete the education of children and to prepare them for future employment. Furthermore, it is supposed to contribute not only to the physical mental and polytechnical education of the pupils but also to their "patriotic" and moral training. Communist sources continually emphasize tha practical work in production is the foundation of the socialist education of youth and that, in Lenin's words, "only by working together with the workers and peasants is it possible to become true Communists."[31]

---

[29] See *Conclusions of the Collegium of the Ministry of Education and Culture, op. ci*

[30] See Decision No. 1122: Relating to the Establishment of Experimental School Lot In Ministerul Justiției: *Colecție de legi, decrete, hotărîri și dispoziții, 1954 1 Julie - 3 August,* p. 90 f.

In the course of practical work, the pupils are expected to develop a "positive attitude toward labor," to strengthen their will-power for the solutions of problems and for the overcoming of difficulties, and to gain a feeling of self-confidence and belief in their creative capacities. Moreover, they are expected to develop respect for public property through the careful handling of machines and tools, and through the economical use of raw materials and natural resources.

In the establishment of the new programs relating to practical work in industrial and agricultural production stress is now laid on adjusting as far as possible the requirements for polytechnic education to the age and capacity of the children as well as to the available facilities of the schools as determined by their location. Care is taken to organize the work in a more systematic manner so as to give the pupils an opportunity to acquaint themselves gradually with the various phases of production. Practical work is expected to assume a "pronounced collective character" and to be stimulated by various incentives and competitive devices.

In line with these general principles, pupils in grades II and III of the village schools perform simple tasks like taking care of the trees lining the streets, destroying harmful pests and insects, beautifying the school yard, etc. Those in grades V and VI of these same schools carry out a number of useful activities in the fields of agriculture and animal husbandry. They participate in the cultivation of cereals, the harvesting of crops and the feeding and tending of cattle and other domestic animals. In the high school grades, the students perform all of these tasks at a higher level under the auspices of the tractor and machine stations and the state and collective farms. In the city schools, the nature of the practical work is determined by the facilities available in the school and in the community. In schools having no workshops or laboratories, the fifth and sixth grade pupils engage in the preparation of educational material employed in various disciplines, especially in the natural and physical sciences and in chemistry. This usually consists of the preparation of herb, insect and rock collections. They may also fulfill their practical work requirement by working on simple jobs in the various shops and enterprises available in the community. High school students carry out their polytechnical education assignments in metallurgical, chemical and mining enterprises or in construction yards.

Lately, increasing attention has been paid to implementing the polytechnical program as smoothly and as effectively as possible. Plans are made in advance with respect to the selection of the shops and enterprises where the practical work program is to be carried out. The leaders responsible for the effectuation of the program both in the schools and in the shops are appointed at an early date. They are entrusted with the planning of all the activities relating to practical work involving the selection of the shops and enterprises, the keeping of attendance records and the evaluation of the pupils' performance in production.

---

[31] V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31 (Russian edition), p. 275, as quoted in "Practica in producție, mijloc important pentru pregătirea multilaterală a elevilor," *Revista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), vol. 3, Mar. 1959, p. 5.

In the selection of the shops and enterprises, the school officials are, theoretically, guided by the following considerations: (a) the nature of the operations and work processes; (b) the availability of working places; (c) the accessibility of equipment and tools; (d) the applicability of the technical or industrial training to the study program of the students; and (e) the existing conditions of safety and health.

The actual practical work program in production begins with an excursion to the designated plant. Here, the students are given an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the general scientific principles underlying the operation of the plant, the goods produced, the organization and methods employed in production, and finally with the plant's importance in the national economy. Attendance and performance records are kept in special roll books either by the instructors or by the master craftsmen under whose guidance the pupils perform their practical work.

It is still too early to assess correctly the success or failure of the "polytechnization" program. So far no objective study has been made and no definitive reports have been issued on the effects of the new measures taken along these lines or on the extent to which they have contributed to the development of the students' interest in science, technoloy and production There is no evidence at hand as yet with respect to the effect of "polytechnization" on changing the students' attitude toward life, society and property. Whatever the long run consequences of "polytechnization," however it is safe to assume that in the field of education, as in all segments of Communist society, the interests of the state have been given preference over the interests of the individual.

Textbooks and Teaching Materials

The textbooks and teaching materials used in the various grades and subjects are selected and approved by the Ministry of Education and Cu ture for each academic year.[32] They constitute a particularly importan "weapon" both for the development of the educational process of th elementary and high schools and for the dissemination of the Party's view

During the period immediately following the enactment of the Educ tional Reform Act of 1948, many of the textbooks used were either prov sional in nature or almost verbatim translations of texts used in the co responding grades of the Soviet schools. With the passing of the transition period, however, the Rumanian authors or "author collectives" have bee allowed to follow a more "national" approach by taking into consideration the "positive" achievements of the educational system of prewar Rumania.

---

[32] For the list of textbooks used during the 1954/55 academic year, for example, s Ministerul Invățămîntului, *Lista manualelor valabile in anul școlar 1954/1955 pent școlile elementure, școlile de șapte ani, școlile medii (de zece ani), școlile pedagogice* *învățători și de educatoare* (Bucharest: Editura de Stat Didactică și Pedagogică, 1954), pp.

Basically, the overall orientation of the textbooks is "realist-scientific," i.e. they reflect the general principles and directives of the Party.

The preparation and selection of textbooks are based upon the results obtained in various state-wide competitions. These are organized by the Ministry of Education and Culture, which issues, whenever the need arises, detailed instructions relating to the type of textbooks to be prepared, the subjects involved, and the grades and school levels for which they are intended. The instructions are published in most Party papers and in all professional journals following their approval by the Council of Ministers. The accepted manuscripts are published by the Didactical and Pedagogical State Publishing House *(Editura de Stat Didactică și Pedagogică)*, established in 1951. At first they are published only in a limited edition to be used on an experimental basis in a few carefully selected schools. Following the revisions introduced in response to suggestions made by the educators first using them, the books are published in the edition established by the educational authorities.

The problem of textbooks came to the fore again following the reorganization of the schools of general education in 1956. Questions related to the writing and introduction of new textbooks to correspond with the curricula for the newly extended schooling period and with the directives of the Second Congress of the Party with respect to the transformation of the educational system along polytechnical lines were the subject of a meeting held on April 1, 1957, by a collegium of the Ministry of Education and Culture.[33] To assure the schools the textbooks required for the general application of the eleven-year educational plan, the Pedagogical and Didactical State Publishing House drew up a four-year plan which stipulated that by the 1959/1960 school year all grades and all subjects would be supplied with new and original textbooks.[34] Considerable strides seem to have been made in the publication of textbooks since 1956, but their number and quality apparently still leave much to be desired. Some of them seem to be overloaded with information much beyond the understanding capacity of the students, others are still published under very poor technical conditions.[35] However, serious efforts are now being made to bring about greater concordance between the curricula and the textbooks and to make the distribution system more effective. The teachers, while having to abide strictly by the specified textbooks, are encouraged to reveal their experiences with them in classroom use. Many of the educational journals, especially the *Revista de Pedagogie* and the *Gazeta Invățămîntului*, carry regular columns on this subject.

---

[33] For the text of the Collegium's findings and conclusions see *Gazeta Invățămîntului* (Bucharest), Apr. 19, 1957.

[34] While 235 elementary and high school textbooks were published for the 1956/57 academic year, the plans called for 312 and 402 textbooks for the 1957/58 and 1958/59 academic years respectively. *Ibid.*

[35] *Ibid.*

While a definite improvement has been noted lately in the printing and distribution of textbooks, the general ideas underlying their subject matter continue, of course, to be those of Marxism-Leninism. This is especially true of textbooks in the social sciences.[36]

Examinations and Grading

The academic and extracurricular performance of the pupils is o great interest not only to the parents but also to the state. Both examinations and grading procedures are carefully outlined in instructions issue periodically by the Ministry of Education and Culture.[37] In their variou types of examinations, the teachers are expected to test the pupil's performance in relation to that of his colleagues and to his ability, as well as to what is expected of him by the school authorities. His daily work is evaluated through oral recitations in class, homework assignments, occasiona and extemporaneous quizzes and periodic examinations. Promotion from all grades except IV, VII and XI is based on the pupil's cumulative recor of daily work, as well as on results obtained in the various quarterly an year-end examinations. Pupils in grades IV, VII and XI are promoted o the basis of the cumulative record and of the results of final standardize state examinations prepared by the central educational authorities. Th examination given in grade XI, crowning the completion of the entir cycle of the school of general education, is the so-called matura or baccalaureate examination. The successful fulfillment of the matura examinatio requirements entitles the student to a baccalaureate diploma enabling hi to take—assuming that he has the "right" social and political background the entrance examinations offered by the institutions of higher learning.

Graduation from grade IV requires a successful written and oral examination in Rumanian (or in the native language) and arithmetic. Pupi graduating from grade VII have to take, in addition to the examinatio required for those in grade IV, oral examinations in the following subjects: natural sciences, Rumanian geography, Rumanian history and t Rumanian constitution. These examinations are given twice a year: on at the end of the academic year (June 5-15) and again at the beginning the following academic year (September 5-12). While the graduation examinations for pupils in grade IV are conducted by the instructors of t respective classes assisted by a delegate teacher assigned by the Education Section of the district or urban People's Council, the examinations for th graduates of grade VII are given by a commission.

The matura (baccalaureate) examination may be taken by all graduates of grade XI. While both written and oral examinations are required mathematics, Rumanian (or the native language) and Latin (for those taking the humanities course), oral examinations only are required in the following subjects: physics, chemistry, geography, foundations of Darwinism, Rumanian history, political economy, and Russian. These examinations are given by a commission of specialists whose head is appointed by the Ministry of Education and Culture. Candidates receiving the grade of "5" or better in all subjects are considered passed and are eligible for the baccalaureate diploma; the diploma itself lists all the grades received in the high school subjects. Students holding this diploma may be given responsible positions in production or they may attend an institution of higher learning. Candidates who fail have a right to present themselves for a second matura examination within the course of two years following the first one; those who fail a second time or who do not appear for re-examination within the prescribed time limit must repeat the eleventh grade before applying again for a matura examination.

---

[36] For more details, see Alexandre Cretzianu, *op. cit.*, pp. 214-219.

[37] The details included in this article on the examination and grading procedu followed in the schools of general education are based on the instructions included Order No. 62 of Feb. 27, 1957, and Order No. 91 of Apr. 5, 1957, issued by the Minis of Education and Culture to be applicable during the 1957/58 academic year. For te of the two Orders see the Mar. 1, 1957, and Apr. 12, 1957, issues of *Gazeta Învățămîntu* (Bucharest), respectively.

The examinations given in mathematics, physics, chemistry and the natural sciences in the upper grades are quite impressive. In chemistry, for instance, the matura candidates are examined on: the atomic-molecular theory and the general laws of chemistry; the determination of the molecular weight of substances in the gaseous state; calculations for chemical reactions, using formulas and equations; oxides, bases, acids and salts (composition, nomenclature, and properties); hydrogen; halogens and their principal compounds; oxygen; sulphur and its compounds; nitrogen and its main compounds; phosphorous, orthophosphoric acid and the phosphates; carbon and its inorganic compounds; silicon, silicon dioxide, glass and cement; the hydro-carbons (methane, ethylene, acetylene, benzene); isomerism; Butlerov's theory of the structure of organic compounds; petroleum and its derivatives; the dry distillation of coal; ethyl alcohol; glycerine; phenol; formaldehyde; formic acid; acetic acid; esters; fats and soaps. The examination also includes the following material studied in grade X: sugars; nitrogenous organic substances; periodic laws and the periodic table of the elements; atomic structure; electrolytic dissociation; metals (physical and chemical properties); alloys; sodium; potassium; calcium; aluminum; and ron.

While for a relatively brief period of time the Rumanian schools followed the Soviet system of grading,[38] at present they follow the one in use during the interwar period, i.e. numbers "10" through "1," "10" being the highest and "1" the lowest mark. A mark of "5" is the minimum final grade equired for passing. Marks are entered in the record book of each pupil, which is to be signed by the child's parents or guardians. The quarterly rade is established by considering the average of the marks received by the pupils in the course of the quarter and in the written examination taken at the end of the quarter. The annual grade, on the other hand, is established by averaging the grades received in the three quarters. Pupils who have received an average of "5" or above in all subjects are considered promoted. Those obtaining grades below "5" in two subjects are given a chance to take another examination in those subjects in the period immediately preceding the beginning of the next academic year. These pupils are referred to in Rumanian as *corigenți*. Pupils who have received grades below "5" in three subjects, or those failing the examination for the second time are considered as having failed and must repeat the entire year. Drastic measures are in force against "misbehaving" or "delinquent" children as revealed by the fact that pupils receiving a grade below "5" in conduc are also considered as failed and must repeat the entire year irrespective o the grades received in other subjects.

---

[38] According to the Soviet system of grading which was in use during 1952/1956 (see Decision No. 1,795/1952 of the Council of Ministers in *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), no. 7, Sept. 16, 1952) a mark of "5" was considered excellent; "4" — good, "3" — passing, "2" — unsatisfactory, and "1" — failure.

Enrollment

The latest comprehensive figures relating to the various aspects of Rumanian education were published in 1959.[39]

Statistics relating to the number of boys and girls enrolled in the various grades of the schools of general education on a national, rural an urban geographic basis during the 1948-49 to 1958-59 academic years i comparison with the number enrolled in 1938-39, and the ones pertainin to the number of schools—day, evening and correspondence—and the number of teachers employed during the corresponding period reveal the following:[40]

(1) Between 1938-39 and 1948-49, the total number of children a tending the schools of general education (grades I to XI) increased fro 1,604,481 to 1,846,202, a percentage increase of 15.1. This increase too place in spite of the country's diminished territory and population resultin from the incorporation of Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia into th Soviet Union (June 1940). Following the education reform of 1948, e rollment gradually declined until 1954-55, when it was 1,717,794. Beginni with the 1955-56 academic year, however, enrollment again began to i crease and by 1958-59 it reached a high of 2,144,812 representing a 7.2 p cent increase over the 1948-49 figures.

(2) In terms of the pupils' distribution by grade, the changes th have taken place since the reform are more impressive. The number children attending the higher grades of the schools of general educatio has increased steadily since 1938-39. In 1948-49, the number of pupils grades V-VII was 284,450, i.e. approximately two-and-one-third times large as in 1938-39. By 1958-59 this figure rose to 511,657, an increase 227,207 (about 80 per cent) over the 1948-49 level. The number of tho

---

[39] *Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1959* (Bucharest: Direcția Centrală de Statistică, 195 pp. 249-293.

[40] It is perhaps not superfluous to remind the reader of the unverifiable nature statistical data supplied by Communist regimes. These figures must, therefore, be view with this fact in mind.

n grades VIII-XI increased two-and-a-half times from the 55,020 level in
948-49 to 181,069 by 1958-59.

(3) While a majority of the children attending the lower grades live
n the rural areas (86.8 per cent of the total number attending grades I-IV
n 1938-39, 85.7 per cent in 1948-49 and 79.2 per cent in 1958-59), the situa-
on is reversed in the middle and upper grades: of the children attending
rades VIII-XI in 1938-39 only 2.7 per cent came from the rural areas, and
n 1948-49 only 0.64 per cent. By 1958-59 this percentage had increased
onsiderably but was still only 7.3 per cent of the total number of children
egistered in these grades.

(4) Although the number of children in the upper grades has in-
eased approximately two-and-a-half times in the decade since the Educa-
onal Reform of 1948, the percentage of children who continue their edu-
ation through grades VIII-XI is still relatively small, especially in the
ural areas. Of the 1,335,503 pupils who were attending grades I-IV in
951-52 and who therefore were of the proper age for grades VIII-XI in
958-59, only 181,069 or 13.5 per cent were actually attending these grades.
n the rural areas only 1.2 per cent of the children of appropriate age
13,351 of a theoretically eligible 1,116, 909) were actually in the grades
III-XI in 1958-59.

(5) The teacher-pupil ratio has steadily improved. Between 1938-39
nd 1948-49, 19,670 teachers were added in the schools of general education
i.e. a 42.4 per cent increase, accompanied by an increase of only 15.1 per
nt in enrollment. From 1948-49 to 1958-59, with a rise in enrollment of
2 per cent, the number of teachers increased from 66,105 to 95,394, i.e. by
.3 per cent. This was reflected in a reduction of the average class size in
e lower four grades from 40 pupils per class in 1938-39 to 34 in 1948-49
nd 28 in 1958-59.

(6) The number of elementary and high schools has increased from
,865 in 1938-39 to 14,988 in 1948-49 and to 16,222 by 1958-59. Between
48-49 and 1958-59 the number of four-year schools decreased from 11,439
11,277, that of the seven-year schools increased from 3,332 to 4,491 and
at of the eleven-year schools more than doubled from 217 to 454.[41]

The National Minorities

Along with the changes introduced in Rumania's general educational
stem, private education and the education of national minorities have
so undergone a series of transformations. While the minority schools
ere the subject of a number of legal acts in the immediate postwar period,
e fundamental change in their structure and functions was brought about
th the enactment of the Educational Reform Act of 1948. Soon thereafter
e government ordered the expropriation of all the assets of churches,
ngregations, religious communities, private associations, individuals, and
ysical and juridical persons which "were used as of January 1948 for

---

[41] This figure includes the evening schools for the village and working youth also.

the operation and maintenance . . . of schools, dormitories and canteens.”[4

Deprived of their educational facilities, the children of the nationa minorities thereafter had to continue their schooling exclusively in stat institutions. The basic principle guiding the educational policies of th regime with respect to the national minorities has been the one elaborate by Stalin in his treatise on the national question.[43] Accordingly, while li service is being paid to the rights and aspirations of the co-inhabiting na tionalities in the sense that the instruction is given in their respective lar guages,[44] the essence and content of education is strictly “socialist.” Th aim is obviously not the exploitation and further enrichment of the cu tural heritage of the respective nationality within the framework of th dominant culture, but the gradual *Gleichschaltung* of the population as whole.

Together with bringing the private, parochial and minority schoo within the state school system, the government also decided upon the elim ination of all foreign-supported schools in Rumania.[45] While the studen and teachers having Rumanian citizenship were permitted to continu schooling and teaching respectively in state institutions, the property c these schools was taken over by the state “having the rights of a tenant.”.

The regime’s viewpoint with respect to the educational policies pu sued regarding the national minorities is reflected in an article by Lászl Bányai, a Director General in the Ministry of Education and Culture. In reviewing, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the establishmen of the regime of the people’s democracy in Rumania, the achievements i the field of education in the languages of the co-inhabiting nationaliti Mr. Bányai contends that past regimes have used education for inculcati chauvinist prejudices in the youth and for alienating children from the own cultural background. As an illustration of the “unfairness” involv in providing equal educational opportunities for all the people, the auth claims that during the 1930/31 academic year, for instance, only 41 per ce of the Ukrainian, 53 per cent of the Turkish and Tartar and only 68 p cent of the Russian children were able to graduate from the first four grad

In contradistinction to this “policy of assimilation and unfairn practiced in the past,” the author emphasizes the achievements since Mar

---

[42] For text of Decree No. 176 of August 2, 1948, “Relating to the Expropriation the Property of Churches, Congregations, Communities and Private Individuals used the Operation and Maintenance of General, Technical or Vocational Schools” see *Mo torul Oficial* (Bucharest), Part I A., no. 177, Aug. 3, 1948, p. 6324 f.

[43] Joseph Stalin, *Marxism and the National Question* (New York, 1942), 222 pp.

[44] This was provided for in Article IV of the Educational Reform Act of 1948, whi however, also stipulated that Rumanian be taught in these schools from the first p mary grade on. The provision was subsequently amended by Decision No. 415 of 1 calling for the introduction of Rumanian as a required course only from the second gra on. For text of Decision No. 415/1956 see *Buletinul Oficial* (Bucharest), no. 25, Aug. 1956.

[45] See Decree No. 159 of July 2, 1948, “Relating to the Operation of Foreign Scho in the Rumanian People’s Republic.” In *Monitorul Oficial* (Bucharest), Part I A., 167, July 22, 1948, p. 6044.

[46] Exception was made only of the property of a foreign state.

[47] *Revista de Pedagogie* (Bucharest), no. 12, Dec. 1957, pp. 33-41.

1945, and especially since 1947. During this latter year a special General cretariat was established in the then Ministry of Public Education to al specifically with minority schools. While a number of facilities were ovided for each of the fifteen nationalities living in Rumania, the Hun- rian minority was especially well taken care of by the establishment a series of schools ranging from kindergartens to various institutions of gher learning. A special high school each was built for the Russian, rbian, Slovak, Tartar and Greek minorities. Special four- and seven-year hools were established in which the language of instruction is Bulgarian, urkish, Croatian, Czech, Armenian, or Yiddish. There are also four-year hools in which Polish is the language of instruction. To train teachers for ese schools, special pedagogical schools were established in which the nguage of instruction is either Hungarian, German, Serbian, Ukrainian, ussian, Slovak, Tartar or Yiddish.

Following the enactment of Decision No. 1380/1956, the regime estab- hed a special General Directorate of Education for the Coinhabiting Na- nalities *(Direcția Generală a Invățămîntului Naționalităților Conlocui- ire)* to deal specifically with matters related to the education of national norities. Its functions were established as follows: (a) it is to work in operation with the other organs of the Ministry in solving various prob- ns relating to the schooling plans, the development of school networks, organization and guidance of the educational process and the equipping the schools; (b) it is to collaborate with the People's Councils in con- lling and inspecting the functions and activities of minority schools.[48]

The first comprehensive figures relating to the educational facilities ovided for the national minorities and to the number of students attend- them were revealed in 1957.[49]

The data pertaining to the minority schools of general education show mall but steady increase in enrollment from 1948/59 to 1951/52, when eached a peak of 244,649. Beginning with 1952/53, attendance declined il 1955/56 when it was 208,658, only to rise again to 214,785 in 1956/57.

The explanation for the gradual decline in the enrollment of the nority schools may perhaps be found in the fact that more and more ldren of the national minorities choose to complete their schooling in manian schools. Thus, the number of children attending schools or tions[50] with instruction in a minority language declined progressively m 1952/53 to 1955/56 although the number of such schools remained ghly stationary—at around 2350 during this period. The 1956/57 na- al enrollment in the minority schools of 6,123 pupils resulted from the lition of 70 such schools or sections. While the number of minority ool units for grades I-XI was 2,424 in 1956/57 as against 2,354 in 1955/ the increase was due to an increase in the number of sections. Actually, the number of minority schools proper was reduced from 2,152 to 2,0 during the corresponding period. That this decline is expected to be lasting trend can be seen from the enrollment figures of the minority-la guage pedagogical institutes, which prepare the teachers for the schools general education: the number of students at these institutes has declin from a high of 6,217 in 1951/52 to only 503 in 1956/57.

---

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] *Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1957* (Bucharest: Editura Stiințifică, 1957), pp. 176-209. also footnotes 39 and 40.

[50] The sections, usually consisting of very small classes, operate within the framework hools having a different language of instruction.

The statistical breakdown of the number of minority schools functio ing during the 1955/56 and 1956/57 academic years in terms of the languag of instruction and of that relating to the number of children attendi them show a few interesting characteristics. The yearly fluctuation in e rollment notwithstanding, the largest number of schools have Hungaria as the language of instruction. Thus, during 1955/56, for instance, 1,6 of the 2,354 minority school units had Hungarian as the language of i struction, 374 German, and the remaining 348 were divided between other languages. Yiddish, for example, was used in four school units onl The enrollment situation was almost identical. In 1955/56 the total e rollment in the minority schools of general education was 208,658; of the 162,024 were attending Hungarian-language schools, 26,086 German, ar the remaining 20,548 were divided among school units using the thirtee other languages. The Yiddish units of general education, for exampl were attended by only 302 pupils.

A more interesting picture is revealed by a comparison of the enro ment figures with the results of the census of February 21, 1956. When t 1955/56 enrollment figures are compared with the figures of column 2 Table V, the per 1,000 ratio of attendance is as follows: Hungarian 96 German 83.9, Tartar 86.3 and Yiddish 8.8 (for the country as a whole, t corresponding figure is 99.0). If nationality rather than mother tongue used as the basis for computation, the ratio is further changed. While ratio of enrollment per thousand of population goes up to 102.3 in case of the Hungarians, the ratio falls to 2.1 per thousand in the case of Jews.[51] It is interesting to note that the Tartars, numerically a much sm er minority group than the Jews, are proportionately about as well provi with educational facilities as are the medium-sized ethnic groups.

The extremely small ratio of attendance in the Yiddish schools is plained, on the one hand, by the drive against "cosmopolitanism a Zionism" that began in 1948 and resulted in the closing of almost Jewish cultural and educational institutions and, on the other, by the creasing attendance in Rumanian and Hungarian-language schools of J ish children. The ratio is in reality much smaller still, for the census figu relating to the Jews are not quite accurate. While it may be true that fear of anti-Semitism only 144,236 identified themselves as Jews, and these only 34,263 gave Yiddish as their mother tongue, the actual num of Jews living in Rumania early in 1956 was much greater. According t *New York Times* dispatch of February 26, 1959, discussing the migratio

---

[51] The number of minority schools and the enrollment figures changed very l during the 1957-58 and 1958-59 academic years. See reference cited in footnote 39.

TABLE V

The Population of Rumania According to Nationality and Mother Tongue as Based Upon the Census of February 21, 1956[52]

	Nationality	*Mother Tongue*
umanian	15,001,090	15,087,228
ungarian	1,589,543	1,651,844
erman	382,400	391,497
iddish	144,236	34,263
krainian	58,637	66,749
rbo-Croat-Slovenian	46,464	43,149
ussian	38,795	44,602
artar	20,718	20,585
urkish	13,909	13,686
ulgarian	11,943	12,573
thers	182,059	123,618
TOTAL	17,489,794	17,489,794

umanian Jews to Israel, there were still "250,000 Jews left in Rumania
ıt of a prewar population of about 800,000."

On the whole, the educational policies pursued by the Rumanian peo-
e's democratic regime towards the coinhabiting nationalities are not dis-
nilar to the ones employed with respect to the majority group. While
e element of chauvinism that, to a considerable extent, characterized Ru-
ania's educational system in the past—as it did those of the neighboring
ites—has greatly diminished, it has been replaced by a new nationalism
phemistically referred to as "socialist patriotism" or "proletarian inter-
tionalism."

In spite of the great efforts of the Rumanian Communists to integrate
coinhabiting nationalities and especially the Hungarian minority
thin the larger framework of the new society, the difficulties that charac-
ized the traditional intergroup relations of the country seem to be persist-
. The regime has so far been unable to overcome, for example, the fer-
nt engendered by the Hungarian Revolt of 1956 among the Hungarian
ellectuals of Transylvania. The unrest is particularly noticeable among
ofessors, students and writers. It is not unlikely that in the attempt to
m the tide of national antagonism the regime will soon embark on a new
licy toward the education of the minorities. The first indication of the
w policy was revealed during the second National Conference of the
ion of Students' Associations held in Bucharest during February 19-22,
9. In his speech to the Conference Professor Ludovic (Lajos) Takács,
ctor of the "Bolyai" Hungarian University of Cluj, declared that "we
not continue the separation of schools by nationalities because it is im-
ssible [in this way] to bring up youth in the spirit of proletarian interna-
nalism, devotion to the people and the cause of the working class."[53]

---

[52] Based on Tables No. 14 and 15 of *Anuarul Statistic al R.P.R. 1957. (op. cit.)*, p. 64 f.

[53] *East Europe* (New York), vol. 8, no. 4, Apr. 1959, p. 55, as quoted from *Scînteia*
charest), Feb. 21, 1959.

Professor Athanase Joja, the then Minister of Education and Cultur while making no definite proposals along these lines, referred to Lenin teachings that "the youth of diverse nationalities living within the sam state should be taught in the same schools."[54] The first steps in this direc tion were taken in the spring of 1959, when the government announced tha the Hungarian-language Bolyai University would be amalgamated with th Rumanian-language Victor Babeş University and that students thereafte would study in Rumanian. Plans were disclosed for the amalgamation i the Hungarian Autonomous Region and in Transylvania as a whole o some of the Rumanian and Hungarian high schools as well. The funda mental idea underlying this step is allegedly to insure that students intend ing to go on to a university will know enough Rumanian to study in tha language.[55]

Evening and Correspondence Schools

In addition to the regular day schools of general education, specia evening schools and correspondence courses were organized in 1954 for th "working youth in towns and villages desiring to obtain or continue thei formal education without leaving the labor force."[56] Organized to includ grades V-XI,[57] these schools graduated 35,000 students during the first fou years of operation.[58] The principal aim of the schools allegedly is to assu the national economy of an ever larger number of well-educated skille workers and technicians.

While their popularity gradually increased, the correspondence cou es and the evening schools of general education came under severe criticis by the Party early in 1959. They were accused of having admitted a lar number of students who were not employed in industrial or agricultu enterprises and of having permitted the continuation of studies by schol tically poor students and by "hooligans," i.e. elements hostile to the regin The school authorities and the various controlling institutions were blam for the hiring of unqualified teachers and were accused of having neglect their academic responsibilities. In an attempt "to improve the social co position" of the students, the evening schools and correspondence cour were reorganized in March 1959.[59] According to the new plan, the eveni schools of general education are of two types: (a) Evening schools for working youths organized under the auspices of industrial and agricultural enterprises; (b) evening sections of the high schools of general education for working youths. Having a schooling period of four years, these schools admit only graduates of the vocational schools as apprentices and of trade or agricultural schools who have completed at least one year in production following graduation. In exceptional cases, they may also admit workers employed in the field of production who graduated from a seven-year school, have completed their apprenticeship requirement, and have a three-year employment record as skilled workers. These, however, must take a six-month preparatory course prior to registration in the evening school. The selection of workers for these studies is made in the various enterprises by taking into consideration the workers' efficiency in production and the degree of "their participation in communal affairs." The "proletarian social composition" of the students is assured by the careful screening of the applicants by the so-called selecting commissions. Such commissions are composed of the director of the enterprise, the delegate of the Party organization, the secretary of the Communist Youth organization, the president of the enterprise committee and the school principal.

---

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] See article by Paul Underwood in *The New York Times*, June 10, 1959.

[56] The evening schools and correspondence courses were first established by virtue Decree No. 438 of October 16, 1954 (*Buletinul Oficial*, Bucharest, no. 45, Oct. 30, 19 Their organization and functioning were regulated by Ministerial Council Decision 2047 of November 1, 1954 (*Colecție de hotărîri și dispoziții ale Consiliului de Miniștri R.P.R.* Bucharest, no. 53, Nov. 1, 1954). These were abrogated in 1959, following the organization of the schools.

[57] The first four grades operate only as day schools.

[58] *Scînteia* (Bucharest), May 13, 1959.

[59] See Decree No. 89 relating to the abrogation of Decree No. 438/1954 in *Bulet Oficial* (Bucharest), no. 8, Mar. 20, 1959. The text of the Decision of the Central C mittee of the Rumanian Workers' Party and of the Council of Ministers for the "imp ing of the correspondence courses and evening schools of general and higher educati was published in *Scînteia* (Bucharest), Mar. 11, 1959.

The curricula and syllabi are established and the textbooks selected by the Ministry of Education and Culture, as are the various details relating to the date and nature of examinations.

Following the reorganization of the evening and correspondence schools in 1959, the curricula and syllabi were revised so as to correspond more fully with the aspirations of the regime. While the number of hours devoted to academic subjects was reduced to 20 per week (21 in grade XI), he bulk of the time was allocated to the study of mathematics, physics, chemistry and the natural sciences. (See Tables VI and VII respectively for he curricula of grades V-VII and VIII-XI.) Of the twenty hours, for example, four hours are devoted to mathematics in grades V-VIII, five hours in grades IX and XI and six hours in grade X. Two hours are devoted to physics in grades VI-IX, and three hours in grades X and XI. Chemistry is allotted two hours per week in grades VII-XI. While the "patriotic" education of the students is pursued through the teaching of all subjects, it is achieved primarily through the first four in the curriculum, namely, Rumanian and Rumanian literature, history, civics (or political economy and scientific socialism), and Russian. The latter is a required subject for all classes with two hours per week in grades V-X and one hour in grade XI.

Students attending the evening schools or taking correspondence courses enjoy a relatively large number of privileges. Their work shifts are organized so as to enable them to attend school and prepare their lessons, and they are not to be assigned "supplementary work" during school days. On he condition that they fulfill their production requirement and are promoted from grade to grade, they are allowed a thirty-day paid leave over and above the regular yearly vacation period. An extra ten-day leave may be given students preparing for the baccalaureate examinations. Graduates

TABLE VI

Curriculum of the Evening and Correspondence Schools of General Education (Grades V-VII) [60]

No.	Subject	Grades V	Grades VI	Grades VII
1.	Rumanian Language and Literature	6	5	4
2.	History	2	2	2
3.	Constitution (Civics)	—	—	1
4.	Russian	2	2	2
5.	Mathematics	4	4	4
6.	Physics	—	2	2
7.	Chemistry	—	—	2
8.	Natural Sciences	3	2	1
9.	Geography	2	2	2
10.	Drawing*	1	1	—
	Total	20	20	20

Guidance once a month (90 minutes)

*Drawing is not required in the correspondence schools.

TABLE VII

Curriculum of the Evening and Correspondence Schools of General Education (Grades VIII-XI) [61]

No.	Subject	Grades VIII	Grades IX	Grades X	Grades XI
1.	Rumanian Language and Literature	3	3	3	3
2.	History	2	2	—	2
3.	Political Economy	—	—	—	2
4.	Scientific Socialism	—	—	2	—
5.	Russian	2	2	2	1
6.	Mathematics	4	5	6	5
7.	Astronomy	—	—	1	—
8.	Physics	2	2	3	3
9.	Chemistry	2	2	2	2
10.	Natural Sciences	3	2	1	1
11.	Geography	2	2	—	2
	Total	20	20	20	21

Guidance once a month (90 minutes)

preparing for the state or baccalaureate examinations may also receiv upon request, an additional maximum unpaid leave of 15 days. Studen of both the evening schools and the correspondence courses are exempte from the payment of school taxes.

While the expectation of the Rumanian Communists with respect t the establishment of evening schools in 1954 has not been fulfilled, the ne effort for "improving the social composition" of the students cannot b minimized. At present, the various Party-controlled educational institutio and selecting commissions are quite active in assuring the reorganization of these schools in accordance with the provisions of the new Decision. It is still too early, of course, to reach any definite conclusions with respect to their prospects. It is safe to assume, however, that barring any unforeseen events these schools will further enhance the importance of vocational and technical schools over the classical-theoretical institutions and will constitute an important means in the hands of the Communists for the "socialist" transformation of Rumanian society.[62]

---

[60] *Gazeta Invăţămîntului* (Bucharest), Apr. 24, 1959, p. 2.
[61] *Ibid.*

Special Workers' Schools of General Education

By virtue of the provisions included in Decision No. 1009 of the Council of Ministers of August 10, 1957,[63] special "workers' schools" *(Școli muncitorești)* were established beginning with the 1957/58 academic year to aid the schooling of employees occupying positions for which they did not possess the required academic and/or professional qualifications.[64]

In accordance with Chapter I of the Decision, special three-year workers' schools with evening sessions and correspondence courses offering the same educational program as the regular schools of general education were established. Divided into technical *(réal)* and humanist sections, these schools admit graduates of the seven-year elementary schools upon recommendation by the Ministries, the central institutions or the central committees of the regional or urban People's Councils. At the end of the three years, students are expected to pass a regular baccalaureate examination. The network, curricula, and operation of these workers' schools are regulated by the Ministry of Education and Culture. To aid the workers studying in these schools educational centers offering preparatory courses *(Centre de consultații; Centre de pregătire)* are set up in case at least 15 students register for such a class. Such preparatory centers are usually established in various institutions and/or enterprises with the cooperation of the nearest school having correspondence courses and are under the supervision of the educational services of the ministries patronizing them. They hire teachers employed in the regular schools of general education or selected from among the specialists of the respective institutions or enterprises. The official appointment of the teachers is made by the Executive Committees of the Regional People's Councils, following proposals by the schools and by the enterprises.

In order to facilitate the schooling of wage earners who wish to acquire a formal education, the following concessions were provided for them in Chapter IV of the Decision: their working hours per week are to be reduced from 48 to 40, and, on condition that they attend school regularly, they are to be granted a forty-day paid leave per annum, in addition to the regular vacation period, as well as a twenty-day paid leave for the baccalaureate examination and a thirty-day paid leave for the state examination; special arrangements are made to enable them to use the laboratories and scientific equipment available in the enterprises in which they are employed. According to Article 15, special preference for entering these various workers' schools is given to Party, trade union and UTM members and to other "activists" who are recommended by the units in which they are employed. These "activists" are to receive a twenty-day paid leave over and above their regular vacation to prepare for the entrance examinations and a thirty-day paid leave if they are preparing for entrance examinations into the institutions of higher learning. Wage earners who were forty years of age at the time when Decision No. 1360/1956 was passed by the Council of Ministers and who occupy positions for which they do not have the educational requirements are exempted from the provisions of Decision No. 1009 if the government organs decide that their qualifications are sufficient for the positions they currently hold. Should they, however, elect to complete their studies they may benefit from the measures included in the Decision.

---

[62] During the 1958/59 academic year, the number of students registered in Grade I of the vocational and agricultural schools surpassed for the first time the number of students registered in Grade VIII of the schools of general education. *Lupta de Clasă* (Bucharest), May 1959, pp. 3-14.

[63] For text of Decision No. 1009/1957 see *Colecție de hotărîri și dispoziții ale Consiliului de Miniștri al Republicii Populare Romîne* (Bucharest), vol. 6, no. 54, Aug. 10, 1957.

[64] The academic and other requirements for these positions were specified by Decision No. 1360/1956 of the Council of Ministers.

Detailed instructions relating to the implementation of the Decision were issued by the Ministry of Education and Culture in September 1957.[65]

Beginning with the 1957/58 academic year, workers' schools were established in the regional administrative centers and in the city of Bucharest. These schools have evening sessions and correspondence courses and form an integral part of the network of school units operated by the Executive Committees of the Regional Peoples' Councils. They use the buildings of the schools of general education and have a curriculum equivalent to that offered in grades VIII-XI. The division of the workers' schools into technical *(réal)* and humanist sections takes place during the third year of the three-year course.[66] At the end of their studies the graduates are expected to pass a baccalaureate examination, and those awarded diplomas have the same rights as students graduated from the regular schools of general education.

Conclusions

The primary and secondary schools of Rumania have undergone a number of fundamental changes since the end of the war and especially since the inauguration of the Educational Reform of 1948. These changes involved a general re-orientation of Rumania's educational system from the French-Prussian model toward the Soviet pattern. With the acquisition of absolute power by the Communists, the transformation of Rumanian society along "socialist" lines assumed paramount importance. Education has been given a determining role in this process. The case of the Rumanian school of general education illustrates the dynamic interaction between the d mands of ideology and indoctrination and the concrete requirements of a ountry in transition from a predominantly agricultural to an increasingly industrial society.

---

[65] See *Gazeta Invăţămîntului* (Bucharest), Sept. 27, 1957.

[66] Only the first year of these workers' schools was in operation during the 1957/ academic year.

While the structure and functions of the schools of general education s well as the curricula and the methods of instruction have been profoundy altered, economic and political rather than pedagogical considerations re primarily responsible for the transformation.

Quantitatively, both in terms of the number of schools and the size f the enrollment, Rumanian education has made considerable strides since he end of the war. The campaign for the eradication of illiteracy is being arried forward with determination and speed. One can only speculate whether this campaign for the attainment of universal literacy and for the aising of the "cultural and intellectual level" of the people will contribute o the further consolidation of the regime and to the transformation of Rumanian society along "socialist" lines. On the other hand, one cannot ose sight of the possibility that the Rumanian Communists—as well as their ounterparts in the Soviet Union and the other people's democracies—may nwittingly have released forces which in time may destroy the foundations long with the superstructure of the totalitarian state they have built.

FAIRLEIGH DICKINSON UNIVERSITY

COMMUNICATION

Princeton, August 16, 196

The Editor, *Journal of Central European Affairs*

Dear Sir:

In a review published in the *Journal of Modern History* in Decembe 1960 I took exception to some statements, techniques and conclusions i Professor Remak's most interesting book, *Sarajevo.* If I comment again o his notions of the murder of the archduke Francis Ferdinand—this time expressed in the stimulating article in the July issue of this *Journal,* "Sarajev —design and accident"—my purpose is not, so to speak, to return to th attack. On the contrary, I think the readers of the *Journal* should b obliged to our colleague for raising a most interesting problem of historica interpretation. The fact that this interpretation invites challenge seems t me in some way a symptom for the commendable liveliness of Mr. Remak' presentation and in this respect an asset. Moreover, in taking issue wit Mr. Remak's article, I should like to make it clear that in my opinion i contains a good number of sound or at least perfectly reasonable and argu able deductions which I cannot repeat and reemphasize here by reason o brevity of space. In this brief discussion of a noteworthy and commendabl paper I feel necessarily bound to concentrate on the more important issue of difference of opinion between Mr. Remak and myself. In doing so believe it serves the interest of the reader if I follow his lines of argume as far as I can take them up here by moving from the more specific to th general.

Without going into the details of the preparations for the assassinatio at Sarajevo, the act itself and the conduct of the perpetrators afterward the strange, almost mystical element of chance to which Professor Rema so frequently refers in his article as he did in his book, reduces itself, in m opinion, to a question of probability. Fortunately the odds against the a tainment of the objective of political murder under difficult circumstanc are in general greater than its chances of success, a factor of which tho who planned the assassination were well enough aware to post seven inste of just one potential perpetrators in the path of their unfortunate victi In view of this it is not so strange then that the first attempt at the arc duke's life by Čabrinović on the way to the city hall failed; and if it still considered strange that the second by Princip succeeded, it is less than if only one assault had been made. Even here, however, the disastro rerouting of the archduke's car which offered Princip such a perfect targ the prime factor of chance for those who perceive an element of chance this tragedy, was conditioned by a whole series of errors of judgment, la of circumspection, and carelessness on the part of those responsible for t archduke's safety, which fits all too well into the administrative pattern time and place. These factors, well enumerated by Professor Remak, c tainly conditioned the accident of Princip's success, if we still want to c it an accident.

In his article, as in his book, Mr. Remak makes much of the fact th Count Harrach had instinctively chosen the left running board of the arc duke's car on the death trip back from the city hall, whereas Princip's atta came from the right. In defense of the judgment, not of the uncontest courage of Harrach, I should say that his action was perfectly reasonable. The archduke was seated in the left rear of the car, the Duchess of Hohenberg to his right. Since it could be expected with certainty that any assassination attempt would be aimed at Francis Ferdinand and not at his consort, the Count took the obvious choice. Yet, the question of chance comes into play again when Mr. Remak comments on the fact that only two of he assassins coming from Serbia actually took the poison prescribed to all three of them after the event, but that the cyanide failed to prove fatal. Thus Serbian complicity in the plot could not be concealed, as planned. Again the obvious answer would be that according to the law of probability as to the execution of arranged or at least premeditated suicides a larger rate of "success" of these attempts would not have been quite likely.

From here on, that is from the details of the assassination itself on which Professor Remak is undoubtedly very well informed, one moves to he gist of his arguments which seem to me far more controversial than the actual account itself. For once he greatly overrates, in my opinion, the mpact of the failure of the suicide attempts on the part of the perpetrators. "The consequences of this bit of negligence were momentous . . ." If "the poison had worked . . . " and Francis Ferdinand's assassins had been dead ike their victim, "The Austrians would have had no clues leading to Belgrade and no grounds for accusing anyone in Serbia of complicity in the rime. In this event, there very likely would have been no Austro-Serbian crisis and possibly no World War in 1914. As it was, the Austrians were o find enough to *suspect* Belgrade but not enough to *prove* it before the World, which was precisely the most disastrous of all possibilities." (Italics by Mr. Remak.)

In the first place, as Professor Remak knows and points out himself in different contexts, considerable internal evidence notwithstanding, even t this time proof exists only to the extent that Serbian government officials were involved in the preparation of the assassination but *not* that the officers of the Serbian army intelligence and the officials of the Black Hand nvolved acted on direct order of the highest echelons of the Serbian government. This is and will be the situation until the uncensored Serbian ecords are opened for unrestricted inspection. Considering this, what ifference would it have made then at that stage of the Austro-Russian onflict in the Balkans and other factors of high international politics hether the Austrian government would have cemented its case better or ad presented it somewhat more skillfully or not? Particularly in this later context, what difference would it have made if the judge in charge of he pre-trial investigation had been more perspicacious than he was, a fact hich appears to Professor Remak of the greatest importance. Yet just here e neglects another fact, namely that the unfortunate Austrian ultimatum Serbia of July 22 and particularly the extensive "Memoire" transmitted the Great European Powers on July 25, was based on much wider and nger standing causes of Austro-Serbian friction than the immediate responsibility for the assassination itself. It would not make sense to discuss this brief context the question whether Austria was right to make decisive demands on grounds which largely rested on internal evidence though, such, evidence of the highest significance. The point to be made here only that the ultimatum as it stood would have given Russia ample oppor-

tunity without loss of face to take a different course in her counseling o
the Serbian government—if she had chosen to do so. Naturally it is impos
sible to discuss here the question—actually a sizable factor of the war guil
problem—whether Russia and Serbia should have taken this different course
That much can be said, however: the notion that an ultimatum substan
tiated by findings of a more perspicuous magistrate of investigation woul
have led these countries to change their course radically, seems strange in
deed. Yet, Professor Remak reiterates in pondering over the prospects o
more concrete results of the Austrian investigation, "In short, might no
there either have been no war at all, or else a war involving Austria an
Serbia only and not a world war?"

Possibly these sweeping deductions are largely due to the fact tha
Mr. Remak somewhat underplays the international aspects of the assassina
tion and overrates on the other hand the personal aspects of the tragedy
To him the assassination was directed not so much against the archduk
as a symbol of alleged or true Austrian suppression of Southern Slav aspira
tions at unification but as a specific person who blocked the way to thes
aspirations. In his article as in his book, though in the former in a les
decisive manner, Mr. Remak suggests that the archduke might have bee
selected as potential victim of political assassination not because he was—
quite unjustly—seen in Serbia as the enemy of the Southern Slav peopl
but as their friend. As such he might have solved the Southern Slav prob
lem of the monarchy either by way of a federalist or trialist reorganizatio
which would have taken the wind out of the sails of the irredenta in th
empire and of integral nationalism in Serbia. But there is no proof wha
soever that the Serbian officials involved in the assassination, let alone th
actual perpetrators, could have known anything but rumors about th
archduke's plans opened to historians only after the Second World Wa
This interpretation of the motivations for the murder, it is true, is qui
frequently found in Austro-German historical literature generally extreme
friendly to the Habsburg monarchy, but even there only as surmise. T
my knowledge it has never been seriously discussed in Southern Slav liter
ture though there would be no obvious reason for refraining from discu
sion of this possibility if it had really existed. Yet did it? Professor Rema
produces actually only one flimsy piece of evidence in his book, if eviden
it may be called, namely a rather general remark made repeatedly by th
Serbian prime minister Pašić to Count Carlo Sforza during the First Wor
War and recorded by the latter in an essay on Francis Ferdinand in th
Makers of Modern Europe. Yet Count Sforza's essay is so full of vague a
rather gossipy allusions to information given to him by intimate but u
identified friends of the archduke, his account of the assassination itself
so flagrantly incorrect, that a true connoisseur of the subject matter li
Professor Remak should lend this interpretation little credibility. I wou
like to rest my case, however, in the main on internal evidence. From
purely intellectual viewpoint it would perhaps be rationally defensible
say that John Wilkes Booth could have shot Lincoln because he w
afraid the President might win the South over to the philosophy of t
North, or that the Russian anarchists assassinated Alexander II n
because his reign was considered oppressive but because he had emancipat
the serfs and thus had to be killed since he was on his way to kill soc

radicalism itself. It seems, however, that integral nationalism and indeed any widely disseminated radical doctrine in its extreme emanations, of which the fanaticism of political murder surely is a part, just does not work that devious way. Thus the deduction that the archduke might possibly have been spared if he had been a man of lesser zeal in the reforms of his future realms and the implied reflection that in such a case World War I might not have happened, seems to me somewhat far fetched, to ay the least.

This leads to an observation on the perhaps strangest conclusion brought forward by Professor Remak. In reference to the connection between the problem of inevitability of war and the copious elements of hance which he sees in the events of Sarajevo, Mr. Remak argues that if things had happened just a little differently there might have been no war at all. Since war had not resulted from the Moroccan crisis, the annexation issue of Bosnia, the Balkan wars and other incidents and conflicts in international relations, why should there have been war if the assassination at Sarajevo could have been avoided, since war was not inevitable? Now I am neither an advocate of the inevitability of historical events in general, nor of the first, second or—God forbid—third world war in particular. Yet, as I see it, the issue of inevitability is not at all the question here. Professor Remak's rather puzzling line of reasoning is indeed comparable to that of the executive of an insurance company who would conclude that somebody who had been involved in six automobile accidents without being seriously injured, would be a better risk than somebody else who had had no accident at all so far. Insurance companies as well as diplomats and other mortals argue the opposite way, however. They believe that a chain of accidents indicates a proclivity to dangerous behavior and that international half-solved crises build up rather than relax tensions in international affairs, just as one heart attack makes the second more likely and not less. Again, ot the question of inevitability but probability of events as deduced from previous behavior is at stake here.

And now a final word as to the philosophical application of Mr. Remak's article in the sense that small causes may create momentous consequences. This statement in itself is certainly tenable in some cases, yet care must be taken that the smallness of the event is not unintentionally produced by fragmentation of one big event into many small ones. Such action would run counter to the very purpose of the historian, i.e. to see nd relate diverse matters in a larger context. If we accept the events of Sarajevo as the last releasing agent—of course not as the primary, underlying cause—of the First World War, then we have to be conscious of the fact that we are dealing with one big event composed of small parts, in other words one composite big cause creating the momentous effect. We are not actually dealing with the element of chance in Čabrinović's failure to hit his target, Count Harrach's chance of choosing the right running board, or the stoppage of the archduke's car at the merger of Appel Quay nd Franz Joseph Street; we are dealing with the overall assassination of the heir of a great power in a politically highly charged atmosphere conditioned by a long chain of events of high political significance. By no means prepared to say that this event, like any single man's death, justifies the outbreak of a world war, I would submit however that this is not a small event but a big one, an important cause, even though not commensurate with its catastrophic consquences.

Yet naturally these observations tuned to a specific event can contribute nothing to the solution of the supreme problem of historical inevitability which neither I nor, I believe, our distinguished colleague Professor Remak intend to tackle in our statements. What I want to restate, as Mr. Remak has already done, is simply this. Historical evidence, even when uncontested in its factual aspects, lends itself to very different, sometimes diametrically opposed conclusions. I am grateful to Professor Remak that his fine article has given me the opportunity to attempt this demonstration here.

Very sincerely yours,

Rutgers University **ROBERT A. KANN**

CORRIGENDUM

Jan Michal, *Central Planning in Czechoslovakia,* was reviewed in the July 1961 issue (p. 244) by Professor V. E. Andic. The review was, *pe errorem editoris* ascribed to Professor Josef Korbel.

ACEK, JOSEF, *Tyrolská selská válka a Michal Gaismair.* Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1960. Pp. 616.

The German Peasant War has been something of a stepchild of modern Ger- nan historiography. Apart from a few rather narrowly specialized monographs ttle has been published in this field since the first appearance, almost three decades go, of Günther Franz's *Der deutsche Bauernkrieg.* The harvest was far from rich, hasis on the Marxian tradition, here mainly presented by Friedrich Engel's work n the Peasants' War, has not produced much of importance, and the most sub- antial recent work (despite its considerable weakness) on the war's greatest gure was not written by a German but by the Russian historian Smirin *(Narod- aya reformatsiya Tomasa Müntzera,* Moscow, 1955). Now another work of more olid substance on this phase of German history comes from a prominent young istorian of the Marxian school of thought in East-Central Europe. The author best known for a considerable number of works on various phases and aspects f the Hussite Revolution, especially on Tabor. His decision to move on to the ext great European revolution—the German one—was already indicated by shorter ublications in *Historica* (vol. I and II) and in a monograph in *Československý asopis historický,* on a lesser known figure of the Tyrolian Revolt, Peter Pässler vol. VI, 1958). The book under review here is an attempt at a truly exhaustive reatment, and while those who do not share the author's Leninist orthodoxy will ave considerable reservations, especially in regard to some of Macek's sweeping eneralizations and political evaluations, there can be little doubt about the value f the basic work done by him. He really is the first to have gained access to much f the rich source material available in Austrian and Italian archives, and from it have reconstructed, in an impressive way, the course of the Tyrolian War and, the process, the life of Michael Gaismair.

The Tyrolian Revolt amply deserved special treatment. There is a sharp ontrast between the often pitiful confusion, the lack of organization and leader- ip that characterized such a large proportion of the Peasant movement in what now Germany, and the far more coherent and temporarily successful Tyrolian ovement (which was also closely connected with movements in the neighboring gions which, in this regard, include not only Vorarlberg and Salzburg but also e Allgäu and Graubünden). Some reasons for this specific character are based n the physical, political and economic geography and the particular economic evelopment of the Tyrol—all elements which Macek analyzes in considerable de- il. But without any doubt Gaismair's personality, too, had much to do with it. he greatness of this man, his clarity of purpose, his pure moral character, but so his organizational and military talents which made him a statesman and sol- ier of high caliber, all contributed to the fact that the Tyrolian movement man- ged to survive for quite a while beyond that of the north. At the same time, the ncentration on Gaismair and the Tyrolian movement made it much easier for acek to limit and focus his presentation than would have been the case in regard the total movement of the German Peasants' War.

It cannot be said that Macek was the first to see Gaismair's greatness. Indeed, ünther Franz—to whom the Czech historian gives less credit than he deserves— ad discused Gaismair with sympathetic understanding and admiration for his ersonalty and his historical role as one of the great pioneers of a society fully democratic in its political and economic structure. But within the framework o Franz' book the treatment of Gaismair and the Tyrolian War could not be mor than a short sketch. It it only through Macek that we can study the man and th movement in which he played the prominent role in their full significance.

Gaismair's role and fate was a tragic one. He was a child of the Reformatior who had early come under the influence of Zwingli, with whom he was connectec by a warm friendship. It is through him, probably, that he acquired the stron element of humanism which Macek, too, recognizes. From a safe and well-protectec existence as a responsible official of a bishop's territorial government Gaismai crossed over to lead the struggle of the poor and downtrodden ones, a group which in the Tyrol, not only included a large part of the peasantry but also some of the workers in the great mines of this metal-rich country. We may wonder whethe Macek is quite correct in dividing the peasantry of Tyrol into exactly two groups– the poor and the well-to-do. (His description of the latter group somewhat reminds one of the official Soviet picture of the Kulak.)

Together with many of the rebels against the rule of clergy and nobles–and last but not least against the great and powerful house of Fugger–Gaismair committed the error of believing that the country's young prince–Archduke Ferdinanc –had a benevolent understanding of the needs and demands of the peasants. Toc late they realized that they had been deceived by the acting of a superb politiciar whose goals were not too different from those of the ruling class as far as the exploitation of the dependent classes was concerned. Ferdinand himself–a ke figure right through the history of the struggle–is treated by Macek with cool objectivity. His role, whether in Austrian or Czech history, is not exactly heartwarming.

Gaismair's so-called "Landesordnung" – a comprehensive constitution to b implemented after the anticipated victory of the revolution–forms a sort of centerpiece of Macek's presentation, and rightly so, since it throws the strongest ligh on Gaismair's pioneering thoughts, his ideas of an essentially state-run econom with public monopolies of trade, nationalization of mining and a government base on a system of democratic elections. In his general enthusiasm for this great pla however, Macek makes rather light of the strangest feature of Gaismair's "Lande ordnung" —his demand to abolish all cities with only two exceptions: Brixen, the seat of the government, and Trent, as the only seat of industry and craft Perhaps we find here a surviving element of Taborite Chiliasm which talked destroying Bohemia's cities? If so, it would be an exceptional rather than a no mal element in Gaismair's spiritual world, which otherwise shows none of th features of Chiliastic mysticism that characterizes the other great figure of th Peasants' War: Thomas Münzer.

Of great interest is the last chapter which describes Gaismair's life as an exil Beginning in July 1526 Gaismair was employed as a condottiere by the Republ of Venice. Here Macek tells a largely unknown story, mainly concerning Gai mair's repeated but always unsuccessful attempts to gain the support of Veni and her allies in the League of Cognac for the invasion and liberation of th Tyrol. At the beginning of this time Gaismair was, indeed, still in effective contr of the troops at whose head he had made his last great invasion attempt an with whom he had retreated to Venetian territory. But soon he lost this litt army; he then spent his remaining years as a private citizen in Brescia and Padu This fact can hardly support Macek's thesis that, as long as he was alive, th Peasants' War as such was still not over. All that can be said is that Ferdinand ared a possible new outbreak and therefore set a high price on Gaismair's head. he ugly deed was finally done in April 1532.

Among the weaker parts of Macek's book is his treatment of the religious sues. Just as in his work on Tabor in the Hussite Revolution, he tries again to lentify, as completely as possible, religious radicalism with the political radicalism ising out of a revolutionary socio-economic class situation. This oversimplified heme is used here especially in relation to the Anabaptists who, in agreement ith the terminology used before by Smirin and others, are classed with the -called "People's heretical movement." Macek believes that Gaismair was at ast a strong sympathizer, if not actually a member of an Anabaptist group. hile it seems true that one or the other of his large family had turned toward nabaptism, this is rather less likely in the case of Gaismair himself, who remained close friend of Zwingli's to the end of the life of the Zürich reformer. Macek nphasizes strongly (and somewhat unnecessarily) the very obvious differences tween Zwingli and Luther, especially in their attitude to the Peasants' War. his, however, still leaves us with the fact of Zwingli's strong aversion to and entual persecution of the Zürich Anabaptists at the very time when Gaismair as in close contact with Zwingli on the subject of plans for a common attack ainst the Habsburg rulers.

Anabaptism was certainly alive in the Tyrol until a large number of its ad- rents emigrated from there to Moravia. There seems to be little evidence that played an important role in the Tyrolian Peasant War. But to Macek such a le seems at least likely, and to him it would signify the essential oneness between is earlier struggle and the later outbreak of the militant and Chiliastic variant Anabaptism at Münster. This seems a doubtful hypothesis but one on which have probably not heard the last word from Dr. Macek.

With all reservations, his work remains a highly important and in many ways illiant contribution to a neglected chapter of German history; a contribution hich, one must hope, will soon also be presented in a language whose diffusion is s limited than that of Czech.

niversity of Alberta **FREDERICK G. HEYMANN**

RKISCH, GUSTAV, *Die Mährisch–Trübauer Stadtlandschaft auf Grund des ältesten Urbars von 1535-1548.* (Vol. 5, *Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum.*) Munich: Verlag Robert Lerche, 1960. Pp. 108. DM 10.-

This little book, the fifth in a series concerned with Sudeten German history, an attractively produced work that tells us much about the life and work of ährisch-Trübau (Moravská Třebová) Germans of the sixteenth century, and o, though not by the author's intention, something of the reason why a twen- th-century Sudeten German writes from Munich rather than from Brno or ague.

From this *Urbar,* a registry of fees and services due the lord of the estate, one n, as Korkisch does, determine not only what rents, fees, and services men ndered to their lord, but also what kind of crops they raised, what trades they ed, what measures they used, what coin they circulated, how much property they ld, and generally find much to bring together a picture of life in town and ntry. Therein lies the appreciable historical value of the work.

However, it would seem from Korkisch's commentary that the purpose of the ok was not only, nor even primarily, to serve seekers after historical evidence, t to state again the case for the Sudeten Germans and their right to possess once again that which they lost in 1945. After reminding us that the Germa first settled the area in the thirteenth century, Korkisch would have us believe th in the middle of the sixteenth century there was still hardly a Czech to be four in the neighborhood. He dismisses the Czech names that he finds in the *Urb* with the assertion that the nationalistically perverse Czech scribes simply trar lated German names into the Czech equivalents. Then he writes that Germa made Mährisch-Trübau the "Athens of Moravia," however it was the Czech lor who held brilliant court, built the library, and patronized men of arts, not t German peasants and artisans. There is more, but it would be useless to argi every point.

It would be equally futile and fallacious to deny any German accomplishme or worth; but it should be said that if history can be used to justify Sudeten clain it can also be used to explain the expulsion of 1945. The wrongs suffered by t Sudeten Germans in 1945 are not to be condoned even when we remember t antecedent wrongs of 1938-1945, including Lidice. Two wrongs do not yet equ one right. But one can understand the Czech's loss of patience with the Sudet Germans, a minority who disrupted when they could not dominate, who we cavalierly inconsiderate or aloofly disdainful of Czech rights and worth, who c operated with the destroyer of the Czech state, and who were, and apparently st are, obsessed solely with German rights and singularly insensitive to Germa wrongs. Such attitudes, and the kind of historical "tunnel vision" which Korkis demonstrates, do not betoken a high corrigibility quotient. Therefore it is frc Munich that we hear this Sudeten protest and righteous indignation—which seer somehow hollow and brassy when heard against the background of lamentatio that the Czechs had to sing from 1620 to 1918 and again from 1938 to 1945.

University of Minnesota **William E. Wrig**

Miskolczy, Julius, *Ungarn in der Habsburger-Monarchie.* Band V in *Wie Historische Studien,* herausgegeben von Univ.-Prof. Dr. Karl Eder, G Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hugo Hantsch, Wien, Univ.-Prof. Dr. Hans Kramer, In bruck. Wien-München: Verlag Herold, 1959. Pp. 210. $4.10.

For almost four hundred years prior to World War I the Kingdom of Hung was intimately associated with the Habsburg domains in Central Europe. defeat of Hungary by Soliman I at Mohács (1526) brought the Crown of Stephen to the Austrian Habsburgs. The latter had repeatedly put forward th claims ever since Albert, the first member of the dynasty on the Hungarian thro had been elected King of Hungary upon the death of his father-in-law, Sigismun in 1437. Dynastic, cultural and political ties between Hungary, Austria, and the H Roman Empire had actually been rather close since the consolidation of the H garian Kingdom under the Árpáds in the XI-XIII centuries. But it was only s sequent to the victory of the Christian armies over the Turk at the gates of Vier in 1683 that the whole of Hungary and Transylvania was *de facto* incorpora into the Habsburg Empire. The greater part of the eighteenth century was sp in strengthening Habsburg power in the re-conquered South-Eastern territo This process was challenged and interrupted first by the great Hungarian natic uprising led by Francis II Rákóczi and the wars against his patron, Louis then by the crisis created by Frederick II's attacks on the "Queen of Hunga and, finally, by the widespread resentment stirred up under Joseph II due to latter's intention to centralize and Germanize the administration of the Em The constitutional issue of the Habsburg succession in Hungary was settled in ragmatic Sanction of 1722-23 which became a "fundamental law" of the country. ut the Diet of 1790, summoned upon the death of Joseph II and on the heels f the French Revolution, posed new issues to monarch and nation. The issues ere the problems of nationality, both Magyar and non-Magyar, and the question f progressive economic and social reforms.

Thus, it is not without justification that Miskolczy chooses as his point of eparture the year 1790, a landmark in the conflict to come between the josephinist oncept of a supranational centralized Empire and the idea of a modern Hungarian ational state. Author and editor of many indispensable works on Hungarian istory (*A kamarilla a reformkorszakban* [The Kamarilla in the Vormärz], Buda- est, n.d.; *A horvát kérdés* [The Croatian Question], 2 vols., published in *Fontes istoriae Hungaricae Aevi Recentioris,* Budapest, 1927-28; etc.), Professor Miskol- y, who currently teaches at the University of Vienna, leads his reader with a unning hand through the imbroglio of involved legal, economic, and political sues characterizing (and embittering) the relationship of the two halves of the onarchy between 1790 and 1914. Himself an expert in archival work, his study based on original research and a first hand knowledge of Hungarian and Austri- n archives, supplemented by an excellent selected bibliography and concise foot- otes which direct those interested to further readings.

The main chapters of the book are summed up under the headings "From the *esamtstaat* to National Sovereignty" (Ch. II), dealing with the period 1790-1847, Autarchy and Absolutism" (Ch. III), covering the years 1848-1867, and "The poch of the Compromise" (Ch. IV), centering around the problems of the pre- orld War I era. These three chapters are preceded by a thorough "Introductory the Problem" (Ch. I), which analyzes the constitutional and religious conflicts nd connections between the absolutistic rulers of the Holy Roman Empire and e rather independent-minded Hungarian Estates. Whereas in the sixteenth and venteenth centuries Hungary was the weakest of all the Habsburg domains, she eveloped in a rather remarkable way during the benevolent absolutism of Maria heresa and Joseph II. Miskolczy is right in emphasizing the importance of that eriod. He points out the fact that in order to maintain the great power status the Empire, the leading statesmen of the Monarchy saw themselves forced to vent a tariff and taxation system that favored the industrial development of ustria and Bohemia, discriminated against Hungary, and lay at the roots of her psided social development. At the same time, the author cannot help blaming e josephinist concept of a centralized *Gesamtstaat* for having contributed to the engthening of separatistic tendencies in Hungarian political life, a trend that came most dangerous both before and after 1848.

Miskolczy seems to consider the *Vormärz* period as a series of missed opportun- es both from the point of view of introducing long overdue reforms, and of ding an acceptable solution to the question of granting reasonable independence Hungary within the framework of the Austrian Empire on the basis of the agmatic Sanction. Essentially, he sides with Széchenyi, regarding Kossuth not much as a great revolutionary leader but as the embodiment of an unfortunate nd which itself was the result of conflicting historical forces.

Miskolczy treats his subject understandably from the viewpoint of the two olitical nations" *(Staatsvolk),* Austrian Germans and Hungarians. This is par- ularly obvious from the closing "Outlook" (Ch. V) of his work. But in the its of the space available he pays due attention, and gives fair treatment to increasingly significant political movements of other nationalities within the

Empire. Well aware of the "grave mistakes" committed in Hungary with rega to the nationality problem and also of the dissatisfaction with the Comprom of 1867 in both halves of the Monarchy, he nonetheless considers the system dualism as the guaranty of both the economic progress and great power status the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the decades preceding the first World War. T underlying assumption and consequence of this concept is the view that the c Monarchy had an organizing role and a historic function to fulfill in South-E Europe, an honest opinion shared or at least pondered by many a former oppone since the rise of totalitarian powers and especially since the end of World War

Dissenting from most Hungarian historians, it is the author's contention th in the latter half of the nineteenth century the political center of the Monarc shifted to Hungary. He regards this transfer of power primarily as a result of t constitutional impasse between the German and Bohemian elements in the Aust an half of the Monarchy. At the same time, he does not mince words in condem ing the revival of Great Hungarian imperialism, which chased the Fata Morga of raising 25-30 million Hungarians through spreading the Magyar tongue (p 170-71). Due to the history-consciousness and dominant political role of t Hungarian element, efforts to revive the centralistic trends of the pre-1867 e or to transform the dualistic system along the lines of trialism (including eith Czechs or Croats) or other federalistic principles, were *a priori* doomed to failu Since, however, the author does not refrain from revealing the anarchic conditio that prevailed in Hungarian political life around the turn of the century, one ca not help wondering whether his sincerity and integrity as a historian does n weaken one of the principal theses implied in the book, namely, that the Du Monarchy's dissolution was the outcome of the shortsightedness of Entente poli

In spite of this rather controversial issue and of the somewhat limited sp given to questions of social development, Professor Miskolczy's recent study a most thoughtful, scholarly, and informative work. Hungarians and those int ested in Hungary must feel indebted for its publication both to the author a to the editors of the *Wiener Historische Studien.*

University of Denver GEORGE BAR

BUSSENIUS, CHARLOTTE, *Die Preussische Verwaltung in Süd-und Neuostpreu 1793-1806.* Bd. 6, *Studien zur Geschichte Preussens,* Dr. Walther Hubat ed. Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1960. Pp. 341. DM 34.

South Prussia and New East Prussia were names given by Prussia to a annexed in the Second and Third Partitions of Poland. The former lay on left bank of the Vistula, south of the province of West Prussia, acquired in First Partition, and included much of the valley of the Warthe with the town Posen, Kalisch, and Warsaw. The latter lay like a quarter-moon south and eas old East Prussia, on the right bank of the upper Vistula and the Bug, inclu the valleys of the Narew and the Boberz, with the towns of Płock and Białys These areas were held by Prussia only until the establishment of the Grand Du of Warsaw by Napoleon, and were not returned to her by the Congress of Vie

The provincial administrative records were preserved, partly in Warsaw f 1806 to 1941, partly in Berlin; thereafter all in the Prussian Secret State Arc in Berlin-Dahlem until taken by the Russians in 1945. The author has been mitted to use them in the postwar "German Central Archive" *(Deutsches Zen archiv II)* in Merseburg. She acknowledges the general guidance of Professor batsch, editor of the series, and of Professor Braubach of Bonn, and financial ort from the German *Forschungsgemeinschaft* (Bad Godesberg), the Herder Institute, and the research association of North-Rhine-Westphalia. Her foreword was written in Oldenburg.

Unpublished documents have been "reorganized" in the new Central Archive I, but are faithfullly listed and cited here with both the old and the new designations. Among the recent or contemporary writers whose works are listed are Professors Braubach, Conze, Ludwig Dehio, A. Hahn, Halecki, Hartung, Hintze, Hubatsch, Meinecke, and Ritter. There is no index or list of persons mentioned; ut the outline is full and the charts and map are clear and complete. The writing is quite detailed.

It is pointed out with some pride but without apparent over-statement that, although the period of Prussian control was short, some material benefits were conferred upon the provinces in the form of honest, efficient, and intelligent administration, that their productivity increased, and that some of these improvements were relatively permanent. If there is propaganda here it is respectable and restrained.

University of Wisconsin **Chester V. Easum**

Born, Karl Erich, ed., *Historische Forschungen und Probleme, Peter Rassow zum 70. Geburtstag dargebracht von Kollegen, Freunden und Schülern.* Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1961. Pp. 373.

Like every *Festschrift* this volume was sent to the wrong reviewer. It should have gone to Professor Rassow who alone can assess with finality what his "friends, colleagues and students" have wrought in his honor. He might find it painful to be candid, but what business has a stranger to tell him whether or not his seventieth birthday was suitably observed in this collection of *Historische Forschungen und Probleme?*

Such a question is more than an opening gambit. Rassow's own contributions have illuminated facets of German history in the times of Frederick Barbarossa, Charles V, Bismarck and William II. On the first Spanish Habsburg he has written most persistently and effectively. Yet only one piece out of twenty (Ramon Carande, "Mercadores, artesanos y paños en Castilla [Sevilla 1518-1550]," (pp. 32-3) deals in its entirety with any area to which the master consecrated his energies. The question whether he has stimulated productive scholarship in the large and heterodox domains of his own interest is left unanswered. If this be an omission is a major defect; if it reflects an existing condition this offering is an ambiguous ft. Taking the collection as such the reviewer notes the usual diversity of subct matter, which ranges from the campaigns of Theodoric the Goth to Pearl Haror. As an American, his attention was first attracted by three contributions hat treat the history of his own country. Elisabeth Charlotte Engel ("Über das Wesen der amerikanischen 'Revolution,'" pp. 194-215) attempts to distinguish between the separation from England, a rebellion, and the founding of a new ate, an actual revolution. Dietrich Gerhard ("Alexis de Toqueville und die Vereinigten Staaten von heute," pp. 342-57) highlights the abiding significance of he *Democracy in America,* especially in the light of our national evolution ince the days of Andrew Jackson. Josef Engel's "Pearl Harbour und der intritt der Vereinigten Staaten in den zweiten Weltkrieg," (pp. 358-73) terminates the volume with a dismal thud. It is sheer Tansill, undocumented—faithful to the spirit of the model—unaware of Langer and Gleason as well as many other relevant authorities. In one lonely footnote the author threatens us with a st "longer study soon to be presented."

There is a great deal more and much of it is a great deal better. Günth Stoeckl adds a broad and solid review of the Moscovite Zemskii Sobor as a pro lem of historical research (pp. 66-87). Interesting new fields are uncovered Richard Konetzke's discussion of Prusso-Spanish relations in the time of Frederi the Great (pp. 161-73). The suggestion that political contacts during this ferti period opened Iberia to the burgeoning intellectual movement of Central Euro widens the vista opened by Richard Herr's recent *Eighteenth-Century Revolutic in Spain*. No less solid and worthwhile on the same period is Karl Erich Borr analysis of Turgot's political thought (pp. 181-93). But after all is said and do the largest raisin in the fruitcake is a substantial and imaginative study of Mar and Engels' view of Asia from the pen of Karl Dietrich Erdmann (pp. 256-83 Here, in somewhat less than thirty pages, we learn first to what extent the tw fathers of Marxism refrained from rash applications of their theories to the myste ious East, and how their caution was thrown to the wind by their more confide successors. Secondly, Erdmann sketches a terse but subtle picture of contempora Oriental upheavals as reflected in the writings of his protagonists. All in all, covers much in a limited space and lends distinction to an otherwise uneve volume. In recognition he deserves the honor of separate publication.

Tulane University HANS A. SCHMI

ADAMS, HENRY M., *Prussian-American Relations, 1775-1871.* Western Reser University Press, 1960. In collaboration with The Goettingen Research Co mittee. Pp. 135.

This slender volume is a valuable brief survey of the diplomatic, econom and cultural relations between Prussia and the United States to the founding the Empire. Although several studies have concentrated on German-Ameri relations since unification, relations prior to 1871 have been largely neglected. P fessor Adams has undertaken the useful task of examining this earlier period.

Frederick the Great was an interested observer of the American Revoluti but Prussia's national interests prescribed a course of strict neutrality. Recognit of the United States thus awaited the end of the war; not until 1785 was a tre of amity and commerce signed by representatives of the two countries. Thereaf diplomatic relations were occupied with matters of trade and routine; the states were too distant and had too few areas of contact for more weighty pr lems to arise. As Secretary of State Forsyth commented to the American Mini to Berlin in 1835, "not a major point of controversy exists . . . "

The most interesting and valuable aspect of this study is the examination the cultural interchanges between America and Prussia. Beginning with Geo Ticknor and George Bancroft, an ever-increasing number of Americans imbib deeply of German learning and returned home to infuse new scholarship methods into American life, manifested in schools, libraries, and the concept faculty as the very soul of a university, not its buildings and material aspe Much has been known of these important interchanges, but Mr. Adams prov a useful compilation and synthesis. Regrettably, however, the author often not go beyond a brief listing of the literary men and travel books. More sp could profitably have been devoted to a fuller treatment of American and Gerr views of the culture and institutions of the two countries.

The final portion of the volume is devoted to the German unification movement, which aroused much American interest and sympathy. Despite monarchical and conservative institutions, Prussia was regarded by many Americans as the most progressive of the German states and a Protestant bulwark against Catholic Austria. When the Franco-Prussian war began, marking the culmination of the German unification movement, most Americans including President Grant were personally sympathetic with Prussia—a sentiment compounded of nationalist empathy, Protestant prejudices, and dislike of the allegedly untrustworthy Napoleon III. Not until after the French defeat at Sedan and the establishment of the Third Republic did the pro-German sentiment begin to abate and concern for defeated France to be expressed. The author places less emphasis on this shift in opinion than does Henry Blumenthal, *A Reappraisal of Franco-American Relations, 1830-1871* (1959).

Professor Adams has made a worthwhile contribution to the historiography of German-American relations. The book is well-researched and well written. The only criticism relates to brevity; an expanded coverage would have allowed fuller descriptions and analyses.

University of Colorado **Daniel M. Smith**

Marx, Julius, *Die Österreichische Zensur im Vormärz* (Österreich Archiv). München: R. Oldenbourg, 1959. Pp. 76.

Published in the *Shriftenreihe des Arbeitskreises für Österreichische Geschich-e,* this useful little study tries to determine, on the basis of hitherto unpublished materials of the Austrian archives, the place and function of censorship in the "Austrian System" before 1848. In the opinion of the supporters of liberal reform, he *Zensurhofstelle* was an inseparable part of the oppressive Metternich "System;" these views of contemporary opponents of the regime survived in the writings of historians critical of the official policies of the *Vormärz* era. While correcting the errors, extreme tenets, and occasional misunderstandings of this traditional school of thought, the author essentially confirms that censorship was an organic part of Austrian government before 1848, and that all high ranking officials including the Kaiser considered it as a sometimes perhaps unpleasant or clumsy but basically useful and perfectly legitimate tool of paternalistic absolutism. Instead of arguing about "right" and "wrong," the author properly describes the legal documents and imperial ordinances regulating the tasks of the agencies engaged in the work of censorship. (Two of the most important regulations, the *Zensurvorschrift* of 1795 and 1810, are included *in toto* in the Annex.) Setting forth the rationale behind the institution of censorship, Julius Marx gives a concise survey of the uthorities and agencies which tried to put into practice the directives of the *Polizei-und Zensurhofstelle* in the different parts of the Empire. The *Polizei-und Zensurhofstelle,* presided over from 1815 to 1848 by Count Josef Sedlnitzky, was he most important coordinating and supervising organ of the varied and interlocking agencies that had something to do with one aspect or another of censorship; in addition, it had to consult in all important questions the State Chancery, which had its own *Zensurreferat* and collected information in other German states and broad, and which also censored the domestic official press. The highest judicial authorities and the Court Chancery did not always see eye to eye with Sedlnitzky; on the other hand, he was usually supported by the *Staatskonferenz.* The operational work of the agencies engaged in supervising the domestic and foreign press, publishing business, theater, and other artistic activities, was considerably slowed down by the necessity of cooperating with other imperial and local authorities;

in 1845 Sedlnitzky reorganized the *Hofstelle's* work, creating a *Zensuroberdirektio* in Vienna which also incorporated the previous *Bücherrevisionsamt* and the d cisions of which could be appealed to a new *Oberzensurkolleg,* a collective bod presided over by Sedlnitzky but in which the State Chancery, Court Chancer and *Oberste Justizstelle* also had one representative each.

Besides analyzing the respective roles of the highest ranking censors, Francis Metternich, and Sedlnitzky, in the establishment, theory, and practice of censorshi (thus subtly correcting some rather traditional views), the author also supplie some valuable information concerning the background and qualifications of th officials and censors employed by the controlling agencies. Generally speaking, h describes them as well educated, honest, and dedicated men, familiar with th problems of literary and scholarly activities. Despite occasional blunders and th clumsiness of the system as a whole, and despite the hostility of the public at larg there is no justification for accusing the majority of the censors of ill will, igno ance, or unnecessary red tape. The work of the censors was supervised by th public and the higher authorities; the latter were quick to remove those who faile in their duties. One may add that there were cases when the censor gave a benev lent opinion to high officials in order to promote the publication of a work whic however, was forbidden by the political authorities (cf. Széchenyi's *Stadium*).

Austrian censorship was intended to be all embracing. Anything writte printed or engraved: epitaphs and lexica, cuff links, rings or brooches, picture and drawings, theater plays, operas (text and music), songs, and the daily press- all had to be submitted to the censor before reaching the public. The treatme given varied aspects of scholarly and literary activities differed from category category. Scientific works, multi-volume scholarly publications, expensive subscri tions to foreign journals were seldom forbidden, unless they contained a dire attack on religion or the dynasty. Calendars and popular literature such as nove however, were treated rather harshly because they were supposed to reach the l educated lower classes, the morals of which were patronized by the governme Works submitted to the censor were either accepted for publication *(admittitu* tolerated *(transeat)* because of their limited appeal, admitted to restricted circu tion among a select group of people *(erga schedam)* or forbidden outright *(dam tur)* The censors were especially sensitive in three areas: in instances where t state was directly concerned (implying by this any critcism directed against t monarch, the dynasty, and high ranking imperial officials), in questions relating religious feeling in general and to the Catholic faith in particular, and in all th affecting the good morals of the people, e.g. erotic literature. In order to ma censorship more efficient, a number of agreements were concluded with vari German and Italian states but not with France.

Those in favor of liberal ideas obviously bitterly resented all measures relat to the institution of censorship. Belief in progress through liberty and educati became the creed of the middle classes; any restriction of the freedom of spee press, and assembly was regarded as a violation of human dignity. Universal c sorship as instituted and practiced by the Metternich "System" was bound perish, along with the "System" itself, in the storm of 1848. Prior to this, howev censorship served the purposes of the Austrian state for almost half a centu Far from being aimed at isolating the Empire from the rest of Germany or Euro its rigor or mildness depended primarily on prevailing political circumstances.

University of Denver **George Bara**

ÉSÁROŠ, JÚLIUS, *Rolnická a národnostná otázka na Slovensku, 1848-1900. (K. problematike feudalnych prežitkov).* Bratislava, 1959. Pp. 227.

To the social historian it is at once apparent that the persistent factors in a udy of social and economic problems in Slovakia must be based on a simple erusal of the enduring character of the land and the people. To this must be dded the political and juridical web by means of which the system and its intriate interrelationships is held together, rooted in the historical past.

The present volume is an expansion of an earlier study (1955), *K problematike udalnych prežitkov na Slovensku v druhy polovici XIX storocia,* in which the uthor examined the "social archaeology" of a dying system of "feudalism" and a ascent capitalism in the old Magyar kingdom. The starting point is the abortive evolution of 1848 in both the Kingdom at large and Slovakia in particular. One ust at once agree with him in his contention that this is a rich field of endeavor, ut scantily probed, even though the story constitutes one of the most painful apters in the history of modern Slovakia. The work in hand is the result of rther research and documentation, sustained by a theory of social causation which ems to rest primarily on Marxist dialectics and historical theory. The author is itical, as indeed succeeding generations of historians have an obligation and a ght to be, of the earlier "bourgeois" approach to one of the central problems Slovak history. It is his contention that a purely national approach, delimiting even excluding, the basic social and economic factors was too limited. While the tainment of civic rights was essential, underlying that factor was the prevailing cial system and the economic mode of production and ownership. To put it other way: in the older historiography, of which he is critical, the "national oblem" as a concept was based on too narrow a foundation. Not only is this ork a corrective of earlier approaches to the agrarian and national problem, plicit in the older Slovak historiography, but it attempts to bolster its main eses by reference to statistical tables and a critique of earlier national ideology. ithal it is a description of the harsh "Prussian road" of exploitation over which e Slovak people were led by overweening land-magnates and bourgeois capitalists.

The following brief summary of ideas and conclusions may be of some use. ne capitalistic period in Slovakia began after the revolution of 1848, i.e. coincintally with the bourgeois upheaval. Nevertheless, there was little social change or minution of the economic and political power pattern in the ranks of the rmer "feudal" landed aristocracy. The methods and mentality of this governing ss changed but little in the process of evolution from a predominantly landed a capitalistic, large enterprise system. In this process the impoverished (pauperd) masses were delimited in their approach to the use and ownership of the nd, the very basis of their existence. Furthermore, the lagging development of siness enterprise in Slovakia failed to make adequate use of the enormous pools reserve labor power and skill to be found in the villages. Due to this uneconomic d unimaginative situation, two alternatives faced the common Slovak man, mely, to sink into a hopeless feudal dependence on the great landlords; or, to igrate to a more highly developed capitalistic country (unnamed).

In order to maintain this implicitly iniquitous set-up, it became necessary to prive the masses of their fundamental rights and liberties, thus compounding one l with another. Obviously the abortive "democratic-bourgeois" revolution, reting in the national persecution of the Slovak people, could have but one ult: their complete moral subjugation and political subjection. In their resistce to this peril, the Slovaks were left largely to their own meager resources. Nevertheless, not only to them but to the Magyar state there remained the basi historic task of completing the abortive reforms and re-instituting the principl of the democratic-bourgeois revolution. This could have been accomplished by th following historical moves: (1) Overturning the landed aristocracy and dividin their estates; (2) Overturning the Magyar monarchy and establishing a democrati state structure, with the broadest rights and liberties. (3) Abolishing all forms c national discrimination. All of which reminds us of the poet's sentiment: th saddest words of tongue or pen, it might have been!

It seems fairly clear that the object of this work, beyond providing schola with some new material but not so new a point of view, is the instruction of th younger generation of Slovaks in the details of the struggles in which their granc fathers and fathers were involved, but which, alas, may have very little to do wit the contemoprary condition of Slovakia.

There is a fairly extensive working bibliography in Czech, Slovak, and Magya

University of the City of New York, GEORGE WASKOVIC
Hunter College

ENGEL-JANOSI, FRIEDRICH, *Oesterreich und der Vatikan.* Band I: 1848-1903; Band II 1903-1918. Styria, Graz-Wien-Koeln. Pp. 323, 420. S. 500.

The American student is likely to take a critical view of state-church relatio in nations which do not follow the U.S. constitutional pattern and well establishe tradition of strict and friendly separation. Of course, the Vatican in F. Enge Janosi's title stands for the former Papal States and, after the absorption of th papal territory by Italy, for its internationally recognized sovereign successio The two volumes under review present a major and highly competent contrib tion to modern Central European diplomatic history. Covering seventy years decisive political developments, they make it abundantly clear why our prese concept did not and could not possibly apply in prewar Europe, especially not Austria-Hungary which, up to 1901, together with France, and after the failu of the attempted "Ralliement" in the last years of the pontificate of Leo XI alone was considered to be the Catholic among the Great Powers.

Readers of the *Journal of Central European Affairs* may remember the pap published by Engel-Janosi in its October 1951 issue (pp. 259-278) on "the Res nation of Count Kálnoky as Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary," an eve (1895) caused by Hungarian criticism connected with certain activities of then Papal Nuncio Agliardi which were denounced as undue interference domestic affairs. Other specialized studies of the same author, i.e. on the Rom Question, French and Austrian Advice to Pius IX, 1846-1848, the Conclave 1878, the Conclave of 1903, the History of the Austrian Veto, etc., appeared the *Catholic Historical Review* (July 1950, April 1952, July 1953), in *Revue Be de Philologie et d'Histoire* (1951), *Rivista Storica Italiana* (1954), *Mitteilung des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* (1954, 1955) and in *F schrift zum 200-jährigen Bestand des Haus-Hof-und Staatsarchivs Wien* (195

Twelve years of extensive research in the archives of Vienna, Rome, and Pa resulted in this two-volume history of the relations between Austria (the th leading Catholic power) and the Holy See in the period between the gr Central European social revolutions of the nineteenth (1848) and twentieth c turies (1918).

No small achievement, brilliantly written and carefully documented, it sho be of interest to all historians concerned with the subtle methods and exten ramifications of the art of classic diplomacy; it shows the rapidly changing political scene of the nineteenth century up to the eve of World War I; it sheds new light on personalities, and the motives of their actions, such as the Popes Pius IX, Leo XIII, Pius X, the papal Secretaries of State Antonelli and Rampolla, Francis Joseph I of Austria, his foreign ministers and ambassadors, Napoleon III, Cavour and their Italian policy; last not least, it puts metapolitical considerations in international relations into the right perspective. Then as today, power alone did not necessarily settle the issues.

For seventeen years Professor of History at the Catholic University of America, the distinguished author returned recently to his native Austria and the University of Vienna, not without bearing witness to a minor double loyalty problem of his own: the allegiance to his teachers in the old, and his students in the new world. Thus, volume I is dedicated to his Austrian, volume II to his American friends. Both volumes prove once more that even highly specialized history writing must by no means be boring. Done with a remarkable degree of objectivity, showing masterly scholarship, and well written, they make for stimulating reading.

The specialist in Church history and Canon Law as well as the student familar with the specific problems of Austrian "Staatskirchenrecht" and Josefinism will probably find most interesting the chapters dealing with the instructions regarding use of the veto on the occasion of the Conclaves of 1846, 1878, and, mainly, 1903 (Vol. I, Ch. 1, 9; Vol. II, Ch. 1, 9). Extensive use of new source material leads to partly revised and, in any case, authentic conclusions. There are other matters of general interest which should command the attention of every trained mind nxious to reach a better understanding of the operative ideals, the cultural climate, and the various irrational trends of the nineteenth-century prewar world. For many it might come as a surprise to learn that the relations between the foremost Western conservative power and the Catholic Church were by no means as mooth and harmonious as it is widely assumed. This holds true for the neo-absolutist period up to 1867, and no less for the following constitutional era. There is a conspicuous difference of opinion between Metternich's "Aperçus," adices sent to the newly elected Pius IX (1723), and the latter's "faremmo qualche osa" answer. The vaccilating policy of Vienna concerning the temporal power of the Pope and the protection of his territorial possessions, mainly under the mpact of the events of 1866 and 1870; the maneuver of the Austrian Chancellor, Count Beust, to buy Italy's consent to an Austrian-French-Italian alliance by giving up the "patrimonium Petri" (I, 153); later on, the bitter controversy about he Austrian Church Laws of 1874, and the inactivity of Austria with regard to solution of the Roman Question as desired by the Holy See, especially under Leo XIII and Cardinal Rampolla (I, Ch. 12)—an inactivity explained by the ituation created by the Triple-Alliance Treaty and the necessary consideration given to Italian sensitivity; all this shows that the field of disagreement between Vienna and the Vatican was considerably wider and more accentuated than the ontinuance of outward friendly relations and the basic conformity of interests would have suggested. It explains also why Cardinal Rampolla leaned towards France and even St. Petersburg, expecting that the French-Russian combination would be helpful in clarifying the precarious situation of the Holy See in the midst of a virtually hostile Rome (I, 299 f.).

As a matter of fact, Bismarck, the guiding force of Central Europe, did nothing o create a more favorable climate. Quite the contrary, he had embarked on his amous *Kulturkampf,* provoked, not exclusively but widely, by German Catholic loyalty towards the Pope in his efforts to attain an acceptable solution of the Roman question.

Moreover, Cardinal Rampolla and the Pope supported the claims of Slavic (mainly south- (Yugo-) Slavic nationalities in Austria) to the use of their vernacular in the liturgy; this would have meant an extension of the Eastern rite, strongly objected to by the Austrian-Hungarian Government as a potential danger to the unity of the Empire (I, Ch. 11, 12). Thus, Rampolla, prospectively the strongest candidate at the next conclave, was considered anti-Austrian and pro-French in Vienna. His election was successfully blocked (II, Ch. 1).

The events at the (top secret) conclave of 1903 became known through an exact account of a lecture given by Cardinal Gibbons of Baltimore at the College in Woodstock, Md., on November 4, 1903. Cardinal Gibbons, as a ranking member in the Sacred College, had been seated at the conclave next to Rampolla. (II, 38, n. 81).

The following pontificate of Pius X was marked by a different attitude towards the Slavic question and a deep-rooted distrust of Russia. The relations between Vienna and the Vatican were friendlier despite some conflicts resulting from different views in matters of cultural affairs (cf. Wahrmund-affair, II, 86 ff.). In World War I Austria and the Papacy had, if for different reasons, the same basic interest in keeping Italy out of the war. For the Vatican, the belligerency of Italy could but mean the virtual loss of its freedom of movement. The chapters dealing with the aspects of the Roman Question under Pope Benedict XV; the international relations of the Papacy during the war; the papal attempt at mediation and the mission of the Papal Nuncio Eugenio Pacelli, the later Pius XII (II, Ch. 14); eventually the concluding chapter dealing with the collapse of Austria and the resumption of diplomatic relations by the newly established Republic with the Vatican, are extremely thought provoking and constitute history writing at its best.

The technique of confronting the reader with original sources by extensive quotations of diplomatic reports, instructions, news releases and comments enables him to reach an independent opinion and to form his immediate conclusions. The author is not concerned with presenting any pre-established thesis or theory. He frankly admits that the final word cannot be expected before the Vatican archives are made fully accessible (Pref. xix); "their treasures are about now coming into the open as to the period of Pio Nono" (xxi). Nevertheless, Engel-Janosi has done an invaluable service to historiography by his publication, the impressive and highly competent result of research on an important and hitherto neglected sector of Central European diplomatic history.

The interested student may gain additional and corroborating insight into the pertinent problems by consulting two recently published, well documented studies by Norbert Miko on "Die innere Lage des Kirchenstaats in den letzten Jahren seines Bestehens" (*Römische Historische Mitteilungen,* geleitet von Leo Santifaller, 3.Heft, Hermann Boehlaus Nachf., Graz-Koeln, 1960) and "Die römische Frage, eine Wurzel des deutschen Kulturkampfs" (Jahresbericht des Kollegium Petrinum, Linz, 1959/60).

The Holy See, reports Professor Engel-Janosi, though basically friendly inclined towards Austria, was deeply concerned and rather pessimistic as to her future and inner strength. This attitude was shown in the pontificates of Leo XIII and Pius X. It became clearly visible again under Pius XI, and this before the definite change in the climate at the Palazzo Venezia (1937).

St. Louis University KURT V. SCHUSCHNIGG

Jenks, William A., *Vienna and the Young Hitler.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. Pp. viii, 252. $5.00.

This book is an attempt to recreate the Vienna in which Hitler spent six aimless but intensely important years. It adds nothing, as the author frankly admits, to the previously collected biographical data on Hitler. The emphasis is mainly on Vienna and only indirectly on the young Hitler. The jacket, which prints the second half of the title in much larger letters than the first, is, therefore, somewhat misleading.

In a number of well-written chapters the reader is introduced to the main political forces and the major currents in art, literature, and music during the last years of the Austrian capital prior to World War I. Jenks ably traces the development of the three political camps as they emerged after the creation of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy in 1867. Particular emphasis is given to the rise of anti-semitism and the Jewish question in Austria, an emphasis which is quite justified in view of the frame of reference of the book. The chapters on Lueger and the Christian Social Party, on Schönerer and the Nationalist movement, on the earlier and later history of the Social Democratic Party and its leading figures, while all based on solid research and incorporating the recent literature, do not add much to the stock of knowledge with which the specialist is already familiar. They are, however, very instructive for the general reader. The most valuable chapter in this reviewer's opinion is the one dealing with the housing situation in Vienna and the various types of "flop" houses with which Hitler undoubtedly became familiar during his stay. The chapters devoted to the cultural and artistic currents are also ably and skillfully done, though they are unavoidably less penetrating. It also could be argued that, given the theme Vienna and the Young Hitler, they are much too "intellectual." It is in no way surprising, as Jenks seems to think, that Hitler took no notice (and if he did, probably could not care less) of the Schönberg movement in modern music, etc., and that "Rilke, Hofmannsthal, Wildgans, etc., never reached him." He may have been more familiar with the so-called *Heimatkunst* (Ganghofer, etc.) which stressed soil and occasionally blood, and not infrequently warned of the Jewish danger. As to pamphlets and newspapers, Hitler was presumbaly as much exposed to and influenced by the trashy anti-semitic publications like the satirical *Kikeriki* as by the *Alldeutsches Tagblatt* and *Deutsches Volksblatt.* More research into the former type of publications might have strengthened the relevant parts of the book.

The author himself is aware that "a reading of *Mein Kampf* calls for great caution" and that anything which goes beyond the accounts of Kubizek, Greiner, and Jetzinger, leads into the realm of conjecture and speculation. Nevertheless, the relationship between Vienna 1906-13 and Hitler is sometimes extremely tenuous. For instance, after giving us an account of the famous Redl spy case the author concludes:

> To Adolph Hitler, abandoning Austria in 1913, the Redl case must have been another sign of the corruption and approaching doom of the despised Habsburg edifice. If Germans in this empire were subjected to "undignified submission and fulfillment of all and every extortion," why be surprised that a high-ranking officer of German stock should sell his honor to a potential enemy? (p. 157)

So the overall impression of this well-written and well-researched book is that, from the point of view of historical scholarship, it is something of a *tour de force.*

Cornell College Eric C. Kollman

Ritter, Gerhard, *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk. Das Problem des "Militarismus" in Deutschland.* Bd. II: *Die Hauptmächte Europas und das Wilhelminische Reich (1890-1914).* München: Verlag R. Oldenbourg, 1960. Pp. 393. DM 30.

The father of Frederick the Great signed one of his pictures *"In tormentis pinxit."* Despite his admirably consistent professional objectivity, Professor Ritter confesses in his foreward to this (second) volume of his (planned) three-volume study of the relation between statecraft and the German military that he has written it in travail of spirit. He is old enough to have gone with his people from the deceptively bright sunshine of the prewar Hohenzollern Reich through the twilight of defeat, 1918, the promising half-light of the Republic, and the blackness of the Nazi period. Yet he is still young enough, as was said of him by this reviewer of the first volume in this series (1955), to be deeply concerned about the present and future of his land and people. So he goes his sturdy way, the way of the scholar and the historian. A second edition of Volume I was published in 1959. Volume III will be eagerly awaited.

In words startlingly like those chosen by Professor Schmitt as title for his 1960 presidential address, "With how little reason," Professor Ritter writes (p. 328): "Seldom has a European great power blundered with so much blindness into a fight for its existence;" and the highest military leadership, he says, played an important part. "The fact (p. 333) that those responsible for the conduct of German policy saw or believed themselves compelled to accept without recognizable opposition such a war plan [1914] as 'military necessity' shows an extreme of helpless dependence of policy upon war policy." This was true; but the author insists (p. 343) that it need not have been so; that there must still have been a sphere of freedom of decision for the responsible statesman, for political reason. "We must despair of the future of mankind if this were not so."

Part of the blindness referred to was inability, especially on the part of von Tirpitz, to understand British reaction to the challenge of a German high seas fleet, which he thought would make Germany *bundnisfähig,* potentially valuable as an ally. Another was largely Bülow's belief that Germany dare not alienate Austria-Hungary by trying to dictate Balkan policy, followed by Moltke's failure to control or restrain his "opposite number," Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorff, who, Professor Ritter says, did not want a world war but wanted war (p 283). So Germany was technically at war with Russia six days earlier than Austria-Hungary, in whose cause principally she had been drawn in (p 334).

The notes give not only sources but useful commentaries. The reader is well guided to them, in a separate section at the end of the book, by a page citation as well as its own serial number for each note. There is also a fine index of persons.

University of Wisconsin Chester V. Easum

Albertini, Luigi, *Venti Anni di Vita Politica:* Parte Prima, Vols I/II. *L'Esperienza Democratica Italiana (1898-1914).* Parte Seconda, Vols. I/II/III. *L'Italia nella Guerra Mondiale (1914-1918).* Bologna: Nicola Zanichelli, Editore, 1950-53. Each volume, L. 2000.

This is a monumental work of memoirs, data, facts and historical reminiscences, enriched with personal experiences. It is packed into five long tomes that deal with *Twenty Years of Italian Political Life,* from the 1898-1900 political crisis up to the 1918 armistice. Luigi Albertini, one of the foremost Italian publicists, a former Senator, and publisher of the largest and most influential Italian daily, *Il Corriere della Sera,* died in 1941. This work is a treasure for those interested in a dramatic period of European history.

Signor Albertini was born in Ancona, in 1871, studied law at the University of Turin, and contributed to some scholarly and non-scholarly Italian publications. In 1900 he joined the *Corriere,* became one of its leading editors and, finally, its publisher and owner. Under his editorship, the *Corriere* became the largest Italian and one of the most prominent European newspapers (in the prewar years it was called The London *Times* of Italy). In 1925 Albertini, a liberal and fierce critic of the Fascist regime, under direct pressure from Mussolini had to leave and finally sell the newspaper to which he had dedicated his whole life. Albertini's disappearance from the *Corriere* meant the end of the free press in Italy. In retirement Albertini started his memoirs, *Twenty Years of Political Life,* but he stopped to write *The Origins of the War of 1914,* published recently in English. (Volumes I and II of the *Origins of the War of 1914* have been thoroughly presented and analyzed by René Albrecht-Carrié in the *Journal,* Vol. XVI, October 1956, pp. 266-282, under the title "Revisionism Revisited." Volume III was reviewed by Howard McGaw Smyth in the *Journal,* October 1958, pp. 332-333).

Both works, *The Origins* and the present one, reveal a unity of thought and political action, thus completing each other. The first two volumes of *Twenty Years of Political Life* describe the "Democratic Experiment" in Italy from 1898 to 1914. This section of the work deals essentially with the internal democratic transformation of Italy. New light is shed on the impact that revolutionary events in Central Europe had on the Italian situation, especially the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Habsburg Empire, of whom Italy was first an uneasy ally and thereafter an enemy. Albertini, however, considers that period to be the dawn of political freedom and sees the need for Italian political life to separate itself from Austria. In joining France and Great Britain, he believes, as did the most progressive section of the Italian political and intellectual *élite,* that Italy could have improved her national aspirations and matured her painstaking democratic growth. Thus he embraces the idea that Italy should have sided with the South Slavs and other new nations in the Balkans and contributed actively to their opposition to the Dual and Ottoman Empires. In this effort Albertini follows the liberal tradition of the Mazzinis and Cavours, opposed by the Italian official policy-makers of the Royal Court and the upper classes.

The last three volumes, *Italy in the World War,* trace diplomatic history from the July crisis of 1914 through Italy's policy of neutrality and intervention on the side of the Entente: in the first volume, from the Declaration of War in May 1915 to the eve of Caporetto, from October 1917 in the second, and from Caporetto to Vittorio Veneto in November 1918 in the third. These volumes deal with the relations of Italy with Austria-Hungary and Germany and with her war allies France, Great Britain, and the Balkan allies, Serbia and Greece. The role of Russia in the London Treaty (1915) is particularly illuminated, especially the activities of Frano Supilo, an exiled Croat publicist, active in the formation of Yugoslavia, who discovered from Russian sources in Petrograd the secret clauses of that treaty which were menacing the national aspirations of the Yugoslavs on the Adriatic.

The volumes describe the part played by the author and the *Corriere della Sera* in the establishment of contacts between Italian liberals and the leaders of the "oppressed nations" in Rome, in 1918. The story of the Congress of Rome is told in all its details. Though the Congress failed to achieve the badly needed unity between the Italians and Yugoslavs, Albertini's work contributes immensely to the knewledge of the Italo-Yugoslav understanding. Albertini's information is tremendously valuable and it has to be taken into consideration in any work dealing with that period of Italy's foreign policy, namely in her dealings with Yugoslavia and other Central European nations. Yet a historian who uses Albertini should take into consideration the Italian diplomatic documents, *I Documenti Diplomatici Italiani,* that are now being regularly published by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome, for Albertini, after his retirement from the *Corriere,* did not have access to Italian official archives.

This work, published ten years after Albertini's death by his son, Leonardo Albertini, who adds a useful and moving preface, is a dignified contribution to Italy's most difficult years, when the democratic experiment of a young state, weakened and interrupted by the rise of Fascism, slowly emerges again. To the young generation of Italians this experience as told by a noble spirit under the shadow of Fascism is of great educational value. To foreign students, particularly those who deal with the relations of Italy and her Yugoslav neighbors, it is a document of unquestionable value. Italy's position in the Adriatic, facing the new South Slav and Balkan world, can hardly be understood without reading and following Albertini's masterly work.

Careful indexes have been added to the volumes, thus facilitating scholarly use.

Fairleigh Dickinson University Bogdan Raditsa

Besson, Waldemar, *Württemberg und die deutsche Staatskrise 1928-33. Eine Studie zur Auflösung der Weimarer Republik.* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1959. Pp. 425. DM 39.

Waldemar Besson's study of *Württemberg und die deutsche Staatskrise 1928-33,* whose scope and intent is best indicated by the subtitle, is an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the final years of the Weimar Republic. The author is able to provide valuable new perspectives on the basis of his thorough research in the files of the Württemberg *Staatsministerium,* files which are important not only for local history but for many hitherto neglected aspects of Weimar history on the national level. The reports of the Württemberg ambassadors to Berlin and Munich have been used to special advantage. Historians working on the Weimar Republic have hitherto concentrated their attention primarily upon party politics, the work of the Reichstag, foreign affairs and the role of the army. Besson concentrates by contrast upon the role of the bureaucracy, financial questions, the Reichsrat, and the constitutional problems raised by the survival of federal elements in the Weimar constitution. Württemberg presents an excellent *point d'appui* for throwing new light on all these questions. It was a *Land* sufficiently large to exercise some political influence (unlike, for example, Oldenburg or Anhalt), yet it was not atypical like Bavaria with its unrealistic pretentions and anti-Berlin complex. The Württemberg Staatspräsident, Eugen Bolz, was a close friend and political ally of Heinrich Brüning, and the materials used by Besson throw important new light on the entire "Brüning era." The book is written with exceptional lucidity even when treating intrinsically dry and technical matters. A carefully selected documentary appendix gives the reader a representative sampling of the new sources utilized by Besson.

The treatment given to local Württemberg affairs is exemplary in never losing itself in parochial detail. Besson provides a superb analysis of the structure of the

Stuttgart government and the parties represented in the Landtag. The author ruthlessly destroys many legends based upon the supposedly exemplary character of "Swabish democracy" *à la* Switzerland. The Württemberg government of the years 1928-33 was characterized by an authoritarian-bureaucratic mentality which paid little attention to, and had less respect for, either the Landtag or public opinion. Its leading figures, Staatspräsident Bolz and Finance Minister Dehlinger, felt and acted like Hegelian bureaucrats rather than democratic politicians. They believed themselves to be servants of a state ideal which looked to the general welfare, not delegates of parties, pressure groups, or other disagreeable "democratic elements." They believed that their economic views, which were in fact a faithful expression of conservative orthodoxy, were the quintessence of disinterested objectivity (*Sachlichkeit*). They contrasted *Staatspolitik* with *Parteipolitik* and *Sachlichkeit* with *Interessentenegoismus,* and believed, in fact, in a Hegelian *state* of superior wisdom keeping a firm rein over a pluralistic *society* paralyzed by short-sighted and selfish social forces. Besson notes correctly that their political and economic outlook was, in fact, a Swabian variety of the outlook held by Chancellor Brüning on the national level. It is no wonder that they gave enthusiastic support to Brüning, once it was clear that the Chancellor was willing to respect their federalist sensibilities. Besson shows deep understanding and sympathy for Bolz and Brüning alike.

The core of Besson's book is, indeed, a warm eulogy of the Brüning constitutional experiment from 1930-1932. The author accompanies his narrative by a frequent polemic against Bracher's *Auflösung der Republik,* a work sharply critical of Brüning. Besson's methodological objections to Bracher will be noted below; here it suffices to note that Besson insists that the Brüning era cannot be considered simply as a brief transition between the Weimar parliamentary system and Nazi totalitarianism, but has a significance and nobility *sui generis.* Brüning contemplated his "Presidential system," in Besson's questionable view, at first only tentatively and without long-range design as the parliamentary parties proved incapable of providing effective government. He established it only in July 1930 after he had failed to achieve a *Bürgerblock* majority in the existing Reichstag. Besson believes that Brüning, in contrast to his successor, Papen, genuinely stood above all party and economic interests with his *Politik der Sachlichkeit,* and that he was overthrown by the Junker clique in May 1932 precisely because of his impartiality. He also believes that Brüning was an adamant foe of Nazism whose intransigent hostility was unhappily succeeded by Papen's purely tactical-opportunist attitude towards Hitler. It appears to this reviewer that he exaggerates somewhat the contrast between Brüning and Papen on both points. Brüning's economic policies were in general—to say the least—not hostile to the interests of the upper classes; his attempt to negotiate with the Nazis before the Presidential election of 1932 did not differ in principle from Papen's negotiations in August 1932.

It should be noted that Besson's eulogy of Brüning and his "Presidential constitutional experiment" is by no means uncritical. He fully recognizes that the entire conception of a disinterested *state* standing above an egotistic-pluralistic *society* is a hopeless anachronsm in an age of mass democracy. Brüning erred in his refusal to modify his *sachliche Politik* by compromises essential for preserving the modicum of popular support needed to dam the Nazi tide. Besson portrays in a profound concluding chapter the ideal of a statesman practicing a doctrine of reason of state brought up to date to fit the conditions of an industrialized mass society. Such a statesman must compromise, first in his own soul and then in his practical policy, the competing claims of "objective state necessities" and of irrepressible political and social forces whose subjective wishes contradict these "objective necessities" (cf. Meinecke's portrayal of the necessary compromise between state necessity and moral law in reason of state as applied to foreign policy). Brüning fell far short of this ideal type of statesman, but Besson treats his policies nonetheless with great sympathy. This is presumably conditioned by his well-justified contempt for the ordinary party politicians of the Great Coalition which preceded Brüning and the frivolous dilettantism of the Papen government which succeeded him. He never fully recognizes the weight of Bracher's argument that the intrinsic faults of the Great Coalition were compounded by the propagation of the ideals of Presidential government, which minimized the inducements to compromise their differences within the parliamentary framework; and he recognizes only hesitantly and indirectly that the political and economic consequences of the Brüning policies were a major factor in the Nazi accession to power (p. 363).

Besson differs from Bracher not only in many of his substantive conclusions but in his fundamental methodology. Bracher's book is dominated by a structural analysis of the weaknesses of the Weimar state as troubled by a hostile bureaucracy, discrepancy between political and economic structure, survival of an anti-democratic spirit in the army, etc. These factors go far to explain the inglorious collapse of the Republic. Besson misreads Bracher's position as involving a "fatalist" determinism, which Bracher has vehemently denied. Besson is on firmer ground in his view that Bracher's use of a "typology" derived from political science handicaps him sometimes in his treatment of concrete individual facts. He draws, however, too sharp a dichotomy between the techniques of political science and history. His own successful use of "structural analysis" and able employment of "general factors" abstracted from the concrete flow of history constitutes, somewhat ironically, a virtual refutation of the methodological objections he advances to Bracher's work.

It remains to note some of the specific contributions made by Besson's study. His account of Württemberg affairs is excellent despite the fact that he gives too little material on how the depression affected the *Land* and how Nazism rose to be a considerable local force appealing to 42% of the electorate by March 1933. The reader would also like to learn more about the leading politicians, some of whom lived to play a prominent role in the Bonn Republic (like Economics Minister Reinhold Maier, later head of the FDP, and Kurt Schumacher, head of the SPD from 1945 to his death in 1952). Besson's treatment of what he calls the "governmental federalism" of Bavaria, is path-breaking. He throws a flood of new light on the work of the Reichsrat, which the Brüning government attempted to build up as a counterweight to the Reichstag in the autumn of 1930: its bureaucratic *Sachlichkeit* differed sharply from the political demagogy of the Reichstag. Besson presents valuable materials on the important *Reichsreform* discussion of the early 1930s and shows how the federalist principle became largely intertwined with the anti-parliamentary cause. He shows that the relationship between the Reich and *Länder* bureaucracy was characterized by incessant friction over the federal problem, yet both were united by a common hostility to parties, politicians, and an *unsachliche* public opinion. Most notable of all is his characterization of the bureaucratic mentality of the Württemberg *Staatsministerium* which led to its internal paralysis when it came to oppose the "legitimate authority" of the Reich, even when this authority was wielded by Adolf Hitler. A man like Bolz was incapable of understanding the true nature of the Nazi totalitarian movement, and the fact that he kept the Württemberg administration free of Nazi influences until March 1933 had no perceptible influence upon the course of national events. The reader can appreciate the many new perspectives introduced by Besson's study even if he dissents from the exaggerated polemic against Bracher, the general defense of Brüning, and the warm if ultimately ambiguous sympathy with the *Politik der Sachlichkeit.*

Brown University KLAUS EPSTEIN

PAASIVIRTA, JUHANI, *Einsimmäisen maailmansodan voittåjat ja Suomi.* Porvoo: WSOY, 1961. Pp. 270.

Finland and the Victors of the First World War is the fourth volume in a series written by Dr. Paasivirta about Finland's struggle for independence. The earlier volumes deal with events in Finland from the March Revolution in Russia to Finland's declaration of independence on December 6, 1917, and with the Finnish Civil War of 1918. In the present volume Dr. Paasivirta analyzes the relations between Finland and the United States, Britain, and France during the period 1918-1919. His primary concern is to show how Finland, after an unsuccessful German orientation in her politics, reached out to the Western Allies in an effort to obtain recognition of her independence.

In 1917-1918 Finland clearly expected Germany to win the war, and Dr. Paasivirta points out that Finland calculated on a victorious Germany to obtain recognition of her independence. During the Finnish Civil War German troops aided the Finnish White forces, and the pro-German orientation of the Finnish Government reached its peak when Finland chose the German prince Friedrich Karl to be monarch of the country. Plans for a German monarch were dropped following Germany's surrender to the Allies, but it was not so easy for the Finnish Government to avoid the consequences of her German policy. This point is made particularly clear in Paasivirta's discussion of the food crisis in Finland, 1917-1919. Finland turned to the United States for relief, but Herbert Hoover, head of the Food Relief Commission, opposed sending food to non-Allies and he expressed fear that food supplies to Finland might get into German hands. However, due to vigorous support from the Scandinavian countries for Finnish relief and due to the influence of Rudolf Holsti on Hoover, an agreement to send foodstuffs to Finland was finally made late in 1918.

Because of Finland's cooperation with Germany the Allies questioned her neutrality, and they did not grant Finland the right to be present at the Peace Conference. Finland had to rely on unofficial contacts with the victorious powers, and the task of obtaining recognition was difficult. It was not easy to overcome the stigma of her past German attachment, and the conflicts between the various Finnish representatives in Paris did not simplify Finland's task. Dr. Paasivirta points out, however, the positive role which Carl Gustaf Mannerheim—Commander-in-Chief of the White forces in the Finnish Civil War and later to become Regent of Finland—played in obtaining diplomatic support for Finland. Mannerheim was known to be anti-German, and this was an important factor in inspiring Allied trust. Paasivirta also considers the role played by Holsti to have been of major significance; it was he who exerted pressure on Hoover who, in turn, caused Wilson to bring up the Finnish question at the Peace Conference. The Western Powers attached certain conditions to recognition of Finnish independence, and with the Finnish parliamentary elections in March 1919 and the formation of a new Government in April—which included Holsti as Foreign Minister—these conditions were met. In the spring of 1919 the Allies recognized Finland.

In his book Dr. Paasivirta also discusses Allied intervention in Russia, and it is perhaps this material which will be of most interest to American readers. He describes the attempts of Iudenich and the White Russians to get Finland to attack St. Petersburg and points out that the major stumbling block to Finnish participation in the intervention plans was the unwillingness of the White Russians to acknowledge Finland's independence. With the failure of Iudenich's attack in May 1919 it became all the more urgent that Finnish participation be secured, and in June 1919 Iudenich and Mannerheim reached an agreement. Finland was granted unconditional recognition of her independence; Mannerheim was to become commander of the war effort; and East Karelia—which Finland had unsuccessfully attempted to get, first by seeking German aid, then with volunteer forces, and finally by Holsti's efforts to obtain Allied support—was to be granted self-determination. Finnish intervention did not, however, materialize because Admiral Kolchak renounced the Iudenich-Mannerheim agreement and the majority of the Finnish Government opposed Mannerheim's intervention scheme. When K. J. Ståhlberg, an opponent of intervention, was elected president of Finland in the summer of 1919 the final blow was delivered to plans for Finnish participation in the Intervention. The conflict between Mannerheim's and Ståhlberg's men continued in the Finnish Foreign Ministry, but intervention was not an official policy of the Finnish Government and by the end of 1919 relations with the world powers had been put on a firm diplomatic footing.

Dr. Paasivirta's book is based on extensive research in many languages, and his scholarship is at once apparent. A reader may wish further information and documentation on certain points—such as the relationship between Holsti and Hoover—but the book as a whole is thorough and is a valuable contribution to a more complete understanding of the turbulent events surrounding the First World War.

Harvard University J. H. Hodgson

Rosenfeld, Günter, *Sowjetrussland und Deutschland 1917-1922*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960. DM 25.

E. H. Carr, L. Kochan, G. Freund and others may now learn where they stand as scholars and as historians. "Ensnared in their bourgeois world of ideas . . . their works in the final analysis serve only to advance the aims of the imperialists." (p. vi) Ambassador George Kennan will be dismayed—but hardly surprised—to hear that he wrote his volume, *Russia Leaves the War*, in order to justify American foreign policy in the 1917-18 period. (p. 24, n. 99) Hilger is depicted as a man of unrestrained enmity toward the U.S.S.R. It is on that high plane that Herr Rosenfeld takes off in his study of Soviet-German relations from the revolution to Rapallo. He belongs obviously to the current crop of Soviet and East European researchers, who, since the end of World War II particularly, have sought to rewrite modern history with "proper" reference to the impact of the Great October Revolution. Their efforts were pooled in a massive campaign at the Leipzig Historical Congress in 1957, and the stream of corrective histories and passionate pamphlets aimed at the Western, bourgeois "falsifiers" of history continues unabated.

The book opens with the assumption of power by the Bolsheviks and their efforts to effect a peace settlement. This appeal for peace, says the author, had the wholehearted support of the masses of Germans and soldiers, but the scheming

German military and the ruling political circles insisted upon an annexationist peace. Despite pro-Soviet demonstrations by masses of German workers and soldiers in January 1918—all ruthlessly suppressed—the reactionary elements imposed the onerous Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in March.

Then came the dangerous months in which Soviet Russia had to defend itself against the double hazard of further German penetration—into the Ukraine—and Allied intervention. The Soviet government, on the other hand, offered friendship and trade with other countries, especially with Germany. Russia was prepared to trade substantial quantities of grain, tobacco, oil and hides for coal, chemicals, medicine and machinery. But German monopoly capitalists in Germany had visions only of exploiting the whole of Russia for themselves. Thus it was that Russia (whose impoverishment is never fully explained) was frustrated in her efforts to relieve the suffering in Germany—and in Europe generally.

Finally, in November 1918, the Majority Social Democrats shamefully betrayed the German revolution. Once in power, such traitors as Ebert sought in every way to prevent the development of normal relations with Soviet Russia, even going so far as to seek an anti-Communist rapport between defeated Germany and the triumphant Allies. The pattern was set and ". . . during the Weimar Republic German foreign policy remained imperialistic, and was not guided by concern for the interests of the German people, but only for those of the gentlemen of capital and the Junkers." (p. 175) Winnig, von der Goltz, Noske and their bourgeois allies tried desperately to destroy the fledgling Soviet state and replace it with one which would be subservient to a new, resurgent Germany.

During the years 1919-1920 Germany did not seek "normal" relations with Soviet Russia, in part because Germany did not want to offend the anti-Bolshevik Western powers, in part because German ruling circles were hoping for a restoration of the old regime in Russia, and in part because the Weimar government hoped to emerge as both sword and shield of a European anti-Bolshevik bloc. This was the policy pusued despite the fact that the overwhelming mass of Germans (we are assured) was sympathetic to the Bolsheviks, whose cause would have triumphed in Germany too had it not been for the irresolution and exhibition of infantile diseases by the left-wing socialists (communists) in Germany.

Right from the start the foreign policy of Soviet Russia was clear and unequivocal. The goals were peace, coexistence, friendship, trade—all of which were frustrated by the greediness of neighbors and the imperialistic machinations of the Great Powers.

Ultimately, the line taken originally by Freiherr von Maltzan—a German commercial representative in Russia and later chief of the Eastern Section of the Foreign Office—was adopted by government leaders in Germany as well as by such anti-Bolsheviks as von Seeckt. This was to establish a closer, preferably exclusive, economic and political rapport with Moscow. This new turn of policy was enforced by circumstances—the failure of intervention, the needs of the German economy, and pressure from the mass of German people who wanted friendly relations with the Soviet peoples. This was the background to the resumption of relations with Soviet Russia; this was the prelude to Rapallo.

What can one then say of this book? The author has used a wide variety of sources, including the Central German Archives in Potsdam and various German provincial archives. The Foreign Office papers captured by the Allies were not, he states, available to him. Pertinent Soviet materials were used—most of them printed documents or books. He has obviously consulted many non-Marxist studies on the same subject. Out of it has inevitably come a few additional details, perhaps a number of insights of secondary importance. But the work will be fully convincing only to those who are already committed to the *Gedankenwelt* of the author.

Is it impossible for historians to arrive at any consensus? The undersigned would be happy to serve as rapporteur for a summit conference attended by G. Rosenfeld, A. Jerusalimsky, E. Carr, G. Freund and Hans Gatzke.

University of Nebraska ALBIN T. ANDERSON

DRAGOVIĆ, VUK, *Srpska štampa izmedju dva rata, I, Osnova za bibliografiju srpske periodike 1915-1945.* Belgrade: Srpska Akademija Nauka, Gradja knj. Xi, Istoriski Institut knj. 8, 1956. Pp. 422.

PLAVŠIĆ, LAZAR, *Srpske štamparije od kraja XV do polovine XIX veka.* Belgrade: Izdanje Udruženja Grafičkih Preduzeća Jugoslavije, 1959.

The first of these works is a bibliographical guide to Serbian periodicals from the beginning of the first World War to the end of the second. The latter is a historical survey of Serbian printing presses from the end of the fifteenth century to roughly the middle of the nineteenth century. Though they differ in aim and treat widely separate periods, nevertheless both contribute to an understanding of Serbian cultural history insofar as the quality and quantity of printing presses and periodicals are valid indices of a nation's culture.

Vuk Dragović is no mere compiler but a productive Serbian historian of the new generation who has felt, as all Yugoslav researchers must, the inadequacy of bibliographical aids in that country. Just as the dean of Serbian historians, Stojan Novaković, devoted his youthful energies a hundred years ago to the compilation of the first useful bibliography of Serbian books, so Dragović has felt, and largely satisfied, a need for an index of Serbian periodicals from 1915 to 1945. Every person working in the period owes him a debt of gratitude.

Dragović lists over two thousand Serbian and Yugoslav newspapers, from Belgrade to Buenos Aires; everything from *The Agitational Library of the United Labor Union League of Yugoslavia* (only one issue) to a newspaper in Uzice whose title is unknown. No one who knows the destruction which two world wars have visited upon Yugoslav libraries and archives will wonder why the title should be unknown. To cite the one most traigc case, the German gutting of the National Library, the official repository for all Yugoslav publications, created an irreparable gap. This, plus the fact that Dragović has had to start practically from scratch, has made his task an enormous one. Indeed, the outsider must wonder why a Historical Institute in a Communist country has encouraged an individual to undertake a project which might well have occupied the combined efforts of a "collective"—to use a common Communist noun.

As it is, the compiler has limited himself largely, but not consistently, to Serbian newspapers at home and abroad as well as to newspapers of all languages in predominantly Serbian lands. One hopes this project will be expanded to include the other ethnic groups and territories of Yugoslavia. Western students will especially appreciate the English, French, German, Russian, and other foreign language publications in Yugoslavia which are listed here. As a native American of Yugoslav descent who has a special interest in the history of immigration to the United States, the reviewer wishes Dragović's section on Yugoslav periodicals in America were more complete and more accurate. Yet we cannot expect a distant Yugoslav to do our work for us. Worthy of special note is Dragović's lengthy and informative preface, which is largely devoted to a description of the political scene in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As one might expect of the author, the treatment adheres to the orthodoxy of the present Yugoslav regime. The reviewer is no apologist for the regimes of prewar Yugoslavia. However, as the eye flits over the names of a myriad periodicals of every description published in the former Yugoslav Kindgom, the reviewer can hardly avoid a conclusion which Dragović would probably feel it necessary to deny, namely, that even under King Alexander's dictatorship there was a greater variety and more genuine expression of public opinion than under Tito's Communism, despite the post-1948 thaw.

Plavšić's survey deals with three categories of presses which printed books in Serbian (or Church Slavonic) for Serbian use: presses on Serbian ethnic territory, Serbian-owned presses in foreign lands, and foreign-owned presses in foreign lands which printed books specifically for Serbs. Especially since this work covers three and a half centuries, the Western reader might think that such a definition might be so broad and inclusive as to make for an unwieldy and encyclopaedic catalogue. But such is not the case, given the primitive level of Serbian culture under Ottoman rule. Though the Serbs had a printing press as early as 1493, the Turkish invasion so barbarized a hitherto thriving Serbian culture that the historian cannot list more than half a dozen presses on Serbian territory before the nineteenth century, and most of these were monastic presses which published exclusively church books, often only a single title. And this dearth continued up to the middle of the nineteenth century: the Serbian Principality had only one printing press until 1860, while Montenegro had no press at all from 1496 until Bishop Njegoš established one in 1834, and even this one ceased to exist in 1853, when Prince Daniel was forced to melt the lead type in order to make bullets needed to fend off a Turkish attack. Yet, thanks to the activity of Serbian—and foreign—owned presses in Venice, Tübingen, Leipzig, Vienna, Novi Sad, and elsewhere in surrounding lands, the Serbs were not without books all these centuries, and any survey of Serbian publications must include these presses.

Plavšić is not a professional historian; apparently he is a printer of many years experience in the Yugoslav printing industry. (His book was published by the Association of Graphic Enterprises of Yugoslavia.) It should be stressed, however, that Plavšić makes no pretense at having written an original work based on his own research. What he has done is to compile a very capable and useful survey on the basis of the best existing literature.

On the other hand, it would be erroneous to regard the book as a mere compilation. Plavšić has worked years at his avocation and has done primary research in the field. Furthermore, his knowledge of the technical aspects of the printing trade has enabled him to engage in fascinating detective work (for example, in tracking down the origin of various presses), which would be beyond the academic historian's competence. Even as a compiler and popularizer, Plavšić is careful to cite the most authoritative opinions on any given problem, and then he does not hesitate to choose the best when he can demonstrate grounds for doing so. Also, Plavšić sees his task as a part of cultural history and in each section of his work he provides the reader with the general political, social, and economic background for that period; indeed, he is often too discursive in that respect. More annoying is Plavšić's ritualistic citation of the works of Marx and Engels throughout and his mechanical application of Marxist determinism. However, this need not impair the general usefulness of this handy survey to the discriminating reader.

University of Wisconsin MICHAEL B. PETROVICH

Mauser, Wolfram, *Karl Hillebrand* (Gesetz und Wandel, Innsbrucker Literarhistorische Arbeiten, vol. I). Dornbirn: Vorarlberger Verlagsanstalt, 1960. Pp. 301.

Karl Hillebrand, fifty years ago widely celebrated as *homme de lettres* across the European scene, today requires an introduction to the student of intellectual history.

Born in 1829, the son of the successor to Hegel at the University of Heidelberg, he suffered the familiar fate of the young German intellectual of the eighteen forties. Involved in radical activities during the revolution of 1848, he participated in the insurrection of 1849 in Baden. Arrested and threatened with execution, Hillebrand managed to escape to Paris where he was for some time the secretary of Heine, a fact which had considerable bearing on his future life. Heine advised him to break with the frustrating life of the chronic political refugee. Instead, he should fully adjust to his new milieu, take up graduate studies in France and make a career in the new country. This is exactly what Hillebrand did. He studied history and literature, became lecturer of comparative literature and consultant to the French Government on problems of higher education. During the two decades that he stayed in France, Hillebrand had indeed full opportunity to benefit from the splendor of French literary life, his intercourse with Ernest Renan, Hippolyte Taine, Sainte-Beuve, Michelet, and Thiers to wit. Nevertheless, the outbreak of the war of 1870 confronted him with the harsh dilemma either to stay in an atmosphere loaded with nationalist chauvinism in the country of his choice or to return to his still beloved native land that had driven him into exile. Faced with these alternatives, Hillebrand decided for England and Italy. For a while he became correspondent of the London *Times* in Rome, but the best part of his remaining years, until 1884, he spent as a free lance writer in Florence.

Like a good number of former revolutionaries of 1848, Hillebrand had gradually turned from radical liberalism to conservatism, but a conservatism which had nothing to do with the opportunism of the political turncoat. Raised in the humanistic tradition of Herder, Goethe and Humboldt, Hillebrand, in France, became an early admirer and student of the works of de Tocqueville and Burke. In philosophy, he turned to the aesthetic doctrines of value of Schopenhauer and during the last years of his life, to the cultural criticism of Nietzsche. Hillebrand considered the state as a community established with strictly limited objectives in which democracy and freedom should not be equalized. He longed for a community of the truly educated, accessible to all those—and only to those—of genuine cultural interests and achievements. In a sense this was *l'art pour l'art* philosophy and as he expressed it, opposed to the mechanical spread and dilution of superficial cultural pretensions.

His major works reflect these ideas. *La Prusse Contemporaine* (1867) endeavors to explain to the French the basic peaceful and limited objectives of Bismarck's unification policy. Hillebrand's rejection of the social character of the Second Reich after 1870 proves that conviction and not opportunism dictated his reasoning. The same holds true for his *Frankreich und die Franzosen in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (1873), where he intends to reconcile the German reader to French ideas and ways of life. Of a major third work, *Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis Philipps bis zum Falle Napoleons III,* only the first two volumes, covering the July monarchy, were completed. They are still significant today.

Yet the major contributions of this truly good European, almost equally well versed in the German, French, Italian and English cultural orbits, are his brilliant essays of somewhat faded fame. They range from the Italian Renaissance, the French and German Enlightenment to English social institutions in the nineteenth century. It is sad to reflect that even this careful, well organized, reflective and never pedantic biography may not succeed in saving a good part of Hillebrand's life work from ill-deserved oblivion. Anyway, Mr. Mauser renders an indisputable service when he illustrates a distinct phenomenon of contemporary historiography: the death squeeze in which the true humanist finds himself between the journalist and the expert.

Rutgers University Robert A. Kann

von der Gablentz, Otto Heinrich, *Die versäumte Reform. Zur Kritik der westdeutschen Politik.* Köln and Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960. Pp. 137. DM 18.50.

Professor von der Gablentz of the Free University of Berlin is an exponent of the new German science of politics *(Wissenschaft der Politik).* His choice of an introductory motto by John Stuart Mill on the nature of government points to "true north" in his version of political science, which is new to Germany but classical in the English-speaking world. This brief collection of essays based on lectures given by the author affords a fascinating glimpse of a German academician using the rational tools and the "healthy common sense" of American and particularly British political thought. Even when he is most systematic he manages to avoid the outrageously complex models of some of his American and German colleagues. When he is rambling, his thought process is never as vagrant as that of certain British writers, nor as tiresome as so many political theorists of the older German school. Professor von der Gablentz genuinely tries to be a pluralist without becoming a strict relativist—evidently a tendency among Germans and others. Nevertheless, for him "ideology" is an evil, rather than something some people carry too far. In spite of this Teutonism, which to be fair we should admit is really part of an intensely three-dimensional humanity, Professor von der Gablentz is astonishingly *weltbürgerlich.* It is refreshing to find a modern German writer who speaks well of the Enlightenment, assimilating and transcending instead of rejecting Voltaire and Adam Smith. Liberation of the East Germans rather than "reunification" is his goal, by the same token. German-Polish friendship is more important than the prosecution of German claims east of the Oder-Neisse line.

Thus the author, who strongly identifies with the men of the 20th of July, 1944, may be said to be a "good European" in the broadest sense. While in no way sympathetic with world Communism, he is urgent in his appeal for understanding of how Communism's accomplishments in the Soviet Union and China are moving the so-called uncommitted peoples. What was most illuminating for this writer, however, was the author's sharp critique of the complacent restorationism in West Germany today, which seeks to return Germany to a Bismarckian *autoritärer Rechtsstaat.* The neglected reform of the first essay, from which the book takes its title, is a pluralistic failure rather than a single, rejected panacea. Summed up, the failure occurred in the years 1945-1950 when Germany might have been shaped economically, politically and socially into a democracy. A modern Christian of firm convictions, Professor von der Gablentz accepts the German responsibility for this without recrimination, just as for the criminal acts of the Nazis. But we who read his essays addressed to the German parties, pressure groups, churches and intellectuals, cannot help but see our own shortcomings in this modern "mirror for sovereigns."

University of Nebraska **Robert Koehl**

Dallin, Alexander, *Soviet Conduct in World Affairs: A Selection of Readings* New York: Columbia University Press, 1960. $4.50.

There is good sense in bringing together these various essays on Soviet behavior and Soviet foreign policy. They represent a fair distillation of intelligent thought on Soviet practice and Soviet conduct, particularly as applied to the relations o the Kremlin with the outside world.

What are the mainsprings of Soviet action? As expected, Mr. R. N. Carew Hunt stresses theory as a force which prompts Soviet leadership to act in a particular way. Professor Samuel Sharp gives more weight to factors of national interes and the predilection of the *vozhd* for total control. Professor Nathan Leites argue cogently—and at length—that the Party has certain built-in goals, and an obsession with power, which has prompted it to develop tactical techniques and manipulative skills which are basically exercises in expediency to fit almost any situation Articles by Kennan, Wolfe, Moore, Roberts, and others place one or another emphasis either on Soviet conduct itself or the kind of behavior from the outsid which might conceivably influence Soviet conduct. The late Professor Karpovich in an essay entitled "Russian Imperialism or Communist Aggression?", pleads fo Westerners not to confuse Tsarist Russian policies—the bear that walks like a man and all that—with Communist policy. Whatever its history, he states, Imperia Russia played the game according to well-recognized rules of international conduc He stresses that the Bolshevik concern has always been to gain political securit for the regime. Tsarist Russia was more concerned with gaining territorial securit for the nation.

This book, then, is a compilation of essays, papers, and excerpts from boo which have been published since the end of the last war and which provide ke to Soviet behavior. In almost every instance one feels that the writer is putting th urgent question: "Are you listening, Washington?" It is this flavor which mak the book a useful, perhaps indispensable, handbook for the practitioner of dipl macy. Its value to the student of Soviet foreign policy is less impressive.

There is no substitute for a day by day, year by year, event by event study Soviet foreign policy from the revolution to the present. Quotations from Leni Stalin, Chicherin, Molotov, and even Khrushchev are by no means the sole gui to Soviet conduct. They are meaningful only in terms of real situations, whi are not all concerned solely with one or another issue—theory, power, Party, a grandizement, or revolution. They may have historical roots which find only th weakest kind of rationalization in the Marxist Soviet lexikon. And a study in dep of individual events or phases of Soviet foreign policy would obviate the err inherent in generalizations. Mr. Leites, for example, might have considerable di culty in documenting his statement that the Politburo was "explicit" in its threa toward Finland in 1939 while it was only "vague" in its threats toward the pro lem of German rearmament in 1950-1952 (p. 134).

Be that as it may, Professor Dallin has performed meritorious service in p paring this book for publication. He would undoubtedly be the first to agree th it must be used with other materials where the ideas and hypotheses can be check for their validity.

University of Nebraska **Albin T. Anders**

ÁDÁM, MAGDA, *et al.* (compilers and editors), *Magyarország és a második világháború.* Budapest: Kossuth, 1959. Pp. 550.

On first examination, the measuring stick applied in the selection and compilation of diplomatic documents and official correspondence should not be regarded as being above suspicion. Honest suspicion and intellectual curiosity have a common target when confronting such a selection of documents, especially when the selection relates to pre-World War II and subsequent foreign and domestic affairs under the subtitle, "Secret diplomatic documents relating to the antecedents and history of the war." Just how "secret" were such affairs?

Magyarorszá és a második világháború (Hungary and the Second World War) is a selection and collection of documents. The common advantages and disadvantages inherent in any collection of historical documents will be found here. Connected narrative is needed and provided in the form of an introduction to each of the nine chapters. Thes narrative gives the chronology of events outside the documents and offers the editors an opportunity to elaborate and to point out the supporting evidence therein identified to prove the proposition before the compilers.

The selection and choice of documents naturally reflects the measuring stick that was used to judge the relevancy of each document available to the compilers. The proposition to be proved by the compilers in 1959 was that "reactionary Hungary and all its antiproletarian political circles led the country to be among the first to recognize the Hitler regime of Germany and in turn to show why these Hungarian circles supported Nazi Germany and Fascism to the end." Thus, the aim in the selection of the documents was to pile up evidence which would show "an irremediable Hungarian drift into the Nazi-Fascist camps and indicate that the overt behavior of the Hungarian Government was molded by the Arrow Cross Party under pressure from Hitler." Moreover, since the book was published on the 20th anniversary of Hitler's attack on Poland, very clearly this selection of documents is intended to be a warning against contemporary Western Germany, where, according to the compilers, "imperialism and militarism have been re-established."

Covering a period of 12 turbulent years with 178 documents, the reader must ask whether or not this limited selection gives a wholly adequate picture of the foreign and internal affairs of Hungary from 1933 to 1945. Furthermore, on the basis of a different proposition and for different views about events discussed in *Magyarorszá és a második világháború,* reference should be made to the two-volume work by C. A. Macartney, *A History of Hungary, 1929-1945,* and another well written work by Stephen D. Kertesz, *Diplomacy in a Whirlpool: Hungary between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia.*

The pressure to permit German troops to cross Hungarian frontiers was opposed and this permission, which was withheld by the Hungarian Government until quite late, did produce serious conflicts in the mind of Premier Pál Teleki who, on April 3, 1941, committed suicide so that he might dramatize this continued resistance and conflict. On June 15, 1941, the Council of Ministers in Hungary dismissed the idea of voluntarily offering assistance to Germany in its attack against Russia, although there was Hungarian military opinion favoring such assistance. The compilers criticize and attack Premier Nicholas Kallay for "pendulum-like politics." They seek to prove that the Kallay Government during its first period in office did not differ in view or action from the Government of Bardossy, even though it voiced "independence," for it was taking steps independently against the Communist menace. This resistance is further illustrated by the fact that, in 1943, Regent Horthy and Premier Kallay hoped that, after the defeat of Germany, the English and American military forces would occupy Hungary and thus, according to the editors, "the capitalist system remain assured" in Hungary. In September 1943 Premier Kallay arrived at an agreement with the Western Allies that Hungary should down arms as soon as the West reached the Hungarian borders

The extensive negotiations which involved Hungary, Germany, Italy and others in the first and second Vienna decisions, each of which awarded some territories to Hungary that had been lost at the end of World War I through the Treaty of Trianon, are examined. The intense revisionist movement and policies of the Hungarian Government during the interwar years are given considerable attention.

The documents are dull, especially some of the long-winded excerpts from diaries and daily reports, memoranda, and letters from ambassadors, embassy officials, and ministers of state. The book contains 550 pages, of which 364 are devoted to Hungarian and translated documentary text. The remaining 185 pages include the general introduction by the editor; the introductory narrative of the compilers; a chronology of events from January 6, 1933 to September 2, 1945; a chronological list of government ministers from 1933 to 1944 in Hungary; a list of the Hungarian foreign ministry officers; Hungarian foreign service officers abroad, and the accredited ambassadors of foreign countries in Budapest; and an index of names and table of contents listing each of the documents cited. The chapter headings are as follows: On the Road to War; the Munich Conference and the First Vienna Award; Hungarian Participation in the Division of Czechoslovakia; the Outbreak of World War II in Hungary; the Second Vienna Award; Hungarian Participation in Aggression against Yugoslavia; the Hungarian Declaration of War against the Soviet Union; a Turn in the Events of World War II; and the German Occupation of Hungary.

Rutgers University AUGUST J. MOLNAR

SHORTER NOTICES

COMENIUS, JOHANN AMOS, *Pampaedia,* Dmitrij Tschižewskij *et al.,* trs. and eds. Heidelberg: Quelle & Meyer, 1960. Pp. 516. DM. 35.

This is the long-awaited publication of one of the seven-volume long-lost pansophic works of Comenius, found by Professor Tschižewskij in the library of the Halle Orphanage in 1935 and 1940. Comenius, who entitled it *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica,* began the actual writing of the monumental work in 1645, but during his lifetime published only two volumes (1656). The remaining volumes, on which he worked the rest of his life, were left unfinished at the time of his death (1670). He instructed his son, Daniel, and his former assistant, Christian Nigrin, to complete the undertaking. Actually it was Nigrin, with Paul Hartmann, who organized the confused and often only roughly sketched material into what they regarded as the form intended by Comenius, and contributed whatever additions were made. Nevertheless, the work was never published; in 1700 it was deposited in the library of the Halle Orphanage, where Tschižewskij found it some 235-40 years afterwards. Such is the modern literary romance of the work conceived by Comenius early in the years of his Polish exile, and partially described in his *Pansophiae prodromus* (London, 1639) and later in *Via Lucis* written in London (1641-42) but not published until 1668. When the hoped-for aid of a whole learned college of collaborators failed, he at last undertook the task single-handed.

The present volume, *Pampaedia,* represents the final version of Comenius' education theories, the earlier form of which is to be found in the *Great Didactic* and the *School of Infancy.* It is on these earlier writings that Comenius' fame as a pioneer in educational principles and methods rests. But henceforth the ideas presented in *Pampaedia* must be taken into consideration. Nevertheless, this posthumous work is not likely to supersede the earlier works, because he left it in such an obviously unfinished state which the younger assistants were not able to complete. Accordingly, it at best affords suggestions of his final aims. This final system differs from the previous ones inasmuch as it expands the educational stages from four to eight: it adds to the previous four—kindergarten, elementary, secondary, and university stages—a pre-kindergarten (including even the pre-natal stage) and three adult educational stages—of manhood, old age, and the preparation for death. Thus literally Comenius insists on the planned education of humankind from the cradle to the grave.

Tschižewskij accompanied the Latin text with a German translation, thus adding to the usefulness of the work. It may be remarked that this volume had already been translated into Czech by Josef Hendrich and published in 1948. It is greatly to be hoped that the remaining six volumes will likewise soon be published, thus at last fulfilling the dearest wish of Comenius—to bring to the attention of the world his entire pansophic ideal.

Claremont, Calif. MATTHEW SPINKA

KLYUCHEVSKY, VASILI, *Peter the Great.* Translated by Liliana Archibald. London: St. Martin's Press, 1958. Pp. 282. $6.75.

Despite the quantity of source material on Peter the Great and the Petrine period that has become available since the appearance of volume 4 of V. O. Klyuchevsky's *Kurs russkoi istorii* in 1910, his portrait of the Tsar, his work and times, remains unrivalled. Perhaps only the small monograph of the late B. H. Sumner deserves a place near or beside it. The reason for this failure of either Soviet or Western historians to attempt a serious re-appraisal, on the basis of the subsequent work of Bogoslovsky and others, of such a key figure in Russian history are many and varied. In the case of Soviet scholars, the chief difficulty no doubt lies in their inability to deal with him in conformity with the shifting ideological requirements of the regime. Western historians of Russia have either tended to neglect him in favor of more recent figures and periods or, probably, have been understandably awed by the magnitude of the subject. In any case, Peter has been left largely to the mercies of historical novelists and popularizers.

The appearance of this translation is, therefore, most welcome. It is far more accurate and readable than C. J. Hogarth's, which has been used perforce over the years by non-Russian readers. In addition, helpful footnotes, a map and genealogical table have been included. It is to be hoped that Miss Archibald will undertake the translation of the other volumes, although, if such is her intention, it is unfortunate that she did not include Chapter XI in this translation. More reproachable is her failure to inform the reader of the omission.

University of Colorado ROBERT PAUL BROWDER

WEILL, HERMAN, *Frederick the Great and Samuel von Cocceji.* Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1961. Pp. 181. $4.00.

This is an interesting and instructive monograph for anyone desiring to understand "enlightened despotism" as an operational concept rather than as a theory or an aspiration. Von Cocceji was the architect of the Frederician judicial reforms and one of the most important personages in the Prussian Government during the first decade-and-a-half of Frederick's reign. Professor Weill, after giving a brief résumé of von Cocceji's career before 1740, presents us with a full-length discussion of the development of the Prussian judicial reforms; his analysis of the intricate processes of the Prussian law is skillful as well as knowledgeable. Von Cocceji undertood that no reform would be possible without a unification of the judicial administration under the Ministry of Justice and a thoroughgoing reorganization of the courts to unify procedures and jurisdiction. Finally, the whole program was predicated upon a reform of the professional and economic status of the personnel of the courts, for only by giving the judge financial independence and professional competence could the age-old evils be eradicated. Professor Weill's account is clear, concise, and to the point.

The study also presents us with pictures of the two kings under whom von Cocceji served. It is probably natural that Frederick Wilhelm I comes out so badly in this account for he was quite unwilling to provide the money needed for judicial reform, and yet it does seem that Professor Weill might have recognized him as the man who made the Prussian army, rather than merely the drill master of the tall guards. The portrait of Frederick II is probably a bit idealized, but perhaps not for an historian discussing this phase of the Frederician reforms.

By and large the book is well and convincingly written, but here and there the author gets tangled in his syntax. He probably did not mean: "Taking a clue from their king, jurists became a laughing stock among the people." (p. 21) Such a sentence, however, does not prevent this from being an excellent monograph.

University of Minnesota JOHN B. WOLF

SOBEL, ROBERT, *The Origins of Interventionism. The United States and the Russo-Finnish War.* New York: Bookman Associates, 1960. Pp. 204. $4.50.

The author states that "the subject of this study is the metamorphosis of American attitudes toward foreign affairs during the winter of 1939-40" (p. 177). This is an ambitious and difficult task, and while this volume adds to our information it by no means offers a satisfactory explanation of the changes in American policy. Actually it is a narrow study of the reaction of the United States to the first Russo-Finnish war, and within these limits lie the merits of the book. The Winter War lasted about three and a half months, and within a couple of weeks "was all but forgotten by the fickle American press; the public had turned its attention to new problems" (p. 166). Here is a more correct evaluation of the whole episode than is given by the title which sees in American reaction to that war the origins of interventionism.

About a third of this slight volume is devoted to a sketch of the enactment of the neutrality legislation, and the amendments, passed in November 1939. The votes in Congress on these amendments are later compared to the votes on the Brown Bill, enacted early in March 1940, which provided for a loan by a United States governmental agency to Finland. This represented direct aid, whereas legislation of the previous months was indirect, and it "may be considered the first positive step Congress had taken in behalf of a belligerent since 1919" (p. 131). Is this quite correct and does it not exalt the importance of the Brown Bill, which indeed the author himself characterizes later as "an innocuous piece of legislation" (p. 135)?

The author separates out the Winter War, rather than placing it in the wider complex of international affairs. Thus there is no account of the outbreak of the controversy, which had so much to do with arousing feeling in the United States. Nor is Finland's appeal to the League mentioned until the very end of the volume, and then this statement is made: "The League recommended economic sanctions against the U.S.S.R. and that nation retaliated by leaving the world organization" (p. 184). Russia did not leave the League, but was expelled from it by vote of the Council. The unfortunate typographical error on p. 72 as to the start of the Winter War—given as December 29, 1939—is serious since this makes it difficult to fit the next events discussed into their proper chronological sequence. Later the start of the war is given as November 31 (p. 150) and, finally, it appears correctly as the last day of November (p. 178); actually the date usually cited is November 29 to 30. Chronology is also somewhat slighted and relationships are distorted when the statement is made: "The Winter War took place during the presidential campaign of 1939-1940, and played a brief role in the electioneering of the hopefuls" (p. 149). Whatever can be said of Lindbergh's actions, they can hardly be classified as "scurrilous attacks on the President" (p. 155). In a book purporting to discuss the origins of interventionism the author does not get around to even mentioning the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies or America First until his concluding chapter. The value of the book is therefore limited, and is concentrated in two or three chapters where the author discusses the attitude of the public and the administration to the Russo-Finnish conflict.

Bowdoin College E. C. HELMREICH

GIMBEL, JOHN, *A German Community under American Occupation, Marburg, 1945-52.* **Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. 259. $5.50.**

An Assistant Professor of History at Humboldt State College, California, Dr. John Gimbel, has written a comprehensive case-study of the impact of American occupation policies in Marburg, Germany, based on a close study of local records as well as the general bibliographical materials dealing with American occupation policy and practice. In the introduction and a concluding chapter on "The Paradox" of American occupation practice as opposed to theoretical ideals, the author develops the thesis that the ideological framework within which the war was fought and its heritage of such *idées forces* as collective guilt, non-fraternization, and denazification precluded any serious cooperation with those German political, social and economic interest groups which might have provided democratic leadership on the local level. He argues that in Marburg such a course would have meant supporting a coalition of Social, Liberal and Christian Democrats. Instead, the military government stood above these groups on the naive assumption that, if local politics were left alone—after the evil of Nazism was extirpated—a new democratic leadership would naturally arise and assume positions of power. This leadership would recreate the American image of democracy and would uncritically accept the vagaries of American policy—impressively exposed in this study—as necessary to the attainment of a democratic system. The end effect of these efforts was to disillusion the occupation's most loyal supporters and to gather widely disparate political groups "into a community of opposition against anything imported by the occupation."

The author's detailed examination of the haphazard attempts at reform and reorientation which characterized the occupation provide an effective counterbalance to such studies as John B. Montgomery's *Forced to be Free. The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan,* which ascribe an order and rationality to American policy that was certainly not present in the occupation of Marburg.

University of South Carolina PAUL W. BLACKSTOCK

WANNENMACHER, WALTER, *Die Umstellung auf sozialistische Ernährungwirtschaft untersucht am Beispiel der Tschechoslowakei.* Munich: Robert Lerche Verlag, 1960. Pp. 228. DM 18.

About half a century ago, in a highly celebrated formula, Lenin hypothesized that productivity in agriculture was directly related to size of individual enterprises and degree of electrification in the countryside. This plausible speculation, the correctness of which has never been born out in reality,[1] has ever since served as the basis for the collectivization policies in socialistic countries.

Wannenmacher's objective is to test the correctness of Lenin's formula. He picks Czechoslovakia as an illustration primarily because good historical data are available. After analytically eating his way through a mountain of interesting prewar and postwar statistics he concludes—not surprisingly—that the performance of Czechoslovak agriculture is not so impressive. He notes that collectivization has hurt livestock production particularly seriously because of the "human element" involved. Cows must be treated with loving care on a person-to-animal basis. The mass production techniques practiced in Kolchozes are apparently bad for productivity. He also notes that plant production is more susceptible to mechanization and therefore has not suffered so much by socialization of Czechoslovak agriculture. Somehow this leads to the conclusion that "Expansion of Communism in Western Europe, as the comparison of productivity rates clearly bears out, would inevitably result in food shortages. The West, in its struggle against Communism, would stand to lose its basis for subsistence a well as its freedom."

This book is a helpful addition to the literature on Czechoslovak agriculture. It is long on facts and unspoiled by ideas of other writers. This is regrettable. So is the loss of the theoretical framework solemnly announced in the introduction but sadly neglected in the shuffle of journalese. But Wannenmacher's editorial background—on such distinguished prewar publications as *Prager Tagblatt, Zeit* and *Neuer Tag*—clearly shows through and makes for an interesting and very readable narrative.

San Francisco State College FRANK MEISSNER

SLUSSER, ROBERT M., and TRISKA, JAN F., *A Calendar of Soviet Treaties, 1917-1957.* Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959. Pp. 530. $15.

This work will be of inestimable value to all students of Soviet foreign policy. Listing more than two thousand international agreements, in the broadest sense of the word, entered into by the Soviet Union from 1917 to 1957, it also gives the status of each whenever possible and cites sources and references. In addition, there are appendices on unratified treaties, non-governmental agreements, unverified treaties, and the secret Soviet-German military agreements from 1921 to 1933 for which no authentic texts are available. An elaborate Index adds greatly to the usefulness of the volume.

To be sure, there were bound to be some few omissions and errors in a work of this scope, based upon research in such a variety of official and unofficial, obvious and highly obscure sources. That so few have come to light is a tribute to the painstaking and thorough work of the editors. Readers will be pleased to learn that arrangements have been made for subsequent periodic supplements to keep the *Calendar* up to date.

---

[1] See F. Meissner, "Economies of Scale in Relation to Agrarian Reforms in Czechoslovakia," *American Slavic and East European Review,* February 1955.

University of Colorado — Robert Paul Browder

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Bartok, L., "Interpretation of Communist Political Strategy," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 21-447.

Boellcher, E., "Die Wirtschaft unter dem Kommunismus," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 6, 402-408

Brzezinski, Z., and W. E. Griffith, "Peaceful Engagement in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Aff.,* 39 (1961) 4, 641-655.

Chamberlin, W. H., "The Soviet Union and the Western Powers," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 177-185.

"Colonialism in East-Central Europe," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 1-21.

Dobriansky, L. E., "The Viennese Dance and the Cold War," *Ukrainian Qy.,* XVII (1961) 2, 117-131.

Durcansky, F., "Defense Alone is not Enough," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 6, 137-144.

Eitner, H. - —., "Der rote Stern auf allen Meeren," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 62, 79-86.

Golubnicki, V., "The Socialist Theory of the National Problem," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* III (1961) 8, 70-81.

Griffith, W. E., "An International Communism?", *East Eur.,* X (1961) 7, 3-10.

Griffith, E., "O nową politykę wobec Europy Wschodniej," *Kultura,* (1961)/7-8, 3-17.

Grzybowski, K., "Protection of Personal Liberty in the Criminal Procedures of Eastern Europe," *Jl. Intern. Com. Jurists,* III (1961) 1, 69-87.

Grosfeld, L., "Raisons et buts économiques de la politique polonaise des puissances centrales (1914-1916)," *Kwart. Hist.,* (1961) 1, 31-68.

Habsburg, O., "Expellees and the European Idea," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 7-8, 165-170.

Hackenberg, R., "Cultural Exchange a Communist Tool," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 6, 148-150.

Halajczuk, B. T., "Two Concepts of Peaceful Coexistence," *Prologue,* V (1961) 1-2, 5-27.

Hanak, H., "The New Europe, 1916-1920," *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Rev.,* XXXIX (1961) 93, 369-400.

Höpker, W., "Das Schwarze Meer—ein roter Binnensee?" *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 311-318.

Kashin, A., "The Soviet and Chinese Paths to Communism: Are They Essentially Different?", *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 5, 40-44.

Kerekes, L., "Akten des Ungarischen Ministeriums des Ausseren zur Vorgesch. d. Annexion Osterr.," *Acta Hist.,* VII (1960) 3-4, 355-390.

Khvostov, V. M., "German Expansion in the East," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/3, 46-58.

Kielczewska-Zaleska, M., and Herbst, S., "Un nouvel ouvrage allemand au service du revisionnisme," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* 2 (1961) 9, 49-66.

Kopp, F., "Das Verhältnis des Kommunismus zu den Nationen u. zum Nationalbewusstsein," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 71/72, 260-270.

Kovalev, P., "The Fulfillment of Marxist Theory," *Bltn. for Study USSR,* VIII (1961) 4, 13-24.

Kutt, A., "Some Features of Foreign Trade of the Captive Eur. Countries," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 47-67.

Lamberg, R. F., "Die Ost-Infiltration in den Entwicklungsländern," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 134, 378-385.

Lavergne, B., "Les principales oppositions Est-Ouest," *L'Année Polit. et Écon.,* (1961)/161, 161-237.

Malnasi, E., "After-Disengagement," *Freedom,* IV (1961) 4, 5-19.

Mikhailov, M. I., "The Communist Parties in the Struggle for Working-Class Unity and the Consolidation of all Democratic Forces," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/3, 7-20.

Neumann, C., "Wirtschaft u. Gesellschaftgestern u. morgen," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 134, 359-363.

Neumann, R. J., "Der Ostblock u. d. Entwicklungsländer," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 69, 177-185.

Polcuch, V., "An der Grenze d. Selbstverleugnung," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 69, 164-170.

Popa, A., "'Popular Democracy' in Action," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 105-111.

Sachs, I., "International Trade and Underdeveloped Countries," *Pol. Persp.,* IV (1961) 5, 8-15.

Schmid, A., "Die Entwicklung des Russischunterrichts in den deutschsprachigen Ländern," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 3, 210-224.

Sermage, "Zwischenbilanz," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 62, 7-11.

"The Soviet Bloc and West Germany," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 6, 3-10.

Stadmüller, G., "The Initial Attraction of Communism," *Inst. for Study USSR,* I (1961) 1, 5-12.

Stieger, M., "The Nature of Soviet Colonialism," *Bltn. Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 5, 11-21.

Stolte, C., "Agricultural Problems in the Communist Bloc," *Bltn. Study of USSR,* VIII (1961) 4, 28-39.

Stoob, H., "Die Ausbreitung der abendländischen Stadt im östlichen Mitteleuropa," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 1, 25-84.

Tzöbl, J. A., "Der Föderalismus im Donauraum," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 2, 142-143.

Vaitiekunas, V., "'Socialist Realism'—A Formula For Cultural Oppression," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 86-105.

Vilcinskas, J., "The Soviet Formula of Peaceful Co-Existence," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961)/4, 81-86.

Wagenlehner, G., "Karl Marx u. der 'Aufbau' des Kommunismus," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 247-267.

Wiatr, J., "Mozliwości przygotowania do wojny w okresie 20-lecia," *Kultura,* (1961)/7-8, 167-181.

BALTICA

"America Confirms Refusal to Endorse Soviet Rights in Baltics," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 4-5.

Benninghoven, F., "Riga im Mittelalter," *Balt. Hetfe,* VII (1961) 4, 193-207.

Kajava, K., "Aktuelle Schul.-und Erziehungsprobleme in Finnland," *Erziehung u. Unterr.,* III (1961) 5, 268-273.

"Latvian CP Secretary Pelse Dispatches Message from Moscow," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 6-7.

Maciuika, B. V., "Lithuanian Agriculture: Structure and Output," *Lituanus,* VII (1961) 1, 6-13.

Meyer, K., "Das Hochschulwesen in den baltischen Staaten," *Zft., f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 2, 237-245.

"A New Wave of Russianization is Sweeping Latvia," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 5-6.

Rastenis, V., "Effects of Soviet-imposed Revolution," *Lituanus,* VII (1961) 1, 2-6.

"Russian Emissary Brigkov Lectures Latvian Communists," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 7-8.

"Soviet Image of Latvia's Voice of the Homeland," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 8-9.

"Soviet Mass Deportations from Latvia Remembered," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 2-3.

Törngren, R., "The Neutrality of Finland," *Foreign Aff.,* 39 (1961) 4, 601-610.

"Young Latvians are made to 'Volunteer' for Forced Labor," *Latvian Inform. Bltn.,* (1961)/2, 1-2.

BULGARIA AND RUMANIA

"Documents relatifs a l'histoire Bulgare," *Bulgarian Rev.,* I (1961) 2, 45-56.

Eşanu, L., and D. Botescu, "Acţiuni ale muncitorilor din Moldova premergătoare grevei generale din octombrie 1920," *Studii si Cercetari,* XI (1960) 2, 173-199.

Florescu, R., "Lord Strangord and the Problem of the Danubian Principalities, 1821-1824," *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Rev.,* XXXIX (1961) 93, 472-489.

Grajewski, H., "Problemy historii państwa i prawa Bułgarii," *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.,* XIII (1961) 1, 127-139.

Grigoras, N., "Despre răscoalele tăranilor moldoveni în vremea domniilor lui Petru Stiri noi despre comerţul de tranzit prin Moldova în a doua jumătate a secolului al XVIII-lea," *Studii si Cercetari,* XI (1960) 2, 241-257.

Kondratyev, V. A., "The Rumanian Internationalist, I.O. Dik-Dichescu," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/3, 109-114.

Krstajic, P., "Détachement resistant de libération nationale de Durmitor," *Ist. Časopis,* (1961)/1, 5-45.

Liess, O. R., "Agrarkollektiv u. Erzeugungsziffern in Rumänien," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 4, 297-306.

Tachauer, B., “Souvenirs de Bulgarie,” *Bulg. Rev.*, I (1961) 2, 27-42.

Villaran y Diez, F. F., “Genesis de la iglesia autocefala bulgara,” *Oriente Europea*, XI (1961) 2, 417-425.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Bareš, G., “ K čtyřicátému výročí KSČ,” *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 2, 165-174.

Batowski, H., “Sojusze wojskowe Czechosłowacji — 1919-1938,” *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 289-307.

Beck, C., “Party Control and Bureaucratization in Czechoslovakia,” *Jl. of Polit.*, XXIII (1961) 2, 279-294.

Bohmann, A., “Die Bevölkerungszahlen Böhmens vom 16. bis zum 18,” *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1961) 1, 127-139.

Bradley, J. F. N., “The Old Catholics and Pan-Slavism in Bohemia in 1904,” *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Rev.*, XXXIX (1961) 93, 512-517.

Cahová, D., “Boj KSČ za jednotu mládeže v letech 1945-1948,” *Sbornik Praci Filosofické Faculty*, IX (1960) G4, 82-94.

Dubsky, V., “Ultralevé tendence v Komunistické straně Československa v letech 1921-1922 a boj za jejich překonání,” *Acta Univ. Carolinae*, (1960)/1, 39-63.

Głębocki, B., “Rejonizacja produkcji roślinnej i zwierzęcej w Czechosłowacji,” *Przeg. Zach.*, VII (1961) 2, 332-343.

Grace, B., “La formation et la lutte de la Tchécoslovaquie du temps de la République Tchécoslovaque avant Münich,” *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 2, 181-200.

Grospic, J., “Une analyse de la situation de la Slovaquie dans la République Tchécoslovaque avant Münich,” *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 318-324.

Hájková, A., “Boj KSČ proti přijetí zákona na ochranu republiky v roce 1923,” *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 3, 325-346.

Holotikova, Z., “A propos de la lutte des classes en Slovaquie dans la République Tchécoslovaque avant Münich,” *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 298-301.

Houser, J., “Valentin Urfus, L'organisation administrative de la Slovaquie sous le régime de la République bourgeoise, *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 275-284.

Hroch, M., “K problematice formavání buržoazního národa v Evrope,” *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 3, 374-396.

Karnik, Z., “Uloha politické literatury v ideologickém boji revolučního dělnického hnutí v českých zemích 1919-1920,” *Acta Univ. Carolinae*, (1960)/1, 23-39.

Kriš, Z., “O ekonomických předpokladech zkracování pracovní doby,” *Sbornik Prací*, IX (1960) G4, 28-42.

Kirschbaum, J., “Le centenaire d'un grand slaviste: Safarik,” *Slavic & Ea. Eur. Studies*, V (1961) 3-4, 189-200.

Kramer, J., “Slovenské autonomistické hnuti v rokoch 1918-1920,” *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 3, 346-374.

Kropilák, M., “Pietnaście lat ludowodemokratycznej Czechosłowacji,” *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 230-262.

Lemberg, E., “Zur marxistisch-leninistischen Periodisierung der tschechischen Gesch.,” *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1961) 1, 104-119.

Liptak, L., “La formation de la bourgeoisie slovaque dans la République Tchécoslovaque avant Münich,” *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 2, 256-275.

Macků, J., K otázce postavení inteligence ve společnosti,” *Sbornik Praci Filosofické*, IX (1960) G4, 42-53.

Magerstein, W., “Minderheitenschutzvertrag, Austreibung u. Enteignung der Volksdeutschen in d. ČSSR,” *Donauraum*, VI (1961) 2, 144- 146.

Mann, S. E., “Karel Havlicek: A Slav Pragmatist,” *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Rev.*, XXXIX (1961) 93, 413-423.

Měchýř, J., “K podstaté sporů v našem dělnickém hnutí v osmedsátých letech minulého století,” *Acta Univ. Carolinae*, (1960)/1, 5-23.

Michek, J., “Specifické rysy průběhu krize v Československu v rámci světove hospodářské krize třicátých let,” *Sbornik Praci Filosofické*, IX (1960) G4, 94-108.

Mlynarik, J., “Les phases principales de la lutte des classes en Slovaquie durant les années 1918-1938,” *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 285-297.

Olivá, V., “K historii československo-rakouské smlouvy z r. 1921,” *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 2, 198-220.

Plevza, V., “La politique agraire en Slovaquie aux temps de la République Tchécoslovaque avant Münich,” *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 2, 229-255.

Pospieszalski, K. M., “Dwie konstytucje czechosłowackie 1948-i. 1960,” *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 276-289.

Proch, F. J., "Czechoslovak-Polish Economic Co-operation," *Cent. Eur. Fed.*, IX (1961) 1, 13-19.

"Pruebas de humanitarismo de eslovacos y checos con los alemanes," *Oriente Europeo*, XI (1961) 2, 439-457.

Šabata, J., "O některých nových prvcích v rozvoji socialistického soutěžní," *Sbornik Prací*, IX (1960) G4, 8-28.

Steiner, H., "Zájmy dělnicke třídy a pravda," *Sbornik Prací Filosofické*, IX (1960) G4, 72-82.

Strhan, M., "Quelques problèmes du développement économique de la Slovaquie de 1918 a 1938," *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 2, 201-228.

"Tekst nowej konstytucji ČSSR (tłum. I. Kwilecka i K. M. Pospieszalski)," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 354-369.

Urban, R., "Germans in the CSSR Today," *Sudeten Bltn.*, IX 1961) 7-8, 179-180.

Urban, R., "Neue Verwaltungsgliederung in der Tschechoslowakei," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1961) 1, 119-126.

Vebr, L., "Sur la migration temporaire des laboureurs slovaques pendant les années 1919- *Carolinae*, (1960)/1, 87-98.

Vebr, L., "Sur la migration temporaire des laboureurs slovaques pendant les années 1919-1937," *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 309-312.

Vejnar, L., "Boj KZČ proti brnénské pravicové skupině v letech 1924-1930," *Acta Univ. Carolinae*, (1960)/1, 63-87.

Vejnar, L., "La caractère et les phases principales des grèves dans la Répubique Tchécoslovaque bourgeoise," *Hist. Časopis*, VIII (1961) 2, 302-306.

Wandycz, P. S., "Beneš and Beck," *Federalist*, IX (1961) 1, 6-12.

Wessely, K., "Verkehrsprobleme der Tschechoslowakei," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte*, III (1961) 3, 202-210.

Whiteside, A. G., "Industrial Transformation, Population Movement and German Nationalism in Bohemia," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1961) 2, 261-271.

Wierer, R., "Die tschechoslowakische Verfassung vom 11. Juli 1960," *Donauraum*, VI (1961) 2, 113-132.

Zagiba, F., "Die bairische Slavenmission u. ihre Fortsetzung durch Kyrill u. Method," *Gesch. Osteuropas*, IX (1961) 1, 1-57.

GERMANY

Angermeier, H., "Das Reich u. der Konziliarismus," *Hist. Zft.*, 192 (1961) 3, 529-584.

Bahr, E., "Polnische Veröffentlichungen zur ost- und westpreussischen Gesch. aus dem vergangenen Jahrzehnt (1950-1960)," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1969) 2, 309-347.

Berger, K. M., "Werden wir niemals kapitulieren?", *Zft. f. Geo-Polit.*, XXXII (1961) 6, 201-205.

Binkowski, J., "Unwille zur Macht," *Polit. Meinung*, VI (1961) 62, 12-19.

Bohmann, A., "Die landschaftliche Herkunft der in der Bundesrepublik lebenden Sudeten- u. Karpatendeutschen," *Zft. f. Ostforschung*, X (1961) 2, 245-261.

v. Carsten, F. L., "Die Ursachen des Niedergangs der deutschen Landstände," *Hist. Zft.* 192 (1961) 2, 273-281.

Castellan, G., "La question allemande," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne*, 2 (1961) 9, 66-72.

Deuerlein, E., "Potsdam Papers," *Polit. Meinung*, VI 1961) 62, 52-61.

Dzelopy, E. - N., "Qui est le général Heusinger?", *L'Année Polit. et Econ.*, (1961) 161, 237-250.

Erdmann, K. D., "Das Dritte Reich im Zusammenhang der deutschen Gesch.," *Gesch, in Wissenschaft u. Unterr.*, XII (1961) 7, 405-418.

Gareau, F. H., "Morgenthau's Plan for Industrial Disarmament in Germany," *West. Polit. Qy.*, XIV (1961) 2, 517-535.

Gorski, K., "Niemieckie misje wśród Słowian i Prusow," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV ,1960) 2, 59-71.

Grabowski, K., "West Germany Prepares for Elections," V (1961) 2, 16-27.

Harrigan, W. M., "Nazi Germany and the Holy See, 1933-1936," *Cath. Hist. Rev.*, XLVII (1961) 2, 164-199.

v. Hauser, O., "Obrigkeitstaat u. demokratisches Prinzip im Nationalitätenkampf Preussen in Nordschleswig," *Hist. Zft.*, 192 (1961) 2, 318-361.

Hauswith, K., "Gorbach in der Defensive," *Polit. Meinung*. VI (1961) 62, 76-79.

Hennis, W., "Bemerkungen zu ihrem Zusammenhang im politischen System der Bundesrepublik," *Polit. Vierteljahresschrift*, 2 (1961) 1, 23-36.

"The Hindenburg Memorandum of 5th July 1918," *Poland & Germany*, V (1961) 2, 34-43.

v. Hubatsch, W., "Protestantische Fürstenpolitik in den Osteeländern im 16. Jahrhundert," *Hist. Zft.* 192 (1961) 2, 282-294.

Jindra, Z., "K hospodářským korenum agresivity německého imperialismu vilémovské éry," *Čsl. Časopis Hist., IX* (1961) 2, 174-198.

Kaiser, H., "Krieg in Deutschland," *Zft. f. Geo-Polit.,* XXXII (1961) 6, 205-211.

Kann, R. A., "Was heisst Restauration?" *Wort u. Wahrheit,* XVI (1961) 5, 345-361.

Keyser, E., and C. J. Burckhardts, "Danziger Mission," Zft. f. Ostforschung," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 1 ,145-158.

Krache, F., "Der letzte Deutsche Kronprinz," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 135, 461-474.

Krasuski, J., "The Problem of Prussia in Germany's Modern History in the Light of Modern German Historiography," *Pol. West. Aff.,* II (1961) 1, 103-118.

Kroeger, G., "Julius Eckardts Artikelreihe 'F. u. wider das Elsass-Projekt' Aug. 1870," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 2, 201-225.

Lipschitz, J., "La République Fédérale et les victimes du nazisme," *Polit. Étrangère,* (1961)/1, 36-47.

Maehl, W. H., "Recent Literature on the German Socialists, 1891-1932," *Jl. Mod. Hist.,* XXXIII (1961) 3, 292-307.

Nolte, E., "Eine frühe Quelle zu Hitlers Antisemitismus," *Hist. Zft.,* 192 (1961) 3, 548-607.

Opitz, G., "Der deutsche Ostfeldzug 1941," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 134, 385-389.

Ostrowska, K., "West Germany and Eichmann's Trial," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* VII (1961) 7, 33-37.

Pachter, H., "Kein Platz f. eine 'dritte Partei,'" *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 62, 61-68.

Pritte, T., "Preview of the West German Election," *Intern. Jl.,* XVI (1961) 3, 231-238.

Schulter-Hermkes, M., "10 Jahre deutsche UNESCO-Arbeit," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 135, 431-444.

Schulz, G., "Über Entstehung u. Formen von Interessengruppen in Deutschland seit Beginn der Industrialisierung," *Polit. Vierteljahresschrift,* II (1961) 2, 124-154.

Telegin, F. N., "The Economic and Military Preparations of Hitlerite Germany for the War Against the Soviet Union," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/3, 34-46.

"Unterricht in der SBZ," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 69, 164-170.

Wiewiora, B., "West German Territorial Claims against Poland and International Law," *Pol. West. Aff.,* II (1961) 1, 3-31.

Winter, E., "Das Wirken der Universität Halle im Geiste Melanchthons und die Aufklärung der slawischen Völker in Europa," *Zft. f. Slawistik,* VI (1961) 2, 260-266.

Zhilin, P. A., "The Nazi Blitzkreig and Its Failure in 1941," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/3, 20-34.

HUNGARY

Borbandi, Gy., "György Lukacs," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 6, 20-27.

Eisner, J., "Slované a Madaři v archeologii," *Slav. Antiqua,* VII (1960), 189-208.

d. Hollander, A. N. J., "The Great Hungarian Plain: A European Frontier Area (II)," *Comp. Studies Society & Hist.,* III (1961) 2, 155-170.

d. Hollander, A. N. J., "The Great Hungarian Plain: A European Frontier Area," *Comp. Studies Society & Hist.,* III (1960) 1, 74-89.

Horvath, Z., "A nacionalizmus kifejlodese és a nemzetiségi kérdés alakulasa a dualista Magyarorszag utolsó evtizedeiben," *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 2-3, 300-339.

Korolovszky, L., "Hungarian Workers in a New Society," *New Hung. Qy.,* II (1961) 1, 74-94.

Milei, G., "Sur l'histoire de la constitution du Parti Communiste de Hongrie," *Acta Hist.,* VII (1960) 3-4, 321-354.

Probszt, G., "Deutsches Kapital in den niederungarischen Bergstädten im Zeitalter des Frühkapitalismus," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 1, 1-25.

Sebestyen, M., "My experiences in the Central Worker Council of Greater Budapest," *Rev.,* III (1961) 2, 41-52.

Suranyi, I., "Old Hungarian Colleges," *New Hung. Qy.,* II (1961) 1, 141-152.

Wittman, T., "A flamand posztóipar tökés lehetöségei a manufaktúra-korszak küszöbén," *Szazadok,* 95 (1961) 2-3, 236-281.

Zillich, H., "Los sajones de Transilvania," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 2, 425-431.

Lacko, M., "La naissance de la démocratie populaire hongroise 1944-1946," *Acta Hist.,* VII (1960) 1, 1-60.

Sztaray, Z., "The Hungarian Worker Along the Road to Revolution 1945-56," *Rev.* III (1961) 2, 5-24.

ITALY AND YUGOSLAVIA

"The Centenary of Italian Unity," *Italian Aff.,* X (1961) 1, 3337-3343.

"Le Conversazioni Italo-Jugoslave," *Rel. Intern.,* VIII (1961) 27, 869-870.

"Italian Foreign Trade," *Italian Aff.*, X (1961) 2, 3427-3431.

Koltay-Kastner, E., "Kossuth e Garibaldi nella guerra del 1866," *Rassegna Storica d. Risorgimento,* XJVIII (1961) 1, 91-104.

"Industrial Expansion and its Results," *Yugoslav Surv.,* II (1961) 4, 484-492.

"The Mercantile Marine," *Italian Aff.,* X (1961) 2, 3465-3471.

Matkovic, D., "Jugoslawiens Seeschiffahrt u. Seeschiffahrts-Polit.," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 2, 133-141.

Milivojevic, D., "The Worker in the Commune," *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1961)/, 45-50.

Pavlovic, B., "Outline of the Development of the Educ. System in Yugoslavia," *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1961)/3, 2-19.

Peschaut, R., "Jugoslawiens Holzindustrie - heutiger Stand, künftige Planung," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 2, 306-316.

Radmilovic, J., "Social and Legal System in Yugoslavia" *Rev. Intern. Aff.*, XII (1961) 268, 14-17.

"Referendums in Macedonia," *Yugoslav Surv.,* II (1961) 4, 460-466.

Stancioff, D., "Memories of the Russo-Turkish war for the liberation of Bulgaria (1877-1878)," *Bulg. Rev.,* I (1961) 2, 23-27.

Stojkovic, S., "La colonisation des Montenegrins dans la Vojvodina (1945-1948-1959)," *Ist. Časopis,* (1961)/1, 45-71.

"The Structure of the Health Service," *Yugoslav Surv.*, II 161) 4, 510-517.

Tamborra, A., "I Congressi della Santa Alleanza di Lubiana e di Verona e la politica della Santa Sede," *Archivio Stor. Ital.,* CXVIII (1960) 427-428, 190-312.

Velcic, V., "Mosa Pijade' Workers Univ. in Zagreb," *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1961)/3, 19-26.

Wessely, K., "Aussenhandel u. Fünfjahresplan in Jugoslawien," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 2, 147-150.

"Yugoslavia's Plan of Economic Development 1961-1965," *Yugoslav Surv.,* II (1961) 4, 467-477.

"Yugoslavia and the Scandinavian Countries," *Yugoslav Surv.,* II (1961) 4, 545-558.

POLAND

Adamus, J., "Nowe badania nad dziejami sejmu polskiego i genezą liberum veto," *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.,* XIII (1961) 1, 169-187.

Bartel, O., "Filip Melanchton w Polsce," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce,* VI (1961). 73-91.

Bartoszewski, L., "Assistance aux Juifs en Pologne occupée," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne* II (1961) 9, 22-40.

Binerowski, Z., "Z problematyki źródel do dziejów budownictwa okrętowego w Gdańsku w XVIII-XIX," *Zapiski Hist.,* (1960) 1, 65-75.

Bruegel, J. W., "German Diplomacy and the Sudeten Question before 1938," *Intern. Aff.*, XXXVII (1961) 3, 323-332.

Chlebowczyk, J., "Powojenny dorobek historiografii polskiej w zakresie stosunków polsko-czeskich i słowackich w XIX-XX wieku (do r. 1945)," *Sobótka,* XVI (1961) 1, 22-43.

Cieslak, T., "Gottlieb Mellien, burmistrz toruński 1770-1830)," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV (1960) 3-4, 67-73.

Ciolkosz, A., "'No Choice' Elections in Poland," *Assembly of Captive Eur. Nations,* (1961) /4, 67-73.

"Co-operative vocational schools," *Pol. Co-op. Rev.,* March 1961, 11-16.

Czaplinski. Wł., "Territories de l'Ouest dans la politique de la Republique nobiliaire (1572-1764)," *Kwart. Hist.,* (1961) 1, 3-30.

Czeslaw, M., "Lengyelek es oroszok," *Szemle,* III 1961) 2, 1-15.

"Die polnische Historiographie d. Nachkriegsjahre," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 3 182-191.

Dopierała, B., "Nowa praca o problemach robotniczych Gdyni międzywojennej," *Zapiski Hist.,* XXVI (1960) 1, 101-113.

Dopierała, B., "Posiązania Szczecina z Czechosłowacja w dwudziestoleciu miedzwojennym," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 2, 307-332.

Dulczewski, S., "Naissance d'une nouvelle société en Poméranie occidentale," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* II (1961) 9, 7-22.

Głębowicz, B., "Związek Wolnych Prusaków w Gdańsku 1793-1797," *Zapiski Hist.,* XXVI (1961) 1, 7-35.

Gluck, L., "Polish Banking System," *Polish Persp.,* IV (1961) 7, 14-22.

Grabski, A. F., "Recherches sur Joachim Lelewel en Pologne contemporaine (1945-1960)," *Kwart. Hist.,* (1961)/1, 184-191.

Guldon, Z., "W sprawie badań nad gospodarką w dobrach szlacheckich w Wielkopolsce w XVIII w.," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV (1960) 3-4, 107-127.

Han, P., "The Plebiscite of 1920 in Warmia and Mazuria," *Zach Agencja Prasowa*, VII (1961) 7, 6-23.

Hass, L., "Formation de l'extrême gauche dans le Parti Socialiste Polonais et la situation intérieure du Parti (Nov. 1923 - mai 1926)," *Kwart. Hist.*, (1961) 1, 69-105.

Heck, R., "Reformacja a problem walki klasowej chłopów ślaskich w XVI wieku," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, VI (1961), 29-49.

Hostowiec, P., "Notatnik niespiesznego przechodnia," *Kultura*, (1961)/7-8, 17-29.

Hoszowski, S., "Sprawy handlu polskiego w okresie Sejmu Wielkiego w świetle archiwaliów angielskich," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV (1960) 3-4, 141-157.

Juzwenko, A., "Na marginesie wpływu polityki wschodniej rządu polskiego na ukształtowanie się zachodniej granicy Polski (1918-1920)," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 54-65.

Kałużny, C., "Bilans 1960 roku w działalności kulturalno-oświatowej," *Kultura i Społ.* V (1960) 2, 127-134.

Komarnicki, T., "Upper Silesia Forty Years Ago," *Poland & Germany*, V (1961) 2, 8-16.

Korab, A., "Polen im Kielwasser der Politik Chruschtschews," *Schweizer Monatschefte*, 3 (1961) 41, 268-278.

Kotarbinski, A., "La renconstruction des villes dans les provinces polonaises de l'Ouest et du Nord," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne*, 2 (1961) 9, 40-40.

Krannhals, H., "Zur Polenpolitik Hitlers," *Ostbrief*, VII (1961) 70, 209-216.

Kucharska, J., "Prepisy prawa zwyczajowego obowiązujące w XIX wieku na półwyspie Helskim," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXVI (1960) 1, 35-47.

Kuczynski, J., "Wizja zagłady mieszczańskiego świata," *Kultura i Społ.* V (1961) 2, 35-51.

Kujawski, M., "Bitwa pod Maidą," *Bellona*, XLII (1960) 4, 274-296.

Kwaśniewski, K., "Niektóra obrzędy ludowe dawnego Wrocławia," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 54-65.

Łepkowski, T., "La foule dans l'Insurrection de Novembre," *Kwart. Hist.*, (1961) 1, 153-175.

Lepszy, K., "Wieki XVI-XVII," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 13-22.

Lubowicki, J., "System of Taxation," *Pol. Persp.*, IV (1961) 15-25.

Machalski, R., Wl. Wisłocki, and J. Matyszczyk, "Polska doktryna wojenna 1919-1939," *Bellona*, XLII (1960) 4, 296-306.

Maleczynska, E., "Okres od XIV do połowy XVI wieku," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 8-13.

Manteuffel-Szoege, B., "Unbekanntes Polen," *Polit. Meinung*. VI (1960) 61, 9-14.

Markiewicz, W., "Society and Culture in the Western Territories, 1945-1960," *Pol. West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 47-74.

Mětšk, F., "Uwagi w sprawie germanizacji na terenie księstwa kronśnieńskiego," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 43-54.

Mieroszewski, J., "Rewolucja przeciw rewolucji," *Kultura*, (1961) 7-8, 101-109.

Olszewski, H., "Praktyka limitowania sejmikow," *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.* XIII (1961) 1, 33-54.

Ostova, M., "Elements of Settlement," *Poland & Germany*, V (1961) 2, 1-8.

"Peligros y dificultades para la Iglesia en Polonia (carta colectiva del Espiscopado polaco)," *Oriente Europeo*, XI (1961) 2, 431-439.

Piskorska, H., "Materiały do dziejów lekarzy i stanu sanitarnego miasta Torunia," *Zapiski Hist.* XXV (1960) 3-4, 127-141.

Polcuch, V., "Polens Herrenlose Jugend," *Ostbrief*, VII (1961) 70, 216-223.

Rapacki, A., "Polens Anschauungen über die Abrüstungsfrage," *Osterr. Zft. Aussenpolit.*

Rudnicka, J., "Relacje Wojciecha Cybulskiego o Wrocławiu (Korespondencja do rodziny z lat 1860-1862)," *Sobótka*, XVI (1961) 1, 54-65.

Sasse, H. G., "La prehistoria de las deportaciones y de la linea Oder-Neisse, 1939-1945," *Oriente Europeo*, XI (1961) 2, 401-417.

Salmonowicz, S., "Krystian Bogumił Steiner (1747-1814), torunski prawnik doby Oświecenia," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV (1960) 3-4, 41-63.

"Silesia's Industrial Progress," *Poland & Germany*, V (1961) 2, 32-34.

Šnejdárek, A., "Rozwój sytuacji międzynarodowej po r. 1945 a stosunki czechosłowacko-polskie," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 215-230.

Starościak, J., "Sprawa samorządu w państwie socjalistycznym," *Kultura i Społ.*, V (1961) 2, 19-35.

Steyer, D., "Działalność organizacji robotniczych w Toruniu w latach 1920-1923." *Zapiski Hist.*, XXV (1960) 3-4, 77-107.

Střida, M., "Znaczenie regionów gospodarczych w nowym podziale terytorialnym Czechosłowacji," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 2, 262-276.

Strobel, G., "Die sozialistische Kulturrevolution in Polen," *Gesch. Osteuropas,* IX (1961) 1, 73-107.

Suchodolski, B., "New Thinking about Education," *Polish Persp.,* IV (1961) 7, 6-14.

Szymańska, H., "Niektóre problemy chłopskich praw do ziemi w Krolestwie Polskim w latach 1815-1864," *Czasopismo Prawno-Hist.,* XIII (1961) 1, 33-54.

Waschinski, E., "Ein neues polnisches Siegelwerk," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 2, 347-354.

Wehler, H.-U., "Zur polnischen Parteigeschichtsschreibung v. 1945-1960 über die Zeit bis 1914," *Zft. f. Ostforschung,* X (1961) 2, 271-309.

Wrzesiński, W., "Materialy o położeniu ludności polskiej w Prusach Wschodnich z 1937 r," *Zapiski Hist.,* XXVI (1960) 1, 75-101.

Zajaczkowski, A., "Premisses sociologiques des récherches sur l'histoire de la noblesse polonaise," *Kwart. Hist.,* (1961) 1, 139-152.

Żelewski, R., "Zaburzenia wyznaniowe w Krakowie Okres przewagi różnowierców, 1551-1573," *Odrodzenie i Reformacja Polsce,* VI (1961), 91-113.

Ziolek, B., "Basic Demographic Problems in the Polish Western Territories," *Pol. West. Aff.,* II (1961) 1, 74-103.

USSR AND UKRAINE

Achminow, H., "Wirtschafts-und sozialpolit. Triebkräfte f. die Proklamierung des Kommunismus in der UdSSR," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 267-278.

Anweiler, O., "Zwischenbilanz der sowjetischen Schulreform," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 285-302.

Arias, L. G., "El Ejercito soviético, los neostalinistas y la China comunista ante la politica de "coexistencia pacifica," *Polit. Intern.,* (1961)/54, 27-85.

Arkhimovich, A., "The 1960 Soviet Harvest," *Inst. For Study USSR,* I (1961) 1, 73-83.

Armstron, J. A., "The Soviet Intellectuals: Observations from Two Journeys," *Inst. for Study USSR,* I (1961) 1, 25-38.

"Aus der sowjetischen Agrarstatistik," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 323-332.

Balabkins, N., "Der Einfluss westlichen ökonomischen Denkens auf die Wirtschaftswissenschaften in der Sowjetunion," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 3, 173-182.

Bilas, L., "Ideology as History and as Poetry," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* (1961)/7, 44-63.

Bolkhovitinov, N. N., and S. I. Divilkovsky; "Russian Diplomacy and the Anglo-American War of 1812-1814," *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961) 4, 31-46.

Byrnes, R. F., "Dostoevsky nd Pobedonostsev," *Gesch. Osteuropas,* IX (1961) 1, 57-73.

Davydenko, V., "Another Crisis of the Collective Farm System in Ukraine," *Ukrainian Qy* XVII (1961) 1, 60-66.

Delimars, E., "Mentalité des Cadres en URSS," *Contrat Soc.,* V (1961) 3, 159-165.

Deuerlein, E., "Chruschtschow u. d. Deutschen," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 61, 47-61.

Dimitrov, G. M., "Nikita Khrushchev on the Witness Stand," *Intern. Peasant Union* April 1961, 8-16.

Engin, A., "Russian Colonialism in Turkestan," *Ukrainian Qy.,* XVII (1961) 2, 158-163.

Fendenko, P., "Hetman Ivan Mazepa in Soviet Historiography," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/ 6-19.

Fedenko, P., "Soviet Views on the 1960 World Historical Congress," *Inst. for Study o USSR,* I (1961) 1, 115-125.

Glovinsky, Y., "Ukrainian External Economic Ties," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 26-38.

Glovinsky, E., "The Consumer and Soviet Agriculture," *Bltn. for Study USSR,* VIII (1961 4, 40-44.

Gsovski, V., "Preventive and Administrative Detention in the USSR," *Jl. Intern. Com Jurists,* III (1961) 1, 135-151.

Heiman, L., "Ukrainians and the Jews," *Ukainian Qy.,* XVII (1961) 2, 107-117.

Holubnychy, V., "Recent Soviet Theories of Value," *Inst. for Study USSR,* I (1961) 1 47-73.

Horak, S., "The First Phase of Soviet Intern. Rel.," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 127-162.

Hutchings, R., "The Origins of the Soviet Industrial Price System," *Sov. Studies,* XII (1961) 1, 1-23.

Jasny, N., "A Note on Rationality and Efficiency in the Soviet Economy," *Sov. Studies* XIII (1961) 1, 35-69.

Karavaev, A., "The 'Withering Away' of the State," *Bltn. for Study of USSR,* VIII (1961 4, 3-12.

Koropeckkj, I., "Soviet Industrial Location in Practice," *Inst. for Study USSR,* I (1961) 1 38-47.

Kravtsyv, B., "Cartography of the Ukraine During and After the Mazepar Era," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* (1961)/7, 63-73.

Kubiyovych, V., "The Ukraine and the 1959 Census," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 19-26.

Leckzych, A., "Neue Reformen—alte Ziele in der UdSSR," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 3, 191-202.

Leckzych, A., "Volkswirtschaftsbilanz in der Sowjetunion," *Osterr. Ost. Hefte* III (1961) 4 270-281.

Lemberg, E., "Mehr Sowjetintelligenz," *Wort u. Wahrheit,* XVI (1961) 5, 361-370.

Leonhard, A. W., "Sovjet-liv i morgen," *Fremtiden,* XVI (1961) 4, 21-31.

Lew, W., "Mazepa in Slavic Literature" *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Studies,* V (1961) 3-4, 200-209.

Liebman, M., "Fabianisme et Communisme: Les Webb et l'Union Soviétique, II," *Intern. Rev. Soc. Hist.,* VI (1961) 1, 49-73.

Markus, V. V., "Soviet Historical Literature Devoted to the Peasant Wars in Russia in the 17th and 18th Centuries," *Voprosy Istorii,* May 1961, 24-48.

Maystrenko, I. "More About Ukrainian-Russian Relations," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* (1961)/7, 87-91.

Mieroszewski, J., "Rosyjski 'Commonwealth,'" *Kultura,* (1961) 6-164, 61-70.

Neubauer, H., "Zur inneren Gesch. der Sowjetunion," *Gesch. Osteuropa,* IX (1961), 107-127.

Prokop, M., "The Question of Ukrainian-Russian Relations," *Suchasna Ukrajinia,* (1961) /6, 49-62.

Protsuk, S., "Problem of the Potential of the Ukrainian Population," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* (1961)/7, 73-87.

Protsuk, S., "The Problem of the Potential of the Ukrainian Population," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* (1961)/6, 62-74.

Prybyla, J. S., "The Soviet Consumer in Khrushchev's Russia," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 194-206.

Ronai, Z. A., "El censo sovietico de 1959 y la politica de nacionalidades," *Polit. Intern.* (1961)/54, 85-99.

Roucek, J. S., "Soviet Psychology," *Prologue,* V (1961) 1-2, 96-121.

Schiller, O., "Das Wesen der kommunistischen Gefahr—Versuch einer Analyse zur Klärung der Begriffs," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 278-285.

Scheggia, A., "Historia de Ucrania," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 2, 457-473.

Schiller, O., "Die 'Verbürgerlichung' in der Sowjetunion in ihrer Bedeutung für uns," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 6, 408-413.

Schurer, H., "The Russian Revolution of 1905 and the Origins of German Communism," *Slav. & Ea. Eur. Rev.,* XXXIX (1961) 93, 459-472.

Shankowsky, L., "The Effects of the Soviet Nationality Policy in the Light of the 1959 Census and other Statistical Data," *Prologue,* V (1961) 1-2, 27-88.

Svobodna, L., "A Look at Ukraine: Russia's Prize Colony," *Ukrainian Qy.,* XVII (1961) 2. 131-142.

Swan, I., "The Disappearance of Metropolitan Nikolai," *Bltn. for Study USSR,* (1961) 5, 44-50.

Teodorovich, N., "The Russian Orthodox Church in the Ukraine," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 100-112.

Tikhomirov, M. N., "Preservation and Study of Historical Manuscripts in the USSR," *Voprosy Istorii,* April, 1961, 62-69.

Toma, P. A., "Lysenko's Genetics Under Khrushchev's Determinism," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 112-127.

Tschebotarioff, G. P., "The Cossacks and the Revolution of 1917," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 206-217.

Uyazebek, L. M., "The Political Status of the Tartar Autonomous Republic," *Inst. for Study USSR,* I (1961) 1, 12-25.

Vvedensky, G. A., "Soviet Industry in 1960 and the Prospects for 1961," *Bltn. for Study USSR,* VIII (1961) 5, 21-27.

Wadekin, K. E., "Die Agrarproduktion der Sowjetunion im Jahre 1960," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 4-5, 318-323.

Wolfe, B. D., "Rosa Luxemburg and V. I. Lenin," *Antioch Rev.,* Summer, 1961, 209-226.

Yurchenko, A., "The Latest Trends in Communist Constitutional Law," *Bltn. for Study USSR,* VIII (1961) 5, 50-57.

Yurchenko, A., "The Soviet Dictatorship and the Intensified Building of Communism," *Ukrainian Rev.,* (1961)/9, 38-70.

Zhuk, A., "Ukrainian Cooperation in Western Ukraine Under Poland," *Suchasna Ukrajina,* III (1961) 8, 81-96.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Armstrong, John A., *The Politics of Totalitarianism,* New York, Random House, 1961, $7.50.

Birke, E., and K. Oberdorfler, *Das böhmische Staatsrecht in den deutsch-tschechischen Auseinandersetzungen, des 19 u. 20 Jahrhdt.,* Marburg/Lahn, Elwert Verlag, 1960, DM 7.50.

Bronska-Pampuch, Wanda, *Polen,* Koln, Verlag f. Polit. Wirtschaft, 1958, DM 16.80.

Codding, G. A., *The Federal Government in Switzerland,* Cambridge, Mass., Riverside Press, 1961, $1.95.

Cysarz, H., *Das Deutsche National Bewusstsein,* München, Olzog, DM 5.80.

Delzell, Charles F., *Mussolini's Enemies—The Anti-Fascist Resistance,* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1961, $12.50.

Dobbek, W., *J. G. Herders Jugendzeit in Mohrungen u. Königsberg 1744-1764,* (Band XVI), Würzburg, Holzner, 1961, DM 19.80.

Experimental Operations on Prisoners of Ravensbrück Concentration Camp. Studies an Monographs, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo Zach., 1961.

Fifth Congress of the Socialist Alliance of the Working People of Yugoslavia 1960 Beograd, Editorial Comm. of the Fifth Congress.

Die Geheimen Papiere Friedrich v. Holsteins, Bd. III, Berlin, Musterschmidt, 1961 DM 60.00.

Horak, S., *Poland and Her National Minorities 1919-1939,* New York Vantage Press, 1961 $5.00.

Kellen, K., *Khruschev, A Political Portrait,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $5.00.

Kiraly, E., *Die Arbeiterselbstverwaltung in Ungarn,* München, Oldenbourg, 1961.

Knorre, W., *Zehn Jahre Rat f. gegenseitige Wirtschaftshilfe (COMECON) des Sowjetblocks,* Würzburg, Holzner, DM 10.80.

Labuda, G., *Fragmenty dziejow słowianszczyzny zachodniej,* Poznań, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1960.

Malia, M., *Alexander Herzen and the Birth of Russian Socialism 1812-1855,* Cambridge Harvard Univ. Press, 1961, $10.00.

Marvick, D., *Political Decision-makers: Recruitment and Performance,* New York, Fre Press of Glencoe, 1961, $7.50.

Mikoletzky, H., *Kaiser Franz L. Stephen u. der Ursprung des Habsburgisch-Lothringische familienvermögens,* Vienna, Verlag f. Gesch. u. Polit., 1961, S 37.-.

Odrodzenie w Polsce, Tom II, Historia Jezyka, Warzawa, Panst. Inst. Wydawniczy, 195 $15.30.

Osterr. Biograph. Lexikon 1815-1950, Herausgegeben v. d. Osterr. Akad. Wiss., Graz/Koh H. Bohlaus, 1961, 01.70.

Paul, J., *Europa im Osteeraum,* Gottingen, Musterschmidt, 1961, DM 15.80.

Paupie, K., *Handbuch der osterr. Pressegesch. 1848-1959,* Bd. I, Stuttgart, Braumulle 1960, DM 18.00.

Pistrak, L., *The Grand Tactician,* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1961, $6.00.

Population Movements Between the Oder and Bug Rivers, Studies and Monograph Wydawnictwo Zach., Warszawa, 1961.

Priebke, M., *Die Evangelische Jugend im Dritten Reich 1933-1936,* Hannover-Frankfur O. Goedel, DM 12.50.

Regele, O., *Feldzeugmeister Benedek, Der Weg Nach Königgrätz,* München, Herold, 1960 43 DM.

Siracky, A., *Dvojake Ponatie Slobody,* Bratislava, Otazky dialektiky Poznania, 1961.

Spulber, N., *Study of the Soviet Economy,* Bloomington, Indiana U. Press, 1961, $3.00.

Steinbrecher, U., *Liberale Parteiorganisation unter Besonderer Berücksichtigung de Linksslibe,* Köln, Univ. of Köln, 1960.

Suter, J.-F., *Philosophie et Histoire chez Wilhelm Dilthey,* Basel, Verlag f. Recht Gesellschaft, 1960, 5.25.

Taborsky, E., *Communism in Czechoslovakia 1948-1960,* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Pres 1961, $12.50.

Tillman, S. P., *Anglo-American Relations at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919,* Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 1961, $8.50.

Topalovic, Z., *Slom Demokratije,* London, Savez Oslobodjenje, 1961.

Treue, W., *Deutsche-Parteiprogramme 1861-1961,* Berlin/Frankfurt, Musterschmidt, 196 DM 24.00.

Ullman, R. H., *Intervention and the War,* Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 1961, $7.50.

Vogel, R., *Südosteuropa,* Jahrbuch Bd. 5, München, Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, DM 15.8

JOURNAL
of
CENTRAL EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

VOL. XXI JANUARY, 1962 NUMBER FOUR

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

by Winfried R. Dallmayr

DURING the past decade, considerable attention has been devoted in learned journals to the postwar institution of constitutional courts in Western Germany and Italy. The emphasis laid on these courts has sometimes fostered the impression that constitutional jurisdiction in Europe was primarily a foreign import whose acceptance was encouraged by a reaction against past years of dictatorship. While correctly assessing some aspects of the situation, this view certainly interprets continental developments in too narrow a perspective. The narrowness becomes manifest with a brief glance at another European court—the Constitutional Court of Austria. Strangely enough, the latter institution has received but scant notice[1] even though some of its competences look back over an almost centennial tradition. The following pages attempt to remedy the situation by sketching the varied history of the Austrian tribunal and of its predecessors from Empire and Dual Monarchy to the present time. The account endeavors to portray this history in the broader perspective of Austrian political developments and, in doing so, to bring out and give credit to those political forces or groups which were mainly operative in promoting the establishment of tribunals concerned with constitutional issues. At the same time, the account may shed some light on the problematical relation between judicial organs as "guardians" of the constitution and the democratic principles of popular rule and representation.

Empire and Dual Monarchy

The Habsburg Monarchy was not entirely impervious to the demands of the modern conception of the rule of law and of constitutionalism. Institutional forms corresponding to these demands, however, were introduced only slowly and under the pressure of historical events. The revolutionary movement which in 1848 swept through Europe pursued in Austria the primary purpose of transforming the hitherto highly centralized, absolute

---

[1] Exceptions are: Paul L. Baeck, "Postwar Judicial Review of Legislative Acts: Austria," *Tulane Law Review,* vol. 26 (1951-52), pp. 76-77; David Deener, "Judicial Review in Modern Constitutional Systems," *American Political Science Review,* vol. 46 (1952), pp. 1079-99; Taylor Cole, "Three Constitutional Courts: A Comparison," *ibid.,* vol. 53 (1959), pp. 963-84.

> If the rule of law is from now on to be the basis of our political life, an organ has to be created which, in full independence from extraneous influences, realizes and implements this rule especially in those areas where its functioning is threatened by the predominance of administrative influences and utilitarian interests of the state.[10]

In regard to the promotion of internal harmony, Kremer affirmed that

> the institution of a Court of the Empire possesses great political value in Austria also because such an institution will convincingly demonstrate that all the nationalities of the different kingdoms and provinces have common interests where the protection of general political rights is concerned and that they may confidently entrust these interests to a common supreme judiciary.[11]

The more liberal and semi-federal aspirations underlying the institution of the Court of the Empire were manifested both in its composition and its competences. According to the statutory basis, the Court had its seat in Vienna and consisted of a president, his substitute, and of 12 members and 4 substitute members, all of whom exercised their functions for life-time terms without remuneration, with only the permanent referees receiving a moderate annual allowance. Only the president and his substitute or vice-president were directly appointed by the Emperor. Of the remaining judges, 6 members and 2 substitute members were appointed by the Emperor respectively on the proposition of the House of Representatives and of the House of Lords.[12] The jurisdiction of the Court comprised three major areas: (1) claims of individuals against the Empire and vice versa, claims among provinces, and civil law claims of individuals against the Empire or provinces if such claims could not be settled before the ordinary courts; (2) conflicts of competence between judicial and administrative authorities, between provincial and central organs, and among autonomous provincial organs; (3) complaints of citizens against violation of constitutionally guaranteed political rights after exhaustion of administrative remedies.

---

[10] *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Hauses der Abgeordneten de Reichsrathes* (hereafter cited as *Sten. Prot. H. A. R.*), 4th Session, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1869 p. 770, (session of October 8, 1867). Kremer added: "Protection by ordinary courts ma suffice where the State derives its claims or counterclaims merely from firmly establishe civil law rules. However, where public law questions are involved, where the right of th individual is not delimited by stable rules but confronted with flexible considerations c the common good and with changing opinions of public need and utility, where th realization and effectiveness of the most important political rights of the citizen are ex posed to decisions of administrative organs of the State, or where the State is able t dodge its obligations through decrees without being exposed to the jurisdiction of ordinar courts: there is need for protection by a judicial organ whose elevated stature, indepen dence and impartiality offer the insurance that decisions in such cases are determined no by the arbitrary dictates of public administration, but by the dictates of law and equity.." *Ibid.*

[11] *Ibid.* In support of the draft, Kremer also referred to the successful functioning o the Supreme Court in the United States and of the Federal Tribunal in Switzerland. Th report was followed by the second reading of the draft which, without eliciting genera debate, was completed on the same day (October 8). On October 16, the lower hous accepted the draft on third reading. In the House of Lords, the draft was transmitte on October 22 to a juridical committee, whence it was reported back by Krauss on Nc vember 5 for second reading. For this report see *Stenographische Protokolle des Herren hauses des Reichsrathes,* 4th Session, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1869), pp. 228-230, (session of Novem ber 5, 1867). During the ensuing debates, Hock questioned the necessity and practicalit of the establishment of the Court arguing that all constitutional problems could mor properly be handled by the Council of State; *ibid.*, pp. 229-232. Count Rechberg objecte to the enactment of the draft in the form of a Basic or Constitutional Law; *ibid.*, p. 23 The arguments were countered by Krauss, Schmerling and Lichtenfels; *ibid.*, pp. 233-24 On December 2, the upper house accepted the draft on third reading. On December the lower house agreed to the slight alterations effected by the upper chamber.

After the passage of the December laws of 1867, the concrete establishment of the Court of the Empire was completed in the comparatively short period of two years. On June 12, 1868, the institution of the Council of State was abolished as no longer serving a useful purpose.[13] With the law of April 18, 1869, the organization and procedures of the Court were specified in greater detail.[14] The first president of the Court and his substitute were appointed by the Emperor on May 6, 1869.[15] During the same month, the two houses of parliament submitted their lists of nominations,[16] whereupon the Emperor on June 9 confirmed the appointment of the remaining judges of the Court.[17] On June 21 the Court was finally able to begin its activity. Two of the initial measures taken were the selection of permanent referees[18]

---

[12] The manner of appointment was controverted during the parliamentary debates. In the upper chamber, Jablonowski considered the parliamentary right of proposition as dangerous to the political independence and impartiality of the Court and as an interference in matters of Imperial authority; in his opinion, direct appointment by the Emperor was necessary to solidify the stature and reputation of the Court; *ibid.*, p. 236. Count Rechberg objected to parliamentary proposition on the basis of separation of powers, arguing that "one of the first rights of the executive—a right commonly recognized in all constitutional governments—is the exclusive faculty to appoint all organs of the state;" *ibid.*, p. 237. The participation of parliament was defended by Schmerling and Krauss, mainly in the perspective of the political importance of the Court; *ibid.*, p. 236 f. Compare also the statements of Kremer in the House of Representatives: "The right of proposition, attributed to the Council of the Empire, finds its justification in the fact that the Court is competent not only to decide on ordinary claims and obligations but possesses jurisdiction which, at least to an equal degree, is of a political nature and that it is destined to serve as guardian and protector of constitutionally guaranteed political rights and of the separation of judiciary and administration. In view of the great political importance of the Court, a basic condition of its effectiveness resides in the fact that parliament is granted a decisive influence on the election of its members and thereby on the independence of its rulings and that, instead of being entirely reserved to the executive, the composition of the Court insures to both branches of government the necessary respect of those interests whose safeguard lies in their respective domains." See *Sten. Prot. H.A.R.*, 4th Session, vol. 1, p. 775. On the developments in parliament compare also Karl Hugelmann, *op. cit.*, p. 465 f.

[13] *RGBl.*, No. 60.

[14] *RGBl.*, No. 44. Compare Karl Hugelmann, *op.cit.*, pp. 472-487.

[15] The Emperor appointed as president Karl Freiherr von Krauss; as his substitute, Ignaz Freiherr von Szymonowicz, a member of the Supreme Court (*Oberster Gerichtshof*) and of the House of Lords.

[16] The lower chamber effected its choice on May 13, and the upper house completed the election on May 18, 1869.

[17] The appointed judges were: (1) upon nomination of the House of Lords: Apfaltrern, Czartoryski, Hartig, Hye-Glunek, Quesar, Unger as regular members, and Holzgethan and Merkl as substitute members; (2) upon nomination of the House of Representatives: Habietinek, Heyssler, Kiechl, Ott, Suppan, Ziemialkowski as regular members, and Steyrer and Dollenz as substitute members. See Karl Hugelmann, *op. cit.*, p. 489, n. 3.

[18] June 25, 1869; the two referees were Hye-Glunek and Quesar. In 1904, the position of a third referee was created. On the succession of referees see *ibid.*, p. 499, n. 1.

and the adoption of standing orders with the ordinance of October 26.[1 On November 29, the first decision of the Court was handed down in a cas involving a conflict of competence between judicial and administrative au thorities. From then on till the end of the Empire in 1918,[20] the Court fun tioned practically, or very nearly, in the same manner and with the sam competences as laid down in 1867. Due to the impending institution the Austrian Administrative Court (*Verwaltungsgerichtshof*) in 1876, th problem of the relation between the rulings of the latter court and othe judicial organs arose. With the law of October 22, 1875, the Court of th Empire received jurisdiction to decide conflicts of competence between th Administrative Court and ordinary courts; for conflicts between the Admi istrative Court and the Court of the Empire a special Senate (*Austräga senat*) was established consisting respectively of 4 members from both cour and acting under the chairmanship of the president of the Supreme Cou (*Oberster Gerichtshof*).[21] In 1892, special procedural regulations wer adopted for a category of legal claims;[22] other measures concerned alteratio of the organizational statute and of the standing orders of the Court.[23]

During the almost fifty years of its existence, the Court of the Empi gained respect as a highly competent and reputable institution of the Du Monarchy. The decisions which were handed down were perhaps not ve daring; but the mere presence of the Court tempered the autocratic featur of the monarchical system. Above all, the rulings of the Court in regard nationalities and national minorities frequently reduced tensions and p vented a more forceful clash of interests. To a significant degree, the succe and reputation of the Court can be attributed to the ability of its membe The continuity of jurisprudence—an important aspect in any court practic is indicated by the fact that, during five decades, only three judges presid over the Court. The first president, from 1869 to 1881, was Karl Freih von Krauss, a former Minister of Justice, president of the Supreme Co and member of the upper house of parliament; he entered upon his off at the age of 79. The second president, from 1881 to 1913, was Jose Unger, certainly one of the greatest Austrian jurists, a former minister und Auersperg. The last president, from 1913 to 1918, was Karl von Grabma a lawyer from Tyrol, successively member of both houses of parliament a already, since 1905, vice-president of the Court.[24] Of the other members, s

---

[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 490-495.

[20] The last decision was handed down on October 14, 1918; it was the 2392nd decis of the Court. In addition there were 30 decisions of the special Senate or "Austrägalsena

[21] *RGBl.*, No. 37; *ibid.*, p. 495 f.; Hans Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 65 ff. on the establishment the Austrian Administrative Court and on Austrian administrative jurisprudence in g eral see Reginald Parker, "Administrative Law through Foreign Glasses; The Austr Experience," *Rutgers Law Review*, vol. 15 (1961), p. 552 ff.

[22] Law of March 16, 1892 (*RGBl.*, No. 64); the claims concerned indemnification errors of justice.

[23] The alterations of the organizational statute were effected on July 12, 1913, (*RG* No. 144); with ordinance of March 27, 1915, (*RGBl.*, No. 78) new standing orders w adopted.

[24] For these data compare Gustav Zigeuner, "Zehn Jahre Verfassungsgerichtshof in Zweiten Republik," *Juristische Blätter*, vol. 78 (1956), pp. 629-630. As vice-president act

cial mention should be made of Anton Hye Freiherr von Glunek, a former Minister of Justice who, until his death in 1894, edited the official collection of decisions of the Court of the Empire, an edition later continued by Karl Hugelmann.[25] In general, the composition of the Court was representative of the major public and legal functions and professions in the Empire: it included a great number of judges from the Supreme Court and other ordinary courts,[26] many professional lawyers,[27] members of the House of Representatives[28] and the House of Lords,[29] ministers and even prime ministers,[30] and a very respectable group of university professors.[31] However, despite the reputable stature of the Court, one should remember that, already during the first decades of its activity, a trend of opinion emerged according to which the competences of the Court were too narrowly restricted and its organization in need of reform. Most prominent among the proponents of this opinion was certainly Georg Jellinek who, in 1885, published his treatise entitled "A Constitutional Court for Austria"[32] in which he advocated the establishment of a constitutional court with greatly extended competences, possibly in the nature of an expansion of the existing Court of the Empire.

Provisional National Assembly

At the end of World War I, as a concomitant of defeat, the old Empire broke apart. In view of the separatist tendencies of the nationalities, the German inhabitants were induced to follow the same trend and to attempt the organization of their own political life. Already on October 10, 1918, the German parties of the House of Representatives consented to a Socialist resolution which proposed the establishment of a new state embracing all the German territories of Austria. Shortly afterwards, on October 21, the German representatives of the House met in plenary session, constituted themselves a Provisional National Assembly and decided on the creation of the independent state of German-Austria. This decision was implemented in the session of October 30 with the "Resolution Concerning the Basic Institutions of the State," which may also be designated as the first constitution of

---

Szymonowicz (1869-1871), Apfaltrern (1871-1876), Napadiewicz (1876-1881) Habietinek (1881-1899), Steinbach (1899-1905), Grabmayr (1905-1913), Schönborn (1913-1914), Randa (1914), and Ott (1914-1918); see Karl Hugelmann, *op. cit.*, p. 501, n. 2.

[25] *Sammlung der nach gepflogener mündlicher Verhandlung geschöpften Erkenntnisse des K. K. Reichsgerichtes,* 17 vols. (Vienna 1874-1919).

[26] Judges of the Supreme Court were: Krauss, Szymonowicz, Apfaltrern, Napadiewicz, Habietinek, Steinbach, Haslmayr, Schmid et al.; Merkl was president of the Court of Commerce in Vienna; Chorinsky, Krall, Call, and Vittorelli were presidents of superior provincial courts; Neumann-Ettenreich was councillor at the Administrative Court.

[27] Ott, Rintelen, Feistmantel, Esser, Pattai, Sylvester, Dollenz, Grabmayr, Ofner, et al.

[28] Jaworski, Count Palffy, Starzynski, Pattai, Sylvester, Ofner, Grabmayr, et al.

[29] Harty, Windischgrätz, Czartoryski, Count Badeni, Lobkowitz, et al.

[30] Randa, Steinbach, Madeyski, Jaworski, Löbl, Windischgrätz; Count Badeni functioned later as prime minister.

[31] Adolf Exner, Leopold Pfaff, Karl Czyhlarz, Edmund Bernatzik, Adolf Menzel, Friedrich Maassen, Emil Ott, et al. For further information on membership see Karl Hugelmann, *op. cit.*, p. 502, n. 1.

[32] *Ein Verfassungsgerichtshof für Österreich* (Vienna, 1885).

the new country.[33] The main feature of the Resolution was the institution of a representative parliamentary democracy, with a heavy emphasis on parliamentary rule. In effect, the supreme power of the state was attributed to the Provisional National Assembly itself.[34] Regarding the direct exercise of power, the Assembly retained the legislative function while the executive function was exercised by a committee, called Council of State (*Staatsrat*), which was chosen by and from among the members of the Assembly. The emphasis placed on parliamentary or assembly rule was also demonstrated by the fact that the Resolution transferred the jurisdiction of the former High Court in matters of impeachment to a committee of 20 members of the Provisional National Assembly. Another important aspect of the document was the endorsement of a strongly centralized, unitary form of administration.[35]

The Provisional National Assembly considered itself as a merely temporary institution. Consequently, on December 18, laws were passed on the convocation of a Constituent National Assembly[36] and on the organization of elections to this body.[37] Among other measures adopted by the Provisional National Assembly, the most significant for the present purpose was the law of January 25, 1919, concerning the establishment of a "German-Austrian Constitutional Court."[38] Already on January 17, the Council of State had resolved to send to the Assembly a draft on this subject. According to the draft—which was introduced on January 23—the projected Constitutional Court appeared essentially as a continuation of the former Court of the Empire within the more limited territorial confines of the new Republic. Thus, the draft stipulated that "for the fulfillment of the functions of the former Court of the Empire a constitutional court is established in Vienna for the territory of the German-Austrian Republic."[39] The new Court, whose competences corresponded to the jurisdiction of the previous judicial organ, was to consist of a president, his substitute, 8 members and 4 substitute members, all of whom were to be appointed by the Council of State.

The statement of motivation which accompanied the draft stressed again the "necessity to provide for the fulfillment of the tasks formerly attributed to the Court of the Empire."[40] It also indicated that, already at this time, divergent opinions existed on the proper manner of reconstituting the court. Thus, the statement referred to a restrictive attitude which, instead of creating a special organ in the place of the Court of the Empire, wanted to transfer its competences to another tribunal like the Administrative Court or its new counterpart. "This would certainly be the most advisable method," the report countered,

---

[33] On the details of this "constitution" see Hans Kelsen, *op.cit.,* pp. 82-102.

[34] On November 11, as a logical consequence of this development, Emperor Charles renounced all participation in affairs of the state; *ibid.,* p. 78.

[35] It was mainly in this regard that the Resolution contrasted with actual developments. For, while the National Assembly was constituting itself in Vienna, similar meetings were held in the provinces and provincial constitutions were adopted by these meetings.

[36] *StGBl.,* No. 114 (*St.GBl.* stands for "Staatsgesetzblatt" or Law Gazette of the State).

[37] *StGBl.,* No. 115. See Hans Kelsen, *op.cit.,* p. 109.

[38] *StGBl.,* No. 48. See *ibid.,* p. 107 f.; Ernst Hellbling, *op. cit.,* p. 200; also Ludwig Adamovich, "Zur Judikatur des Verfassungsgerichtshofes," *Zeitschrift für öffentliche Recht,* vol. 4 (1925), p. 367; Paul Vittorelli, "Zehn Jahre Verfassungsgerichtshof," *ibid.,* vol. 8 (1929), p. 435.

[39] *Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen der Provisorischen Nationalversammlung für Deutschösterreich,* (hereafter cited as *Beilagen Prov. Nat.*), vol. 1 (Vienna, 1919), Beilage 141, p. 1.

[40] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

> if the most important competences of the former Court of the Empire —namely, protection of constitutionally guaranteed political rights and decision in conflicts of competence—did not by their very nature require an organ which insures the complete independence and excellent juridical qualification of its members. These conditions, however, are met only in the case of the honorarily working members of the Court of the Empire.[41]

The statement also referred to an opposite attitude which advocated the idea of expanding the jurisdiction of the new court beyond the competences of the Imperial organ. "The need to reform the latter," the report observed,

> is commonly known and the desire for a court which serves to protect the constitution in every respect is widely shared. Thus, one might well ponder the question whether the new constitutional court should receive jurisdiction not only over protection of civil rights but also in regard to the impeachment of ministers and the examination of elections. Such far-reaching reforms, however, transcend the limited competence of the Provisional National Assembly and must be reserved to the Constituent National Assembly.[42]

Explaining that "the envisaged number of 8 members and 4 substitute members corresponds approximately to the number of German members and substitutes of the former Court of the Empire,"[43] the report added that "the judges of the previous organ are not *ipso jure* members of the new constitutional court . . . especially in view of the fact that the composition of the Court of the Empire reflected also those nationalities which belonged to the old Empire but no longer form part of German-Austria." However, the statement concluded, "it is planned to appoint the German members and substitute members of the Court of the Empire as members and substitute members of the Constitutional Court."[44] This plan was indeed carried out except in cases where death, old age or conflicting engagements made the appointment impossible.

After having been recommitteed, the draft statute was reported back to the Assembly with only minor changes on January 25.[45] Reporter Kofler described the establishment of the Court as the "adoption of an institution which through several decades has become an integral part of our Austrian constitutional and juridical life," an adoption which

> can no longer be delayed although it might perhaps have been advisable to settle several organizational questions which are intimately connected with the problem of administrative reform. However, in view of the

---

[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*

> urgent nature of the institution, the Constitutional Committee felt bound to recommend the draft to the Assembly with only minor alterations and to reserve reform in this matter for a later date when the Constituent National Assembly will be in session and when the necessary changes can be effected in conjunction with the administrative reform.[46]

The draft encountered objections primarily from Julius Ofner, former judg at the Court of the Empire and later member of the Constitutional Court According to Ofner, the draft was entirely unsatisfactory, especially in regar to the competences and the composition of the Court. In the former respect he criticized the limited range of jurisdiction and the retention of the unim portant function as a court of claims. "The proposed draft should actuall be entirely changed," he said,

> for, the Court of the Empire has now turned into something like a justice of the peace for claims against the state. Our present juridical conceptions should lead us to the conclusion that claims against the state belong before the ordinary courts in the same manner as do claims against any private person.[47]

Concerning the composition of the Court, Ofner remarked that "there ar also weighty objections to the provision according to which members of th Court are to be appointed by the Council of State, since the latter is actua ly nothing else but the government." He concluded by saying that he di not intend to introduce a countermotion "because this is really a temporar arrangement, and, as I hope, an arrangement of only a few weeks."[48] Th draft was then accepted without further debate. During February, the judg of the new court were sworn in[49] and, on March 10, the first decision w handed down in a case involving pecuniary claims of a civil servant again the state.[50]

Before passing on to the Constituent National Assembly, another mea

---

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 4.

[44] *Ibid.* The report also mentions that the last president of the Court of the Empi Grabmayr, was still sworn in by the president of the Provisional National Assembly. C February 15, however, Grabmayr was notified of the possibility of his becoming preside of the new Administrative Court, which position he then accepted; see Gustav Zigeun *op. cit.*, p. 630.

[45] For the slightly altered draft see *Beilagen Prov. Nat.*, vol. I (Vienna, 1919), Beila 169.

[46] *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Provisorischen Nationalversam lung* (hereafter cited as *Sten. Prot. Prov. Nat.*), vol. I (Vienna, 1919), p. 567.

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 568.

[48] *Ibid.*

[49] As appointed by the Council of State, these judges were: Vittorelli as preside Menzel as his substitute; Fuchs, Esser, Sylvester, Ofner, Harpner, Engel, Bernatzik, Ne mann-Ettenreich as members; and Kienböck, Austerlitz, Kolisko, Bloch as substitu members. Of these, Vittorelli, Menzel, Bernatzik, Esser, Ofner, Sylvester, Kolisko, an Neumann-Ettenreich had been members of the Court of the Empire. On February Neumann-Ettenreich, Ofner and Sylvester were selected as permanent referees. See Pa Vittorelli, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

[50] *Sammlung der Erkenntnisse des durch das Gesetz vom 25. Jänner 1919, StGBl. N 48, geschaffenen österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofes*, vol. 1 (Vienna, 1920), p. 1 ff. Un the remodeling of the Court by the Federal Constitution of 1920, the Court rendered decisions which were published in two volumes, the second one in Vienna, 1922.

ure of the Provisional Assembly bearing on judicial organization should be reported—the establishment of a Court for the Examination of Elections (*Wahlgerichtshof*) on February 6, 1919.[51] Under the Dual Monarchy, the Council of the Empire itself had been competent to decide on the propriety of elections and on protests against election results.[52] The statute of December 18, 1918, concerning organization of elections to the Constituent National Assembly,[53] had stipulated that a special judicial body should decide on complaints against the illegality or impropriety of election procedures; however, the institution of this body was reserved to a special law and the Administrative Court was designated in the meantime as the competent organ. According to the law of February 6, 1919, the Election Court was to consist of a president, 3 members of the Constitutional Court, 3 members of the Administrative Court, and 3 members of the Supreme Court; the office of president was to be exercised by the respective president of the Administrative Court. The jurisdiction of the Election Court comprised actions against illegality of election procedures and election results; it was also declared competent to determine, upon motion of the president of the Constituent National Assembly, the loss of the right of membership in the latter body.[54]

Constituent National Assembly

The Constituent National Assembly was elected on February 16 and convened for the first time on March 4, 1919.[55] Changes in the field of constitutional jurisdiction were adopted by the Assembly only gradually. Ten days after the first meeting two significant laws were passed which together may be designated as the constitution of March 14:[56] the laws concerning popular representation[57] and state government.[58] The two laws largely maintained the emphasis on parliamentary supremacy and on a centralized form of government which had been introduced by the Provisional National Assembly. In the first, the Constituent National Assembly instituted itself as the highest organ of the Republic and solidified its legislative competences. With the second, the Council of State was abolished and replaced by a state government composed of a chancellor, vice-chancellor and state secretaries, all of whom were elected by and dependent on the National Assembly, while the position corresponding to a "head of state" was entirely reserved to the president of the same Assembly. For the present purpose, the law on popular representation was significant primarily by virtue of the fact that it attributed to the Constitutional Court for the first time a limited power of judicial review. However, the extension of the competences of the Constitutional Court reflected at the same time the preeminent position accorded to the national parliament and the central government. The power of judicial review did not extend to laws adopted by the national legislature, only to draft resolutions of provincial assemblies upon request of the central government. As Article 15 of the law provided:

---

[51] *StGBl.*, No. 90; see Hans Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

[52] Art. 3 of the standing orders of the Council of the Empire of 1873 (*RGBl.*, No. 94) and Art. 4 of the Law of 1907 (*RGBl.*, No. 17).

[53] *StGBl.*, No. 115; see *supra*, n. 37.

[54] Compare also the explanatory remarks to the draft statute: "Concerning the organization of the Court, mainly two ideas were decisive for the present draft: (1) greatest possible objectivity and independence; (2) greatest possible economy. The first requirement has been observed in that the Election Court is composed of members of the highest courts of the state, with the additional proviso that no member of the Court shall belong to parliament or to the Main Election Office (*Hauptwahlbehörde*). Neither the members nor the president are appointed by a governmental authority involved in politics." See *Beilagen Prov. Nat.*, vol. I (Vienna, 1919), Beilage 183, p. 9.

[55] Of the 170 seats in the Assembly including representation of occupied territories, 72 went to the Social Democratic Party, 69 to the Christian Social Party, 26 to the German National Party (of a National Liberal vintage), and one seat respectively to three small splinter parties. Compare Hans Kelsen, *op.cit.*, p. 115.

[56] On this "constitution," see *ibid.*, pp. 116-146.

[57] *StGBl.*, No. 179.

[58] *StGBl.*, No. 180.

> Legislative resolutions of a provincial assembly can be challenged as unconstitutional by the State Government before the Constitutional Court within fourteen days after receiving the required notification.[59]

The draft of the statute on popular representation had been elaborated by the Constitutional Committee on March 13[60] and submitted to the Assembly on the following day. The debates in the Assembly illustrated in a striking manner the different attitudes of the parties toward constitutional reform in general and toward the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court in particular. Reporter Ignaz Seipel discovered in the draft the solution to two "fundamental problems."[61] Identifying the first problem as the expression of the popular will, he found the answer in the institution of popular referendum, while by-passing the much more pronounced and more obvious principle of parliamentary or assembly rule. The second problem consisted, for Seipel, in the relation between national and provincial legislation. In this regard, he merely stressed the decentralizing feature of provincial legislative competence, but made no reference to any form of subordination, just as he was entirely silent on the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court over provincial draft statutes. In contrast to this interpretation, Arnold Eisler found in the draft the fulfillment of a democratic postulate: "namely, when we stipulate that the National Assembly, elected by the German-Austrian people, is invested as the highest organ of the people with supreme power in the Republic."[62] Regarding the relation between state and provinces, Eisler viewed the draft mainly as an instrument regulating and specifying the authority of central institutions. Though the aspect of judicial competence was perhaps not paramount in his mind, he expressed happiness over the prospect

---

[59] See *ibid.*, p. 126 f.

[60] *Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung* (hereafter cited as *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*), vol. I (Vienna, 1919), Beilage 61.

[61] *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen der Konstituierenden Nationalversammlung* (hereafter cited as *Sten. Prot. Konst. Nat.*), vol. I (Vienna, 1919), p. 65 (session of March 14, 1919). Seipel belonged to the Christian Social Party.

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 74. Eisler spoke for the Social Democratic Party.

> that the question as to whether or not a provincial statute is to become effective will no longer be decided by former uncontrollable influences . . . but by objective arguments, and that, where constitutional issues are involved, a judicial organ will be competent to decide these issues in an objective and equitable manner.[63]

In any event, he added that "we should be sorry if any separatistically-minded circles in the provinces chose to regard the provisions of Article 12 and 15 as a retreat of the state and of the legislative competence of the state."[64]

While the two major parties accepted the draft, though under different perspectives, Hans Angerer criticized and rejected the preeminence of parliamentary rule, the disregard of the separation of powers, and the unsatisfactory institution of the rule of law. In his opinion, the executive branch should not depend on but rather be separated from the Assembly or parliament and possibly be "subjected to a High Court in order that political questions might be transformed into legal questions."[65] Angerer also deplored the incomplete realization of the rule of law in the case of the Constitutional Court. "It is true," he said,

> we have in this law an article dealing with the relation between state and provincial legislation which stipulates that a judicial decision has to determine whether a provincial statute remains within the confines of the constitutional order. This is entirely proper. We agree with this conception; however, we would have liked to see this conception observed and applied in all respects.[66]

During subsequent developments, one discerns a slight but growing tendency to place a less extreme emphasis on parliamentary rule in favor of a more equitable balance between state and provinces and of an accentuation of the rule of law. This trend was already visible in a law of April 3, 1919,[67] by which both the competences and the composition of the Constitutional Court were enlarged. The jurisdictional innovation concerned ministerial responsibility or decision in cases of impeachment. In this manner, a function which during the Empire had been reserved to a special High Court and which the Provisional National Assembly had transferred to a committee of the Assembly was finally assigned to the Constitutional Court. As the explanatory remarks to the draft statute pointed out, the government thought it at this time

> advisable, instead of utilizing again a committee of the Assembly, to transfer the adjudication of constitutionally impeached members of the

---

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 76.

[64] *Ibid.*

[65] *Ibid.*, p. 71. Angerer spoke for the German National group. This group has subsequently assumed many different names ("Grossdeutsche Partei," "Nationaler Wirtschafts block;" under the Second Republic: "Wahlpartei der Unabhängigen," now "Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs"). For purposes of simplification, the group is subsequently always designated after its basic orientation as the Naional Liberal group.

[66] *Ibid.*

[67] *StGBl.*, No. 212.

[68] *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*, vol. I (Vienna, 1919), Beilage 82, p. 2.

> government to the Constitutional Court which thus, in addition to its present competences, merely assumes another related function of constitutional jurisdiction.[68]

Submitting the draft to the Assembly on March 27, Chancellor Renner conceded the excessively "parliamentarian" character of the procedure adopted by the Provisional National Assembly. "This feature," he observed,

> was rightly considered by jurists as a mistake, since the Assembly itself, or a majority in the Assembly, would have to sit in judgment over ministers who in turn originate in the majority of the Assembly. If the draft is accepted the Constitutional Court which is competent in all other constitutional matters will also be competent to judge impeached ministers.[69]

The Constitutional Committee of the Assembly to which the draft was referred accepted the increase in jurisdiction, but added several changes mainly in regard to the composition of the Court. As the Committee report explained:

> In view of the greatly enlarged competences of the Constitutional Court —function of impeachment and judicial review of provincial draft resolutions—an augmentation of the number of judges is necessary. While hitherto only 8 members and 4 substitute members were stipulated, there shall now be 12 members and 6 substitute members.[70]

Moreover, the new draft provided that all members of the Court, including the president and his substitute, were to be appointed by the president o the National Assembly upon proposition of the State Government.[71] Th debates in the Assembly on April 3 did not bring out novel arguments[72] an ended with the acceptance of the law on the same day.

The main task of the Constituent National Assembly, of course, was th elaboration of a definite constitution. This is not the place to trace in deta the complicated and intricate history of this elaboration. The roots of th final document go back partly to the initiative of political parties, partl if not mainly, to the activity of the government under Chancellor Renne and to his legal adviser Hans Kelsen who, in collaboration with the constitutional department of the State Chancellery (*Staatskanzlei*), elaborated during the summer of 1919 several variants of draft constitutions which, in turn, served as a basis to party proposals. One of the first drafts submitted to the Assembly was introduced by the Christian Social group on May 14, 919. The early date of the initiative is not surprising since it was the Christian Social Party which was primarily interested in a normalization of the political situation and in a reduction of the more radical orientation of existing central institutions. Though rather sketchy in other respects, the draft was very specific in the intention to introduce a more decentralized or federative system of government, stating that "the present centralized form of legislation and administration is more and more coming into conflict with . . . the constitutional rights of the provinces and has already engendered entirely unbearable conditions to the greatest detriment of the people."[73] In the field of representation, the draft proposed the establishment of a Popular and a Corporative Chamber. While leaving detailed organization of the "highest courts" to future legislation, the draft mentioned the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court only in two areas: in conflicts of competence between state and provinces and between provinces, and in cases of impeachment.[74] More than a year later, on June 25, 1920, the Christian Social group introduced another, more elaborate draft which was actually derived from one of the governmental draft variants and which had served as a basis of discussion in provincial conferences.[75] The new document placed primary emphasis again on the aspect of federalism; for the Corporative Chamber it substituted a Federal Council as representation of the provinces. While giving major attention to the rights of provinces, the draft was entirely silent on individual human rights. The field of constitutional jurisdiction was also viewed under the aspect of federalism and the Constitutional Court presented as the "highest guardian of the constitution and arbiter between federation and provinces."[76] In regard to jurisdiction, the draft now listed practically all the competences later to be exercised by the Court, with the exception of the competences as court of claims and in the area of international law.[77]

---

[69] *Sten. Prot. Konst. Nat.*, p. 113. Renner belonged to the Social Democratic Party.

[70] *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*, vol. I, Beilage 116, p. 1.

[71] A final innovation of the draft was the provision that decisions of the Court on complaints against violation of civil rights were to have a nullifying effect and that the administrative authorities were obliged to issue new orders in conformity with the ruling of the Court. The increase in membership—coupled with the substitution for the decease Bernatzik—was effected with the appointment of five regular members and, since three these appointed members had formerly acted as substitutes, of five new substitute members. Regular members became: Austerlitz, Kienböck, Kolisko, Kelsen, and Gruene substitute members: Eisler, Erler, Falser, Hugelmann, and Winter. See Paul Vittorell *op.cit.*, p. 450 f.

[72] The only controversial issue was the manner of the Court's selection. "To som members of the Constitutional Committee," reporter Weiskirchner said, "it seemed incorrect that those whose impeachment was eventually to be adjudicated should be competent to make proposals to the president of the National Assembly; the question was thu raised whether the members of the Court should not preferably be appointed upon nomination of the Main Committee of the Assembly (*Hauptausschuss*)." *Sten. Prot. Konst. Na* vol. I, p. 195.

The other parties, like the Christian Socials, were anxious to present their views on constitutional reform to the Assembly. On May 18, 1920, the National Liberal group had submitted a detailed draft document. This document also endorsed the federal principle and a bicameral system of representation composed of a Federal Assembly and a Federal Council. In contrast to the Christian Social proposals, however, the draft contained a long catalogue of human rights with emphasis on laicist and liberal-economic tendencies, and inclined more strongly toward a system of presidential democracy, mainly through the provision of popular election of the president of the Republic. Under the heading of "highest federal courts," the document envisaged a "Federal Constitutional Court" whose president and substitute were to be appointed by the federal president while the election of the remaining 14 members was left to the two houses of parliament.[78]

---

[73] *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*, vol. I, Beilage 231, p. 1. The draft added: "In fact, the provinces are the true cradle of spiritual life and of that spiritual freedom which is so basically different from the unhealthy influence of an alien, pseudo-spiritual predominance of the capital in a completely centralized state." *Ibid.*

[74] *Ibid.*, p. 18 (Art. 55). The function of election examination was attributed to the Administrative Court.

[75] Michael Mayr had submitted the draft, in almost the same form, to provincial conferences held in February and April, 1920, in Salzburg and Linz; see Hans Kelsen, *op. cit.*, p. 161 f.

[76] *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*, vol. V (Vienna, 1920), Beilage 888, p. 13 (Art. 31).

[77] The president and vice-president of the Court were to be elected by parliament in joint session, while half of the members were to be chosen respectively by the Federal Assembly and the Federal Council; *ibid.*, p. 14.

The longest and most elaborate of all plans submitted to the Assembly was the Socialist draft of July 7, 1920. It contained several compromises which the Social Democratic Party was at this stage apparently willing to make. Thus, the draft accepted the federal principle and embraced a bicameral system of legislature, though insisting that "the Federal Assembly elected by the entire people is the highest organ of the federation."[79] Few or no concessions were made in regard to the executive power; rejecting all forms of presidential democracy, the draft reserved the highest executive function to the president of the Federal Assembly who, like the rest of the government, was to be elected by the same Assembly. The proposals of the National Liberal group were rivaled, however, by a large section on basic human rights and freedoms. Constitutional jurisdiction was treated among other plans in the most detailed manner, and judicial competences were listed almost exactly in the order later adopted by the Federal Constitution.[80] The composition of the Constitutional Court, which was to consist of a president, a vice-president, 14 members and 8 substitute members, showed again the imprint of a preference for parliamentary rule in that the president, the vice-president, and half of the members and substitute members were to be elected by the Federal Assembly, the rest by the Federal Council.[81]

The draft constitutions of the parties, especially of the two major parties, exhibited many similarities, a circumstance which gave rise to the expectation that a constitutional agreement was close at hand. However, no such agreement was reached at the time, mainly due to the breakup of the governmental coalition. As the term of the constituent body was to expire in the fall and as new elections were being prepared, the constitutional settlement appeared at a dangerous impasse. In this situation, the Constitutional Committee of the Assembly took the initiative and, in long deliberations—often directly with party representatives—and with the assistance of legal advisers like Kelsen, elaborated a draft constitution which, after com mittee approval on September 26, was sent to the Assembly. The new document constituted, in the main, a compromise solution between the proposals of the two major parties, a compromise which was facilitated by the omission of the major obstacle to mutual agreement—the catalogue of human rights and freedoms. The committee report which accompanied the draft concentrated attention primarily on the attenuation of the more excessive features of the previous centralization and on the establishment of more harmonious relations between federation and provinces. The former power of the Constitutional Court to review draft resolutions was termed an entirely one-sided arrangement whose adoption was due only to lack of experience. "The manner in which the remedies of the State Government against draft statutes of provincial assemblies were organized," the report said, "has, on the one hand, proven to be impractical for the State Government and, on the other, created in the provinces the impression of unpleasant restrictions of provincial legislation."[82] In contrast to this arrangement, the Constitutional Court was now pictured as "something like a link combining the dualistic structure of federation and provinces into a higher unity."[83] The balancing character was found by the report in the composition of the Court "whose members are now selected partly by the federation and partly by the provinces," and also in the regulation of competences, especially the new organization of judicial review:

---

[78] *Ibid.*, Beilage 842, p. 29 (Art. 95). The draft mentions most of the later competences of the Constitutional Court, with the exception of the decision on complaints against violation of constitutional rights and in international law matters; *ibid.*, (Art. 96).

[79] *Ibid.*, Beilage 904, p. 9 (Art. 18).

[80] *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41 (Art. 165-171). Only the competences as court of claims and over international law cases were missing.

[81] *Ibid.*, p. 41 (Art. 172).

> Since review can now be demanded both by federal and provincial governments and extends to federal as well as provincial statutes, complete parity between federation and provinces is preserved also in this area.[84]

Draft and committee report were introduced in the Assembly on September 29. Due to the urgent nature of the matter and a previously secured agreement between parties on major issues, most speakers refrained from strong criticism of the draft.[85] The second reading was completed on the same day and the third and final acceptance followed two days later. Thus the draft became the Federal Constitution of October 1, effective as of November 10 1920.[86]

---

[82] *Beilagen Konst. Nat.*, vol. VI (Vienna, 1920), Beilage 991, Report of the Constitutional Committee, p. 2.

[83] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[84] *Ibid.*

[85] To be sure, the various speakers viewed the constitutional document from a different standpoint. Reporter Seipel, of the Christian Socials, stressed mainly the federal, decentralizing aspects of the document and treated the institution of the Constitutional Court accordingly. See *Sten. Prot. Konst. Nat.*, vol. III (Vienna, 1920), pp. 3375-3383. Socialist Danneberg relied primarily on the aspect of "parliamentary" democracy while considering the principle of federalism, the bicameral system and the institution of a "federal president" as secondary or unnecessary. He welcomed the expansion of the Constitutional Court but found its significance lay mainly in the promotion of legal and administrative unification: "These provisions according to which the Court shall be competent not only to examine administrative ordinances of provinces upon request of the federal government but also to review the constitutionality of provincial statutes . . . offer the guarantee that public administration will be guided by a unifying element." *Ibid.*, pp. 3385-3398, at p. 3394. Clessin, speaking for the National Liberal group, criticized primarily the omitted incorporation of features of "presidential" democracy, especially in regard to popular election of the federal president. *Ibid.*, pp. 3398-3404.

On the basis of the Constitution of 1920, the Constitutional Court possessed—and still possesses—jurisdiction in eight major fields. Three of these fields can be traced back to competences of the Court of the Empire: (1) decision over claims against the federation, provinces or municipalities, i such claims cannot be settled before the ordinary courts;[87] (2) decision i conflicts of competence between courts and administrative authorities, between the Administrative Court on the one hand and ordinary courts or th Constitutional Court on the other, between federal and provincial organ and between provincial organs;[88] (3) decision in complaints against violation of constitutionally guaranteed rights by administrative authorities. One competence had been attributed to the Court prior to the adoption c the Constitution: the decision of impeachment cases, which now were formulated to include the federal president, members of the federal governmen the provincial governor and members of provincial governments.[90] The remaining competences were in effect added by the Federal Constitution. Th major addition was the competence of judicial review—the review of provincial statutes upon request of the federal government and of federal statute upon request of a provincial government, and review *ex officio*.[91] Judici review proper was accompanied by the power to review ordinances, namel provincial orders upon request of the federal government, federal orde upon request of a provincial government, and both federal and provinci orders upon judicial request.[92] The Federal Constitution also gave to th Court the power to examine contested elections to the National Council, t Federal Council, provincial assemblies and other general representati bodies, and to determine loss of membership in these bodies.[93] Finally, th Court was declared competent to determine violations of international la on the basis of federal legislation.[94] In regard to the composition of th ourt, the Constitution adopted practically the Socialist proposal, by stipu- ting that the president, the vice-president and half of the members and ubstitute members were to be elected by the National Council, the remain- er by the Federal Council.[95] A formal gap was left by the document of 1920 hen it provided for a president, a vice-president, and the "necessary" num- er of members and substitute members. However, in conformity with the revious law of April 3, 1919, the practice was established from the begin- ing of using 12 members and 6 substitute members, a practice which was pecifically laid down in the first organizational statute of the new Court f July 13, 1921.[96]

---

[86] *StGBl.*, No. 450 and *BGBl.*, No. 1 (*BGBl.* stands for "Bundesgesetzblatt" or Fede Gazette). Compare Hans Kelsen, *op.cit.*, pp. 163-223. Art. 151 of the Constitution desi nated as the date of effectiveness the first session of the National Council (November 1 From this date on, the decisions of the Constiutional Court were reported in a "ne series" wih decisions numbered again from No. 1 on up: *Sammlung der Erkenntnisse Verfassungsgerichtshofes, Neue Folge*. The new collection opened with two decisions December 14, 1920 in the field of claims of civil servants against the state; see vol. (Vienna, 1923), p. 1 ff.

[87] Now Art. 137 of the Constitution.

[88] Now Art. 138, sect. 1, Constitution.

[89] Now Art. 144, sect. 1, Constitution.

[90] Now Art. 142, sect. 1, 2, 4, and Art. 143, Constitution. With the Law of April 1919, the functions of the Imperial High Court had been transferred to the Constitution Court.

[91] Now Art. 140, sect. 1-3, Constitution. The Law of March 14, 1919, had given to t Court merely the power to review provincial draft resolutions. Compare J. A. C. Gra "Judicial Review of Legislation under the Austrian Constitution of 1920," *Americ Political Science Review*, vol. 28 (1934), pp. 670-676.

[92] Now Art. 139, sect. 1, Constitution.

[93] Now Art. 141, sect. 1, Constitution. The Law of February 6, 1919, had created special Election Court for similar purposes.

[94] Now Art. 145, Constitution. The federal legislation necessary for the exercise of t competence has not been passed to the present time.

The First Republic

The era of the First Republic may conveniently be subdivided into two horter periods, the dividing line being the Constitutional Amendment of 1929. During the first period, there was still some basic agreement among he parties regarding the value of the maintenance of the existing constitu- tional system. Despite dissatisfaction in conservative circles with the pre- minence of parliamentary rule and despite a slight lead of the Christian ocial group,[97] neither of the two major parties was actually able or even willing entirely to subdue the opposition. In the field of constitutional juris- diction, this situation was manifested already by the fact that the parliamen- ary selection of judges was usually effected without much delay or contro- ersy.[98] The Constitutional Court was able to consolidate its position and, in 1925, its competences were enlarged. However, after 1927 or 1928, th co-existence of the parties under one constitutional roof grew increasingl difficult while economic depression embittered the struggle of social groups The ruling Christian Social majority gradually began to identify socialism with the present condition of party struggle and lack of order, and to attac in the opposition the "decadence" of parliamentarianism and finally th democratic system itself. In the place of parliamentary rule, conservative inclined to champion elements of direct democracy and especially a strengthened authority of the federal president. On the other hand, with economi depression increasing their appeal to the masses, the Socialists started t press their demands in a progressively radical manner and thereby perhap overstepped the confines which their conservative opponents had previousl considered as tolerable.[99]

---

[95] The election was in all cases for life. The pertinent provisions (Art. 147, sect. 1, 2, Constitution) were later changed in numerous ways.

[96] *BGBl.*, No. 364. The statute also contained stipulations of incompatibility, to the ffect that judges of the Court could not be members of the federal or of a provincial overnment and that the president, the vice-president, and two-thirds of the members and ubstitute members could not be members of the National Council, the Federal Council r a provincial assembly. The provisions regarding the number of judges and incom- patibility were inserted by the Amendment of 1925 into the Constitution. Until the assage of the organizational statute of 1921, the Court continued to function practically vith its previous membership.

[97] For the party composition of the National Council since 1920 compare L. Adamovich nd H. Spanner, *Handbuch des österreichischen Verfassungsrechts*, 5th ed. (Vienna, 1957), . 122, n. 1. The Christian Social lead was broken by the Socialists only in the elections f November 9, 1930.

[98] After the passage of the organizational statute of July 13, 1921, (*BGBl.*, No. 364), he National Council fulfilled its function on July 15, and the Federal Council on July 20. The selections brought only few changes in membership; Vittorelli remained president, Menzel vice-president of the Court. See *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Nationalrates* (hereafter cited as *Sten. Prot. Nationalrat*), 1st Legislative Period, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1923), p. 1961; *Stenographische Protokolle über die Sitzungen des Bundesrates*, (hereafter cited as *Sten. Prot. Bundesrat*), pt. I (Vienna, 1930), p. 230 f. For subsequent selections and changes in membership see *Index zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates*, 1st Legislative Period, vol. 2 (Vienna, 1923), p. 950; 2nd Legislative Period (Vienna, 1927), p. 346; 3rd Legislative Period (Vienna, 1930), p. 340; *Index zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Bundesrates* (Vienna, 1930), pt. 1, p. 59; pt. 2, p. 43; pt. 3, p. 35. Commenting on the manner of selecting judges, Charles Eisenmann indicated the reason for its functioning in Austria in these terms: "In fact, the election is based on a tacit pact among the parties according to which each party—Christian Socials, Socialists, and Nationalists—designates a number of judges approximately corresponding to its numerical strength and chooses for this office, apart from parliamentarians, such persons as are neutral and not involved in active politics. This system which obviously holds the danger

During the first period,[100] the competences of the Constitutional Cour were slightly expanded by various laws and ordinances in 1922.[101] Th major innovation in the field of constitutional jurisdiction, however, wa contained in the Constitutional Amendment of July 30, 1925.[102] The reason for alteration can be found partly in the progress of administrative reform which required a certain reorganization also in the judicial area; partly i the fact that the first five years of constitutional life had permitted the accumulation of experience and had suggested the desirability of variou changes.[103] The Amendment clarified the competence as court of claims b attributing to the Constitutional Court the function of deciding on pecun ary claims of civil servants against the state and thereby eliminating potential conflicts of competence with the Administrative Court. In conjunctio with this clarification, the Constitutional Court received the competence t decide on complaints of civil servants against violations of rights arising fro their public employment, a competence formerly exercised by the Admini trative Court. Concerning the field of conflicts of competence, the Amen ment gave to the Court jurisdiction also over conflicts between ordinary an other courts. An important addition in the same field was the attributio

---

of resting solely on the good faith of the parties, can function in Austria due to the fa that the two strongest parties . . . balance each other almost completely." *La justice co stitutionnelle et la Haute Cour constitutionnelle d'Autriche* (Paris, 1928), p. 178.

[99] One should also take into account that, in Austria, the Social Democratic Par incorporated also most of those radical elements which, in other countries, were absorb by the Communist Party.

[100] On the first decade of the Constitutional Court see especially Ludwig Adamovic *op.cit.*, pp. 367-444; Paul Vittorelli, *op.cit.*, pp. 434-453.

[101] According to a Law of March 3, 1922, (*BGBl.*, No. 124), the Court was authorize upon request of the federal government, to review resolutions of provincial assembli providing for provincial surtaxes to federal taxes. By federal ordinance of July 20, 192 (*BGBl.*, No. 562), the Court became entitled to decide conflicts of competence between th Financial Court (*Abrechnungsgerichtshof*) and other authorities. The territorial range constitutional jurisdiction was extended to the Burgenland by governmental order July 2, 1922, (*BGBl.*, No. 405). Cf. Paul Vittorelli, *op.cit.*, p. 436 f.

[102] *BGBl.*, No. 268. The Amendment became effective on October 1, 1925. See *ibid.*, 437; Ernst Hellbling, *op.cit.*, p. 222 f.

[103] See Explanatory remarks to the governmental draft, *Beilagen zu den stenographischen Protokollen des Nationalrates* (hereafter cited as *Beilagen Nationalrat*), 2nd Legislative Period, vol. IV (Vienna, 1925), Beilage 327, p. 7.

of the preventive function of "authentic interpretation": the Court was authorized to determine, upon request of the federal or any provincial government, whether a projected legislative or administrative act comes within federal or provincial competence, according to Articles 10 to 15 of the Federal Constitution. In matters of impeachment, the Amendment extended the Court's jurisdiction to proceedings against the substitute of a provincial governor, against a provincial minister entrusted with the execution of federal administrative policies, against the president of the Board of Accounts (*Rechnungshof*) and against his substitute.[104] Regarding the composition of the Court, the incompatibility stipulations of the organizational statute of 1921 were incorporated into the Constitution, to the effect that members of the federal or any provincial government could not belong to the Court and that the president, the vice-president, and two-thirds of the members and substitutes could not be members of the National Council, the Federal Council or a provincial assembly. Due to these changes, a new statute dealing with organization and procedures of the Court had to be passed on December 18, 1925.[105]

The second period was initiated by an alteration of the Court's jurisdiction which illustrated the growing disaffection of the government majority with parliamentary rule and the desire to balance or outweigh the influence of parliament by elements of direct democracy.[106] The Constitutional Law of July 2, 1929, added to the constitutional article dealing with the Court's function in election disputes a new section according to which the conditions for proceedings against the results of a popular initiative or referendum before the Court were to be determined by federal legislation.[107] This provision was implemented in regard to popular initiative by a federal law of the same day.[108] However, the battle against parliament was conducted not only by means of a direct appeal to the voters beneath parliament, but also by a strengthening of governmental authority above parliament and by an alteration of the character of parliament itself. These objectives were realized, at least to a degree, in the Second Constitutional Amendment of December 7, 1929.[109] According to the explanatory remarks of the governmental draft of October 18, the original Federal Constitution, adopted under the shadow of a lost war, could not possibly be of permanent validity.

---

[104] The Court also received the competence to decide conflicts between the Board of Accounts and the federal government or a federal minister. Other expansions of the Court's jurisdiction proposed in the governmental draft were not accepted by the Constitutional Committee of the National Council: e.g. the proposed competence as a "negative legislator" in the sense of the present Art. 140, sect. 4, Constitution; or a further extension of the right to demand declaration of loss of membership in representative bodies. See the report of the Constitutional Committee, *Beilagen Nationalrat,* 2nd Legislative Period, vol. IV, Beilage 422.

[105] *BGBl.,* No. 454. The statute was slightly altered shortly afterwards by the Law of May 26, 1926, (*BGBl.,* No. 77).

[106] This desire may have been strengthened by the prospect of a Socialist majority in the National Council as was actually achieved in the elections of 1930.

[107] *BGBl.,* No. 295.

[108] *BGBl.,* No. 297. In regard to referenda, implementation came with the federal law of June 16, 1931, (*BGBl.,* No. 181).

[109] *BGBl.,* No. 392. See Ernst Hellbling, *op. cit.,* p. 223 f.

As a major goal of the Amendment the remarks indicated the strengthening of public authority and the reduction of the influence of party politics and parliamentary institutions. This goal implied, on the one hand, the elevation and strengthening of the position of the federal president, who was now to be chosen by popular election[110] and whose powers were greatly enlarged.[111] On the other hand, the goal implied an expansion of direct democracy in the forms of popular initiative and referendum, and a reduction of the properly "political" institutions of representation—parliament and provincial assemblies—and their supplementation or replacement by corporative bodies.[112] As a corollary of the reduction of party politics as expressed in parliament, the draft included an objective which is particularly significant in the present context: the "depolitization" (*Entpolitisierung*) of administration and judiciary.[113] In implementing the latter objective, the draft provided for rather sweeping changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court, by reducing the number of judges[114] and by excluding any kind of parliamentary influence on the selection of judges: the president and vice-president of the Court were to be appointed by the federal president upon proposal of the federal government, while the rest of the members and substitute members were to be appointed or nominated by other highest courts, in part by the Constitutional Court itself.[115] The draft also restricted the jurisdiction of the Court, especially by eliminating the additions contained in the Amendment of 1925 in regard to public employment

During the debates in the National Council on October 22, Renner—speaking for the Social Democratic group—attacked the draft in very strong terms as untimely, undemocratic and highly reactionary. In his opinion the present economic crisis was not an argument for, but rather against artful constitutional changes and maneuvers which would merely have the effect of leading Austria back to pre-republican conditions.[116] As he pointed out, a parliamentary regime had been adopted in the original constitution in order to prevent conflict between a powerful president and the people; but now—he continued—"a constitutional draft is submitted to this popular assembly . . . , a draft which pursues no other goal but that parliament shall behead itself and the people of Austria."[117] In conjunction with the obliteration of the political influence of parliament, Renner also commented on the ominous issue of "depolitization." While admitting that concern over partisan domination of public offices was frequently justified, he accused his opponents of decrying "political" penetration only in case of Socialist influence.[118] In the same light he viewed the "depolitization" of the highest courts and especially of the Constitutional Court. The basic purpose of constitutional jurisdiction as it had existed in Austria since the time of the Dual Monarchy—Renner affirmed—consisted in the protection of the public against the bureaucracy, a protection which "could not be exercised by the bureaucracy itself and which found expression in the arrangement that members of parliament were called to the Court of the Empire in order to represent the interests of the people."[119] According to the new provisions, however, "the Constitutional Court becomes corrupted in its basic idea," since it is transformed "from an organ which controls bureaucracy . . . into a bureaucratic organ."[120] The arguments of Renner were instantly countered by Schmitz, speaking for the Christian Socials, who objected primarily to the implication that the projected alterations of the Constitution were merely an artful maneuver of an Austrian party and who, against this interpretation, pointed to a "movement of varying intensity not only in Austria but in Germany, France and many other countries which attempts critically to reassess democracy and parliamentarianism."[121] In a similar vein, the draft was defended on the following day by Clessin in behalf of the National Liberal group, who actually claimed that "popular sovereignty" did "no longer correspond to the wishes of the people"[122] and who, in support of the "depolitization" of the Constitutional Court, argued that "a greater part of the population has only recently discovered that it was up to now possible for people without any legal training to act as members of this highest court of public law."[123]

---

[110] This was true at least in regard to the first ballot; if the first ballot did not produc an absolute majority, parliament was to decide in joint session.

[111] Particularly significant was the new competence of the president to issue law amending decrees in cases of emergency, a competence tailored after Article 48 of th Weimar Constitution.

[112] The Federal Council was to be transformed into a Council of Provinces and Corporations. At the same time, the proportional representation of provinces was replaced at least in the draft, by a system of equal representation which had as a consequence th reduction of the influence of the largely Socialist capital.

[113] Concerning the judiciary, the draft remarked: "This Amendment attempts t secure the depolitization of the courts of public law, namely, the Administrative and th Constitutional Court. Above all, the selection of all members of these courts shall b arranged in a manner which excludes the influence of parliamentary bodies. Moreover provision is made for far-reaching incompatibility between these judicial posts and political functions." See *Beilagen Nationalrat,* 3rd Legislative Period, vol. IV (Vienna, 1930) Beilage 382, p. 19.

[114] The Court was to consist of a president, a vice-president and only 10 members and 5 substitute members.

[115] Both the Supreme Court and the Administrative Court were to appoint 2 member and one substitute member from their midst for a period of three years; 6 members and substitute members were to be appointed by the federal president upon nomination o the Constitutional Court. These arrangements, and especially the influence of the president and of the highest courts, resemble to a degree the present manner of selection o the Italian Constitutional Court.

---

[116] *Sten. Prot. Nationalrat,* 3rd Legislative Period, vol. III (Vienna, 1930), p. 2875: "Let us recall for a moment the seriousness of our economic situation . . . One should assume that, in such a moment, a responsible government could say nothing but: Leave everything behind, gather all strength together in order to save our economy from disaster. Instead, we now receive these drafts as the most urgent thing our parliament has to do. Instead, we hear these appeals that 57 per cent of the population shall unite in order to eliminate politically 43 per cent of the population."

[117] *Ibid.,* p. 2879. The substitution of corporative bodies for parliament appeared to Renner as a retrogressive development, since "nations have become . . . states only by overcoming the corporative idea;" *ibid.,* p. 2882.

[118] *Ibid.,* p. 2884: "It is only that you have a peculiar manner of speech. When you have filled all posts with adherents of your party and when you have completely satisfied your party interests, then you say: this is not political, this is apolitical, this is the state, the general interest. But when the Socialists on any occasion exercise their democratic right and fill a post, fill it in the most conscientious manner, then the office is rendered political."

[119] *Ibid.,* p. 2889.

[120] *Ibid.* Pointing to the new incompatibility provisions, Renner appealed to the memory of Joseph Unger who had been parliamentarian, professor and president of the Court of the Empire: "According to this draft, you would, of course, consider Unger unworthy of being a member of the Constitutional Court. Thus, you want to pervert and bureaucratically deform this institution; you even restrict the competence of the Court regarding protection of civil rights and thereby devaluate the institution." *Ibid.,* p. 2889 f.

From the strong objections voiced by Renner, one might have expected that his party would refuse to collaborate in any manner in the constitutional reform. However, when the draft was referred to the Constitutional Committee, the Socialists took a more active part in the matter, their attitude being prompted mainly by the desire to settle the constitutional issue as quickly as possible in order to proceed to "more urgent" business. The result of the committee negotiations was thus a compromise in which the Social Democrats were able to block the more extreme authoritarian features of the draft while accepting some of the milder manifestations of a "presidential" system. Though admitting that the new proposals fell short of the expectations of the proponents of constitutional reform, the committee report termed the system resulting from the draft amendment a "parliamentary presidential republic" and later simply a "presidential democracy."[124] In regard to the composition of the highest courts, the report stressed the fact that "the principle of depolitization is here realized;" it also pointed to the more adequate delimitation of competences between Administrative and Constitutional Court.[125] Without encountering further difficulties in the National Council the new Amendment was passed on December 7.

The Amendment restricted the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court mainly in those fields which touched on issues of public administration. Thus, the functons attributed to the Court in 1925 of deciding on pecuniary claims of civil servants against the state and on complaints against violation of rights arising from public employment were revoked and transferred to the Administrative Court. Other alterations were a result of the desire to reduce the influence of parliament. The article dealing with the Court's competence in electoral disputes was supplemented by a provision according to which judicial activity in cases of popular initiative and referendum was to be regulated by federal legislation. In the field of judicial review, the Court received the function as "negative legislator" in the sense that, after nullification of a statute by the Court, the legislative provisions in effect prior to the enactment of this statute were to come back into force, if the Court so specified.[126]

---

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 2892. As Schmitz continued, constitutional reform was not merely an outgrowth of partisan politics but almost a logical necessity; for parliament could not possibly be the ruling sovereign and at the same time be torn by vehement partisan strife; *ibid.*, p. 2895.

[122] *Ibid.*, p. 2906.

[123] *Ibid.*, p. 2910. For the remarks of Schönbauer in behalf of the farm group (*Landbund*) see *ibid.*, pp. 2929-2938.

[124] *Beilagen Nationalrat*, 3rd Legislative Period, vol. IV, Beilage 405, p. 2 f. Compare also p. 1: ". . . the parties and all sections of the Austrian people entertain further wishes for constitutional reform which the present amendment could not satisfy."

[125] *Ibid.*, p. 5.

The most important innovation, however, concerned the composition of the Court. While retaining the original number of judges, the Amendment stipulated that the president, the vice-president, 6 members and 3 substitute members were from now on to be appointed by the federal president upon nomination by the federal government and were to be selected from among judges, administrators and professors of law or political science faculties. The remaining judges were to be appointed by the federal president upon proposals made in regard to 3 members and 2 substitutes by the National Council and in regard to 3 members and 1 substitute by the Federal Council. All judges had to be law school graduates who had served for at least ten years in a position for which a law degree is required. The Amendment also raised the barriers of incompatibility in the sense that none of the judges of the Court could be members of the federal or of a provincial government, members of the National Council, the Federal Council or any general representative body, or employees or other functionaries of a political party.[127] At the same time, the Amendment introduced for the first time an age limit for judges at the completion of their seventieth year of age.[128] The Amendment was closely followed by a Constitutional Law of the same day[129] which stipulated that the sections of the Amendment pertaining to the highest courts were to become effective on January 1, 1930. In regard to the composition of the Constitutional Court, the law provided that the term of former judges of the Court was to expire on February 15 and that the nominations for new appointments had to be submitted prior to January 31.[130] After receiving the required nominations from the competent bodies, the federal president completed the new appointments on February 3, 1930, with effectiveness as of February 16.[131] The changes contained in the Amendment of 1929 necessitated a reformulation of the statute dealing with the organization and procedures of the Court, a reformulation passed on April 4, 1930.[132]

The remaining years of the First Republic can be treated very briefly.

---

[126] Another alteration in the same field was the feature that the Supreme Court and the Administrative Court received the right of access to the Court if determination of the constitutionality of a statute appeared essential for decision of a pending trial.

[127] Moreover, a person who had exercised one of these functions during the past four years could not become president or vice-president of the Court.

[128] The main features of the 1929 Amendment in regard to the composition of the Court (Art. 147) are still in force today.

[129] *BGBl.,* No. 393.

[130] Since the Council of Provinces and Corporations was not yet established, the respective proposals were to be made by the Federal Council. The National Council submitted its proposals on January 29, the Federal Council on January 30. See *sten. Prot. Nationalrat,* 3rd Legislative Period, vol. IV, p. 3426; *Sten. Prot. Bundesrat,* Pt. III (Vienna, 1930), p. 1604 f.

[131] Appointed as president was Ernst Durig, former president of the superior provincial court in Innsbruck; as vice-president, Georg Fröhlich, ministerial councillor in Vienna. Among other judges one may mention Adamovich, Engel, Palla, Mathias, Lenhoff, et al.

[132] *BGBl.,* No. 112.

Changes in the field of constitutional jurisdiction resulted in the main from the described inclination toward presidential authority and features of direct democracy. On June 16, 1931, a federal statute was passed regulating the conditions of the Court's competence in cases of popular referenda;[133] the statute merely implemented the provisions of the Amendment of 1929 according to which judicial activity in this area was to be specified by federal legislation. A more important alteration was contained in the Constituitonal Law of March 27, 1931, which also expanded the jurisdiction in electoral matters to the extent that the Constitutional Court was to be competent to decide actions challenging the election of the federal president.[134] In view of the constant clamoring for presidential authority, one might have expected that the majority parties would be eager to utilize the new provisions in the upcoming presidential election of October, 1931. However, strangely enough, the widespread enthusiasm for popular election of the president suddenly subsided on this occasion. In fact, a law was adopted on October 8, 1931, according to which the provisions for popular election of the president and the competence of the Constitutional Court were suspended for the impending event.[135] Even more curious was the circumstance that the draft proposing the suspension was introduced by the National Liberal group, whose record of advocating popular election of the president dated back to the Constituent Assembly.[136] The motives of the suspension can be found in the growing apprehension among National Liberals and moderate Christian Socials of the developing radicalism and extremism of rightist groups.[137] The correction of election modalities, however, was unable to forestall the spreading vehemence of party struggle and the breakdown of constitutional consensus. On March 4, 1933, the National Council held its last regular session. From then on, the Christian Social government proceeded to govern by ordinances and decrees whose validity was ostensibly derived from a Wartime Economic Enabling Act of 1917.[138] Whether this Act was sufficient authority after a lapse of sixteen years and during peacetime was highly questionable. In order to discourage such questions, the government issued a decree on May 23, 1933,[139] by which the competence of the Constitutional Court to examine ordinances and decrees was eliminated and the Court for all practical purposes put out of action.

---

[133] *BGBl.*, No. 181. As previously mentioned, a similar law concerning popular initiative had been enacted on July 2, 1929.

[134] *BGBl.*, No. 103. A minor aspect of the law was that, upon authorization by the provincial legislature, administrative authorities were entitled to decree the loss of seat in general representative bodies; recourse to the Constitutional Court was open against such decrees.

[135] *BGBl.*, No. 303.

[136] *Sten. Prot. Nationalrat*, 4th Legislative Period, vol. II (Vienna, 1932), pp. 1209, 1241 (October 1, 1931).

[137] See Heinrich Benedikt et al., *Geschichte der Republik Österreich.* (München, 1954), p. 177: "The deeper reason was that Seipel, whose political thinking moved more and more toward the establishment of an authoritarian state, was at this time campaigning for the post of federal president. His own (i.e. Christian Social) party abandoned him in this attempt and put Miklas up as candidate. However, large circles of the *Heimwehr* were ready to vote for Seipel on a second ballot, and a second ballot was expected since the first was probably not going to result in the victory of Miklas or his opponent Renner. In order to prevent this eventuality, the National Liberal group demanded that the procedure be restored as it had been prior to the Amendment."

[138] "Kriegswirtschaftliches Ermächtigungsgesetz," of July 24, 1917 (*RGBl.*, No. 307).

Constitution of 1934 and Annexation

The Constitution of 1934, while not entirely breaking with the past, greatly accentuated the trends exhibited during the later years of the Republic.[140] As a competent interpreter pointed out, the new constitutional system was marked by the following major traits: Austria was to be a Christian state of German tongue, guided by an authoritarian form of government, organized territorially into a so-called "authoritarian federalism," and founded on a corporative form of representation.[141] These traits meant a broad expansion of the power of the federal president and the chancellor, and also a drastic curtailment of parliament resulting from the complete dependence of the newly created "consultative" and "resolutive" bodies upon government and upon corporative elements. In the field of constitutional jurisdiction, the most obvious innovation was the abolition of the Constitutional Court as a separate judicial organ. In the place of the former Administrative and Constitutional Court, a new Federal Court (*Bundesgerichtshof*) was established which, though in a modified form, exercised many or most of the competences of the previous separate courts.[142] The practical result of the combination of competences in the Federal Court, however, was that constitutional jurisdiction was curtailed, if not obliterated, in favor of administrative jurisdiction. The two forms of jurisdiction, it is true, were not entirely merged together, but attributed to different "senates" of the Court. The alterations brought about by the system of 1934 in regard to constitutional jurisdiction can perhaps best be illustrated by a comparison between the competences of the new "Constitutional Senate" and the competences of the former Constitutional Court. This comparison shows that of the 8 major competences of the Constitutional Court only 6 were retained by the Constitutional Senate and several of the latter were considerably restricted. The reduction of competences concerned the jurisdiction as court of claims and in cases of constitutional complaints, both of which functions were transferred to administrative jurisdiction within the Federal Court.[143] The Constitutional Senate retained competence in election matters; but due to the entirely different status of executive and legislative organs, the competence was strongly modified and, above all, did not extend to elections of the federal president.[144] In the field of impeachment, the jurisdiction of the Senate no longer comprised trials of the federal president, provincial governors or their substitutes.[145] Other functions of constitutional jurisdiction—judicial review,[146] decision on legality of decrees and ordinances,[147] on conflicts of competence,[148] and on violations of international law[149]—continued without significant alterations.

---

[139] *BGBl.*, No. 191. On this measure, compare Heinrich Benedikt et al, *op.cit.*, pp. 203, 212: "Terror from the street met with pressure from above, action and counteraction increased each other. In this dangerous situation, the government made the fatal move of eliminating the Constitutional Court and thus leaving, without doubt, the confines of the rule of law . . . For the masses who were educated in the ideology of socialism and for many other people there existed an identity between the rule of law and the constitutional system. They were therefore unable to comprehend or follow the more and more expansive interpretation of the Wartime Economic Enabling Act." An additional device used for obstructing the functioning of the Court was the failure to appoint enough new judges to constitute a quorum.

[140] The Constitution of 1934 went back to a decree of the interim government of April 24, 1934 (*BGBl.*, No. 239) concerning the Federal Constitution of Austria. With the constitutional enabling law of April 30, 1934 (*BGBl.* I, No. 255), the new document was proclaimed valid even on the basis of the previous constitution. On May 1, 1934 (*BGBl.* II, No. 1), the new document was promulgated as the "Constitution of 1934." In regard to constitutional jurisdiction, the Constitution was followed by an organizational statute of July 12, 1934 (*BGBl.* II, No. 123).

[141] Georg Fröhlich, *Die "Verfassung 1934" des Bundesstaates Österreich* (Vienna-Leipzig, 1936), p. 32.

[142] Compare Georg Fröhlich, *op.cit.*, pp. 202-253; Hans Spanner, "Der österreichische Bundesgerichtshof," *Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht*, vol. 15 (Vienna, 1935), pp. 195-240; in a more theoretical perspective, Erich Voegelin, *Der autoritäre Staat, Ein Versuch über das österreichische Staatsproblem* (Vienna, 1936), p. 270 ff.

The composition of the Federal Court demonstrated the more authoritarian character of the new constitution. According to Article 177, the Court consisted normally of a president, a vice-president, and the "necessary" number of other members. All these judges—who were called "ordinary members"—were appointed by the federal president upon nomination of the federal government. The Constitutional Senate was to be supplemented by four "extraordinary members" and their four substitutes whose appointments were to be made by the federal president upon nomination in equal proportion by the Council of State and the Council of Provinces. In regard to the qualification of judges, the Constitution adopted and sometimes intensified the stipulations of the Amendment of 1929. All judges of the Court, including the extraordinary members and their substitutes, had to be law school graduates who had served for at least ten years in a position for which a law degree is required. At least one-third of the ordinary members had to fulfill the requirements for judgeship; at least one-fourth had to be taken from professional occupations in the provinces and especially from the provincial bureaucracy. The Constitution also maintained strict standards of incompatibility. The age limit of all judges of the Court was lowered to the completion of the sixty-fifth year of age. Despite the efforts of several outstanding judges,[150] the Constitutional Senate under the new system was unable to function as freely and as successfully as the previous Constitutional Court; its activity was progressively overshadowed by the other occupations of the Federal Court. With the German annexation of Austria in 1938, constitutional jurisdiction came to an end entirely.[151]

---

[143] Art. 164 and 165 of the Constitution of 1934.

[144] Art. 172.

[145] Art. 173-174.

[146] Art. 170.

[147] Art. 169.

[148] Art. 168 and 171.

[149] Art. 175.

[150] Since his appointment on July 9, 1934, Ernst Durig functioned as president of the Federal Court and as president of the Constitutional Senate. Among other judges, one should recall Georg Fröhlich who as extraordinary member served in the Constitutional Senate.

The Second Republic

Already in March and April 1945, the representatives of the three major parties in Austria convened and proceeded to the formation of a Provisional Government under Renner. With the Proclamation of April 27, the re-establishment of a democratic Republic in the spirit of the Constitution of 1920 was announced.[152] The Constitutional Transition Law of May 1[153] provided for the renewed effectiveness of the Federal Constitution in the form of the Amendment of 1929 together with the constitutional alterations enacted prior to March 5, 1933. At the same time, in order to allow for necessary adjustments, the Transition Law announced a Provisional Constitution whose stipulations were to last not longer than six months after the convening of the first National Council. The main features of the Provisional Constitution—which was proclaimed on the same day[154]—were the unitary form of administration and the concentration of executive and legislative powers in the Provisional Government until the reconstruction of parliament and the provincial assemblies. While the Provisional Constitution itself did not yet make reference to the Constitutional Court, an amending law was passed on October 12, 1945, according to which the Court was eventually to be re-established in the form and with the competences stipulated in the Amendment of 1929.[155] During the transitional period, however, the Court was reconstituted only in a restricted form, mainly in view of the fact that without the institution of parliament and other state organs the constitutional provisions of 1929 could not become fully operative. According to an organizational statute of October 12,[156] the Court, during the transition period, consisted of a president, a vice-president, and only 5 members and 5 substitute members. President and vice-president were appointed by the Political Cabinet Council;[157] one member and one substitute member were selected respectively by the Supreme Court, the Administrative Court, and by the executive organs of the three political parties. This transitional Court handed down a single decision on June 14, 1946.[158]

After the elections of November 25, the National Council held its first session on December 19, 1945. Since, according to the regulations of May 1, the Provisional Constitution was to expire six months after the first session of the National Council, the interim period terminated on June 19, 1946; the same day brought the end of the transitional Constitutional Court.[159] The reconstruction of the Court on the basis of the 1929 Amendment required only a few months. While the appointment of the new president and vice-president, upon nomination of the federal government, was effected by the federal president immediately upon the termination of the interim period,[160] the propositions of the National Council and the Federal Council were submitted in July.[161] On October 4, 1946, the Constitutional Court was able to convene in its first regular session. Since that time, the Court has regained its stature as major "guardian" of the Constitution, exercising essentially the same competences as established in 1929. On October 9, 1946, the function as court of claims was reformulated and clarified in a statute dealing with administrative and constitutional jurisdiction.[162] As will be recalled, the Court in 1925 had received the competence to decide also on claims arising from public employment; in 1929, this addition had been rescinded while, in 1934, the entire function as court of claims had been transferred to administrative jurisdiction. The new statute of 1946 reinstated the constitutional organ as court of claims; demands arising from public employment, however, were for all practical purposes left to the administrative tribunals. The competence of the Court in regard to examination of ordinances was slightly expanded by a Constitutional Law of June 12, 1947, in the sense that the Court was entrusted with the function of deciding whether, in re-enacting previous legislative stipulations, the federal or a provincial government observed the limits of legislative delegation as specifie in the same law.[163] In the field of election disputes, a federal statute of January 16, 1951, clarified and implemented the constitutional provision concerning judicial activity in elections of the federal president.[164]

---

[151] President Durig resigned in September 1938 from his position in the Court.

[152] *StGBl.*, No. 1.

[153] *StGBl.*, No. 4.

[154] *StGBl.*, No. 5.

[155] *StGBl.*, No. 196.

[156] *StGBl.*, No. 209. For the period after the expiration of the Provisional Constitution, this statute also provided for the renewed effectiveness of the main features of the organizational law of the Court of April 4, 1930 (*BGBl.*, No. 112). This meant that the alterations contained in the decree of May 23, 1933 (*BGBl.*, No. 191) were not to regain validity. See Ernst Hellbling, *op.cit.*, p. 224 f.

[157] On November 22, 1945, Ernst Durig was appointed as president of the Court, Ludwig Adamovich as vice-president.

[158] *Sammlung der Erkenntnisse und wichtigsten Beschlüsse des österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshofes*, No. 1520.

[159] As Durig was already over 75 years of age and as the 1929 Amendment established an age limit of 70 years, the president of the transitory Court retired on June 9, 1946.

During the past decade, and especially since the establishment of th German Constitutional Court, the question of further expansion of th jurisdiction of the Austrian Court has frequently been raised. Discussions of this topic have brought forth proposals envisaging extension of the right of access to the Court in the major fields of judicial activity, inclusion of all elective offices in the competence of election examinations, possibility of instituting complaints against statutes, court decisions and other public acts, organization of complaint proceedings in two judicial instances and other reforms.[165] Up to now, these proposals have not resulted in any considerable alteration of jurisdiction; modifications have so far occurred only, or primarily, in the electoral area. According to the Constitutional Law of January 22, 1958, the Court is now also competent to examine elections of provincial governments by provincial assemblies, elections of directing organs of municipalities by municipal representative bodies, and elections of professional representations by their constituents; these changes were supplemented by a corresponding expansion of the faculty to determine loss of seat in the mentioned elective positions.[166] The prospects for additional reforms lie in the domain of speculation. The long tradition and gradual development of the Austrian Court will probably prevent rash or spectacular innovations. At the same time—as the foregoing pages indicate—constitutional jurisdiction in Austria has not been customarily insensitive to newly arising needs and aspirations.

---

[160] Ludwig Adamovich became president, Gustav Zigeuner vice-president of the Cour with appointment as of June 19. To the present, the office of president has been held by Ludwig Adamovich (1946-1955), Gustav Zigeuner (1955-1958), Walter Antoniolli (1958-) the office of vice-president by: Zigeuner (1946-1955), Antoniolli (1955-1958), Karl Wolf (1958-).

[161] On July 24 by the National Council, on July 26 by the Federal Council; see *Sten Prot. Nationalrat,* 5th Legislative Period, vol. I (Vienna, 1945-1946), p. 578; *Sten. Prot Bundesrat,* 1st to 49th Session (Vienna, 1945-1949), p. 107.

[162] "Verfassungs-u. Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeits-Novelle," (*BGBl.,* No. 211). Due t this alteration of constitutional competence, the organizational statute of the Court wa amended on June 11, 1947 (*BGBl.,* No. 132). In the same amending act the Court receive the faculty to decide on the basis of the affirmations of the plaintiff if the authoritie failed to submit documents or counter-charges.

[163] *BGBl.,* No. 114. In the same context belongs a law on fiscal organization of 194 (*BGBl.,* No. 45) by which the Court was authorized, upon request of the Federal Ministe of Finances, to void illegal resolutions of municipal representative bodies in tax matters This competence had formerly been exercised by the Administrative Court.

[164] *BGBl.,* No. 42. The described alterations required a reformulation of the law dealin with the organization and procedures of the Court, a reformulation contained in th resolution of May 12, 1953 (*BGBl.,* No. 85).

DUKE UNIVERSITY

---

[165] For such discussions see: Ludwig Adamovich, "Probleme der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Juristische Blätter*, vol. 72 (1950), pp. 73-77; "Die verfassungsmässige Funktion des Richters," *Österreichische Juristenzeitung*, vol. 9 (1954), pp. 409-413; Hans Spanner, "Bedeutung und Bewahrung der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in Österreich," *Die Öffentliche Verwaltung*, vol. 8 (1955), pp. 65-70; Helfried Pfeifer, "Ausbau der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Juristische Blätter*, vol. 78 (1956), pp. 513-519, 544-548; Felix Ermacora, "Haushaltbesteuerung und Klaglosstellung im Verfahren vor dem Verfassungsgerichtshof sowie Gedanken über eine Reform der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Österreichische Juristenzeitung*, vol. 13 (1958), p. 41 ff. Some of the reform proposals are intended to cope with the unsettled relations and conflicting jurisdictions of the highest courts, and especially of the Administrative and the Constitutional Court. See in this regard: Paul Viktor Winfried, "Eine neue Gegensätzlichkeit in der Rechtsprechung des Verfassungs- und Verwaltungsgerichtshofes," *Juristische Blätter*, vol. 77 (1955), pp. 569-571; the discussion in the Juridical Society of Vienna on the "Möglichkeit der Vermeidung wesentlicher Differenzen in der Rechtsprechung der drei höchsten österreichischen Gerichtshöfe," *ibid.*, vol. 79 (1957), p. 263 ff., 287 ff.

[166] *BGBl.*, No. 12. The same law also brought a slight modification of the Court's jurisdiction in conflicts between the Board of Accounts and the federal government. An ordinary statute of the same day (*BGBl.*, No. 18) contained detailed reformulations and supplementations of the organizational statute of the Court. On both laws see Ernst Hellbling, "Die Neuerungen in der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit," *Österreichische Juristenzeitung*, vol. 13 (1958), pp. 281-284.

REINTERPRETING MODERN GERMAN HISTORY: THE WEIMAR REPUBLIC*

by Eric C. Kollman

FEW periods in German history invite such a degree of interpretation and reinterpretation as does the short span between the Second and Third Reich, the fourteen years of the First German Republic. Here most of the issues of German history seem to be fought over again, democracy struggles against authoritarianism, capitalism is threatened by socialism, centralism battles federalism,[1] militarism[2] endangers a civil society. These fourteen years of defeat, revolution and postwar turmoil, then of seeming stabilization and finally of another collapse under the onslaught of the Great Depression and of fascist totalitarianism, were years of potential or actual civil war.[3] Of the fourteen years, only five and a half years can be considered "normal" (and were, incidentally, free of the use of emergency power by the government). It was a period in which "all decisions were possible and none seemingly taken."[4] The richness of the political spectrum finds its reflection in the excitement, sensitivity and intellectual ferment of the time—in significant contrast to the epoch since 1945.

The profoundly controversial character of the Weimar period is brought forward in the basic questions which those fourteen years pose to the historian. To begin with: What is the position of the Weimar period in the general course of German history? Is it to be considered merely as an epilogue to the Wilhelmian era,[5] a strange interlude between the Second and the Third Reich, a prologue to the Third Reich, or a real and significant experiment in Democracy? Similar dissenting interpretations can be found concerning the "character" of the Republic, the reasons for the failure of the revolution of 1918—if there was one—the causes for the collapse of Weimar. After so much insistence that the Republic was not liberal enough or radical enough we have been told recently that it was not conservative enough.[6] As to the revolution, did it fail because of the character of Ebert and the other leaders of the SPD; or was it the fault of the Spartacists, or of the "deal" between Ebert and Groener, or of the international situation? Did the Republic collapse because of Versailles and Moscow,[7] or because of the economic depression, or was it betrayed by the military or by Hindenburg? The puzzle remains unsolved and the debate goes on and on. And behind the answers to these various questions are the issues of guilt and responsibility so that almost all the judgments about Weimar cannot help but be intensely political, even moral judgments.[8]

---

*This is the somewhat enlarged version of a paper which was read at the meeting of the American Historical Association in Chicago on December 30, 1959.

[1] This important problem is, unfortunately, beyond the scope of so brief a paper However, see particularly K. Schwend, *Bayern zwischen Monarchie und Diktatur* (Munich 1954); Heinz Gollwitzer, "Bayern 1918-1933," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, III (1955), 363-387; Arnold Brecht, *Federalism and Regionalism in Germany* (New York, 1945); Werner G. Zimmermann, *Bayern und das Reich* (Munich, 1953).

[2] Important, but not specifically concerned with the Weimar Period, is Ludwig Dehio's essay, "Um den deutschen Militarismus," *Historische Zeitschrift*, August 1955 (vol. 181) an answer to Gerhard Ritter's narrow concept of the term. See the latter's "Das Problem des Militarismus in Deutschland," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 177, (1954), 21-48, and his *Staatskunst und Kriegshandwerk*, I (Munich, 1954).

[3] Symbolic of this situation was the inability to agree on a flag which would be acceptable to the large majority of the German people.

[4] Thus Ernst von Salomon, with reference to the first five years of the Republic, in his *Nahe Geschichte: Ein Überblick* (Berlin, 1936), p. 123.

[5] See Golo Mann, *Deutsche Geschichte des neunzehnten und zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin, 1958), pp. 738 ff., 787.

[6] Klemens von Klemperer, *Germany's New Conservatism* (Princeton, 1957).

Since the German catastrophe a massive literature has accumulated on the Weimar period. Reinterpretations depend in the main on three factors. There is first, and most tangible, the availability of new source material. I mention merely the Seeckt, Groener, Stresemann and Westarp papers, material from the Nuremberg War Crimes trials, among many others. To these must be added the stream of memoirs which have appeared since Hitler's seizure of power, like the ones by Otto Braun, Severing, Curtius, Schacht, Papen, Meissner, Gessler, books naturally of varying importance and reliability.

A second factor on which reinterpretation of the Weimar period hinges is the new perspective which the historian today enjoys compared with the one writing in 1935 or even in 1946. Apart from the obvious fact that Weimar has now become not the last but the second to the last period of recent German history, the existence of the German Federal Republic cannot but invite a constant comparison with and often differentiation from Weimar.[9] The history of the Soviet Union and of the international Communist movement has made possible a better understanding of and a deeper insight into the meaning of the split of the German working-class movement, so decisive during the 1918-1923 period, so fateful during the end phase of the Republic. A Germany divided and occupied for a long period after World War II has meant that we have a much better understanding of the men and the policies most responsible during the early stormy days of the Republic for preserving German unity and for preventing large-scale Allied occupation. The division of Germany today, much as it is the result of outside forces, makes for new reflections on the continuous tension in modern German history between freedom and unity, and for new interpretations concerning the relationship between nationalism and socialism, and between socialism and democracy. The greater historical distance and the experience of the Third Reich has also softened certain issues which were most controversial and loaded with emotion and prejudice in previous times. The war-guilt question,[10] the stab-in-the-back legend have been "settled" by historical research and have lost much of their emotional and political character, due to the experiences since 1933. The question of monarchical restoration[11] has become purely academic and has lost much of its emotional and political overtones, and so has the issue of the loss of the German colonies. The lack of a German peace settlement after 1945 and the division of Germany has made even the German historian accept the judgment long since expressed by many of his Western colleagues that the Versailles settlement offered much greater opportunities for Germany than he would have been willing to admit twenty-five years ago.[12]

---

[7] Cf. Otto Braun, *Von Weimar zu Hitler,* 2nd ed. (New York, 1940), p. 5.

[8] The earlier histories of the Weimar Republic reflect in an almost paradigmatic way the possible interpretations of the period. The first work of high scientific rank is Arthur Rosenberg's *History of the Weimar Republic* (London, 1936). Its center of gravity lies in the early period—two-thirds of the book deals with the first five years. Rosenberg's is an interpretation of the character and meaning of the Republic from its origin. In Godfrey Scheele's *The Weimar Republic—Overture to the Third Reich* (London, 1946), the orientation, as the subtitle indicates, is toward the end. A Communist interpretation which treats the history of Weimar also more or less as a prelude to the Third Reich is the first volume of Paul Merker's *Deutschland—Sein oder nicht Sein* (Mexico City, 1944), while *Durchbruch zur Nation, Geschichte des deutschen Volkes 1919 bis 1933* (Jena, 1933), is a good example of a nationalistic interpretation—the "Conservative Revolution" variant. The first serious attempt to treat the whole Republican period in its own right is Ferdinand Friedensburg's *Die Weimarer Republik* (Berlin, 1946), already written in 1934, to "set the record straight." In a similar vein, though more polemic and apologetic, is Friedrich Stampfer's *The Fourteen Years of the First German Republic* (Karlsbad, 1936). Naturally, much that was written about Weimar during the period of the Third Reich and the Second World War was flavored by the contemporary atmosphere. See e.g. the relevant chapters in A. J. P. Taylor's *The Course of German History* (New York, 1946), and William Ebenstein's *The German Record* (New York, 1945). For an extreme case of a hostile interpretation of German history during the Weimar period see W. M. Knight-Patterson, *Germany from Defeat to Conquest, 1913-1933* (London, 1945). (The preface to this book was written, appropriately, by Lord Vansittart.) The first balanced history of the Weimar Repubilc which tried to look at the period neither exclusively as a trailblazer to the Third Reich nor as a predetermined failure due to the many miscarriages of 1918, was written by an American scholar at the end of the Second World War. I am referring to S. William Halperin's *Germany Tried Democracy* (New York, 1946).

[9] See the penetrating *Bonn ist nicht Weimar* by Fritz René Allemann (Cologne, 1956).

A third factor which influences concentration on certain issues as well as their reinterpretations can also be discerned, though it operates rather subtly sometimes. It is the actuality of certain themes of the Weimar period and the general political climate of today in which they are viewed. That this factor determines the outlook, selection of topics and (foregone) conclusions of most of the historical publications coming out of the German Democratic Republic goes without saying, even if some work done on the other side of the Curtain cannot simply be dismissed out of hand. Nor can it be denied that actuality of topics and political climate play their role in the West also. The burning question of German-Russian relations—or the absence of such relations—during the forties and fifties has recently helped to stimulate research on this topic for the interwar period. So has the broader question of German Western orientation and her reliability as an ally. The issue of German rearmament has undoubtedly increased the interest in the problem of German militarism and the relationship between the civilian and the military, a topic timely in the United States also, the country outside Germany contributing most heavily to research in recent German history. The new respectability of conservatism is possibly reflected in the studies devoted to that aspect of Weimar. And it is only natural that the political realities of the German Federal Republic have led to extended research in the party history of the First German Republic.

---

[10] On the war guilt clause of the Versailles treaty and its interpretations see Hajo Holborn, "Diplomats and Diplomacy in the Early Weimar Republic," in *The Diplomats,* ed by Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, 1953), especially p. 143. For an interesting psychological interpretation of both the war guilt question and the stab-in-the-back legend see Richard M. Hunt, "Mythus, Guilt and Shame in pre-Nazi Germany," *Virginia Quarterly Review,* 34/3, (summer 1958), 355-371.

[11] See on this topic Walter H. Kaufmann, *Monarchism in the Weimar Republic* (New York, 1953).

[12] Even Gerhard Ritter admitted after the Second World War that the *Diktat* of Versailles left very favorable chances for a peaceful political and economic resurgence o Germany. (G. Ritter, "Der Versailler Vertrag von 1919," in *Festschrift des Evangelischen Stiftsgymnasiums Gütersloh,* 1951.) And Karl Dietrich Erdmann recently pointed out how great, precisely as a result of the configuration in East Central and Southeastern Europe after World War I, the opportunities were for Germany, if peacefully and patiently pursued. The new Baltic States as well as Poland and Czechoslovakia, to say nothing o Austria, were dependent on good relations with Germany. Seen from the viewpoint o the present German and European situation, the restoration of the East-European configuration as it had been created after the First World War would appear as an overwhelming fulfillment of the wildest political dreams. (*Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht* X/7 (July 1959), 436-448. Cf. his *Die Zeit der Weltkriege* (note 13), p. 104 ff.

If one surveys the tremendous amount of literature on the Weimar period—scholarly and popular, general[13] and monographic—which has been published since the end of the Second World War, the following patterns and trends are observable: (1) There is a general tendency to move away from extreme positions in intepreting both the period as a whole and single issues, events and personalities, and to come to a more moderate, balanced view.[14] (2) Connected with this is a decline in attempting to explain the faults and the failures of Weimar by a single cause: for instance, proportional representation, the guilt of the army, the split of the working-class movement, the absence of a real revolution, the depression, a fixed militaristic and/or anti-democratic German national character, the Junkers, the industrialists, Hindenburg, etc., etc., and thus a move back to multicausal explanations. There are also fewer straight lines drawn like "There was a direct and logical road from the Republican constituents of 1919 to the totalitarian tyranny of Hitler"[15] or, another sample, "From Noske to Hitler, or from Social Democracy to National Socialism, a straight line leads from the Free Corps of 1919 defending the 'unity of the Reich' against 'Bolshevism' to the Storm Troopers and Elite Guards of 1933, also defending 'the unity of the Reich' against 'Bolshevism.' "[16] The pitfalls of oversimplification, always a danger when one feels strongly, are now usually avoided. There is (3) a less deterministic treatment of German history from 1918-1933 in general, and a greater appreciation for the openness of historical situations and for the existence of genuine choices and alternatives.[17] There is a desire, at least by some historians, to stress the continuity between the Wilhelmian period, the Weimar Republic and the present Federal Republic as something positive[18] and to consider the Third Reich as the aberration[19]

---

[13] Among the general histories of the Weimar period which have appeared since Halperin's work either as books or parts of books, attention should be paid to Werner Conze's contribution in *Deutsche Geschichte im Überblick* (Stuttgart, 1953), pp. 616-666. The treatment is well balanced and judicious. The reader is never permitted to forget the fate of the German minorities and of Austria. Some will take exception to various points, e.g. the evaluation of Stresemann's Locarno policy as only a passing success and a false hope which ended "symbolically" with the final departure of French troops from the Rhineland in 1930; or the defense of the demarche of several top industrial and financial leaders with Hindenburg in November 1932 to make Hitler chancellor. Very well organized and generally scrupulously fair in its judgment is the more elaborate *Die Weimarer Republik* by Albert Schwarz, in *Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte,* ed. by L. Just, vol. IV/3 (Konstanz, 1958), with an excellent bibliography. The book has been criticized in Germany for showing no understanding whatever of the *Frontsoldatentum:* "All questions of defense are seen from the point of view of a pacifist republican." The criticism seems hardly justified. The treatment of the stab-in-the-back legend is a model of accuracy. Perhaps the author is too harsh on Hindenburg in connection with the events of the 30th of January 1933. The best written of the histories of the Weimar Republic is Erich Eyck's *Geschichte der Weimarer Republik,* two volumes (Zurich, 1954 and 1956). Eyck writes from the position of a liberal republican and has been criticized in Germany by those who stand further to the Right for his "bloodless liberalism." He is at his best in the treatment of foreign affairs, weaker on economic history. The "atmosphere" of the period, admittedly difficult to reconstruct, is also somewhat missing. A relatively elaborate treatment of the Weimar period, very well balanced, can be found in the pertinent chapters of Hans Herzfeld, *Die Moderne Welt,* vol. II, 2nd ed. (Braunschweig, 1956). Particularly valuable are the bibliographies, which include most of the important foreign publications. The latest comprehensive treatment of the Weimar period is by Karl Dietrich Erdmann in his *Die Zeit der Weltkriege* (Stuttgart, 1959), pp. 80-176. This work is volume IV of the *Handbuch der Deutschen Geschichte* by Bruno Gebhardt, 8th ed., ed. by Herbert Grundmann. Of non-German histories of Weimar, Edouard Vermeil's *Germany in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1956), is poorly organized, badly translated, and too full of errors to be of much value. It does contain some good parts, however, on German economic development and on certain aspects of German intellectual history. By far the best treatment of the Weimar period in this country since the publication of Halperin's book are the corresponding chapters in Koppel Pinson's *Modern Germany, Its History and Its Civilization* (New York, 1954). A straight Communist interpretation of the Weimar period can be found in the outline of the *Handbook of the History of the German People,* a planned textbook for university students in the German Democratic Republic, by Albert Schreiner. The outline is printed in *ueitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* II/5 (1953), 700-753, and follows strictly the party line: e.g. Ebert and Groener made their deal to murder the German Republic, the shameful treaty of Versailles was one of the main causes of World War II, the Dawes Plan was a victory of English and American over French imperialists, Brüning's appointment was the move from hidden to open dictatorship by the German financial

---

capital. The offer of the KPD to form a United Front with the SPD came to naught because the SPD leaders were really the executioners of the German working class. The participation of the National Socialists in the communication strike of November 1932 deepened the crisis of that party while it demonstrated the great influence of the KPD on the masses. The emphasis is always on the treacherous role of the SPD, which is alleged to have been the trailblazer for the fascist dictatorship.

[14] One needs only to compare e.g. Knight-Patterson with Pinson, or the "tone" on Versailles, even in Franz Schnabel, *Grundriss der Geschichte,* IV (Leipzig, 1932), 139, with Hans Herzfeld, *op.cit.,* 199 ff.

[15] G. Scheele, *op.cit.,* p. 15.

[16] W. Ebenstein, *op.cit.,* p. 196.

[17] This was essentially already Rosenberg's approach. See, however, Karl Dietrich Erdmann's dissent in his important essay, "Die Weimarer Republik als Forschungsproblem," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* III/1 (1955), 6 f., and the criticism of Erdmann's position by Erich Matthias in his bibliographical article "Zur Geschichte der Weimarer Republik," in *Die Neue Gesellschaft,* 1956, pp. 312-320. Most historians now take the position that neither the end of Weimar nor the coming of Hitler to power was inevitable Thus, for instance, Ferdinand Friedensburg, in the preface to the new edition of his "Die Weimarer Republik," printed in *Der Monat,* 95 (August 1956), p. 63, writes: "The unhappy end was not at all necessary."

[18] See Pinson, *op. cit.,* p. 411. Werner Conze in a bibliographical article, "Zur Deutschen Geschichte 1918-1933," in *Neue Politische Literatur,* 1957/2, col. 925-936, pleads that one should not look at the continuity of personnel and institutions across the break of 1918 as something negative and see in it the essential reason for the failure and fall of Weimar. The opposite view, i.e. a positive evaluation of continuity, must be adopted and the question raised whether the German people before and after 1918 were not more and more in a political and social democratic evolution, and how much they found themselves on the way to democratic constitutional forms also. The history of parties and of parliaments, especially of the Reichstag, the development of the suffrage laws, the increasing power of

instead of as a logical, if not *the* logical and inevitable outcome of German history, as was the previously prevailing interpretation.

(4) There is also a general tendency toward a more conservative interpretation of the politics of the period, which expresses itself in the possible overestimation of the Communist danger, in emphatic endorsement of the policies of Ebert and Noske,[20] in attempts to excuse the conservatives, and in stressing their difference from the National Socialists.[21] But any revisionism cannot easily be brought under a common denominator. The more cautious, more multidimensional, less emotional and more objective treatment of Weimar history does not mean, however, that all the old hatchets have been buried and that there are no significant differences in interpretations, even though they are not so easily detectable and most of the time more subtly expressed.[22]

(5) As to the concentration on certain topics and the avoidance of others, the following picture emerges. There is in general a greater emphasis on domestic rather than on foreign policy—and the *Primat der Aussenpolitik* in explaining Weimar has been seriously challenged.[23] The topics most con-

---

organizations, especially of the trade unions, the development of welfare policy—all prove this trend. The First World War is also a good illustration, when the cooperation between capital and labor became indispensable and the trade unions moved closer to the state. On the political implications of the call for continuity in the Weimar period itself see the brilliant article by Waldemar Besson, "Friedrich Meinecke und die Weimarer Republik," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* VII/2 (April 1959), especially p. 121.

[19] So Gerhard Ritter, who (in his contribution to *The Third Reich,* ed. by Maurice Baumont et al., New York, 1955, "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism") comes to the conclusion that Hitler's system was a contradiction of tradition. Cf. the trenchant criticism of this essay by Robert G. L. Waite, in *The American Historical Review,* LXI/1 (October 1955), 129 f.

[20] See e.g., the praise of Noske by Hermann Heidegger, in *Die Deutsche Sozialdemokratie und der Nationale Staat,* 1870-1920 (Göttingen, 1956). Cf. Eyck, *op.cit.,* vol. I., p. 76 f.

[21] The positive evaluation of continuity between Empire and Republic, the "Ausklammern" (circumventing) of the Revolution of 1918-19, the emphasis on the self-elimination of the Parliament in 1930 (see below p. 000) rather than on the army and the President and the forces behind him as causes for the fall of Weimar might all be so interpreted. While Pinson devoted almost exactly one third of his account to the revolution of 1918, Schwarz gives it about one tenth, Conze even less. Gerhard Ritter calls—as late as 1953—the meeting of K. V. Schroeder and Papen in Cologne in early January of 1933 a "legend," and tries to pin the responsibility for Hitler's coming to power on the "shortsighted selfishness of the parties" and on the German people, thus relieving Hindenburg and his camarilla of their responsibility. (*Der Tagesspiegel,* January 30, 1953: "Als die Freiheit lautlos starb.") Is it really a "legend" that one reason for Hindenburg's dismissal of Brüning was the Junkers' attack on Brüning because of his "agrarian bolshevism"? Thus Conze in *Deutsche Geschichte,* ed. by Peter Rassow, p. 660.

[22] Interesting and instructive in this respect is sometimes a comparison of the book reviews in *Das Historisch-Politische Buch* with those in *Neue Politische Literatur.*

[23] See Karl Dietrich Erdmann, "Die Geschichte der Weimarer Republik als Problem der Wissenschaft" in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* III/1 (January 1955), 16 f. This is also the general line taken by Eyck. On the other hand, the one comprehensive, but certainly not definitive, account on German foreign policy during the Weimar period by Ludwig Zimmermann (*Deutsche Aussenpolitik in der Aera der Weimarer Republik,* Göttingen, 1958) comes to the conclusion that "the timely revision of the peace treaties would probably have saved the Weimar Republic and the peace." Cf. the review of Zimmermann's book by Hans Gatzke in *Journal of Central European Affairs,* XIX/3 (October 1959), 317 f.

spicuously treated are the army, the end of the Republic, certain aspects of the revolution, political parties, the conservative revolution, and, in the area of foreign policy, Stresemann and German-Russian relations. Conspicuous lacunae exist, among others, in the field of economic history and in the cultural history of the period.[24] Especially surprising here is the absence of any major attempt to interpret the Weimar period by a sociological treatment of its literature, particularly the novels, which would be such an inviting and fruitful task.[25] Since space does not permit dealing with all the special themes on which the attention of the scholars has been focused in recent years, I have selected, somewhat arbitrarily, the revolution of 1918 and the end of the Republic for some illustrative comments.

II

Interpretations—old and new—of the German revolution of 1918 naturally focus on the question why it failed, or rather, why the political revolution was not followed by a social revolution. There is general agreement among Western and Eastern historians that at the time there existed a revolutionary *situation.* The Communist interpretations stress the absence of a disciplined revolutionary Marxist party as the main reason for the negative outcome of the events of 1918-19. The split in the Social Democratic party should have occurred before 1914 or at the latest immediately after the fateful vote of August 4th of that year.[26]

---

[24] See Werner Gebauer, "Wirtschaftspolitische Probleme der Weimarer Republik im neueren Darstellungen," in *Jahrbuch für Sozialwissenschaft,* II (1951), 222-235. Two important recent publications in this field are: Gerhard Kroll, *Von der Weltwirtschaftskrise zur Staatskonjunktur* (Berlin, 1958), and Rolf E. Lüke, *Von der Stabilisierung zur Krise* (Zurich, 1958). Cf. the earlier book by Wilhelm Grotkopp, *Die Grosse Krise; Lehren au der Überwindung der Wirtschaftskrise, 1929-1932* (Düsseldorf, 1954), and the forthcoming Hamburg dissertation by Werner Yochmann, *Die Auswirkung der Weltwirtschaftskrise au das Ende der Weimarer Republik.* There is also an important bibliographical article by Gerhard Schulz on "Die grosse Krise in der Zeitgeschichte" in *Neue Politische Literatu* IV (1959), 10 (October 1959). However a political history of German industry has still t be written. The role of the churches, both Protestant and Catholic, in the Weimar period needs more exploration. So does that of the universities. Among biographies we now have the excellent work by Klaus Epstein on *Erzberger* (Princeton, 1959), the satisfactory but all too short political biography of *Stresemann* by Anneliese Thimme (Hanover, 1957) and a new biography of *Hindenburg* by the prolific Walter Goerlitz (Bonn, 1953) which however, leaves much to be desired. At least one Ebert biography is *in statu nascendi* by George Kotowski, Berlin.

[25] The best short account of the intellectual life in Weimar is still Pinson, *op.cit.,* pp 454-466. Schwarz is unsatisfactory and Schreiner, in his outline (see above note 13) leaves only a space open for this aspect of Weimar, to be filled in later.

[26] The only recent book on the revolution of 1918-19 as a whole is Rudolf Coper *Failure of a Revolution; Germany in 1918-1919* (Cambridge, 1955), a somewhat impressionistic account, and even more critical of Ebert and the Majority Socialists than Rosenberg One would wish that this period might find a Bracher, both in terms of meticulous and detailed treatment, and of trying the approach of power loss (this time suddenly), power vacuum, and power seizure (or the lack of it), for 1918-19 to test the validity of Bracher's thesis. Most authors would still accept A. Rosenberg's characterization of the movement as a middle class revolution won by the working class in a struggle with feudalism. While R. Bauer, "Über den Charakter der Deutschen November Revolution," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* VI (1958), 161, insists that the revolution of 1918 had at its start a definite proletarian, socialist character, the official thesis of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party is that the November Revolution of 1918 remained in its essence a

The course of action of the Social Democratic party in 1918 has continued to stimulate important research in the background, the development and the character of the party prior to 1918. This research (I am referring to the works of Schorske,[27] Gay and Berlau, among others) has resulted in a much better understanding of the forces of revisionism, the influence of the trade unions in the party, the outlook of the revolutionary Left and its abhorrence of a tight, disciplined and potentially bureaucratic party organization, the patriotic, almost nationalistic sentiment of a large segment of the party leadership and its inability to break in the decisive moment with the tradition of August 4th, and its continued reverence for Hindenburg.

The interpretations of the SPD before 1918 shed important light on the question whether or not there was available a third way in 1918 between the cooperation of the SPD with the German High Command and other conservative forces on the one hand and a victory of Bolshevism on the other. Among German historians, Erdmann[28] has stressed time and again that there was no third alternative between the alliance of fictitious Marxism with fictitious Monarchism, and social revolution. In the United States Klaus Epstein has taken an equally rigorous deterministic position: "American scholars refuse to accept the view that the problems confronting German Socialists were in fact insoluble, and that whatever line of conduct the leaders took—be it moderation or radicalism—they were most unlikely to achieve their objective. American historians have underestimated the impersonal forces and conditions which made German Socialists act as they did, and have engaged in an essentially groundless search for villains."[29] On the other hand, Rosenberg, already in the thirties, and recently Matthias, Tormin, Waldman and Oertzen have emphasized the openness of the situation in 1918 and the possibility of a combination of democracy and socialism rather than the alternative of parliamentary democracy or a Soviet regime.

It is understandable, therefore, that much attention has been paid in recent years, on both sides of the Iron Curtain, to the character and role of the councils during the German revolution. The conclusion reached at a recent meeting of East German and Soviet Russian historians was that the present status of research does not justify the assertion that anywhere in Germany (with the possible exception of the Bavarian Soviet Republic) the

---

bourgeois-democratic revolution which was carried out to a certain degree with the help of proletarian means and methods. (*Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* VI 1958, Sonderheft zum 40. Jahrestag der deutschen November Revolution, 1-27.) See also Eric Waldman, *The Spartacist Uprising of 1919 and the Crisis of the German Socialist Movement: A Study of the Relation of Political Theory and Party Practice* (Milwaukee, 1958). Waldman shows convincingly that this fateful event was neither provoked by the Majority Socialist nor deliberately planned by the Communist leadership in Berlin or ordered by Moscow. In other words it was not a plot, but grew out of circumstances. Cf. the unpublished Ph.D. thesis by John Raatjes, *The Role of Communism during the Munich Revolutionary Period, November 1918 - May 1919* (University of Illinois, Urbana, 1958).

[27] Carl E. Schorske, *German Social Democracy, 1905 - 1917* (Cambridge (U.S.A.), 1955), p. 322 ff. Cf. A. Joseph Berlau, *The German Social Democratic Party 1914-1921* (New York, 1949), and Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism* (New York, 1952).

[28] Most recently in his *Die Zeit der Weltkriege* (Stuttgart, 1959), p. 88 f.

[29] Klaus Epstein, "Three American Studies of German Socialism" in *World Politics,* XI/4 (July 1959), 651.

councils were organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat.[30] In the West, Walter Tormin has conclusively shown the largely moderate, non-Communist character of the councils during the period from early November 1918 to early February 1919. His thesis is that the question Constituent Assembly or Dictatorship by Councils was already decided by November 10th. The German Workers and Soldiers Councils were not an imitation of the Russian Soviets, they were not a motor of the revolution but rather a product of the military collapse. Only later did they lean more toward the Russian model because of the Council of Peoples Commissars' lack of initiative in the question of socialization, and their cooperation with the forces of yesterday.[31] Tormin's research reinforces the interpretation that the alternative, councils or parliamentary democracy, was not as crucial and decisive a question as it appeared to the participants during the revolution. More decisive was what kind of political decrees were issued by the Council of Peoples Commissars. Government by councils may have led to anarchy but could never had led to a party dictatorship because of the absence of a tightly knit revolutionary party.[32] A similar conclusion is reached by Peter von Oertzen in a most interesting study on the political perspectives of the great strikes in the Ruhr coal mines during the Spring of 1919.[33] Oertzen marshals impressive evidence that there was—as Rosenberg had contended—a broad unified current in the working class which would have been satisfied with limited socialization in the framework of a social democracy, that this current was neither the result of a planned Spartacist conspiracy nor did it aim at a dictatorship of the proletariat after the Russian model, and that the desire for socialization of the Ruhr mines was genuine and widespread among the workers. For Oertzen, then, the third way would have consisted in a parliamentary democracy based on an economic system organized by councils.

In view of its crucial importance both during the revolutionary period and in the subsequent history of the Republic the so-called "deal" between Ebert and Groener has attracted renewed attention in recent research. A more discerning judgment of its character and meaning is now possible. Groener's intention was not only to protect the country against a radical revolution from the Left and against separatist movements, but, as he wrote later himself, "We hoped by our activities to gain a share of state powers for the army and the officers corps. If we succeeded then, in spite of the revolution, the best and the strongest element of the old Prussiandom would be safely imbedded in the new Germany."[34] On the other hand, it is equally clear that the much dramatized first telephone conversation between Ebert and Groener was not as decisive in itself as it is usually interpreted. That it doomed the Weimar Republic at birth is a retrospective judgment.[35] There were several forkings of the way later which could have been taken by the government. Robert Waite[36] has rightly pointed out that all Ebert did in this initial conversation was to promise to combat Bolshevism in return for the support of the Supreme Command. We also now have evidence that Ebert was by no means willing in November 1918 to sacrifice cooperation with the moderate wing of the Independent Socialists for cooperation with the Supreme Command.[37] But due to the unwillingness or the inability of the Socialist leaders to create a military force of their own, they did, indeed, make the Supreme Command the protector of their government.

---

[30] See S. K. Eggert, "Über die Rolle der Räte in der Novemberrevolution 1918 in Deutschland," in *Kommission der Historiker der DDR und der USSR. Protokoll der wissenscaftlichen Tagung in Leipzig,* 25 - 30 (November 1957), 123-134. Cf. *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft,* 1956, pp. 264-277, and 738-750.

[31] Walter Tormin, *Zwischen Rätediktatur und sozialer Demokratie* (Düsseldorf, 1954). Tormin comes to the conclusion that there were really not two (economic and political) but three forms of councils during that period: (1) temporary revolutionary committees, (2) permanent dictatorial organs of state power, (3) councils for the purpose of representing the interests of the workers. Only the second had a "Russian" character. But because of the absence of any theory of their own, the council movement leaned more and more toward the Russian model, i.e. a dictatorship by councils. Originally, however, the councils, result and not cause of the Revolution, were the beginnings of new organs of democratic self-government whose aims were peace, order, and democracy. They might have become useful control organs of the bureaucratic apparatus.

[32] See the excellent discussion of this issue by Evelyn Anderson in her *Hammer or Anvil* (London, 1945), pp. 43-49.

[33] Peter von Oertzen, "Die grossen Streiks der Ruhrarbeiterschaft im Frühjahr 1919," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* VI/3 (July 1958).

By stressing continuity rather than change in 1918 and looking for democratic elements and their character in the monarchy and for monarchical elements and their character in the republic, Theodor Eschenburg has come to important and partly new interpretations.[38] Thus, he argues convincingly that the office of *Reichspräsident* was modeled as much on the office of the Emperor as on that of the American president. He shows how the cleavages of the war period continue after the war; the positions of government and opposition are merely reversed. During the war, the fronts had been expansionist foreign policy combined with conservative domestic policy versus a peace of understanding and domestic reforms. After the war, the antithesis was a fight against Versailles and monarchical restoration versus cautious revision of Versailles and democratic constitutionalism. Eschenburg explains the weakness of Weimar and the continuation of the powerful influence of the army, the industrialists, the Junkers and the bureaucracy more in terms of the improvised character of German democracy than as the result of the failure of the "unnecessary" revolution. The trouble with the creation of the Weimar Republic, whose republican democratic form had already lost its legitimacy for a majority of Germans with the Versailles treaty, was the improvised introduction of a cooperative organization of the state at a time when the people were still largely linked to an authoritarian tradition.[39]

---

[34] Wilhelm Groener, *Lebenserinnerungen* (Göttingen, 1957), p. 468.

[35] John Wheeler-Bennett, *The Nemesis of Power* (London, 1953), p. 21.

[36] Robert G. L. Waite, *Vanguard of Nazism* (Cambridge (Mass.), 1952), p. 5.

[37] Hans Herzfeld, "Zur neueren Literatur über das Heeresproblem in der deutschen Geschichte," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* IV/3 (October 1956), 380n.

[38] Theodor Eschenburg, *Die Improvisierte Demokratie der Weimarer Republik* (Laupheim, 1953). Cf. John L. Snell, "Die Republik aus Versäumnissen," in *Die Welt als Geschichte,* XV (1955), 196-219.

It may be permissible, in connection with the various interpretations of the German revolution, to comment briefly on the advantages and the limitations of historical parallels. The neighborhood in time and space of the Russian revolution to the events in Germany in 1918-19 influenced not only happenings at that time, but also their interpretation then and later. The parallel between 1918 in Germany and 1917 in Russia is, however, in many ways rather misleading and hinders more often than it helps a true understanding and evaluation of the German scene in those years. Among others, Dehio[40] implicitly and Pinson[41] explicitly have rightly stressed that a comparison of Germany in 1918-19 with France in 1870-71 is much more meaningful, both as to similarities and differences. The similarities to France lay in the military debacle, an emperor completely compromised, no particular enthusiasm for the republic, a small minority of radicals.

As to the differences, France had at least four advantages in 1871 over Germany in 1918. First, the impact of the war was much less severe. Second, France fought on under the new republican government, thus making a stab-in-the-back legend and a linkage between the Republic and defeat very difficult if not impossible. Third, France had a strong revolutionary tradition in 1871, so conspicuously lacking in Germany in 1918. And, finally, history gave the French Republic more time. If one remembers, however, that even so France had the Commune, elected a popular monarchist general to the presidency, and had much difficulty in bringing the army under the control of the Republican government and creating a loyal officers corps—as the Boulanger crisis and the Dreyfus case attest—then one will be incline to be less harsh in one's judgment of the hapless leaders of the Weima Republic.

III

All interpretations of the Weimar Republic are unavoidably influence by the facts and features of its decline and fall and, more specifically, by th question of what caused its collapse.[42] It is probably not accidental that th most outstanding work on the Weimar period to appear in recent years deals with the dissolution of the Weimar Republic. I am referring to *Die Auflösung der Weimarer Republik,* by D. K. Bracher,[43] whose painstaking

---

[39] Similarly Franz Neumann: "Weimar democracy perished because the political form of democracy was imposed upon an authoritarian social and economic structure." "Germany and Western Union," *Proceedings of the American Academy of Political Science* XXIII (1949), 262.

[40] Ludwig Dehio, *"Deutschland im Zeitalter der Weltkriege," Historische Zeitschrift* 173/1 (February 1952), 87.

[41] Koppel Pinson, *op.cit.*, p. 352 f.

[42] Of the older interpretations the strictly Marxist one, that it was the imperialism o German monopoly capital that caused the tensions of Weimar and led to its collapse an to Hitler's seizure of power, so lucidly stated e.g. by Franz Neumann (*Behemoth,* Ne York, 1942, p. 13 ff.) is today held by very few Western historians. Wilhelm Högner's explanation that the decline of German Social Democracy caused the frightened bourgeoisi to look for another savior from Bolshevism, and, therefore, to throw itself into the arm of National Socialism will hardly be acceptable in this form today. (*Die verratene Republik,* Munich, 1958, p. 9). Arthur Rosenberg had stressed the important role of America financial capital in saving the German Republic in 1923 and its inability to do so agai after the Great Depression struck. (*op.cit.*, p. 305). Ludwig Dehio, (*op.cit.*, p. 88) has als pointed out the influence of the United States' withdrawal in 1919, its return in 192 and its second withdrawal in 1929 on the fate of the German Republic, but more in term

---

of international power relations than of economic help. One might well ponder the question whether a France backed by the British-American security treaty might not have been less inflexible in the decisive first postwar years toward Germany with respect to the reparations question and related issues. On this point cf. K. D. Erdmann, *Die Zeit der Weltkriege,* p. 109.

According to Dehio, (*op.cit.* 87 f.), the origin of the German Republic out of exhaustion and in giving in to the enemies rather than fighting them as did France in 1870 and Russia in 1917—almost determined its later fate. Otto Braun (see note 7) in an oft quoted passage of his memoirs attributes the downfall of Weimar to Versailles and Moscow. Few historians today would, however, accept the interpretation that it was mainly issues of foreign policy which brought about the decline of the Republic, let alone its collapse. Friedensburg, (see note 7) in a recent essay, still considers the lack of achievement of Brüning's foreign policy an important reason for his fall. One could rather argue that it was the relative successes of Brüning's foreign policies which kept him in office so long—without denying, of course, that the granting of the Austro-German Customs Union would have made things easier for Brüning and his Cabinet in domestic affairs. (On Brüning's foreign policy see the excellent article by Wolfgang J. Helbich, "Between Stresemann and Hitler: The Foreign Policy of the Brüning Government," *World Politics,* XII/1 (October, 1959), 24-44. Cf. Oswald Hauser, "Der Plan einer Deutsch-Österreichischen Zollunion von 1931 und die Europäische Föderation," *Historische Zeitschrift,* 179 (1955), 45-92. Zimmermann's (see note 23) contention that a revision of the peace treaties would have saved the Republic has aroused much dissent among historians in Germany and abroad.

As to "Moscow" as a cause of Weimar's fall, who would doubt that a united working-class movement might have contributed substantially to the saving of the Republic? Nor is it necessary to labor the point that the fear of Communism, genuine or as a pretext, strengthened all the enemies of Weimar democracy. But the question must immediately be raised why the German Communist party could become so strong while e.g. in neighboring Austria the Communists never played a role during the same period. That proportional representation is not entirely satisfactory as a "whipping boy" for the fall of Weimar need not be elaborated. (Ferdinand A. Hermens, *Democracy or Anarchy?* Notre Dame, 1941.) It has recently been convincingly argued (Donald J. Ziegler, *Prelude to Democracy,* Lincoln, 1958, p. 63 ff.) that a single member district system of election would not have given the Social Democrats in 1919 a majority in the national assembly while, on the other hand, in 1932 the representation of the Nazis would have been even greater. Only in the 1930 election did proportional representation help the Nazis in a decisive way. In any case, the diseases of Weimar might have been alleviated but certainly could not have been healed by electoral devices. But proportional representation did indeed aggravate and accentuate the political divisions in Germany and the weaknesses of the German party system.

The political parties were considered by all too many Germans as the symbol of disunity and a main cause of the weakness of Weimar Democracy. The major parties expressed, as has been aptly remarked, "potential Germanies in *statu nascendi* imbued with philosophies which were not linked by any common ties." (Ebenstein, *op.cit.,* p. 214). They were too rigid both in ideology and organization, and with the exception of the Centre Party, they behaved too much like pressure groups. The pluralism of the German party and political system could have worked successfully only if all the parties had been held together by some common ideology. The inability to make democracy the common ideology and an integrating force constitutes Weimar's major weakness, which proved fatal when the crisis struck. Much has been made in recent literature of the fact that the parties of the Weimar coalition had lost their majority already in 1920, never to regain it. (Arnold Brecht, *Prelude to Silence,* New York, 1944, p. 129.) But why did the parties lose their majority so soon? Could the Weimar coalition not have regained it by bolder programs and more vigorous leadership? After all, in politics the sequence is not from majority to bold programs but from bold programs to majority.

[43] Stuttgart, 1955. See also the excellent work by Waldemar Besson, *Württemberg und die deutsche Staatskrise 1928-1933. Eine Studie zur Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (Stuttgart, 1959).

research has given us some keen analyses on various aspects of Weimar and a very detailed picture of its final phase. The work is also important because of its successful application of the methods of the social scientist and of the historian, combining in a happy way a typological and a narrative approach. Whether one can and should see in the Weimar Republic, especially in its last stage, a kind of model of power loss, power vacuum and power seizure, as Bracher does, must appear doubtful to the historian; but as a working hypothesis it has certainly proved very fruitful, even if it is not entirely satisfactory as a thesis. Bracher pleads against an interpretation of the dissolution of Weimar primarily as the result of the economic emergency, an interpretation used by liberal (Stolper) as well as socialist (Sternberg) economists and recently even by an apologist for Hugenberg.[44] But would the National Socialists have won so many mandates in 1930 without the economic depression? Would, in time of prosperity, the pressure of heavy industry against the parliamentary regime have been as great and as successful? One will, however, agree with Bracher's interpretation that Brüning's subordination, in the domestic arena, of all political considerations to his economic program was a misconception of the relationship between economics and politics.[45] Bracher also shows conclusively that there was no "third way between democracy and dictatorship and that the turning away from Weimar merely prepared the way for the totalitarian rule of the single party."[46]

If one accepts this interpretation, then few of the forces which contributed to the turning away from Weimar can be held blameless either for its downfall or for the totalitarian dictatorship which followed it. German historians have pointed out, however, that the beginning of the end started long before the economic situation became critical and that the increase in presidential power and in the political influence of the army *followed* the self-elimination of the Parliament with the fall of the Müller Cabinet in March of 1930. Therefore, by implication, neither the army leadership[47] nor Hindenburg[48] deserve the heavy criticism which has been heaped upon them.[49]

---

[44] Bracher, *op.cit.*, 345 and note 37. Fritz Sternberg, *Der Niedergang des deutschen Kapitalismus* (Berlin, 1932), p. 371 ff. Gustav Stolper, *German Economy, 1870-1940*, pp. 181 ff., 218 ff., 229 ff. Stolper, however, denies the merits of a purely economic interpretation of National Socialism (*op. cit.*, p. 230 f.). N. Borchmeyer *Hugenberg's Ringen in deutschen Schicksalsstunden* (Detmold, 1951), p. 8.

[45] Bracher, *ibid.*

[46] Bracher, *op.cit.*, p. 545.

[47] The picture of Schleicher has become somewhat clearer in recent years and less "all black," but no reinterpretation can be considered even relatively definitive. He is often compared with Seeckt in an unfavorable light and there can hardly be any doubt as to the greater depth of the former. However, one was as much a political general as the other. Somewhat pointedly one might say that Seeckt was more a foreign policy strategist, Schleicher more a domestic policy tactician. (See, however, Wilhelm Deist, "Schleicher und die deutsche Abrüstungspolitik," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, VII/2 (April 1959). Their immediate purposes were different, because the circumstances were different. With Seeckt the need was to be left alone in his work so as to build up a cadre army with a minimum of outside interference and domestic control. With Schleicher the problem was to find a mass basis for the time when the army was to be considerably enlarged, and also to break the isolation of the army and integrate it into the social and political body of Germany. This determined largely Schleicher's short-range political plans—as Craig (*op.cit.*, p. 453) rightly asserts, his long-range goals are hard to

Two important studies, by Werner Conze and by Helga Thimm,[50] have been devoted to the crisis of parliamentary government in 1930. They make amply clear that the refusal of the Social Democrats to agree to a compromise proposal about the increase of the social insurance contributions was only a surface phenomenon. Behind it stood the much larger question of the just distribution of the burdens of the economic crisis. This crisis also brought into sharpest focus the structural weaknesses of the Weimar system which, being a parliamentary *Parteienstaat* with several mass parties, had

---

fathom—and accounts for his various attempts to do everything possible to bring the mass movement of National Socialism into a closer relationship with the state, to tame it and make it politically responsible. In this attempt he failed as much as his former friend and recent enemy, Papen. See *Vierteljahrschefte für Zeitgeschichte,* VI/1, January 1958, "Zur Politik Schleicher's gegenüber der NSDAP 1932," a series of documents edited by Thilo Vogelsang, and the latter's comments, pp. 115-118. See also "Neue Dokumente zur Geschichte der Reichswehr," ed. by Th. Vogelsang, *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* II/4, (October 1954). Schleicher understood, as Papen did not, that Germany could not be run by a government which had as slender a basis as Papen's. Schleicher was certainly more than a mere intriguer, even if his role in German politics must be considered disastrous. His plans of political and economic reforms made sense. But he obviously vastly underestimated, in a naive, amateurish way, the difficulties of their execution.

[48] The judgment on Hindenburg concerning his responsibility for appointing Hitler chancellor differs widely in recent literature. On the one hand, he is excused because of his old age and his resulting inability to see through the situation in the critical last weeks prior to January 30. That is, at least by implication, the line taken by Bracher and also by and large by Eyck (*op.cit.,* vol. II, ch. 24). On the other hand, Schwarz (*op.cit.,* p. 193 f.) speaks of Hindenburg's stab-in-the-back. Friedensburg (*Der Monat,* 95, 61 f.) points out the many weak spots in Hindenburg's character, and comes to the conclusion that Hindenburg's responsibility for the success of the National Socialist revolution and, therefore, for the end of Weimar is by no means merely formal. Arnold Brecht, in a lengthy essay on Bracher's book, (*Zeitschrift für Politik,* neue Folge, II/4, December 1955, 291-308) points out that Hindenburg's guilt consisted in the fact that he listened behind the back of his legitimate advisor (Chancellor Schleicher) to the counsel of illegitimate advisors (Papen and Oskar von Hindenburg) and acted according to their wishes. Therefore he cannot escape responsibility for appointing Hitler chancellor. What is sometimes forgotten in the discussion of Hindenburg's responsibility is the fact that Hindenburg was elected twice to the presidency by the German people. In 1925 his election would most probably have been prevented if the Bavarian People's Party had not voted for the Protestant Prussian rather than for the Catholic Candidate of the Centre, Marx. This too is often conveniently forgotten—merely the special candidacy of the Communists, which indeed clinched Marx's defeat, is always stressed. Whether a candidacy of Hugo Eckener in 1932 would have had a chance against Hitler, as Brecht seems to believe and Bracher to doubt, is hard to say. In any case, Bracher's bitter words about the Hindenburg myth and the political immaturity of the German people (*op.cit.,* p. 480) are an important reminder of the fact that the issue cannot be settled in terms of Hindenburg's personal guilt alone. Where he stood politically had never been a secret. Incidentally, he wanted as early as December 1927 the development of German politics in the direction of an energetic Cabinet of non-party-bound civil servants. (See Bracher, p. 304, note 45.)

[49] The argument, though coming from the opposite direction, would not be too dissimilar to Rosenberg's contention that the Republic actually ended in 1930.

[50] Werner Conze, "Die Krise des Parteienstaates in Deutschland 1929/30," in *Historische Zeitschrift,* 178 (1954), 47 ff. Helga Timm, *Die Deutsche Sozialpolitik und der Bruch der Grossen Koalition im März 1930* (Düsseldorf, 1953). See also the conclusion of Erdmann, *Die Zeit der Weltkriege,* p. 163. The parliamentary system of the Weimar Republic was not overthrown from without. It perished from within when the "Flügelparteien der Grossen Koalition nicht mehr die Kraft und den Willen aufbrachten, über den widerstreitenden Interessen der hinter ihnen stehenden Gruppen eine zum Kompromiss fähige undoktrinäre Staatsgesinnung zur Geltung zu bringen."

never been able to integrate its own bureaucratic and military basis. There is now ample evidence that long before the actual fall of the Müller Cabinet, the army, the Junkers, the forces of heavy industry and the President and his entourage were getting more and more restless and wanted to move away from parliamentary democracy.[51]

The categorical imperative of the Weimar Republic, as Ernst Troeltsch[52] had seen very early, was the necessity of compromise between potentially and sometimes actually antagonistic groups. In the history of the Republic the Social Democrats,[53] whatever else one might want to say against them, had understood the necessity of such compromise much better and sacrificed much more than the German Peoples' Party and the German National Peoples' Party. Stresemann, and Westarp at times too, understood this necessity and acted accordingly, while Hugenberg[54] did not, though the experience at the Harzburg Front meeting was a clear enough warning of who would profit from the Fall of Weimar. The fault lay not with conservatism as such but with its *authoritarian* character, deeply rooted in past German, especially Prussian history, and its politics of narrow class interest. In order to avoid making the necessary sacrifices themselves, the conservatives tried to solve Germany's economic and political problems without parliamentary compromises and by bureaucratic methods. This became essentially even Brüning's[55] policy, and it could not succeed. His fall was only the logical outcome of the faulty construction of his system. Those who had "hired" him would bring about his dismissal before he succeeded because his very success would mean a return to parliamentary government.[56]

---

[51] See the rich material (text and notes) in Bracher, *op. cit.*, pp. 287-309.

[52] Ernst Troeltsch, *Spektatorbriefe* (Tübingen, 1924). Cf. Eric C. Kollman, "Eine Diagnose der Weimarer Republik," in *Historische Zeitschrift,* 182/2 (October 1956), 291-319.

[53] One may want to take exception to the conclusion which John L. Snell seems to draw from his comparison between German Marxism (and especially the vocabulary of Rosa Luxemburg) and National Socialism. He obviously infers that the Marxist ideology and phraseology conditioned the German people in a significant degree for the later acceptance of National Socialism. (J. L. Snell, ed., *The Nazi Revolution,* Boston, 1959, pp. xiii.) But the nonrevolutionary, conciliatory character of the Social Democrats was much too obvious to the German masses during the Weimar period to be able to condition them for the militancy of National Socialism, except to make them turn *away* from the Social Democrats because of their lack of leadership, imagination and forcefulness.

[54] The alliance between the German National Peoples Party and the National Socialists in the initiative and referendum against the Young Plan has rightly been considered the actual start of Hitler's seizure of power. (Erdmann, *Die Zeit der Weltkriege,* p. 160 and H. Ullmann, *op.cit.,* p. 275.)

[55] See the excellent discussion in Bracher (*op.cit.,* p. 342) on the main characteristics of the bureaucratic state and its difference from a totalitarian dictatorship. Brüning may have preferred a parliamenary solution. But his tactics, and already his strategy in dissolving the Reichstag in July of 1930, made such a solution less and less likely.

[56] On Brüning's character and his dismissal see also the forthcoming essay by Theodor Eschenburg, "Die Bedeutung persönlicher Entscheidungen für die Krise der Weimarer Republik," given as a lecture on November 25, 1959, at the International Congress of Contemporary History in Munich. In this lecture Brüning, "that noble man," is characterized as a great *Massnahmenstrategie,* an unpolitical *Politiker,* a political strategist without tactical abilities—in contradistinction to Schleicher, who was a shrewd, imaginative tactician without strategic gifts. Hindenburg was not strong enough, especially intellectually, to have political concepts, except in specific areas, but not weak enough to be simply led by Brüning.

One important reason, then, for the dissolution of the Weimar Republic was the inability of the conservative forces to function properly. They were either authoritarian, not understanding that "an industrial society that has passed through a democratic phase cannot exclude the masses from consideration,"[57] or they were revolutionary, thus undermining not merely the liberal-democratic ideology and loyalty to the Weimar state but also, even if sometimes unwittingly, making national socialism respectable and paving the way for its victory. The fine study on the *New Conservatism* by Klemens von Klemperer,[58] and the recent essay on the *Tatkreis* by Kurt Sontheimer[59] make this amply clear.

Recent literature on Weimar has also revived the older controversy concerning the reaction of the Social Democratic party to the illegal ouster of the Prussian government on July 20, 1932, and later to Schleicher's attempt to get the support of the Free Trade Unions for his government.[60] The Social Democrats have been severely criticized for not trying forceful resistance to the Papen coup on the one hand, and for being so unyielding to Schleicher's approach on the other. This criticism of either making too many compromises or too few, of being too conciliatory or not conciliatory enough, is symptomatic of the dilemma the party had found itself in ever since the beginning of this century.[61] Its leaders could never make up their mind during the Weimar period whether to be capitalism's doctor or its heir,[62] whether to pursue a policy of vigorous opposition or of bold constructive leadership in the government. By its lack of theoretical flexibility, by continuing to pay strong lip-service to orthodox Marxism, the party failed to attract large support from the white collar workers and to broaden its base while, on the other hand, by its timidity and its many compromises it could not prevent the growth of a strong Communist party on its left. The lack of leadership, initiative and vision on the part of the Socialist leaders in the crucial first months and years of the Republic also demonstrates how well Bismarck had done his work in weakening the responsibility of the political parties.

The dilemma of the German Social Democratic party is symbolic of its fateful position between East and West—getting the worst of both worlds. Under the Empire, a *Rechtsstaat,* the party had been free enough, at least after 1890, to develop without real oppression, even if with much hindrance, chicanery and discrimination, so that it could become strong, a large bureaucratic mass organization and an important pressure group, very much influenced by its trade union wing, but officially keeping strictly to Marxist orthodoxy. Because the German working class was not really oppresed under the Empire, it would not develop a hard core of revolutionary leaders, inflexible in their aims but completely opportunistic in their tactics, as was the case in the Russia of the Tsars. So neither the way to democratic socialism in the style of the British Labor Party nor the way to Bolshevism seemed open in Germany after 1918—only the alternative of either democracy without socialism or socialism without democracy.[63]

---

[57] Franz Neumann, *Behemoth* (New York, 1942), p. 34.

[58] Klemens von Klemperer, *The New Conservatism* (Princeton, 1957).

[59] *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* VII/3 (July 1959).

[60] See Bracher, *op.cit.,* p. 591 ff., especially p. 599. Arnold Brecht, in *Zeitschrift für Politik,* neue Folge, II/4 (December 1955) and Bracher's reply in the same magazine, III (1956). Cf. Erich Matthias, "Der Untergang der alten Sozialdemokratie," in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* IV/3 (July 1956).

[61] Most impressive is a letter by Viktor Adler to August Bebel (reprinted in *Neue Politische Literatur,* III/5, May 1958, 351) in 1903, in which Adler noticed the dangerous political paralysis of German Social Democracy and hoped that Bebel at the forthcoming party congress at Dresden would not merely forcefully repudiate the revisionists but come forward with positive words and actions. But Dresden did not bring a victory for a new activist radical policy, merely a new triumph for the old pseudo-radical tactics.

[62] From a famous passage of an address by Fritz Tarnow at the Social Democratic Party congress in Leipzig, 1931. Quoted in Adolf Sturmthal, *The Tragedy of European Labor, 1918-1939* (New York, 1943), p. 83.

If one wants to evaluate the dilemma of both German Social Democracy and of German conservatism in the Weimar Republic one must agree with the judgment of Eschenburg: "That Ebert and the German Social Democratic Party did not succumb in 1918 to the temptation of Bolshevism, but prevented its penetration into Germany by sacrificing their own party doctrines, remains their historic merit. That the Conservatives (*die Gegenrevolution*) did not recognize the dangers of national socialism . . . but let themselves be seduced by it first only to be destroyed by it in the end, remains their historic guilt."[64]

Two thoughts in conclusion. First, it is doubtful whether the Weimar period of German history can be understood altogether in terms of political power, power loss, power vacuum, power seizure—with all respect for Bracher's admirable work. It is rather, or turned out to be, an experiment not so much with democracy as with liberty, i.e. with a society without authority. This might work for a while in the valley between the aftermath of the World War and the Great Depression, when seeming prosperity and the "Spirit of Locarno" gave people a feeling of normalcy and a certain illusion of security. The absence of absolutes was very fruitful in the intellectual realm; it also offered many chances to enjoy the relativity of values, the possibility of experimentation, the pleasure of irresponsibility without the fear of sanctions. *Placet experiri,* how symbolic for the whole period is Thomas Mann's *Magic Mountain!* But all through those years we see also the hunger for absolutes, the desire of the best, especially in the young generation, to find something to which one could dedicate one's life.[65] When the depression struck, the increased insecurity, the irrational character of economic forces, all made as much for a desperate longing to find a new authority as to "escape from freedom." That German society with its tradition could then not live by liberal-democratic values, which were even threatened in the much older and more stable societies of the West, is not surprising; nor that it was not attracted by Papen's so-called "New State" and his Cabinet of Barons which, after 1848, even a Frederick William IV might have hesitated to appoint. The real riddle for the historian lies in the fact that Germany could not produce a better leader in that crisis than a Hitler.

---

[63] Ossip K. Flechtheim, *Die Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands in der Weimarer Republik* (Offenbach, 1948), especially pp. 196-203 for the issue discussed in this paper. Cf. Ruth Fisher, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948).

[64] Theodor Eschenburg, "Kurze Geschichte der Weimarer Republik," in *Deutsche Rundschau,* 80; I (1954), 225.

[65] See M. Buber-Neumann, *Von Potsdam nach Moskau. Stationen eines Irrweges* (Stuttgart, 1957), for a significant illustration.

[66] Cf. Eric C. Kollman, "The Historical Significance of the Weimar Republic," *University of Toronto Quarterly,* XVI/3 (April 1947), 228.

Until the advent of the German Federal Republic it always seemed to many historians that the Weimar Republic had come too late—like so much else in German history if one takes the West as a yardstick; that the nineteenth-century forms of liberal democracy were somewhat outworn and did not fit the needs and necessities of an industrial mass society in a country which had only a weak democratic tradition.[66] Perhaps, in the light of new historical perspectives, the question should be raised whether the Weimar Republic did not come too early—a creation which could grow only in an age of genuine restoration rather than of revolution, where compromise is the order of the day and not the battle cry of the "we or they," where people are more interested in civic virtues and civil pleasures than in martial virtues and in the glorification of violence, where they strive more for individual betterment than for dedication to great causes, where they see in the state an instrument of welfare rather than of power. As so often in the past, only after a second round are the decisions of history accepted. But what a price had to be paid by the German people and by the rest of the world before that lesson was learned!

It would be tempting to speculate what kind of reinterpretation of the reinterpretations of the Weimar Period might be called for if and when Germany should be reunited, and what a combination of the present German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic would be like. But it is probably safer and saner to heed Burckhardt's advice: "We must always be on guard against taking our historical perspectives for the decrees of history."

CORNELL COLLEGE

A HEAVY POPULATION LOSS IN LITHUANIA

by Albert N. Tarulis

DATA on the Soviet population census of January 15, 1959, disclosed, among other things, a frightening decline in the Lithuanian population over the last two decades. For, as announced by the Central Statistical Administration of the U.S.S.R., 2,880,000 persons lived in independent Lithuania in 1939, but only 2,711,000 in Soviet Lithuania in 1959 (each time at the beginning of the year).[1] This shows a net loss of 169,000 persons. In fact, the Soviets made a clumsy attempt to reduce the net loss by excluding from 1939 data the whole Klaipeda district in the west and a large number of settlements in the east, but including their inhabitants in the 1959 data. The difference for 1939 was at least 154,000 since that many persons lived in the Klaipeda district alone.[2] Consequently, the correct figure for 1939 should read at least 3,034,000, and the net loss — 323,000.

The hypothetical loss is much larger, however, for the reason that the 1939 population of 3,034,000 was expected to grow at the same average rate of 1 per cent per year, which was customary for prewar Lithuania,[3] and to attain the figure of 3,700,000 by 1959. The loss of nearly one million, or a third of a nation, is indeed frightening. And it cannot be exclusively attributed to the ravages which Lithuania sustained in World War II. The Soviet Union, too, went through war devastations, but its population grew 9.5 per cent larger between 1939 and 1959, wartime territorial annexations taken into consideration. Evidently, the Lithuanian nation must have suffered debacles more serious than war. Let us examine step-by-step what really happened.

Lithuania fell victim to Soviet aggression in mid-1940. Her territory was overrun by overwhelming military and police forces, her political institutions were dissolved, and she was forced to beg for admission into the Soviet Union as one of the new Soviet Republics.[4] Her population at the time of the Soviet invasion, excluding the Klaipeda district (which was taken by Germany in the spring of 1939) and including a normal natural increase for one-and-a-half years, numbered about 2,921,000. The first wave of Soviet occupation that submerged the country for exactly a year caused several plus and minus shifts in the country's population. After Lithuania became a member of the Soviet Union, the neighboring White Russian Republic transferred the predominantly Lithuanian-inhabited Švencionys and

---

[1] *Izvestiia,* May 10, 1959, and February 4, 1960 (all figures are rounded out). The earlier figure was 2,713,000, but it underwent a slight reduction in the process of correction. The correct figure for 1939 should read 2,879,000 (*Bulletin de Statistique de l Lithuanie,* 1939, No. 10, p. 1).

[2] *Bulletin de Statistique de la Lithuanie,* 1939, No. 2, p. 87, Table II.

[3] *Ibid.,* Table I, shows fluctuations between 0.91 and 1.08 per cent per year in 1936-1938.

[4] Cf. Albert N. Tarulis, *Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic States 1918-1940* (Notre Dame, 1959), p. 182 ff.

Druskininkai districts with 83,000 inhabitants.[5] Furthermore, some 21,000 persons took advantage of the Soviet-German repatriation agreement of January 10, 1941, and moved to Lithuania from the Klaipeda and Suvalkai districts, which Germany annexed in 1939.[6]

As a result of these additions, Lithuania would have become more populous by 104,000 had it not been for escapees and expatriates. The number of escapees, before Soviet police assumed tight control of the Lithuanian-German frontier, has been placed at about 2,000. These were followed by 50,000 expatriates to Germany, by virtue of the same agreement of January 10, 1941.[7] Thus, the net addition to the population amounted to only 52,000 persons. The natural increase of 30,000 would have raised the aggregate figure to 3,003,000 by the end of the first wave of Soviet occupation in mid-1941, resulting in a net increase of 82,000.

The use of a conditional clause is prompted by the fact that the hypothetical increase was largely nullified by Soviet depopulation measures, such as deportations and mass executions. A large-scale deportation measure was carried out in the night of June 13/14, 1941 (shortly before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war on June 22). Captured documents prove that at least 20,000 men, women, and children were seized, loaded in cattle cars, and shipped, under most inhuman conditions, to Western Siberia: the Omsk-Semipalatinsk-Barnaul-Novosibirsk area; Russia's North; the White Sea, Kotlas, and Perm' areas; and the Donbas coal mines in the Ukraine.[8] Deportation reports and routing lists did not cover Vilnius and other places in Eastern Lithuania, where large deportations also were staged. The Lithuanian Red Cross subsequently, after the Soviet flight, drew up complete lists of deportees with as many as 35,000 names.[9] Other estimates raise the figure to 49,000 or even 66,000.[10]

Additional losses were caused by torturing and executing thousands of prison and concentration camp inmates. The whole fury of terror struck toward the end of the Soviet occupation. These facts were ascertained: only 300 prisoners out of 12,000 in Vilnius and Kaunas survived the final week; about 2,000 prisoners were machine-gunned along their evacuation route in White Russia (Cherven'); all 5,000 inmates of Pravieniškiai concentration camp were shot (so were even dogs); mass graves or tortured bodies were found at a number of places throughout Lithuania. About 10,000 young men and women perished upon their spontaneous uprising against the Soviet oppressors in the first week of the German-Soviet war.[11]

---

[5] *Lithuanian Bulletin* (New York, 1950), No. 1-6, p. 2. Incidentally, the Lithuanians held a perfectly clear title to a much larger piece of territory by virtue of the Russo-Lithuanian Peace Treaty of July 12, 1920. The Soviet Government in 1939 chose, however, to forget its obligations.

[6] Eugene M. Kulischer, *The Displacement of Population in Europe* (Montreal, 1943), p. 13.

[7] *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 62. Among the expatriates, only 35,000 were of German descent. The others used all possible excuses to get on the list and move out of the reach of Soviet occupation powers. A slightly higher figure—52,600—is quoted by "official Lithuanian sources" (*ibid.*, p. 13, no. 2).

[8] *Lithuanian Bulletin*, 1947, No. 7-8, pp. 24-31, including photostats.

[9] Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, *Memorandum to the United Nations on Genocide* (n.p., n.d.), p. 25.

[10] K. Pelekis, *Genocide—Lithuania's Threefold Tragedy* (n.p., 1949), p. 234; Eugene M. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move* (New York, 1948), p. 264 (map). Kulischer's estimate, however, includes both deportees and evacuees.

Thus, a single year of Soviet occupation cost the Lithuanian people about 60,000 victims. The reliability of these estimates seems quite high. After the Soviet police fled in a hurry, leaving behind even their files, an opportunity was on hand to assemble documents, send out questionnaires, get witness depositions, etc. Photostats of captured documents, with authentic signatures, seals, and ink blots, were subsequently published in the American press.[12] In substantiating one of its memorandums to the United Nations, the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation was so sure of its cause that it offered to submit proofs of Soviet genocide committed in Lithuania in 1940-1941 "at any time."[13] All guesses about the number of escapees and evacuees to the Soviet Union—mostly Administration and Party officials and Jews—are unreliable and confusing. However, they will be considered later.[14]

After Soviet troops and police fled, the Germans came in and stayed until the second half of 1944. During the German occupation, the Lithuanian population also experienced plus and minus shifts. On the plus side, Lithuania—which was renamed *Generalbezirk Litauen* in the framework of *Reichskommissariat Ostland*—received the predominantly Lithuanian-inhabited Ašmena and Svyriai districts in the east, with 173,000 inhabitants.[15] This raised the population for the country as a whole to 3,116,000. On the minus side, the first measure the German occupation authorities took was to eliminate the country's entire Jewish population from an active role in Lithuanian demographic statistics. The Jews were herded into ghettoes, where they died rapidly of starvation or were otherwise exterminated. The Jews did not even appear in the *Ostland* census taken on May 27, 1942. It is believed that only a small fraction of the Jews the Germans found in Lithuania survived the ordeal—often by hiding with Catholic families, at great danger to the latter.[16] The total loss can be ascertained fairly easily and reliably.

---

[11] *Memorandum,* p. 25 f.; Col. J. Petrutis, *Lithuania Under the Sickle and Hammer,* (Cleveland, n.d.), *passim;* Pelekis, *op. cit.,* p. 234. A large number of anti-Soviet guerrillas are believed to have died after 1945; however, not even rough estimates can be made due to the extreme secrecy surrounding their actions and Soviet countermeasures.

[12] *Lithuanian Bulletin,* 1947, No. 7-8, pp. 24-31.

[13] *Memorandum,* p. 25.

[14] Kulischer, *The Displacement,* p. 63, says that 10,000 Jews were evacuated to the Soviet Union. Yet the Jewish *Black Book: The Nazi Crime Against the Jewish People* (New York, 1946), p. 234, asserts that 8,000 to 9,000 Jews escaped from Kaunas alone. An even greater exodus could have taken place from Vilnius and other places which German troops did not reach as quickly as Kaunas.

[15] *Statistische Berichte für das Ostland,* 1942, No. 7-8, p. 283.

[16] *The Black Book,* pp. 324-328. An eloquent German police report was accepted in evidence by the Nuremberg Military Tribunal. Introduced by the Soviet prosecution, the report said that the *Einsatzgruppe A* between October 10, 1941, and January 31, 1942, had massacred over 136,000 Lithuanian Jews (*The Trial of German Major War Criminals: Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal Sitting at Nuremberg, Germany.* Part 7, p. 333 f.).

The number of Jews in Lithuania before the German occupation was about 225,000. It consisted of some 155,000 Jews who had been living in Lithuania throughout her independence period[17] and nearly 70,000 "newcomers" who were transferred to Lithuania by the Soviet-Lithuanian treaty of October 10, 1939, providing for the return to Lithuania of Vilnius and the adjacent territory.[18] An undetermined number of Polish Jews escaped to Lithuania after the outbreak of the German-Polish war in the fall of 1939. These Jews, however, were only transients. Most of them had gone to other countries before the Germans arrived in Lithuania in mid-1941. The eventual small remainder is disregarded here. Some Lithuanian Jews escaped to the Soviet Union along with the retreating troops and thus avoided a sure death at German hands. How many did so is irrelevant. The fact is that the Germans at the very outset placed all Jews they found in a position that—from a statistical viewpoint—made no difference whether they were in the country or not. Demographically, they ceased to exist. It is logical, therefore, to take under further consideration only the non-Jewish Lithuanian population: 3,116,000 – 225,000 = 2,891,000.

Only these people played an active demographic role during the entire German occupation. German statistics for the *Generalbezirk Litauen* show this picture of demographic changes in 1941-1944:[19]

Year	Born	Died	Increase
1941 VII-XII	17,923	9,235	8,688
1942	69,699	33,353	36,346
1943	66,139	34,419	31,720
1944 I-VII est.	39,200	19,600	19,600

The rate of excess births over deaths is extremely high: 1.3 per cent in 1942, which is one-third higher than in normal prewar years; the picture was almost the same in 1943. One is tempted to disbelieve such a high natural increase rate in wartime, yet it would be unreasonable to imply the German statisticians had deliberately falsified data to show how everything went well in Ostland, for they recorded, for example, a drop in population in Estonia.[20] Hence, the Lithuanian population which was present at the beginning of the German occupation, minus the Jews, should have grown by the second half of 1944 about 96,000. It did not.

As the Lithuanians showed no enthusiasm for collaboration with the Germans, repressive measures were taken, and terror began. Prisons and concentration camps filled. Reprisals were imposed, sometimes resulting in the extermination of entire villages (for example, Pirčiupis). Hostages were executed on the principle of "an eye for an eye." Young men were pressed into auxiliary military services, where quite a few of them died or were taken prisoners of the Soviets. Losses through the application of all these measures were relatively low, however. The Lithuanian Association of Anti-Nazi Resistants and Former Political Prisoners estimated that "only" 14,000 Lithuanians of non-Jewish origin died in prisons and concentration camps.[21] Possibly another 2,000-3,000 found death as a result of other terroristic measures, so that the figure of 16,000 - 17,000 may quite well cover Lithuanian victims of the German occupation (not counting the Jews). These victims reduced the natural population increase during the three years of German occupation to 80,000.

---

[17] The Lithuanian population census of 1923 listed 157,000 Jews. However, this number remained stagnant or even grew smaller by 1939 because of a relatively low birth rate among the Jews and their emigration to the United States, Palestine, the South African Union, and elsewhere (*Annuaire Statistique de la Lithuanie,* various years). A Jewish study of the same problem placed the number of Jews in "pre-Hitler" Lithuania at 155,000 (*The Black Book,* p. 251).

[18] *Bulletin de Statistique de la Lithuanie,* 1939, No. 10, p. 3.

[19] *Statistische Berichte für das Ostland,* 1942, No. 9-10, p. 371; 1944, No. 1-2, p. 120 f.

[20] *Ibid.,* 1942, No. 9-10, p. 292.

A further decrease in non-Jewish population resulted from deportations to Germany for work ("slave labor") and voluntary exile in fear of the returning Soviet troops and police. A Soviet estimate placed the number of "slave laborers" taken to Germany from Lithuania at 36,000.[22] The Nuremberg Military Tribunal accepted in evidence an American estimate that 130,000 "Balts" were put to work for the war effort in Germany.[23] Since the population of Lithuania nearly equalled the combined population of Latvia and Estonia, her share of "slave laborers," according to the American estimate, would have been in the neighborhood of 60,000. While both estimates are exaggerated, the American estimate is out of proportion. For the total number of Displaced Persons (DP's) in UNRRA's care at the peak of registration (179,000)[24] was only a quarter larger than the purported number of Baltic "slave laborers," all of whom ultimately registered at its field offices.

Of course, the question may be raised whether all "slave laborers" became DP's. The answer is in the affirmative with only minor exceptions. By failing to register with UNRRA, "slave laborers" would have gained nothing but lost indisputable advantages. Nor was it possible they could have been repatriated without going through UNRRA repatriation machinery. There were no returnees among the Lithuanians. A report prepared by UNRRA's Director General for the period up to March 31, 1946, shows that nearly six million DP's were repatriated by that time; the number of Lithuanians among them—0.[25] UNRRA ultimately had to admit "there was little chance that the Jews, the *Balts,* and the Polish Ukrainians would return," despite its policy "to make every effort to facilitate repatriation."[26]

An insignificant number of Lithuanians also succeeded in escaping to Sweden and other countries,[27] and were not covered by UNRRA. Conversely, some of those who had expatriated to Germany in 1941 and were ineligible for UNRRA's care managed to circumvent eligibility rules and get on relief rolls. One can safely assume these two groups compensated each other. These considerations lead one to the conclusion that the combined number of refugees and "slave laborers" from Lithuania was identical with, or close to, the official number of Lithuanian DP's in UNRRA's care, i.e., 56,000.[28] Hence, the number of people (without the Jews) the Soviets found in Lithuania upon their return in the second half of 1944 was: 2,981,000 + 80,000 − 56,000 = 2,915,000.

---

[21] *Lithuanian Bulletin,* 1950, No. 1-6, p. 2.

[22] *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia,* 2nd ed., XXV, 260.

[23] *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, 1946), V, 257-258.

[24] George Woodbridge, *UNRRA: United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration,* 3 vols. (New York, 1950), III, 423.

[25] *Lithuanian Bulletin,* 1947, No. 1-2, p. 1.

[26] Woodbridge, *op.cit.,* II, 514; III, 400 (author's italics).

[27] Kulischer, *Europe on the Move,* p. 269, estimates that 30,000 Balts had escaped to Sweden before the return of Soviet troops in 1944. However, with no ports of their own (Germany took the only port of Klaipeda in 1939) and only a narrow coastal stretch, the

The return of a Soviet administration in the second half of 1944 caused the addition to Lithuania of the Klaipeda district, with a population of about 40,000,[29] compared to 154,000 before the war. The Jews either returned home from the Soviet Union or, those who survived the German occupation, acquired their human rights. Assuming that only the small number of 25,000 Jews the 1959 census found in Lithuania were newcomers, not having lived there prior to World War II, their number in 1944 was perhaps 22,000 (which discloses the extent of the calamity that befell the Jews under the German occupation). On the minus side, the White Russian Republic promptly detached from Lithuania the Ašmena and Svyriai districts which the Germans had attached to her. This represented a loss of 176,000 persons, including the natural increase since 1941. As a result, the Lithuanian population at the beginning of the second phase of Soviet occupation numbered: 2,915,000 + 40,000 + 22,000 − 176,000 = 2,801,000.

The year 1945 initiated a substantial Lithuanian expatriation to Poland. Triggered by the Soviet-Polish treaties of September 22, 1944, and July 6, 1945, expatriation brought about the loss of 177,000 persons within less than two years.[30] After the expatriation, the Lithuanian population dropped to 2,643,000. The two years' natural increase raised the number again to 2,690,000 by the end of 1946.

At this point, Soviet rulers of Lithuania took some sort of count of the country's population. This was necessary for subdividing the republic into 179 electoral districts with 15,000 inhabitants each, as provided for by the decree of November 27, 1946. If the count was well executed, the population at that time numbered 2,685,000, which figure is almost identical with one arrived at hypothetically. However, the Soviet count included all residents of the country at that time—armed forces, police, government officials, etc.—regardless of their nationality. It will be shown later that the group of non-Lithuanians was substantial in 1959; it also must have been substantial in 1946.

Lithuanians could make but little use of this escape route. The proof thereof may also be seen in a small Lithuanian colony in Sweden.

[28] Woodbridge, *op.cit.*, III, 423.

[29] *Lithuanian Bulletin*, 1950, No. 1-6, p. 3. Kulischer, *Europe on the Move*, p. 270, stated that part of the Lithuanians who were abducted by the Germans or were fleeing voluntarily became stranded in East Prussia and Poland. Many of them could have come from the Klaipeda district, where they eventually returned.

[30] Glówny Urząd Statystyczhy, *Rocznik Statystyczny 1947*, p. 29.

With no further territorial changes, the hypothetical population of 2,690,000 by the end of 1946 continued to grow. As for the rate of growth, the Statistical Administration of Lithuania claimed it was running surprisingly high:[31]

1950	1.16 %
1951	1.11 %
1952	1.10 %
1953	0.97 %
1954	1.09 %
1955	1.18 %
1956	1.11 %

Assuming that the average rate of 1.1% growth per year continued after 1956, the Lithuanian population by the beginning of 1959 should have grown to 3,070,000. It has not, since the January 15, 1959, census found only 2,711,000 inhabitants. This was some 360,000 persons fewer than there should have been, taking into account all traceable population losses and natural increases during the period under discussion. The figure of 360,000 does not represent, however, the aggregate losses the autochthonous population of Lithuania sustained under Soviet occupation. The truth is that a large group of newcomers to the country—who may be termed Soviet colonists—were included in the total of 2,711,000 persons. A look at the number of Russians, Poles, Ukrainians, and "others" in Lithuania in 1959 confirms the assertion.

The 1959 census enumerated 231,000 Russians in Lithuania. This was substantially more than the 50,000 Russians enumerated in 1923, and 85,000 in 1942.[32] Due to natural increase, the Russian minority in the country could have grown to about 100,000 by 1959, but by no means to 231,000. The excess of 130,000 Russians could be nothing else but Russian colonists. The presence of 230,000 Poles is more puzzling. The German census of 1942 enumerated in Lithuania 337,000 Poles. However, large numbers of Poles were taken to Germany as slave laborers in 1942-1944, while 177,000 Poles were repatriated to Poland in 1946-1947. Consequently, not more than 175,000 Poles could have been in Lithuania in 1959, with due consideration given to natural increase and assuming that only a handful of Polish "slave laborers" returned from Germany. Suspicion has been voiced that the 55,000 "excess Poles" actually were Russians, who deliberately altered their nationality while completing the census questionnaire. The suspicion is based on the fact that an authoritative Soviet source placed the number of Russians in Lithuania in 1954 at about 300,000.[33] Although no information is available on any large-scale exodus of Russians between 1954 and 1959, the census showed a reduction of about 69,000 persons. As the "missing" Russians and "excess Poles" practically balance each other, suspicion acquires a great degree of credibility. The 1959 census also listed 18,000 Ukrainians in Lithuania. Neither the 1923 nor 1942 census found enough Ukrainians to list them as a separate national entity; hence they likewise must be added to the group of Soviet colonists. Finally, the census group of "others," 26,000 strong, includes at least 6,000 - 7,000 colonists (the 1942 census listed only 18,000 "others" plus fewer than 4,000 Germans, all of the latter presumably escaping to the West in 1944).

---

[31] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR: Statisticheskii sbornik* (Vilnius, 1957), p. 7.

[32] The respective figures have been taken from German census data. Cf. Also Kazys Pakštas, "Changing Population in Lithuania," *Lituanus*, No. 1 (10), p. 17.

[33] *Draugas*, August 24, 1960, quoting G. N. Cherdantsev et al., eds., *Ekonomicheskaia geografiia* (Moscow, 1954), p. 143. It is unlikely that the editors could have published their estimate without giving it a second thought—the book was approved by the Soviet Ministry of Higher Education as a text for teacher colleges.

A simple summation of these figures adds up to 210,000 Soviet colonists in the over-all population of 2,711,000. They must be substracted to arrive at a figure representing the country's autochthonous population at the beginning of 1959, namely: 2,711,000 – 210,000 = *ca* 2, 500,000. Conversely, colonists must be added to the statistical losses of 360,000 as calculated in the foregoing: 360,000 + 210,000 = 570,000. The addition of 60,000 victims of the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941 yields a composite figure of 630,000 persons killed or deported under Soviet rule in Lithuania in 1940-1941 and 1944-1958 and failing to produce their share of natural increase.

These are direct losses, for which Moscow bears the full responsibility. Indirect losses, incurred through "voluntary" expatriation and/or exile, are also frighteningly high: 283,000 according to the available data, much higher according to other estimates. Although Soviet authorities bear no direct responsibility for the loss of people who left their homeland voluntarily, one wonders, however, whether these people would not have remained at home had it not been for the lesson of Soviet invasion in 1941 and the threat of reinvasion in 1944. So that, in the final analysis, the two Soviet occupations have caused the Lithuanian nation direct and indirect losses of over 900,000 persons. The accuracy of these calculations can be easily checked, using the following method (in round figures):

Losses under Soviet occupation 1940-1941	60,000
Losses under German occupation	250,000
Losses under Soviet occupation 1944-1958	570,000
Expatriates and escapees	280,000
Combined losses	1,160,000
Autochthonous population found in 1959	2,500,000
Autochthonous population + combined losses	3,660,000

The resultant figure is almost identical with the hypothetical Lithuanian population for 1959 under normal conditions (no ocupations, no war), as projected at the beginning of this study. These are plain figures and cold facts. The extent of the losses is not subject to doubt. Some of the losses are accounted for: 280,000 expatriates, 200,000 Jews, 20,000 prison and concentration camp victims; the total–500,000. The question remains, however, where are the other 660,000 persons? A hint as to what might have happened to the missing two-thirds of a million was given in 1941, when lists of 35,000 deportees to the Soviet Union were drawn up. There is ample evidence that deportations resumed as soon as the Soviet police returned to Lithuania in 1944, and continued in many waves for about a decade.

Soviet authorities made an indirect admission of the presence of Lithuanian deportees in the Soviet Union upon listing 175,000 Lithuanians living in other union republics. Of these, 32,000 were listed as living in Latvia. For unexplained reasons, the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR chose not to disclose the whereabouts of a further 143,000 Lithuanians. No Lithuanians at all were listed in the neighboring White Russian Republic, where the Germans in 1941, however, found a sizable Lithuanian group and, as a consequence, attached their inhabited districts to *Generalbezirk Litauen.* The unidentified group of 143,000 Lithuanians was not a negligible statistical unit, even if it was scattered among several republics. After all, as small a group as 5,000 Jews in Estonia was shown; so were national groups as small as 4,000 in other republics. It may be assumed that the underlying policy was not to disclose that large groups of Lithuanians were living in Kazakhstan and other places—thousands of miles away from Lithuania, where the first loads of deportees, as attested to by shipping orders, had been dispatched in 1941.[34]

While the fact and extent of 1941 deportations cause no doubt, the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation in the late forties and early fifties addressed to the United Nations repeated complaints about the continuance of deportations and executions also in later years. The complaints gave details on these mass deportations: three in 1945; one in 1946; five in 1947; one in 1948; and two in 1949.[35] A complaint of November 15, 1950 claimed that "the number of victims of Communist atrocities in occupied Lithuania already has reached a half million, this number comprising the arrested, the massacred, and the deported."[36] These and other similar complaints and petitions caused the United Nations to create an *Ad Hoc Committee on Forced Labor.* After examining voluminous evidence, the Committee concluded that "the system of forced or compulsory labor constitutes an important element in the economy of the country." However, the Committee could not arrive at a definite conclusion as to the number of forced laborers, or the number and location of forced labor camps.[37]

It has been reported that large-scale deportations subsided after Stalin's death in 1953. However, a more subtle form of depopulation is very much in use at the present time. This is the so-called "voluntary" enlistment for work or permanent settlement in Kazakhstan and other places, where development projects are ambitious while working and living conditions are poor.[38] With the whole propaganda machinery thrown behind such undertakings, the notion of "volunteering" becomes problematic. So does the return of the "volunteers" after completing the hitch. In the final analysis, the recruitment turns out to be another kind of deportation.

---

[34] The census disclosed, however, the presence of 53,000 Poles in Kazakhstan, where hardly a single Pole lived before World War II.

[35] *Memorandum,* p. 54.

[36] *Ibid.,* p. 70.

[37] *The Department of State Bulletin,* August 10, 1953.

The earliest Soviet hint that not all was well with the population in Lithuania was given in 1957. It transpired from an estimate by the Statistical Administration of the Lithuanian Soviet Republic that its population on April 1, 1956, numbered 2,673,000.[39] The authoritative *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* also accepted this figure.[40] Assuming that the population in 1946 numbered 2,685,000 - 2,690,000, as stated in the foregoing, and that the natural increase rate was 1.1 per cent per year, the population in ten years should have grown to about 3,000,000. The loss of over 300,000 in ten years of peacetime was a shock. Yet as further, though more refined, depopulation continued, an increase of only 38,000—instead of nearly 90,000—occurred in 1956-1958. This means that the annual natural increase rate has lately been of the order of 0.5 per cent rather than 1.1 per cent, as claimed for the earlier years. Another disquieting factor is a drop in school enrollment. Taking the enrollment in grades 1 through 4, where attendance is compulsory for all children of 7 to 11, the picture was as follows:[41]

Years	1940/41	1954/55	1955/56	1956/57
1000's	298	230	224	222

Thus, despite a larger territory and seventeen years' span between 1940 and 1956, the number of pupils in elementary schools declined to 77 per cent by 1954/55, and slipped further to 74 per cent by 1956/57. Hence, not only is the real natural increase in Lithuania now much lower than before World War II, but the population consists of elderly people, with its cream taken off.

Since it was impossible to conceal or deny such huge losses, Soviet authorities began looking for someone to put the blame on. The Germans appeared the most logical choice. An early report, prepared by the *Extraordinary State Commission for Ascertaining and Investigating Crimes Committed by the German-Fascist Invaders and Their Associates*, accused the "German scoundrels" of having shot, burned alive, and tortured to death "over 300,000 civilians" in Lithuania. This, however, covered also "citizens of France, Austria, and Czechoslovakia" as well as other "foreigners."[42] Characteristically, the elaborate Soviet report, reproducing names, places, and minute details, did not mention that the "civilians" were mostly Jews. The fact of extermination of local *and* foreign Jews in Lithuania under German occupation was also confirmed by an authoritative Jewish study of the problem. Lithuania's second-largest town, Kaunas, "was turned into one of the monstrous Jewish mass graves in Eastern Europe," the study pointed out.[43]

---

[38] Proof of which may be seen in reputed clashes with the Soviet police in the fall of 1959.

[39] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR,* p. 7.

[40] *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia,* 2nd ed., I, 672.

[41] *Narodnoe khoziaistvo Litovskoi SSR,* p. 188.

[42] *Pravda,* December 20, 1944; *Soviet War News,* January 5, 1945.

This first Soviet estimate of losses sustained by the Lithuanian population in 1940 through 1944 covered surprisingly accurately the actual losses for which both Soviet and German occupation authorities were responsible, specifically: 60,000 deportees and other victims in 1940-1941; 225,000 Jews and 16,000 concentration camp victims in 1941-1944. Thus, with a single stroke of the pen, the Soviet Government whitewashed itself and made the Germans responsible for all losses sustained by the Lithuanian people. As large-scale deportations and executions continued after the war, too, the Germans again were made responsible. Already in 1946, the Germans were blamed for having "murdered" 436,000 persons and "deported to German slavery" 36,000. Such an estimate was given an American writer and newspaperman, A. Bimba, who visited Lithuania in 1946 and described in glowing colors all he saw there.[44] Broken down by counties, the revised estimate looked quite authentic. More interesting is the fact that the addition of 136,000 victims of German occupation coincided astonishingly closely with the claim made by the Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, that about the same number of Lithuanians were massacred or deported in 1944-1946.[45]

For some strange reason, the revised Soviet estimate was not made public in Lithuania. Here the Extraordinary Commission's figure of 300,000 remained in currency until 1957. Even as late as the spring of 1957, the First Secretary of the Communist Party in Lithuania, A. Sniečkus, blamed the "fascists" for having shot, burnt, and annihiliated more than 300,000 inhabitants.[46] The change occurred late in 1957. It was initiated by the publication of a 112-page pamphlet under the title *Hitlerite Crimes in the Baltic Countries.* This pamphlet was based on the proceedings of the Soviet Military Tribunal in Riga between January 26 and February 2, 1946. Speaking of Lithuania, the Tribunal said: "In the Lithuanian Soviet Republic, German invaders killed some 700,000 peaceful Soviet citizens and war prisoners and drove more than 36,000 Soviet citizens into slavery in Germany."[47] The figure of 700,000—withheld from publication for more than ten years—has been accepted by both the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*[48] and, of course, the Communist Party of Lithuania.[49]

Since there were 156,000 war prisoners among those allegedly annihilated, the number of other "Soviet citizens" in the total number of victims was 544,000. The term of "Soviet citizens" not necessarily being identical with the term of "inhabitants" of Lithuania, the country's Communist

---

[43] *The Black Book,* pp. 324-328.

[44] A. Bimba, *Prisikėlusi Lietuva* (Brooklyn, 1946), p. 31.

[45] *Memorandum,* p. 26 f.

[46] *Tiesa,* 1957, No. 142.

[47] *Hitlerininku piktadarybės Pabaltijyje* (Vilnius, 1957). The speed of the Riga Military Tribunal is truly amazing when compared with the protracted proceedings of the Nuremberg Tribunal.

[48] *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia,* 2nd ed., XXV, 260.

[49] *Tiesa,* 1959, No. 125.

Party clarified this point in 1960 and 1961. This was done by declaring, through one of its leading members, that "Hitlerites and their henchmen . . . annihilated physically about 500,000 persons, this being more than one-sixth of the Lithuanian population."[50] The same figure also appeared in the official Soviet-Lithuanian study of the Hitlerite occupation of Lithuania, published by the State Publishing House for Political and Scientific Literature in Vilnius.[51]

Although the Germans could not be blamed, by any stretch of imagination, for killing even half as many persons as 500,000, the identification of the victims as determined by the Soviet authorities with the inhabitants of Lithuania made it much easier to explain why only 2,711,000 persons were found in the area where 3,034,000 used to live in 1940. Placing 250,000-300,000 Soviet-own victims on the German doorstep and adding 36,000 slave laborers to the roster of German victims theoretically reduced the estimated population to 2,498,000 by 1945. A swift calculation with the pencil shows however, that the population of this size should have grown under normal conditions to about 2,850,000 by 1959, i.e., 137,000 more than the census showed.

Thereupon the wheels began grinding again. The official study of the Hitlerite occupation of Lithuania came out with a categorical assertion that the number of those deported to slave labor in Germany was 200,000 rather than 36,000 as originally estimated.[52] The authors of the study blamed the absence of complete data in the beginning for the original underestimation and added that a great number of deportees perished from bombs and hunger. This, in turn, implied that the total number of victims to the German occupation was as high as 700,000; in other words, the Germans annihilated better than every fourth man, woman, and child in Lithuania.

Whatever the credibility of this juggling and rejuggling of completely unsubstantiated statistics, the Soviets outdid themselves by resorting to a sheer *reducio ad absurdum* of their arguments. Let the figures speak for themselves:

Est. Population in 1939		3,034,000
Expatriates to Germany	21,000	
German occupation victims	500,000	
Slave laborers	200,000	
DP's	56,000	
Expatriates to Poland	177,000	− 954,000
Natural increase 1939-1944		+ 20,000

---

[50] *Izvestiia*, December 25, 1960.

[51] M. Ioffe, ed., *Hitlerine okupacija Lietuvoje* (Vilnius, 1961), p. 15 f. In their zeal to ascribe to the Germans as many victims as possible, particularly prominent ones, the authors listed by name and rank individuals and families who died of natural causes or even were deported to the Soviet Union in 1940-1941.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

Est. Population in 1945	2,100,000
Natural increase 1945-1948	300,000
Est. Population in 1959	2,400,000
Census	2,711,000
Unexplained excess of the census population	311,000

This writer inquired twice at the Soviet Academy of Sciences seeking to ascertain the Soviet explanation of the discrepancies. No reply has been received. This could hardly be expected, for a plausible explanation, devoid of all propaganda overtones, would call for the admission of the heinous crime of genocide.[53]

WASHINGTON, D. C.

---

[53] After completing this paper, the writer received a memorandum on the situatio in the Baltic States in 1960, prepared by Mme von Lowzow for the Consultative Assembl of the Council of Europe (Doc. 1173, September 14, 1960: *Rapport sur la situation de pays baltes à l'occasion du 20ème anniversaire de leur incorporation forcée dans l'Unio soviétique.* In the part dealing with Lithuania, the memorandum also reviewed demo graphic changes in the last twenty years (p. 30 f.). The following estimates were give for 1959: hypothetical population under normal conditions—3,900,000; autochthonou population found—2,400,000; hypothetical losses—1,500,000, subdivided into these categories put to death by the Nazis—300,000; evacuated to the east—60,000; died as anti-Sovie guerrillas—50,000; expatriated to Poland—180,000; deported to the Soviet Union—350,00 sent to the Soviet Union for slave labor ["volunteers"]—100,000; combined actual losses 1,040,000; Soviet-caused drop in natural increase—460,000. While some figures seem exag gerated (Nazi victims) or based on pure guesswork (number of guerrillas), other definit losses are not considered (expatriation to Germany, DP's).

FINLAND'S POLICY IN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PAASIKIVI LINE

by Kent Forster

THE ELECTION of Finland to membership in the United Nations in 1955 was hopefully regarded by many Finns as the beginning of a new era in their country's international position. Finnish relations with the rest of the world have long been over-shadowed by those with the Russians, but never had that shadow been more depressingly evident than during and following the Fenno-Russian Wars of 1939-1944. During the succeeding decade, despite deep Russophobia and strong sympathies for the West, Finland struggled successfully to fulfill the severe terms of the Russian armistice and peace treaty and avoided actions offensive to its great eastern neighbor. With entry into the United Nations, however, the question arose whether the Paasikivi Line, as this postwar policy was called, might not be modified to afford the Helsinki Government greater freedom and latitude in its foreign relations.

Hopes for such modification were understandable. The Paasikivi Line (named after Juho K. Paasikivi, Finnish political leader, chief negotiator of the 1944 armistice, and presidential successor to Marshal Mannerheim in 1946) asserted that Finland could preserve its independence only by convincing the Soviets that Finland's international posture in no way threatened Russian security. Taking into account Stalin's acutely suspicious view of the outside world, Finns were obliged to pursue a policy of scrupulously good neighborliness, maintained Paasikivi and his supporters, if they were to avoid Soviet intervention. To such a policy Finland had clung in the lonely, difficult years after the war.[1]

By 1955, however, a change in the international climate was apparent. Stalinism had given way to the "Geneva Spirit." An Austrian peace treaty was signed. Russian objections to Finland's adherence to Scandinavia's Nordic Council were dropped. Most significantly, the Kremlin terminated its ninety-nine year lease, granted in 1944, to Finland's Porkkala Peninsula. The departure of Soviet troops from this area inevitably aroused optimism about future Fenno-Russian relations. Russia's endorsement of Finland's admission to the United Nations in December 1955, therefore, heightened the impression that brighter days for the Finns were approaching.

Helsingin Sanomat, the "Times" of Finland, cautiously opined that while Finland alone could not change the course of world events, there was reason to be hopeful about the future of the United Nations and Finland's membership therein.[2] *Maakansa,* the Agrarian Party's Helsinki organ, optimistically observed that Finnish admission to the United Nations was only part of a generally friendly Soviet policy which augured well for the future.[3] The Communist press, not unexpectedly, hailed admission as an opportunity to work for peace with the U.S.S.R.[4]

---

[1] Among the best recent analyses of the Paasikivi Line are John H. Hodgson, "The Paasikivi Line," *The American Slavic and East European Review,* XVIII (Apr. 1959), 145 ff.; Allan A. Kuusisto, "The Paasikivi Line in Finland's Foreign Policy," *The Western Politcal Quarterly,* XII (Mar. 1959), Part 1, 37 ff.; Lauri A. Puntila, *J. K. Paasikiven Linja* (Lahti: Esan Kirjapaino, 1957).

[2] United States Information Service, *Summary of the Finnish Press* (Helsinki) (hereafter cited as *SFP*), No. 300 (Dec. 29, 1955) Editorials, p. 1.

The retirement of Paasikivi at the end of February 1956 further set the stage for innovation. The newly elected President, Urho Kekkonen, stated that the Paasikivi Line remained Finnish policy, but Helsinki's leading Swedish language daily, *Hufvudstadsbladet,* pointed out that Paasikivi's leadership had enabled Finland to grow "stronger and stronger," an implication that this increased strength afforded Kekkonen opportunity to experiment with a more independent foreign policy.[5]

As the time drew near for Finland's attendance at its first United Nations General Assembly in November, speculation on what this would mean increased. The conservative *Uusi Suomi* (Helsinki) believed that difficulties in maintaining a neutral position could be expected, but could be solved by Finland's adherence to her pledges both to the United Nations and the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, the country had an important task in social, economic, and cultural efforts to foster a more peaceful international atmosphere.[6] *Suomen Sosialidemokraatti,* the Social Democrats' Helsinki paper, entitled its leading editorial on Finland's appearance at the General Assembly "A Day of Good Expectation."[7] In summary, United Nations membership, accompanied as it was by other indications of Soviet relaxation, suggested that more flexibility than heretofore had been possible in Finnish policy might develop. Abandonment of the Paasikivi Line was not seriously contemplated, but there was hope that its modification might enable Finland, without offending Russia, to gravitate toward a position of more pronounced non-alignment.

Unexpectedly, on November 1, Finland's United Nations responsibilities began in the Emergency Session of the General Assembly summoned to deal with the invasion of Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain. On that day the Finnish Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, M. George de Gripenberg, cast Finland's first General Assembly vote, along with that of the United States and the Soviet Union, for the Suez cease-fire resolution. During the next week resolutions calling for creation of a United Nations Emergency Force were also adopted, though with less unanimity than had accompanied the cease-fire. Russia and her Warsaw Pact associates took the position that the forces invading Egypt should withdraw immediately and, therefore, that the Emergency Force was unnecessary. Finland, on the other hand, aligned itself with the majority voting for the Emergency Force and indicated willingness to participate in it.[8] Ultimately, Finnish troops were among the contingents flown into Egypt to supervise the armistice. Thus, Helsinki began its United Nations participation on an independent note, though it should be recognized that it was not placing itself in direct opposition to Moscow, which abstained, but did not vote against the creation of the Emergency Force.

---

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *Ibid.,* No. 293 (Dec. 19, 1955), Editorials, p. 4.

[5] *Ibid.,* No. 51 (Mar. 1, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[6] *Ibid.,* No. 242 (Oct. 24, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 3.

Subsequently, the Finns found themselves more openly in disagreement with the Soviets on the issue. Those nations contributing troops assumed the initial expenses, but expected reimbursement from the United Nations. In the Fifth Committee (administrative and budgetary questions) and in the 1957 General Assembly, Finnish delegates expressed concern about such reimbursement. In view of Finland's strained finances this concern was understandable and received a favorable hearing. The Russians, however, took an opposing position. Because the Emergency Force had been established by the General Assembly, and not by the Security Council, they charged that the Force existed in violation of the United Nations Charter. Accordingly, they opposed reimbursement and voted against the General Assembly's resolution of 22 November, 1957, to continue the Force.[9] This independent position assumed in the Suez Affair by the Helsinki Government was applauded by the Finnish public and by the non-Communist press.[10] It was a promising beginning for those hoping for modification of Finnish policy.

The Emergency Session on the Hungarian Revolution which quickly followed that on Suez, however, was a different matter. On November 4 the Finnish delegation confronted decisions of much greater portent. At the same time, Finnish public opinion reacted more sharply to Hungarian events.[11] A Hungarian relief program was promptly organized and generously supported. Within a few days everywhere on the streets of Helsinki one saw the red-white-green cockades which signified contributions; within a week the Finnish Red Cross had collected 18,000,000 Finnmarks, clothes, food, and medicines.[12] This writer, at the time in Helsinki, heard frequent expressions of sympathy for the Magyars, with whom the Finns felt a special kinship because of their common, though remote, linguistic roots. Concomitantly, there was restrained, but unmistakable, condemnation of Russian actions in Budapest. According to *Helsingin Sanomat,* "The sympathy of the world is on the side of those who suffer and who are victims of bloodshed in Hungary." Furthermore, it stated that Soviet intervention was obvious and that the matter ought to be dealt with by the United Nations.[13] This suggested popular endorsement of a strong stand by Finland on Hungary.

---

[8] United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly* (hereafter cited as *UNGA*), First Emergency Special Session, 1-10 November, 1956, Plenary Meetings (New York, 1956), p. 34 ff.

[9] *Ibid.,* Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 514.

[10] *New York Herald Tribune* (Paris edition), November 14, 1956, p. 10.

[11] *SFP,* No. 256 (Nov. 10, 1956), Editorials, p. 3 f.

[12] *Ibid.,* p. 2.

In New York Gripenberg, polished and urbane in the manner of a diplomat seen less frequently in this age of "popular diplomacy," awaited instructions from Helsinki. In contrast to the previous day, when the government of Prime Minister Karl August Fagerholm had promptly instructed Gripenberg to vote for the Suez cease-fire, there were delayed instructions on the first Hungarian resolution. This document, drafted by the United States, "Condemning the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights," called for Russian withdrawal and an investigation by the Secretary General.[14] On this resolution fifty affirmative votes buried eight dissenting Soviet bloc votes. Finland joined fourteen delegations in abstaining.[15]

In Helsinki this action immediately raised questions. *Uusi Suomi* recognized the need for caution in voting on the Hungarian resolution, but asked what Finland's basic policy now was.[16] Another conservative daily, *Aamulehti* (Tampere), flatly stated that Finland should have voted either for both Suez and Hungarian cease-fires or for none. Who, it asked, was responsible for this inconsistent stand?[17] The Government unofficially let it be known that the abstention on the Hungarian vote had resulted from communication difficulties with New York which had prevented issuance of instructions. *Ilkka* (Vaasa), an Agrarian paper, accepted this explanation with the notation that Finnish sympathies were unquestionably with the suffering Hungarians.[18] Before this controversy could be further developed the fateful session of November 9 ensued.

On this day a resolution was introduced calling for Russian withdrawal from Hungary, free Hungarian elections under United Nations auspices, and an investigation and report by the Secretary General. In support was a large bloc of nations, including the members of NATO, Latin America, Ireland, and Sweden. Opposed was the Soviet bloc. Also before the Assembly was a resolution condemning the Russian and Hungarian Communist Government for interference with the distribution in Hungary of food and medical supplies. Another, presented by Austria, called for general aid to Hungary without mention of the U.S.S.R.[19]

At this juncture the Helsinki Government faced an unavoidable clarification of its position. It was obliged to choose between a new affirmation before the world of the old Paasikivi Line, in its strictest sense, and an abrupt departure from it. Moreover, it would have to make its decision while fully aware of the widespread popular sympathy in the country for the Hungarian "freedom fighters." It was a dramatic moment, therefore,

---

[13] *Ibid.*, No. 246 (Oct. 29, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[14] *UNGA*, Second Emergency Special Session, 4-10 November, 1956, Annex, Document A/3286, p. 2.

[15] *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, p. 20.

[16] *SFP*, No. 255 (Nov. 9, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[17] *Ibid.*, No. 256 (Nov. 10, 1956), Editorials, p. 3.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 3 f.

[19] *UNGA*, Second Emergency Special Session, 4-10 November, 1956, Annex, Document A/3316, p. 4.

when Gripenberg, prior to the balloting, asked for the floor. For the Finns it was their first statement before the General Assembly. Waiting attentively were the Finnish people, Finland's Nordic associates, the West, the non-aligned nations, and Moscow. Little wonder that the Finnish delegate chose his words with great care:

> The Finnish delegation will abstain from the vote on the five-Power draft resolution calling for Russian withdrawal and free elections only because we do not find it possible to associate ourselves with the formulation of some of the paragraphs of the draft resolution. We shall vote in favor of the draft resolution presented by Austria. In this connexion, we should like to emphasize Finland's fervent hope that Hungary and the Soviet Union will be able to agree on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary and on the safeguarding of the fundamental human rights of the Hungarian people, in a way corresponding to the traditions of freedom which have existed in that country for many centuries.[20]

Thus did Gripenberg initiate what was to become a familiar Finnish pattern in the United Nations. On the one hand was identification of Finland with the principles of national independence and democracy. On the other was dissociation of Finland from an open condemnation of Soviet policy when it violated those principles. As announced, Finland abstained from voting on the five-Power draft's preamble, which referred to the "violent repression of Soviet forces." Similar abstentions followed on the third paragraph asserting that "foreign intervention is an intolerable attempt to deny to the Hungarian people . . . freedom and independence;" the fourth, which read, "the repression undertaken by the Soviet forces in Hungary constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations;" the first operative paragraph calling for immediate withdrawal of Russian forces from Hungary; and on the third and fourth operative paragraphs providing for investigation by the Secretary General.[21]

On three paragraphs Finland voted affirmatively despite Soviet bloc opposition: the second, which noted that "recent events in Hungary manifest clearly the desire of the Hungarian people to exercise . . . freedom and independence;" and the fifth, which stated that "immediate withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Hungarian territory is necessary;" and that endorsing free elections under United Nations auspices.[22]

On the resolution as a whole, containing the paragraphs on which Finland had earlier abstained, the Finns abstained. The final tabulation revealed forty-eight ayes, eleven nays, and sixteen abstentions, including that of Austria, whose voting record on this day closely paralleled Finland's.[23]

Having refrained from direct condemnation of Russia, while at the same time expressing sympathy for the Hungarian revolutionaries, Finland assumed a more open anti-Soviet position on Russian interference with the flow to Hungary of relief supplies. Gripenberg voted affirmatively on the resolution specifically censuring the U.S.S.R. This Moscow voted against. Next he voted for the Austrian resolution calling for general aid but omitting mention of the Soviets. On this Moscow abstained.[24]

---

[20] *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, p. 66.

[21] *Ibid.*, Annex, Document A/3316, p. 4; Plenary Meetings, p. 77 ff.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] *Ibid.*

A summary of this 9 November "day of decision for Finland" indicates eleven votes on resolutions which, in varying degree, censured Russia's actions in Hungary and against which the Soviets spoke and voted. Each resolution carried by favorable votes on the part of forty-eight to fifty-three delegations. Finland abstained on six and voted affirmatively on five, including one which singled out the U.S.S.R. for reproof. These carefully calculated efforts to avoid arousing Soviet hostility while giving voice to Finnish popular opinion on Hungary inevitably drew criticism.

As was anticipated, the Communist *Työkansan Sanomat* (Helsinki) declared it "deplorable that in the U.N. . . . on November 9 our delegation voted for a resolution which contained severe attacks against the Soviet Union."[25] *Nya Pressen* (Helsinki) charged that the voting of Finland was unduly conciliatory to the U.S.S.R.[26] Between these extreme views was *Helsingin Sanomat,* which conceded that the November 9 resolution was too demanding in tone to receive Finnish support, but approved the stronger stand taken on aid to Hungary.[27] Best expressing the Government's feelings was *Hufvudstadsbladet's* hope that Finland would face no more such difficult decisions.[28]

When the regular session of the General Assembly convened the following week, however, Finland's difficulties resumed. On November 13 the Soviets endeavored to block inclusion of Hungary in the agenda of the Eleventh Session. The Finnish delegation, now joined by Foreign Minister Ralf Törngren, Minister of Social Affairs Tyyve Leivo-Larsson, and several parliamentary deputies, voted for inclusion.[29] Eight days later it abstained from voting for a resolution ordering the Russian and Kadar Governments to cease the deportation of Hungarian rebels to the U.S.S.R., but supported an Asian-sponsored resolution which noted reports of deportations and urged the Hungarian Government to clarify the situation.[30] Support was also given to continued aid to Hungarian refugees in a vote on which the Soviets abstained.[31] Finally, a Russian effort to limit aid to refugees inside Hungary and not to those who fled abroad, was opposed by the Finns, in company with sixty other delegations.[32] But this stand, especially on deportations, elicited new criticism.

Minister President Fagerholm and Foreign Minister Törngren defended abstention on grounds that they had no verified data on deportations.

---

[24] *Ibid.*, Annex, Document A/3324, p. 5; Plenary Meetings, p. 80.

[25] *SFP*, No. 267 (Nov. 23, 1956), Editorials, p. 2.

[26] *Ibid.*, No. 272 (Nov. 29, 1956), Editorials, p. 2.

[27] *Ibid.*, No. 257 (Nov. 12, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] *UNGA*, Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, I, 23.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 187 f.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 194.

The normally sympathetic *Helsingin Sanomat* rejected this explanation, commenting that there was so much information on other developments in Hungary it was unlikely that on this subject the information was incorrect.[33] Four days later the same paper observed, "It is strange that we send troops to Suez, but dare not vote on sending observers to Hungary."[34] More disappointed than critical, the provincial *Karjala* (Lappeenranta) declared that admission to the United Nations had come at an unfortunate time and hoped that Finland would not be involved again in so complicated a situation.[35] Further indication of this disappointment is reflected in the shrinkage of space devoted by the Finnish press to the United Nations.

Yet, Finnish policy did not fully deserve this reaction. During the 1956 Assembly, Finland faced seventeen "crucial" (namely, entailing anti-Soviet stands) ballots. On eight it voted against the Russian position, on the other nine it abstained.[36] Neutral Austria on the same ballots voted ten times against the Russians and had seven abstentions. India recorded four votes against the Soviet bloc, twelve abstentions, and one vote with the U.S.S.R. Comparatively, therefore, Finland had taken a stand which did constitute a very modest, but nonetheless distinguishable, adjustment of the Paasikivi Line in the direction of active neutrality, though obviously not enough to satisfy many Finns. Moreover, Finnish diplomats may well have been subject to Kremlin pressures which they could not reveal to the public and in the face of which they dared go no futher than they did.

While less stormy, the meetings of the General Assembly in the following year continued to pose problems for Finland. The Twelfth Session began its work in September 1957 with receipt of the report of its Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary. Consistent with its 1956 position, Finland abstained from approving this scathing indictment of Russia's actions in Hungary. Adoption of the report carried by sixty votes to ten, with ten abstentions.[37] *Kansan Uutiset,* the leading Communist daily, alone expressed satisfaction with the Finnish stand.[38]

Although the perennial question of admitting the People's Republic of China to the United Nations was again debated in 1957, this posed no difficulty for Finland. As early as 1955 *Helsingin Sanomat* had favored such admission and continued to do so.[39] Furthermore, the vote in this case did not strictly follow the Cold War alignment, since Denmark and Norway joined the Warsaw Pact members and neutrals like India and Sweden in endorsing admission. Finland, therefore, freely voted its conviction by joining the twenty-seven delegations in favor of admission.[40]

---

[33] *Helsingin Sanomat,* December 2, 1956, p. 6.

[34] *Ibid.,* December 6, 1956, p. 8.

[35] *SFP,* No. 283 (Dec. 13, 1956), Editorials, p. 4.

[36] Among these eight votes counted as anti-Soviet is one on which Finland voted while the U.S.S.R. abstained.

[37] *UNGA,* Eleventh Session, Plenary Meetings, III, 1476.

[38] *SFP,* No. 209 (Sept. 25, 1957), Editorials, p. 3.

[39] *Ibid.,* No. 292 (Dec. 9, 1955), Editorials, p. 1; No. 289 (Dec. 20, 1956), Editorials, p. 1.

[40] *UNGA,* Twelfth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 130.

More significant in determining the course of Finnish policy was the question of free elections under United Nations supervision in Korea. Support for free elections was in accord with Finnish democratic tradition and consistent with Finland's stand on free elections for Hungary in 1956, but involved standing with the West against the Soviets. A particularly acrimonious debate between the Russian and United States delegates before the vote emphasized this. When the vote was taken, Finland, along with Ghana, India, Yugoslavia, and a dozen other Afro-Asian countries, abstained.[41] Such action indicated a retreat from the more independent position taken on Hungary the year before. At that time abstention took place only when the resolution singled out the Soviet Union for specific censure. On Korea the Finns abstained from voting for a resolution which only endorsed action disapproved by the U.S.S.R.

This new posture was again evident in the issue of a nuclear test ban, another major topic of consideration at the Twelfth Session. Finland's M. Ralph Enckell in the First Committee on November 6 announced his country's readiness to support any,

> . . . reasonable and practical proposal, provided it was supported by the Great Powers, on whom progress toward disarmament primarily depended. It was evident that no proposal before the Committee would obtain unanimous support and his delegation did not want to support any move which might have the effect of widening the difficulties between the Great Powers or of hardening their positions.[42]

When, therefore, the Soviets and the United States took opposing sides on the question of international controls accompanying a ban, it might have been expected from the above statement that Finland would abstain from supporting either proposal. This was not, however, the case.

On November 14 a resolution calling for establishment of international controls over nuclear weapon development was supported by the United States and fifty-eight other nations. The Soviet bloc registered nine negative votes. Finland was among fifteen abstaining. Five days later India submitted the Soviet-endorsed proposal for immediate agreement on cessation of nuclear tests with deferment of discussion of inspection controls. For the non-aligned nations this vote was particularly vexing. Fervently desiring a halting of tests, they viewed the Indian resolution as better than no agreement. On the other hand, there was merit in the American stand and some neutrals, especially those in Europe, no doubt preferred inspection. The result was that Austria and Sweden, who had voted for inspection, and eighteen other delegations abstained on the Indian proposal, which was defeated thirty-four to twenty-four. Finland, however, cast her ballot for the resolution.[43]

Almost at once a new twist in Finnish policy appeared in the debates over the Disarmament Commission's membership. Russia's proposition that the twelve-member Commission be replaced by a commission of the total membership of the United Nations was defeated, with Finland abstaining. India then suggested addition of fourteen members to the existing Commission as a compromise. During the ensuing debate the Albanian delegation moved inclusion of seven additional nations to bring the total to thirty-three. Among the seven additions proposed by Albania was Finland. Promptly Enckell asked for the floor and announced that, despite Finland's agreement in principle with disarmament and acceptance of membership on disarmament bodies, it could not accept this nomination without further reflection. Subsequently, Albania's suggestion was dropped, but it served to cast more light on Finnish policy. Having aligned with the neutral and Warsaw Pact delegations on a nuclear test ban, the Finns drew back from identification with a Soviet-sponsored seat on the Commission seeking agreement on a test ban, as well as on general disarmamaent.[44] Clearly, Finland had endeavored to pick its way through the battles of the 1957 General Assembly with great caution. The resulting impression is that Finnish policy was less boldly neutral than in 1956. This impression is confirmed by Finnish actions in the General Assemblies of 1958 and 1959.

---

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 541.

[42] *Ibid.*, First Committee, I, 133.

[43] *Ibid.*, Plenary Meetings, p. 467.

On free elections in Korea Finland abstained in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Sessions.[45] It also abstained in 1958 on the West's proposals for a nuclear test ban with international controls. In 1959 joint support by East and West for a ban "with controls" removed this issue from Finland's crucial category.[46] A new critical controversy emerged for Finland in 1959, however, with Red China's actions in Tibet. A resolution expressing concern for reported violation of human rights and freedom in Tibet was opposed by a Russian bloc of nine and supported by forty-five delegations, including that of the United States. Finland's abstention was one of twenty-six.[47]

The question of Hungary demands special attention. On the 1958 resolution deploring the continued presence of Russian troops in Hungary and the execution of Imre Nagy the Finnish delegation's abstention was consistent with earlier policy.[48] So was Finland's abstention on a similar resolution in 1959.[49] What marked a change of policy were the abstentions from the vote in favor of placing Hungary on the agenda of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Assemblies.[50] The Hungarian issue had been the one on which Finland had initially, and most emphatically, asserted its independence in the United Nations, therefore its abandonment is significant.

---

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 476.

[45] United Nations Office of Public Information, *United Nations Review*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Dec. 1958), p. 57; *UNGA*, Fourteenth Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 851st Plenary Meeting, 9 December, 1959, p. 37.

[46] *United Nations Review*, Vol. 5, No. 6 (Dec. 1958), p. 57; *UNGA*, Fourteenth Session, Provisional Verbatim Record of the 851st Plenary Meeting, 9 December, 1959, p. 16.

[47] *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Session, 834th Plenary Meeting, pp. 82-85.

[48] *Ibid.*, Thirteenth Session, Plenary Meetings, p. 546.

[49] *Ibid.*, Fourteenth Session, 851st Plenary Meeting, p. 16.

[50] *United Nations Review*, Vol. 5, No. 5 (Nov., 1958), p. 10; Vol. 6, No. 7 (Jan., 1960) I, p. 22.

Perhaps, as was the case with New Delhi, Helsinki concluded that nothing more could be done for the Hungarians and that Washington-Moscow polemics, certain to ensue if Hungary was again on the agenda, would be best avoided. But of undoubted influence in this modification of policy were Finland's strained relations with the Soviet Union in the autumn of 1958. During the preceding year Finland had taken certain steps calculated to increase its trade with the West. The results of these steps were apparent by late 1958 in the decline of Finnish imports from the U.S.S.R., something to which the latter reacted sharply. Before the tension relaxed the Social Democratic Fagerholm Government had fallen and President Kekkonen had made an unprecedented appeal to the Finnish nation to adhere to the Paasikivi Line and good neighborliness toward Russia. It can be argued that these steps were necessary to avoid Kremlin insistence that Finnish Communists be included in the V. J. Sukselainen Government, which eventually succeeded Fagerholm's. In any case, amid such a crisis, the most circumspect behavior by the Finns in New York could be expected. In this situation appears to rest the explanation of Finland's shift on Hungary in the General Assembly.[51]

In conclusion, can it be asserted that membership in the United Nations produced changes in Finland's basic foreign policy as embodied in the Paasikivi Line? Between 1956 and 1959 the Finnish delegation in the General Asembly faced thirty-one ballots involving a choice between cultivation of Russian good will through alignment with the Soviets and a stand more in accord with Finland's ideological and pro-Western outlook but entailing, contrary to the emphasis of the Paasikivi Line, possible irritation, if not provocation, of Moscow. These ballots were on the Hungarian, Korean, nuclear test, and Tibetan issues. On twenty-two Finland abstained, on seven it voted against the Russians, and on two it aligned with them. This record becomes more meaningful when compared with the votes on the same ballots of the four following non-aligned countries:

	Aligned with USSR	*Opposing USSR*	*Abstentions*	*Total votes*
Yugoslavia	9	0	22*	31
India	3	4	24	31
FINLAND	2	7	22	31
Austria	0	20	11	31
Sweden	0	28	3	31

However, as has been noted, Finland's most emphatic assertion of independence was in 1956 when it cast all seven votes against Soviet-endorsed positions on the Hungarian revolution. If the votes cast only in the three succeeding years are tabulated, the somewhat altered results are as follows:

---

[51] See Kent Forster, "The Finnish-Soviet Crisis of 1958-59," *International Journal*, XV (Spring, 1960), 147 ff.

	Aligned with USSR	*Opposing USSR*	*Abstentions*	*Total votes*
Yugoslavia	7	0	8*	15
India	2	1	12	15
FINLAND	2	0	13	15
Austria	0	11	4	15
Sweden	0	12	3	15

*Twice Yugoslavia was non-participating. These two occasions are counted here as abstentions.

Finland, unlike Austria and Sweden, is seen to have avoided since 1956 placing itself in the anti-Soviet voting bloc; but through a maximum number of abstentions avoided to a greater degree than Yugoslavia identification with a pro-Soviet stand. Closest to Finland's voting behavior was India, although it would not be correct to assume that Helsinki and New Delhi were influenced by the same considerations. India, champion of racial equality and anti-colonialism, second most populous nation in the world, acknowledged leader of a bloc of non-aligned governments, spoke for more than herself and pursued a multiplicity of aims in the United Nations. But, as Finland's Enckell explained on December 12, 1957, in the First Committee of the General Assembly,

> The foreign policy of Finland was based on a few simple principles. Finland belonged to no group . . . Finland had made a point of furthering conciliation . . . and had practiced toleration and consideration in its foreign relations.
>
> It had been said that good relations with Finland were useful to the Soviet Union and that, by maintaining them, Finland was serving Soviet interests. The Soviet Union undoubtedly regarded its friendly relations with Finland as useful, but the attitude of Finland toward the Soviet Union had been dictated solely by its own national interest and had been developed without prejudicing the interests of any other nation.[52]

What Enckell could not state was that Finland, as a member of the United Nations, desired to be independently neutral, but was obliged to pursue such an aim within the limitations of maintenance of good relations with the Soviet Union.

The Finns did support during this period the activities of the United Nations Specialized Agencies along lines of their own choosing. Finland was represented on the committee codifying international law. It supported a long-range approach for Palestine refugee settlement, and endorsed expansion of Technical Assistance. Mrs. Leivo-Larsson of the Finnish delegation pressed for action in the Commission on the Status of Women, for exchange of housing information, and for abolition of capital punishment in the draft of Human Rights.

---

[52] *UNGA,* Twelfth Session, First Committee, p. 402.

But on the more explosive political issues this independence was less evident. Initially, over Hungary, it was asserted, though most of the Finnish press believed not with sufficient vigor. By 1957 a less forceful pattern is discernible. Whether in response to Muscovite pressure or in anticipation of it, Finland resorted increasingly to abstentions on those ballots where its inclinations and preference were for the anti-Soviet position. Active neutrality gave way to passive neutrality. Thus, in spite of the hopes many Finns had entertained concerning United Nations membership opening a new period in Fenno-Russian relations, the Paasikivi Line remained the guiding principle of Finnish foreign policy. Instead of United Nations membership significantly altering Finland's relationship with the Soviet Union, the latter largely determined Finland's relations with the United Nations.

PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

YUGOSLAV NATIONALISM REVISITED: HISTORY AND DOGMA

by Bogdan Raditsa

WITHOUT DOUBT, postwar Yugoslav historiography far exceeds its prewar counterpart in quantity. More than this, new names, quite unknown in the prewar years, now appear among the regime's historians. Among them one finds publicists and even former members of the foreign service, who have exchanged their old professions for the new scholarship. These historians have been intensively rediscovering and reinterpreting the origins of the Yugoslav peoples, and, more important, digging up new data on the modern era, that period which deals with the formation of Yugoslavia. Much of this writing revolves around a central question: was the formation of the "new nation" in 1918 the result of "popular choice," or was it rather a consequence of foreign influences to which the so-called "bourgeois" parties and leaders more or less yielded, sometimes wholeheartedly but more often against their own inclinations? Along with this question, a great deal of attention has been focused on the antagonistic relationship between Serbian and Croatian nationalisms as well as the lesser Slovene, Montenegrin, Macedonian, and hyphenated Bosnian-Herzogovinian nationalisms.

Much of this work enriches our knowledge of the Yugoslav past and to that extent, at least, invites serious consideration and comment from abroad. The new history is an improvement over the prewar presentations of Šišić or Stanojević. Important issues are often dealt with in a franker and more honest manner than was true of prewar historical writings. Facts are presented more fully. The new historian often tries to polish his style. Still, current Yugoslav historiography has yet to produce a scholar whose brilliance of style and outstanding ability to synthesize data begins to approach that of the late Serbian historian, Slobodan Jovanović.

More than this, a major disappointment in the new history is its artificial and often unyielding dogmatic use of Marxism. Dogma hounds the new historians. Some surround their data with an introduction and a conclusion that emphasize historical materialism. Others permeate their entire work with this dogma. Even though the new historian uses a greater amount of economic data than his prewar counterpart to show how national issues have been shaped by the class struggle, he often uses it inflexibly and therefore unconvincingly. In book after book one feels the Marxist pattern hanging over the historian's mind as a Damoclean sword and threatening his imagination as well as his critical abilities. This is clearly shown, for example, in the recent writings of Grga Novak[1] or even Vaso Čubrilović,[2] who often appear terrified of having insufficiently stressed historical materialism. At the same time, in an old Marxist such as Vaso Bogdanov the official Communist pattern loses its shininess and assumes a natural though unconvincing quality.

---

[1] Grga Novak, *Povijest Splita* (Split: Matica Hrvatska, 1957). See p. 396, dealing with the economic situation in the early days of the city of Split.

[2] Vaso Čubrilović, *Istorija Političke Misli u Srbiji XIX Veka* (Beograd: Prosveta, 1958), p. 565. About the book see the review in the *JCEA*, July 1960, pp. 212-215.

Throughout, the inevitability of historical materialism that permeates the new history is unconvincing, but this is especially so when applied to early Yugoslav history, an era when neither personalities nor movements were shaped by class forces or class consciousness. The reinterpretation of the past in this manner inevitably falsifies it. To assume, for example, that the kings, the church leaders, and the feudal nobility acted as a class conscious social group all of whose political decisions were motivated by economic considerations attributes to some innocent historical figures a Marxist or even a Communist attitude alien to them. It is one thing for each new generation of historians to reinterpret the past in the light of its changing contemporary experiences; it is quite different to treat the past from a rigid theological viewpoint which has as its mission the reinforcing of the total, if not monolithic, Communist vision of the world. In this case, history becomes *ancilla* to the Communist *Weltanschauung,* and the historian becomes only the servant of an ideology which obscures and mystifies the past and cloaks "feudalism" and the "bourgeoisie" in trappings that simply do not fit.

A number of preconceptions, therefore, dominate current Yugoslav historiography: (1) The new historian insists that the formation of Yugoslavia, while inevitable, was delayed and harassed by feudal and bourgeois forces but was finally consummated by the Communist Party after 1945. Yielding to the Marxist belief that the Communist Party alone can grasp the direction of historical movement, he continually asserts that "real" unity among the various South Slav nations could only be achieved after the Communist rise to power. (2) The new historian also constantly overestimates the role that the "masses" played in the formation of the state. It was, of course, the Communist Party that led and guided the "masses." Neither of these views is accurate. For one thing, as in the case of modern Italy, the unification of Yugoslavia was more the work of Croat and Serb elites than of the popular masses. If, furthermore, the prewar Yugoslav "ruling classes" misunderstood and mistreated the national question, so, too, has the Communist leadership. The Communist Party started as a unifying movement based upon centralistic "integral Yugoslavism." It changed its constitution into a multi-national one as soon as the Serbo-Croatian antagonism emerged, incited both peoples against each other through its political activities, and then declared, in theory, that it alone could unify the nation. During the Second World War and after it became the unifying Yugoslav Communist Party and based the so-called federal union on the equal partnership of all Yugoslav nationalities. More recently, however, it has supported the transformation of its federal structure through "democratic centralism" into "Yugoslav integralism" — its main goal.

Thus, in their studies, these historians reject Panserbism and Pancroatism as remnants of a feudal and bourgeois past that worked against the organic unification of the nation. They also repudiate Illyrism (that first attempt in the nineteenth century to project a Yugoslav nation as the future aim of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) and Panslavism or Slavophilism as "romantic and idealistic" nationalist archaisms which supported Russian or Austrian "absolutism." At times, prewar "Yugoslav integralism" is identified with the Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian "bourgeois classes;" in other instances, it is linked with Panserbian royalist "bureaucratism." Both are considered to have brought the nation to the impasse which the Communists alone could overcome. Following Kardelj's main thesis, which is little more than Stalin's formula adapted to Yugoslav conditions, the new historian appears to believe that through socialist, collective experience the state will wither away. Each nationality in the multi-national state will lose its peculiarities and be engulfed in "Yugoslav integralism," once the creed of certain "idealistic bourgeois" elites and now apparently the ultimate goal of the Communist leadership.[3]

Committed to this kind of thinking, the new historians have recently published the first two volumes of the most important historical enterprise put together under the Communist regime, the monumental *History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia*.[4] Clearly expressing the guiding ideological commitments, the preface explains: this history, "freed from the idealistic considerations and chauvinistic tendencies" which dominated prewar historical studies, is written "on the basis of historical materialism." Recognizing that their "efforts" to work out a uniform history have been made "more difficult" because of "the level of development of [Yugoslav] pre-existing historiography," the authors still express satisfaction in having "made a step forward in the materialistic clearing of our past." A complete bibliography is appended to each chapter. The first volume, covering the period from the seventh to the sixteenth century, deals with the origins of the South Slavs and also with the medieval era. Volume two is concerned with the disintegration of the feudal order, the advent of capitalistic production, and the emergence of urban society. It takes the story into the eighteenth century. Each volume is crammed with valuable data that are subjected to the above-mentioned Marxist intepretation.

A most significant aspect of the entire work is its unusual emphasis upon the unique history of each nationality. Since these groups lived as separate and relatively individual historical entities until 1918, the "organic development of each people" is separately studied, "not forgetting . . . all those instances that have connected together all or some of our peoples." Such a history constitutes neither the history of Yugoslavia nor of the Yugoslav people, as was the prewar official fashion, but rather the history of the "peoples of Yugoslavia," that is the history of the Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and the residents of Bosnia and Herzegovina who were influenced by Christian and Moslem cultures. Without a doubt, these volumes are the first major scholarly effort at understanding the different geographic, political, and cultural aspects of Yugoslav history. They merit attention because they emphasize how historical experience differentiated the peoples of Yugoslavia one from the other, how the internal character of one contradicted that of another, and how different religious experiences shaped contrasting cultures and political aspirations. The body politic of the peoples who now make up Yugoslavia has historically been spread over a checkered geographic area; each people developed its own cultural characteristics. This condition has created methodological problems for historians that have been serious obstacles. These two volumes earnestly seek to overcome certain of these obstacles and problems. The authors reveal that the peoples of Yugoslavia struggled with contrasting realities as well as conflicting cultures imposed upon them by neighboring empires and churches.

---

[3] Edvard Kardelj Sperans, *Razvoj Slovenačkog Nacionalnog Pitanja* (Beograd: Kultura, 1958). See particularly the preface to the new edition, pp. 5-65.

[4] *Historija Naroda Jugoslavije,* I (Zagreb, 1953), 5-7; II (Zagreb, 1959).

The new historians, it is clear, emphasize a unity formed as a river is by its many tributaries. It draws from many diverse sources. In this case, it starts in the Byzantine and Ottoman era and continues through the Medieval Catholic and Renaissance as well as the Reformation and Counter-Reformation periods. Such an interpretation is found in the above discussed volumes. It is also emphasized in the *Yugoslav Encyclopedia,* whose editor and founder, the Croat Marxist writer Miroslav Krleža, argues that Yugoslav unity emerges as the nation uses those elements—especially its folk poetry and its language—which mold its national personality. The same line of thinking is firmly adhered to by those historians who deal with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Vaso Bogdanov, Professor of the History of the Peoples of Yugoslavia at Zagreb University, is an example in point. In his most recent book, *Political Parties in Croatia,*[5] this old time Marxist argues that the most progressive leaders among the Croats and the Serbs in the Habsburg Empire from the eighteenth through the twentieth century have been inspired basically by the idea of Yugoslav unity. The ultramontain clericals and other "reactionaries" among both Croats and Serbs are described as having opposed that unity and "opportunistically" relied upon Vienna's and Budapest's political parties. The first such effort by a Serb or Croat historian deepens our understanding of the Illyrians in 1848, who launched the idea of Yugoslav union and of "one free and independent national state." He makes it clear, furthermore, that the primary objective of the Illyrians was to "win the freedom and independence of Croatia." In making this judgment, Bogdanov dissociates himself from the current official line as well as from the dominant prewar view which saw the Illyrian Movement as exclusively and only Yugoslav. He joins such prewar Croat historians as Fancev in describing Illyrianism as primarily Croat and only secondarily Yugoslav.

---

[5] Vaso Bogdanov, *Historija Političkih Stranaka u Hrvatskoj* (Zagreb, Novinarsko Izdavačko Poduzece, 1958), p. 794.

Perhaps Bogdanov's status as a Party member allows him this "freedom" to differ from the official interpretation. In any case, the Illyrian Movement is evaluated in its proper context and follows the Ritter-Vitezovic concept of a "Resurrected Croatia" (Croatia Rediviva) : a united and independent Croatia is the dominant motive; unity with Serbia is only an afterthought. Bogdanov's analysis of the career and outlook of Ante Starčević, the leader of the Right Party, who became the most worshipped figure among the Croat ultranationalists and later among the Ustasha movement, is likewise suggestive. Starčević believed that both the Croats and the Serbs belonged to the same "race" *(pasmina)*, and this permitted the Serbs in the Dual Empire to join the Croats in his party. Bogdanov concludes that Starčević was not a Croat separatist, was an outspoken opponent of both the Austrians and the Hungarians, and saw the independence of Croatia coming from collaboration with the Serbs. Starčević found Panslavism an alien ideology that served both Austria and Russia in their efforts to subjugate Croatia and Serbia. In these findings and judgments, Bogdanov, a Serb, follows the interpretations of the Croat Marxists, A. Cesarec and Krleža, as well as those of Jovan Skerlić, the Serbian cultural historian.[6]

Bogdanov's "materialist" approach, however, is questionable when he condemns the nobility and the bourgeoisie because of their refusal as a "class" to favor a sincere, genuine national sentiment. Count Janko Drašković's "Dissertation," for one thing, proves the contrary; his national and liberal beliefs are self-evident. Similarly, the earlier Križanić and Ritter-Vitezović concepts cannot be rejected as opportunistic and false. The Croatian populist movement was motivated by sincere desires and objectives. Yet Bogdanov insists that "the platforms, statements, speeches, and articles of the majority of the [Serb and Croat] bourgeois politicians were used to hide the real aims and the real actions of their parties." "The basic character of the bourgeois parties of this era," he goes on, "is the contradiction between political theory and practice." He forgets that contradictions have also characterized the "theory and practice" of the Yugoslav Communist Party. In 1941 the Communist Party, completely subservient to Stalin, supported the Kremlin's official "Slavophilism." Such support continued blindly until 1948. Its "war of liberation" propaganda drew entirely on the "Mother Russia" concept in order to attract the Serbian masses, particularly in the Croat lands. After the break with Stalin, this line shifted. The sincerity of Communist "theory and practice" on the national question and other issues has been completely demonstrated by Milovan Djilas in *The New Class*, to cite only one example.

A different and no less valuable study of the national question is *The National Question in the Yugoslav Lands*[7] by Ferdo Čulinović, Professor of the History of the State and Law, of the Faculty of Law at Zagreb University. A newcomer to Marxism and still basically a prewar Yugoslav integralist, he sees the national question torn between unitarism and federalism. The prewar ruling class could not solve this dilemma because it used royalist centralism as symbolized by the Serbian royal dynasty after the 1929 dictatorship to develop unitarism against the mounting national sentiment in each nation. Čulinović says that the Yugoslav idea developed first in Croatia and spread to Serbia in the nineteenth century, where it was argued that Yugoslav union meant either the annexation or the joining together of the lands inhabited by the Slovenes, the Croats, and the Serbs in the Dual Empire to Serbia itself. Čulinović attributes the origin of Pancroatism to the ideas of Ritter-Vitezović in the eighteenth century. It re-emerges because of the pressure of Belgrade Panserbianism, and "Yugoslav centralism" finds further expression in the programs of Garašanin and especially Vuk Karadžić, whose slogan "Serbs all and everywhere" meant the Croats and Slovenes as well as the Serbs. It is to Karadžić's concept that the Croats, Bosnians, Serbs, and Slovenes are all "Serbs of three rites" (Orthodox, Catholic, and Moslem) that we must look to find the so-called "integral Yugoslav unitarism," which proved incapable of solving the major issue of unification in prewar Yugoslavia.

---

[6] J. Skerlić, *Eseji o Srpsko-hrvatskom pitanju* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska Biblioteka,, 1918), p. 48.

[7] Ferdo Čulinović, *Nacionalno Pitanje u Jugoslavenskim Zelmjama* (Zagreb: Biblioteka Instituta za Historiju Drzave i Prava na Pravnom Fakultetu, 1955), p. 158.

The essential permanent crisis regarding the national issue in Yugoslavia is the conflict over concepts concerning the organic structure of the "nation." It has been the refusal to recognize the fact that Yugoslavia was not a country of "one nationality" but of "many nationalities" *(više-nacionalnosti).* The Serb political leaders made a major error in considering 1918 Yugoslavia as one nation with three names: Serb, Croat and Slovene. Some of the most important Croat leaders in the Yugoslav movement, such as Supilo and Trumbić, also viewed Yugoslavia as one nation in one state under one leadership. Subsequent investigations, however, indicate that Trumbić and Supilo, even though they favored establishing Yugoslavia to prevent the fragmentization of the Croat lands, felt that federalism might have been a means of achieving unification. It is nevertheless difficult to believe that a unilateral centralism which denied the existence of a multinational state could have achieved that unification. The integral Yugoslavism which Čulinović correctly ascribes to the Serb-Croat coalition and to the political activities of Svetozar Pribičević could have been achieved only if the Serbs had yielded their central leadership to the other nationalities. The reality of the prewar years proved the contrary: under the formula of one state, one nation, one leader (the king), Great Serbianism rather than Yugoslav integralism was practiced. This created the deadlock in which two competing nationalisms and conceptions of the state battled: Croatia versus Serbia. The bourgeois ruling classes could not solve that dilemma, and the old Yugoslavia fell. In his recent book *The Downfall of the Old Yugoslavia,*[8] Čulinović attributes the end of Yugoslavia in 1941 to the chauvinist and particularist conceptions of the Serb and Croat bourgeois political parties. These parties could not solve the national question on federalistic premises. Instead, like a *deus ex machina* that fell from the blue sky in 1941, the Yugoslav Communist Party appeared as the "savior" of Yugoslavia and gave her people the status of independent republics within the framework of the present Yugoslav federation.

---

[8] Ferdo Čulinović, *Slom Stare Jugoslavije* (Zagreb: Školska Knjiga, 1958), p. 367.

The Yugoslavia of 1918 was incapable of considering all the historical differences that shaped the various South Slav peoples. Orginating in Croatia, the Yugoslav idea was viewed with divided interest in Serbia and, when accepted, applied solely in the interest of the Serbian bourgeoisie. The idea was even less attractive in Slovenia, where the clerical elements were stronger and viewed their independence in the light of an Austro-Slavism. In Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as in Macedonia, the Yugoslav idea was even less important, while in Montenegro it was recognized in the time of Petar Petrović-Njegoš, whose relationships with the Croats, Ban Jelačić and Strosmayer, were most promising. King Alexander's coup d'etat in 1929, however, was not motivated by sincere Yugoslav aims. The 1939 Serbo-Croat agreement made Croatia an equal partner with Serbia but did not establish an independent Croatia. Nor did it solve the national aspirations of the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Serbian and Croatian nationalists, therefore, fought each other at the start of the Second World War. Through the Serbo-Croat civil war (1941-1944), the Communists united the country and established the "new" Yugoslavia, based upon the "system of a dual statehood whose aim was to solve the essence of the national question in the Yugoslav lands." The Yugoslav federal state was a "multinationality" and a "system of multi-statehood" which would "solve the state juridical essence of the national question in the Yugoslav lands." Such was the task, writes Čulinović, of the National Revolution led by the Communists. Faithful to the Marxist premise that whenever the Communists seize power contradictions "wither away," Čulinović concludes that the Yugoslav national question "has reached its final phase, its full solution, its ultimate liquidation." The present situation is, therefore, "the most convenient method of solving the national question."

Even though Čulinović refuses to "predict the future," neither he nor any of the historians has answered the essential problem surrounding the postwar Yugoslav national question: how can federalism be achieved in a country that lacks a functioning democratic political system? The existence of six republics-states in present Yugoslavia offers the different nationalities a formal "independence" that is meaningless because of the iron grip of "democratic centralism" and the executive and legislative power exercised by the Communist Party.

Recent economic and even cultural conflicts between the national republics, mainly between Zagreb and Belgrade, indicate the struggle still goes on.[9] Tito's constant insistence that Croatia and Slovenia, the more developed republics, must share in the growth of the underdeveloped areas of Macedonia, Montenegro and even Serbia is evidence that the old prewar struggle appears under new conditions, those bred by centralism, dictatorship and one party rule, along with the ever-increasing bureaucratization that is inevitable in every monolithic *étatism*. Against this stern reality, all the Communist promises that the exploitation of one nation by another ceases when the Communist Party seizes power become slogans as empty as those that promise the classless society. The crucial question of whether the Yugoslav Communist Party has overcome the national dilemma that makes Yugoslavia either a united or a disunited structure still remains unanswered. Two possible developments exist: (1) Yugoslavia may pass from Communist "federalism" to "Yugoslav national integralism" which appears to be its main goal; or (2) the present national republics may become separate independent states. These alternatives, of course, will not merely be shaped by the Communist forces in Yugoslavia. Other historical forces already are at work, for history does not cease to develop when the Communists seize power.

Fairleigh Dickinson University

---

[9] At the Second plenum of the League of the Yugoslav Communists, Tito declared: "I must now turn to a problem which is quite widespread in our country. This is the problem of localism. People often ask whether certain cases involve localism, or whether they also reflect national chauvinism. I think what is involved is localism, the narrow concern with the interests of what is directly administered, and not with the interests of the whole community. . . . I hold that we, communists, primarily the Central Committee, the core of the League of Communists . . . must have a common attitude in this. . . . I believe that this democratic centralism must be upheld in the League of Communists today, just as it was upheld in the Communist Party in the past. . . .

"We have been carrying a certain amount of ballast since the early postwar years, because, in drawing up our laws, we made mistakes which must now be rectified. For instance our citizens, when travelling abroad, should all have Yugoslav passports. Furthermore when a person goes to a hotel he is obliged to fill out a form and state his nationality—to put down whether he is a Croat or a Serb or something else." (Yugoslav Information Center, New York: *Yugoslav Facts and Views,* March 21, 1960, p. 4).

NOTES

The annual 1961 meeting of the Austrian Forschungsinstitut für den Donauraum took place in Salzburg, September 30 to October 2. A variety of papers were offered. Hermann Gross (Kiel), Mitteleuropäische Handelspolitik 1890-1938; Hermann Raschhofer (Würzburg), Die nationale Frage in ČSR seit 1918, with discussion by Rudolf Wierer; Karl C. Thalheim (Berlin), Langfristige Entwicklungsplanung in den kommunistischen Donaustaaten; Josef Tzöbl (Vienna), Die Anfänge des Parlamentarismus in Österreich; Kurt Wessely (Vienna), Die Donaustaaten und die westeuropäische Wirtschaftsintegration.

* * *

The Sudetendeutscher Tag for 1961 was held at Köln from May 17 to May 22, with an attendance of roughly 250,000. There were speeches by Federal Minister Seebohm, and officials of the Sudeten Landsmannschaft. Philip A. Hrobák, President of the Slovak League in America, was presented the European Charles Prize of the Landsmannschaft.

* * *

It has recently been announced that Prague and Budapest have agreed to allow individuals who claim dual citizenship, Czechoslovak and Hungarian, to opt for one or the other. Failing declaration of this choice by March 15, 1961, it is assumed that they accept the citizenship of the country in which they live.

* * *

The leading Ukrainian historian in the emigration, Prof. John Mirtschuk died on May 2, 1961, only a few weeks from his seventieth birthday. An émigré of the first World War, he began his academic career at Vienna in 1925 and moved to Prague the following year. He succeeded Dmytri Doroshenko as Director of the Ukrainian Institute in Prague in 1931. When, in 1945, Munich became the center of free Ukrainian studies, he became Rector of the Ukrainian University there, a post he occupied until his death. His researches covered many aspects of Ukrainian life and culture. His earliest interest had been in philosophy and his whole corpus bore the imprint of reflective thought. His last large work was his *Geschichte d. Ukrainischen Kultur* (Munich, 1957). He was a fellow or corresponding fellow of a number of foreign academies.

* * *

In Germany, in recent months, a few academic events of interest to students of Central and Eastern Europe should be recorded and welcomed. The Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften (DDR) has established a center for the history of German-Slavic scientific relations to be headed by Prof. Eduard Winter. At Köln the Federal Ministry of the Interior has established an Institut f. Sowjetologie. The Institut plans to study Marxism-Leninism, East-West relations and world Communism. Well known scholars will direct the labors of the Institut: Boris Meissner (Kiel), Gunther Stökl (Köln), Karl C. Thalheim (Berlin), and Gustav Welter (Rome). At Stuttgart the Deutsche Gesellschaft f. Osteuropakunde concluded a two-day seminar for teachers of Russian and Russian history. The Osteuropa Institut of the Free University of Berlin celebrated its tenth birthday in June, and opened its new home in Berlin-Dahlem at the same time.

The Austrian Ministry of Education announced in January 1961 the foundation of an Österreichisches Institut für Zeitgeschichte, modelled after the Munich Institut. The Diretor is Alfons Lhotsky and the Directors are Richard Meister, Hugo Hantsch, Leo Santifaller and Friedrich Engel-Janosi. There is reason to think that the modern discipline of Zeitgeschichte may also soon be accepted in the Scandinavian countries.

* * *

The Central Statistical Office in Warsaw has published a report giving some interesting information on population trends. Total population 1937, 34.5 million; 1946, 23.9 million; 1950, 25.0 million; 1960, 29.7 million. Rural population, 52%, urban, 48%. This is a very significant shift from pre-1939 figures which were approximately 70% and 30%, respectively. The percentage of those deriving their livelihood from agriculture has changed in the same direction but not markedly. Now 38.2% live from agriculture.

* * *

The first volume of *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* has come to the Editor's desk. The *Archiv* is published as the Jahrbuch der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and is edited by George Eckert, published by Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen (Bergenstadt). This first volume brings nine meaty articles, ranging from a study by Johannes Klein on "Ästhetische und soziologische Literaturbetrachtung" to "Die wirtschaftspolitischen Ziele der Sowjetunion" by Kurt Müller. The breadth of interest of the *Archiv* may in fact limit its appeal, as most academicians would prefer to know where to look for definite sorts of studies. There are here, however, stimulating and carefully presented statements of social and political history.

* * *

The annual 1962 meeting of the Far Western Slavic Conference will be held at the University of Washington (Seattle) on April 28 - 29. This will be the first meeting held in the northwest. The program is not yet firm, but, if one may judge from the 1961 meeting in San Francisco, the 1962 meeting will lack nothing in interest and challenge. The 1961-2 Chairman is Raymond H. Fisher, University of California at Los Angeles.

CORRIGENDUM

In line 20, page 83 of Mr. Rintala's article *The Politics of Gustaf Mannerheim* in the April 1961 issue for "fourteen," read "nineteen."

Istoriya Latviyskoy SSR (Also in Lativian). Riga, Vol. I, 1952; Vol. II, 1955; Vol. III, 1968; (*ca.* 1,900 pages with maps and illustrations.) Published by the Academy of the Latvian SSR.

The eastern shores of the Baltic Sea belong to the most harassed area of the European continent. Many battles, not only military but also ideological, have been fought there. Since the Middle Ages these shores have rightfully claimed their own definition: *limes christiani orbis.*

Soon after the end of World War II, historiographical battles began anew. During the second half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth, the principal ideological adversary of the newly created Latvian historiographic school was the German-Baltic historical tradition, founded at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The few Russian historians at that time who had any interest in those problems generally followed the German line. However now, with the Soviet occupation of Latvia, and the subsequent interpretation of Baltic history, the German-Baltic historians watch the present Latvian-Soviet struggle while reserving their arguments and eloquence for the future.

With the exodus of the Latvian university professors and intellectuals, the Latvian historians among them lost no time in presenting age-old Latvian history to the Western World. Detailed bibliographies may be found in many of the works cited below. One should not devote time to too many details and explanations, although the chronological aspect should be stressed.

During World War II, as during the following years, the Latvian Minister in Washington, Dr. A. Bilmanis, developed an intense propaganda activity by publishing a series of books and sketches, especially about Latvia's more recent history. The more important of these is his *Latvian-Russian Relations. Documents* (Washington, D. C., 1944). In 1948, A. Spekke's *History of Latvia* appeared anonymously in the Latvian language (Stockholm). A. Svabe published a historical sketch in 1949 in Edinburgh, Scotland. His *Histoire du peuple letton* appeared in Paris in 1953. Spekke's *History of Latvia* was translated into English and published in 1951 (reprinted in 1957 in Stockholm). A. Bilmanis' *A History of Latvia* was published by the Princeton University Press in 1951. The reaction of the international critics, and their appreciation of the works of the Latvian historian in exile may be seen in the respective book reviews appearing in the *Historical Review, The Times Literary Supplement* and others. This historiographical tradition is now being continued by a younger generation of Latvian historians abroad, and the present trend shows no sign of exhaustion.

The present Soviet masters in Latvia could not allow the Latvian émigré historians to be the only torch bearers in this field, but, on the other hand, they could not produce works in other than Latvian and, of course, Russian (cf. titles in this review).

The first volume of the Soviet's Latvian History reveals the impatience and haste of the Soviet historians, who glossed over centuries and millenia, to follow the rigid style of the traditional Bolshevik interpretation of ancient history: "From the earliest times to 1860." The foreword, outlined in the most efficient slogans of Stalin's era, need not be quoted here. What is worthy of retention is the fact that a large committee of historians, headed by the late Soviet historian, B. Grekov, was sent from the "center," i.e. Moscow, "as an example of creative cooperation to avoid serious mistakes in writing Baltic history." (p. 4)

This 650-page volume has many maps and illustrations, almost all of them of an earlier origin, a valuable chronological index, and a ten-page bibliography, in which the mention of any Latvian historians presently living abroad has been carefully avoided, while German-Baltic works are quite well represented. The exposition, with all its abuse of bourgeois science and abundant quotations of the "classics of Marxism-Leninism," is very unbalanced. The general ideological phrases are well known by now: the age-old friendship between the Balts and the Russians (notwithstanding the Russian *Lietopisi*), the deep indebtedness of the Balts to the highly developed Russian civilization (p. 49); derision for the role of the Varangian impact on the life of ancient Russian (p.4), etc. In the centuries following, we find the "objective" report of the bestial deeds of Ivan IV in Livonia (p. 165, 171); the "benefits and blessings" of Russian rule in northern Latvia after the Great Nordic War, in contrast to the "miserable" period of Swedish rule in Livonia (actually an era of prosperity for the Livonian peasants) (p. 287). At the end of this first volume, the first Latvian writers and publicists, who were unfamiliar with the Russian language and mentality, are instructed to "adhere always to the Russian orientation."

Particularly weak are the first few chapters on Latvia's prehistory, since at that time there were no authorities in occupied Latvia on Latvia's early history and prehistory. The authors themselves were aware of this lacuna, as some years ago the Soviet archaeologist, A. Mongait (cf. his *Archaeology in the USSR,* 1959, in which the material on Latvia is very scanty, p. 342 ff.), was compelled to write a special article on this subject in the *Voprosi Istoriyi* (1958, No. 6).

In the foreword to Volume II, we find the following leading ideas: In the first volume the primitive communist organizations and feudalism in Latvia are treated, while the second volume professes to deal with the "problems of the history of Latvia's capitalistic society" from 1861 to 1917, i.e. a span of less than 60 years. A very unique way to establish new periods. Also in the second volume some help from Moscow is noticeable. The head of this rather large assisting commission was Mrs. Pancratova, and later "when the volume was ready for print, the authors got help also from the Historical Institute of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party." Double help "to avoid serious mistakes." (p. 3)

In the bibliography no traces of other interpretations of differing points of view are to be found, which is reminiscent of the German-Balt *Totschweigen,* forged in critical moments of sharp national struggle between the German-Balts and the emerging Latvian intellectuals at the turn of the last century.

The fanatical one-track-mind of the Soviet authors has produced some new facts, especially in demonstrating the growth of socialistic trends in Latvia before the revolution. But to assume generally that all of the developments and achievements of the Latvian people could be included in such a basically distorted picture would mean a total lack of understanding of the real and true value of Latvian culture. It need not be further emphasized that Soviet political and dogmatic shadows throughout this volume are deep and depressing.

Volume III offers the heaviest and most indigestible reading of all. It is impossible to give a reasonable survey of this 800-page volume in a short review. Only a few slogans will be chosen at random to indicate the trends and intents of the authors, and a few quotations concerning the "Latvian bourgeois republic," as the authors have chosen to call the period of Latvia's independence: "The Entente imperialists acted as the most wicked foes of the peoples of the Baltic shores." (p. 222) "Latvia's bourgeoisie pursued an anti-national and anti-Soviet policy. President Ulmanis [who was deported to the Soviet Union, where he died in a Russian prison] had plans to attack Russia." (p. 225) On page 230, however, we read that Lenin had said that "the Balts had no imperialistic plans whatsoever." "The first Parliament of independent Latvia was elected under conditions of the most cruel terror. The exploitation of the working people had no parallel, and the raging of the police knew no limits." (p. 233) P. 243: "the economic development of bourgeois Latvia went in cycles—from one crisis to another." P. 263: The results of the agrarian reform, the basis of independent Latvia's social existence, according to the Bolshevik formula, "The land (estates) was the means of making one part of the population rich and oppressing the other." As Lord Balfour once said, "The Bolsheviks alone possess the secret of how to make all people poor, but they do not have the panacea to make them all rich." P. 275: "The most profitable commerce for Latvia came from the USSR." (Cf. the statistics of that period published by the League of Nations.) To cap all, "The Soviet Government has never ceased its efforts to create peaceful good-neighbor relations with the Baltic Republics." (p. 277)

Regarding cultural developments in independent Latvia, the reader will find no mention of any Latvian scholar among those who managed to escape Communist "blessings" at the end of World War II.

Finally, when we come to the terrible year of 1940, when the Soviet armies invaded Latvia, and the unspeakable horrors of mass arrests and deportations of June, 1940—a date known as the Latvian Night of St. Bartholomew, the reader is spared any mention of these Soviet atrocities, and is instead asked to admire the "spontaneous uprising of the oppressed masses," an exhortation garnished with a considerable amount of graceful and inspiring quotations from the works of Lenin. Thus is presented the end of Latvia's period of self-determination. The Communists continue to exercise supreme authority over that unfortunate country, offering the people "democratic freedom" (p. 473 f.) and "fulfilling the will of the people." (p. 480). This depends upon whom the Bolsheviks classify as "people."

Washington, D. C. A. SPEKKE

MAROLT, MARIJAN, ed., *Zgodovinski zbornik.* Buenos Aires: Slovenska kulturna akcija, 1959. Pp. 212. $2.00. (Obtainable from L.C.S.A., 238 East 19th Street, New York 3, N. Y.)

The historical studies and essays collected in this book excel in quality as well as in originality. In the carefully documented opening study, "St. Bernard's Itinerary in the Years of Anaclet's Schism: 1130 - 1138," P. Maver Grebenc finds F. Jaffé's thesis that the Council of Pisa was held in 1135 untenable in the light of St. Bernard's correspondence. The author places the *generale concilium* in April of 1134, but points out that this event has to be distinguished from the broad period of *concilium pisanum,* which encompasses the entire stay of the Pope and the cardinals in Pisa until June 1136. St. Bernard's possible visit to Stična is not included in the itinerary, but Grebenc shows that this visit, attested by tradition, could have taken place from Aquileia, shortly after the arrival of the first Cistercian monks in Stična in 1132.

Rajko Ložar's study, "Home Industry and Trading in Slovenia," written in 1943-1944 but published only now, contains a wealth of ethnographic and lexicographical material on home-type production of clothing, wooden articles, ceramics, wickerwork, as well as on pre-industrial techniques of iron making, grain milling, etc. The treatment of trading is limited to those aspects in which folklore elements are particularly strong (e.g., country fairs, ambulant traders).

Under the title, "Rome and Baraga's Second Voyage to Europe" Maksimilijan

Jezernik analyzes the events which led to the elevation of the Slovenian-American missionary from vicar apostolic to the Bishop of Sault Saint Marie, in 1856.

The late Bogumil Vošnjak, who represented the Slovenes at the Corfu Conference in 1917, relates in "Constitutional Aspects of the Corfu Declaration," that at the time of the signing of the Declaration, the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes shared the desire for a future unitary state; there were, however, differences of opinion regarding the degree of centralization. Vošnjak adhered to the British system of self-government and, in addition, to a broad regional principle permitting not only decentralization but autonomy and a moderate type of federalism as well. Ante Trumbić wanted only a few functions of the government centralized, leaving much room for autonomy in economic matters, transportation, interior affairs, and justice. Nikola Pašić and the majority in his cabinet believed in the extension of the Serbian administrative system over all Yugoslavia. Stojan Protić, however, was in favor of self-administrative units which would be broader than the Serbian districts; he advocated a flexible system closer to British than to French tradition. The English text of the Corfu Declaration is included at the end of Vošnjak's article.

"Autonomistic Declaration of Slovenian Cultural Workers in 1921," by Fran Erjavec (died in Ljubljana in 1960) provides an interesting insight into the period preceding the Vidovdan Constitution. The author points out that, almost without exception, leading Slovenes always insisted upon the preservation of Slovenian cultural identity, notwithstanding their desire for close political cooperation with other South Slavs. This was also the position Ivan Canker took in answer to neo-illyrian tendencies of 1912-1913. In their Declaration of 1921 the men of whom many represent the peaks of Slovenian cultural achievement adhered to the same principle. The text of the Declaration is reprinted in the article.

Finally, in "Totemism and Shamanism of Chamacocos," Branka Sušnik summarizes the results of her anthropological research during an expedition sponsored by the Paraguay Academy of Sciences. The rich content of this volume should be of particular interest to medieval Church historians and to those specializing in Yugoslav history.

Keuka College — Toussaint Hočevar

Konstantinović, Zoran, *Deutsche Reisebeschreibungen über Serbien und Montenegro.* Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1960. Pp. 240. DM 22.50.

In 1854, Jovan Ristić dedicated a whole essay to an analysis of the "historical significance" of the writings of sixteenth-century German travelers in Serbia. Subsequently most leading Balkan historians have treated the recorded accounts of their countries by Western European travelers as a rich collateral source of pertinent historical information. The present volume deals with the reports made by German travelers in Serbia and Montenegro during the long span of time between the tenth century and the beginning of World War II. It is not a mechanical summation of selected published material but a serious scholarly effort to identify the dominant types of individuals who visited Serbia and Montenegro at different times, to analyze their personal interests and cultural biases, and to assess, as accurately as possible, their usefulness as sources of documentary material.

Ascetic Germans who in the tenth and eleventh centuries traversed the Balkans on their pilgrimages to the Holy Land left the first written accounts of the countries inhabited by South Slavs, the people whom they were wont to label *barbari, crudeles, homicidae.* The Crusades brought more German "observers" and widened the contact between the Western travelers and their unwilling Balkan hosts. Pilgrimages and other holy missions were often mere excuses for flight into foreign lands in search of adventurous exploits; the writings of these adventure-seekers emphasized the real and fancied dangers which encompassed the life of lone wanderers, yet they contained interesting true life episodes and quite often valuable linguistic data.

The Renaissance and Reformation produced a new type of traveler, one who was neither an ascetic refugee nor an adventure-seeker but who was likely to be inspired by a thirst for new knowledge about relatively unknown lands and their peoples. There were also those who came to the Balkans to collect first-hand information on the suffering of Christians under the Turkish yoke. This material was circulated in the West and exploited by those who sought a unity of Christian nations against the swelling Ottoman Empire. But whatever their overt missions or personal proclivities, these writers left rich information covering the cultural spectrum. They were succeeded by new generations of travelers, each a product of a unique *Zeitgeist* and increasingly more deliberate and sophisticated in recording pertinent information. The interest of German *literati* in Serbian folk ballads opened a new and perhaps the richest chapter in the history of cultural relations between the Germans and the Serbs. Otto Dubislav v. Pirch, who combined an ability for minute observation with scholarly zeal, "regarded the Serbian people primarily as poets and creators. In the folk ballads he sought to find an artistic expression of the soul of these people." (p. 59) The author presents in significant detail the views of such modern travelers-observers as Pirch, S. Kapper, F. P. Kanitz, and H. Wendel. Unfortunately, he devotes the largest part of the book to the material covering the period from the beginning of the nineteenth century to the end of the 1930s: this is the period for which information of this kind is not as essential as it is for earlier centuries, for which there is a dearth of historically significant documentary sources.

To the specialist this volume opens the doors to important sources, summed up, critically examined, and bolstered by bibliographical hints, while providing the general reader with fast-moving and dramatic glimpses of the cultural and social history of Serbia and Montenegro. Both the specialist and the general reader will find the book steeped in information which is at the same time exciting and ethnographically rewarding. It is a welcome addition to the fast-growing literature on cultural relations between the Germans and individual South Slav peoples.

San Jose State College ALEXANDER VUCINICH

STUPPERICH, ROBERT, ed., *Kirche im Osten. Studien zur osteuropäischen Kirchengeschichte und Kirchenkunde.* In Verbindung mit dem Ostkircheninstitut. Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk. Band III, 1960, pp. 192; DM 9.80; Band IV, 1961, pp. 192, DM 15.80.

The yearbook *Kirche im Osten,* published in cooperation with the Protestant "Ostkircheninstitut" of Münster University, resumed in 1958 the tradition of *Kyrios,* a German quarterly for the ecclesiastical and intellectual history of Eastern Europe which was published between 1936 and 1943 (a new *Kyrios* has recently started publication). The yearbook, by its chronicle "Die Kirche im Osten," is closer to the contemporary scene than the general historical journals dealing with Eastern Europe in the German language—the *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* (Munich), the *Forschungen zur osteuropäischen Geschichte* (West Berlin) and the *Zeitschrift für Ostforschung* (Marburg). Each volume is divided into three sections: Articles; Church chronicle; and book reviews. The emphasis is on the Russian Orthodox Church. Such well-known scholars as Bertold Spuler ("Volkstum und Kirche in der orientalischen Welt," Vol. III), R. A. Klostermann (two contributions dealing with the Athos visit of Rev. Robert Frew just before the outbreak of the First World War, Vol. II and Vol. IV, and an extended review of Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im Byzantinischen Reich,* in Vol. III), Ludolf Müller und Robert Stupperich make *Kirche im Osten* worthy of the attention of American scholars, inasmuch as work on the history of the Russian Church by American historians is still limited to a very small group (see *American Research on Russia,* ed. by Harold H. Fisher. Bloomington, 1959, p. 70 f.).

A few hints must suffice to convey an idea of the variegated content of the last two volumes of the yearbook. To the field of Russian Church history belong: "The charitable activity and religious significance of the Russian women's monasteries at the turn of the 18th Century" (Claire L. Claus, Vol. IV); "The influence of liberal Protestantism on the theology of Russian laymen in the 19th Century" (especially on Tolstoi and Dostoievsky) by Ludolf Müller (Vol. III); "The Arch-Priest John of Kronstadt [1829-1909]" (with a hint of his mounting veneration by Russian Orthodox groups in USA) by Peter Hauptmann (Vol. III), and "The 'Living Church' (Zhivaia Tserkov)"—its history in the early 1920s based on notes written in 1924 by the Metropolitan Seraphim (Lade)—by Robert Stupperich (Vol. III). An article of H. Skrobucha in Vol. IV describes the little-known West-German center for the study of icons, the Recklinghausen "Ikonenmuseum" which was opened in 1956; backed by a Society of Friends of the Art of the Icons, it is about to publish the first volume of a yearbook devoted to "Ikonenkunst," iconography, and the theology of the icons.

Ukrainian religious history is represented by Rudolf Gundlach's "Church and sacrament in the *Confessio orthodoxa* of Petrus Mogila" (Vol. IV) and Oskar Wagner's article on the Protestant movement among the East Galician Ukrainians between 1925 and 1933 (*ibid.*). Eduard Kupsch stresses the Polish authorship (Pawel Włodkowic) of the *Speculum aureum de titulis beneficiorum* (1404), giving full credit to the research of František M. Bartoš, first made known in the *Věstnik České Akademie* of 1944.

In the "Chronicle" of the churches of the East comprising the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia surveys written by two assistants of the Münster institute, Peter Hauptmann (Soviet Union) and Georg Wild (Yugoslavia), are especially noteworthy; they contain much information which cannot easily be found elsewhere. Hauptmann has also reviewed (in Vols. II and IV) publications on the Raskol.

Bonn University FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

BASDEVANT, DENISE, *Terres roumaines: contre vents et marées.* Paris: Les Editions de l'Épargne, 1961. Pp. 192.

A brief popular survey of a nation's history is not likely to attract much notice unless there is something extraordinary about the circumstances or about the text itself. Mme. Basdevant's book deserves a special welcome on both counts. First, because it concerns one of those nations of Eastern Europe where today what is being written on its soil as history is in large part a carefully constructed mythology serving the interests of the current regime. It is important that the world have put before it from time to time historical works which, though they may be tinged with mythology of another kind (in this case, the romantic nationalism that colored most of the historical writing in that part of Europe in the pre-Communist period), are still basically inspired by the search for truth. Secondly, this particular book has something extra to offer by virtue of the author's decision to forget about balance and devote the entire second half of it to the twentieth cenury.

Thus while the centuries from the Roman conquest of Dacia to 1919 are covered in a reasonably accurate summary of standard historical works, it is so summary a summary that little more than the bare bones are there. For the contemporary era, on the other hand, we are given a solid narrative which, so far as the years between 1944 and 1948 are concerned, is perhaps the best presentation that exists in any language. A fact in the author's favor is that she resided during some of those critical years in Rumania, when her husband was serving in the French diplomatic service. One can find errors of fact if one searches diligently for them, but they are few. The general point of view is not disguised. What took place in these years was the stifling by force and fraud of all hope for freedom, a subject on which the author pretends to no false impartiality. Because she was dependent principally on Rumanian sources, her account inevitbly reflects the bitterness which Western-oriented Rumanians felt not against the Russians and the local Communists, who acted as they expected them to act, but also against the Western powers, by whom they felt let down and betrayed.

The hero of the book is the grand old man of Rumanian politics, Iuliu Maniu. He was the last of that series of national leaders of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who had created the modern Rumanian state. Although the "greater Rumania" which arose from the ashes of the first World War and came to grief in the second never lived up to his expectations, he remained the symbol of hopes for democratic freedom and national independence. Mme. Basdevant catches the poignancy of his trial and imprisonment by the Communists in 1947. With the silencing of Maniu and his colleagues were extingushed the hopes of all Rumanians who had tried to seek for their country a future based on the ideals of the West. The trial of Maniu, therefore, was also a trial of the West and a measure of its failure in Eastern Europe. The author does not show just how the Western powers could have brought about a different outcome. But her story shows clearly enough how feeble was the effort they made.

Council on Foreign Relations JOHN C. CAMPBELL
New York City

SUTTER, BERTHOLD, *Die Badenischen Sprachenverordnungen von 1897, ihre Genesis und ihre Auswirkungen vornehmlich auf die innerösterreichischen Alpenländer.* Vol. I (Verböffentlichungen der Kommission für neuere Geschichte Österreichs, Band 46) Graz-Köln: Verlag Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger, 1960. Pp. 310. DM 20.

We have come to expect certain things of a work by a German historian treating Bohemia, German-Czech relations, or the Austrian nationalities problem. We expect to find the Czech national renaissance deplored, with Palacký playing a heavy role; we expect to find a little amazement and deep hurt that the Czechs did not confess themselves to be Germans in 1848; we expect to find that the Austrian national controversies of the nineteenth century were initiated, groundlessly and intemperately, by the Czechs, with Germans only responding in kind after being forced to the wall; and, finally, we expect some expression of outraged innocence at the *Vertreibung* of 1945, an event which saddens us all, but as a justification, *ex post facto,* for any and all possible German shortcomings in the past, but which just *might* be an unhappily chosen, uncondonable, reaction to past

German conduct. This first volume of Sutter's proposed two does not disappoint our expectations.

Sutter begins the story of Badeni's *Verordnungen* of 1897 with an account of the times of Joseph II. The events of 1620, 1627, and all that, are not considered in this background. The nationalities conflicts through 1848 and the attempts to reach compromises up to 1890 are reviewed to the extent of half the length of the book. Having once set the stage so that the passion, contumely, and stubborn demands of the Germans appear somewhat more understandable than those of the Czechs, Sutter impartially points out that both sides failed in statesmanship in treating their national differences. While indicating that Badeni was not so black a character as he has been painted, Sutter shows that the Prime Minister must nevertheless bear a great deal of the blame for the failure of the *Verordnungen*, and, ultimately, of Austria. Badeni, ambitious, not overburdened with scruples, and politically insensitive, overestimated the political value of the Young Czechs, and his need of them for the forthcoming economic negotiations with the Hungarians, while, at the same time, he underestimated the depth of national feeling among the German parties. His language ordinances, forced by decree upon Bohemia, and later upon Moravia, at an unpropitious time, were not only poorly conceived as to practical application, but they would also make Czech nearly equal to German in the courts and civil administration of Bohemia. This was an affront unbearable to the Germans both within and without Bohemia, for it meant that Germans must learn both tongues, as the Czechs had long had to do, if they were to compete for government positions. The Germans must have felt that their linguistic abilities were inferior to those of the Czechs, for they feared that the latter might now regain dominance in their own land by gaining all the positions and offices of government by reason of their command of both languages. Such a turn of events might set a bad precedent elsewhere in the monarchy.

Sutter concludes this first volume with a description of the immediate and violent reactions to the ordinances by which Germans began that most unseemly obstructionism that soon lamed Austrian parliamentarism entirely, and by which the more radical Czechs threw oil on the fire with demands for more than was granted in the ordinances. The balance of this sad narrative is reserved for the second volume of the work.

Sutter has based his study on an extensive literature and published sources, listed in the bibliography, and on archival materials until now unworked. He affords us great detail from his sources—certainly a service, but one which sometimes makes the reading heavy going. In the appendices the author favors the reader with the texts of various proposed and issued language ordinances dating from 1871 to 1899. Happily, the footnotes, which are many, sometimes lengthy, and informative, are located at the foot of the page where they belong—a practice that should be more often imitated.

Aside from the colored interpretations inspired by national sympathies, Sutter's work is a very useful, scholarly book based on solid, and sometimes new, archival material. Judged overall, the first volume prepares a welcome for the second to come.

University of Minnesota WILLIAM E. WRIGHT

WYTRWAL, JOSEPH A., *America's Polish Heritage—A Social History of the Poles in America.* Detroit: Endurance Press. Pp. 350. $6.50.

This is not a definitive history of the Poles in America, as the author himself frankly admits, whether from a social, economic, or any other angle. It is not comprehensive enough and, in many respects (especially from the statistical point of view), not reliable enough. The author occasionally wanders off into by-paths that have little connection with the subject at hand (as, for example, the controversy between the Warsaw and the Kraków schools of Polish historiography), disregarding the reader's desire to know more about the 5 to 6 million Americans of Polish blood or ancestry. Yet, despite its many shortcomings and weaknesses, it is a good book; the best single volume so far available on the subject. It reads well and is a useful reference volume.

Among the many writers, Poles and Americans, who have had something to say about "The Poles in America," the following deserve special mention: Father Wacław Kruszka (*Historja Polska w Ameryce,* 1905, 13 small volumes; and *Siedm Siedmioleci czyli Pół Wieku Zycia,* 1924, 2 large volumes); W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (*The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* 1918, 2 volumes); and Miecislaus Haiman, the author of about a dozen books and monographs on the Polish past in America. Father Kruszka's books are no longer descriptive of the present situation. The Thomas-Znaniecki's *Polish Peasants* (an excellent sociological study based for the most part on original letters) are no longer Polish peasants in America. Their children and grandchildren are now full-fledged American citizens, engaged in industry, business and the various free professions. Mr. Haiman deals with selected topics, for the most part with Polish pioneers, never attempting a synthesis.

Dr. Wytrwal has given us a summary of the contributions of most of his predecessors, and has tried to bring the story up-to-date. However, the account is neither complete nor quite up-to-date even in those elements he covers. After the introduction, a short sociological treatise on acculturation, Dr. Wytrwal has thirteen chapters—from Historical Background of Poland to Jamestown Revisited—including: Pioneer Polish Immigrants, 1608-1776; Political Immigrants, 1776-1870; Economic Emigration, 1870-1929; Causes for Polish Emigration to America; The Organization of Poles in America; Activities of the Polish National Alliance; Activities of the Polish Roman Catholic Union; The PNA and PRCU Compared; Dissolution and Asseveration; American Polonia During World War II; Polish-American Cultural Relationships. At the end there is an extensive (but not critically chosen) bibliography of 294 items, most of which may prove useful to future writers on the subject. And there are several Appendices of statistical information, interesting enough for general orientation purposes though some of the tables are not quite reliable—as the author makes plain in the text.

Though most of the book contains information already published, some of it from second- and third-hand sources, it is an intelligent synthesis, and a great deal of it reflects the author's own thinking. The chapters on Causes for Polish Emigration to America and The Organization of Poles in America are among the best.

The authors experienced some difficulties with figures when calculating how many Poles and Americans of Polish descent there are now in the U.S.A. and how many Poles there were at a given time (due to the inadequacy of official book-keeping on the national origin of immigrants). Some of the other numbers given are subject to a more thorough investigation. For example (p. 65): "At the time of the Civil War there were some 30,000 Poles in the United States. Of this number, 4,000 fought in the ranks of the Union army and 1,000 served the Confederacy." This may be true, but perhaps more thorough research would be necessary, beyond the authority given. The same question applies to another set of figures (p. 98): "In World War II more than 900,000 served in the Armed Forces. According to Army and Navy records, approximately twenty per cent of the United States Armed

Forces on the eve of World War II consisted of men of Polish extraction." Why not give a specific reference to Army and Navy records (if the two services have information on the national origin of the men in service)? Another example, taken at random (p. 78 f.): "By 1889, there were approximately 800,000 Poles in the United States." And a few lines below the author gives another figure from another authority: "In 1890 [one year later], there were in this country 147,440 persons born in Poland." Which is correct, or "approximately" so? And still another set of figures (p. 100): "New York is in the first place with 404,000 Poles followed by Chicago with 316,000 Poles." When it comes to Poles, or rather Americans of ethnic Polish lineage, the New York figure has to be divided (approximately) by 2 and the Chicago figure (according to claims by the Chicago leaders of Polonia there) must be multiplied by 2. At any rate Chicago is the leading "Polish" city.

The author was also a little careless about Polish-American names and the evaluation of their contributions. It was Joseph Mruz, not Mruc, who was the first mayor of Polish descent in Buffalo. It is Jerzy (not Artur) Bojanowski who is an orchestra conductor now living in Milwaukee. Prof. W. Swietoslawski, an outstanding physical chemist, is not a Polish-American. He was a Polish war refugee, lived in America for a few years, and returned to Poland a good many years ago. The author places Wanda Landowska and Gilda Gray on the same level of achievement (pp. 80-83).

But on the whole this is a useful and provocative book, which should stimulate further researches.

Kosciuszko Foundation S. P. Mizwa
New York City

Bry, Gerhard, *Wages in Germany 1871-1945*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1960. Pp. xxvi, 486. $10.00.

Gerhard Bry, a member of the faculty of the Rutgers University School of Business and also a member of the Research Staff of the National Bureau of Economic Research, has organized material from a wide range of sources into this highly readable and illuminating monograph on German wage trends. His analysis is presented in topical form, each topic being surveyed historically. These topics include hourly and weekly trends in money and real wages, regional, industrial, sex, age and skill differentials, the relationship of wages to business cycles, the impact of war and national socialism on wages and an overall comparison of the wage trends prevailing in Germany since 1871 with those obtaining in Great Britain and the United States. An extensive use of tables and charts graphically points up his main statistical findings.

The comparison of wage trends in Germany with those in Great Britain and the United States over the same period lend a special interest to the author's conclusions since the economic, political and social *milieu* in these countries was divergent in so many respects while being so strikingly similar in others. Thus, hourly money wages in Germany rose about fourfold, against a nearly sevenfold rise in Great Britain and the United States, while weekly real wages increased only 55 per cent in Germany, compared to 80 per cent in Great Britain and 300 per cent in the United States. If we must assume, as the author does, that real wages are closely related to productivity, this would suggest that productivity rose more rapidly in Great Britain, and even more so in the United States, than it did in Germany. The disparity between hourly money wages and weekly real wages, at least in part, reflects the shortening working week in all three countries. In Germany the average working week contracted from about seventy to about forty-eight hours during this period.

The author found that wages were relatively stable, in contrast to prices, weekly wages fluctuating more than hourly rates, and that wages lagged far behind up turns in the business cycle in all three countries. The economic dislocations of the interwar years, especially severe in Germany, are reflected in the behavior of wages, though it may seem ironical that the first and last five years of the Weimar Republic were very trying ones, in terms of real wages. In fact, the latter period, as well as the half decade following the 1875 economic crisis, witnessed the most prolonged declines in real wages during that three-quarter century. It will not surprise the reader to learn that the Nazi dictatorship, with its growing demands on the country's manpower, quickly reversed the deteriorating wage trends initiated by the great depression.

Professor Bry found a very close relationship between real wages and general economic conditions, especially as measured by per capita national income. He also found that there was a striking tendency on the part of sex, industry, skill, regional and age wage differentials to level off, reflecting, in part, the progressive evolution of a national labor market, the impact of organized labor and tendencies toward mechanization inherent in industry itself.

This is a solid and scholarly contribution to the growing but still woefully inadequate literature on the behavior of wages and prices. Inevitably, such a work must have some limitations, the most obvious being that of time and space. Among the various limitations which the author set for himself, his exclusion of the study of so-called fringe benefits was especially unfortunate. This is doubly regrettable. In the first place, this factor reduced apparent real wages, especially during the last generation when social security legislation became almost universal in the Western world and hence introduced an artificial bias by understating labor's share in the national product. It is unfortunate also because these fringe benefits have loomed large during the last several decades. Thus we have a distorted impression of real wages at the very time when the working week is undergoing its greatest hourwise contraction.

In the main, Professor Bry's findings agree with the wage index compiled for Germany for the years 1820-1935 by the well-known statistician R. Kuczynski and the more comprehensive studies of labor conditions in Germany published by his son Jürgen, works acknowledged by the author. Though Jürgen Kuczynski's analyses of wage and price behavior, especially when related to entrepreneurial income, were calculated to confirm his Marxian premises, he took both fringe benefits and unemployment into account. Whatever fallacies or distortions may have derived from Kuczynski's special preoccupation with German postwar inflation and the depression years, one cannot help wondering why the author did not make more of unemployment data and the impact of that recurring phenomenon on wage behavior.

Pennsylvania State University Alfred G. Pundt

Šepić, Dragovan, *Supilo Diplomat, Rad Frana Supila u Emigraciji 1914-1917 godine* [Supilo the Diplomat, The Activity of Frano Supilo in Emigration 1914-1917]. Zagreb: Naprijed Publ. Comp., 1961. Pp. 275.

More than ever before the amazing political personality of Frano Supilo (1870-1917) continues to fascinate contemporary Yugoslav historiographers.

In this volume, Dragovan Šepić, after several other contributions on Supilo's diplomatic activities, sums up all his diligent research by giving us a full version of Supilo's tremendously active and dynamic diplomacy as it evolved after his first appearance in exile in 1914 and until the time of his death in 1917. These dramatic years in world politics were of great significance to the South Slav exiles from the Habsburg Empire, who endeavored to form a state together with the representatives of the Serbian Government.

Supilo, possibly one of the most impressive political figures of the beginning of this century in Croatia, an author of the Serbo-Croatian coalition (1904) and later one of the founders of Yugoslavia, went into exile in 1914. Together with other prominent Croats from the Dual Empire he resolutely worked for the dissolution of the Empire and the formation of Yugoslavia. Together with Ante Trumbić and Ivan Meštrović he was one of the most able and brilliant members of the newly founded Yugoslav Committee, an association of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes from the Empire. A publicist and a clever politician, Supilo outdid all his colleagues in his capacity to contact important, key people in the Allied world, and to convince them of the necessity to destroy the Habsburg Empire and create Yugoslavia. Šepić brings into new light Supilo's encounters with Sir Edward Grey of England, Delcassé of France, Sazonov of Russia and many others who were often stunned by Supilo's powerful arguments in favor of a new Europe. In this Supilo was helped by British and other Allied writers and historians, namely R. W. Seton-Watson, H. Wickham Steed, and Guglielmo Ferrero who deeply trusted his political judgment.

For the first time, this book clarifies the inside conflict that went on among the Croats and the Serbs. Though the initial contacts between Supilo and Nikola Pašić, the prime minister of the Serbian Government, were friendly and hopeful for the future, they later became hostile and deadlocked the unifying process in Yugoslavia. The reason for the Supilo-Pašić conflict is also found in the events that took place after Italy's entry into the Entente. Sonnino's opposition to a Yugoslavia that might become a serious threat to Italy in the Adriatic had much to do with the internal divisions of the South Slavs. The Treaty of London (1915) worsened those relations. Supilo who, at the time, was in Russia, found out with bitter disappointment that even the Petrograd Government, which he hoped would protect the South Slavs, had yielded to Italy's demand for the Croatian lands on the Adriatic. It appears, according to Šepić's documentation, that for a while only a Greater Serbia would be planned, with a small Croatia without Dalmatia. Tsarist Russia seemed anxious to defend only the Orthodox Slavs, leaving the Catholics to fend for themselves. Under these circumstances this also seemed to be the opinion of the Serbian leader Pašić.

This interlude in Serbo-Croatian relations in exile—later to become between two wars a real and permanent drama—was responsible for the crisis between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government. It, moreover, divided the Yugoslav Committee, and Supilo was one of those who left it. Supilo, who in the beginning of his exile was a firm believer in the principle "Yugoslavia—or nothing", now became convinced that to satisfy all her different people Yugoslavia had to be built on the principle of "equality," "without domination of one people over the other." If "for any reason that should not be possible," Šepić explains, closely following Supilo's thinking, "then a separate Croatian state should be allowed to exist side by side with Serbia, accepting all the Yugoslavs who want to join it." In other words, Supilo advocated a "new," possibly federal Yugoslav state over against Pašić's centralistic concept, a mere extension of a Greater Serbia. This predicament of Supilo points the way to the tragic unfolding of events that would later make Yugoslavia weak and fragile as a national composition.

However, Supilo, though not present at Corfu when the Declaration between the Yugoslav Committee and the Serbian Government was signed in 1917, accepted without reservations the principles announced in it. His last meeting with Trumbić and Pašić in London, after Corfu, gave him the opportunity to underwrite the Serbo-Croat agreement. But Supilo was already a very sick man and his untimely disappearance deeply affected Yugoslav politics.

This extremely valuable work sheds new light on our understanding of the preliminary efforts to form Yugoslavia. It is highly documented from previously unused Yugoslav and other archival material. Its importance as compared with prewar historical works or with some foreign works on the same subject consists in the fact that Šepić is not afraid to expose the painful struggle that went on before the formation of Yugoslavia. Once more it makes clear that the Yugoslav-minded Croats had to relapse into the idea of a separate and independent Croatian state after the Serbs insisted that Yugoslavia be treated as Great Serbia.

The author has made some minor mistakes such as identifying the Italian writer Mrs. Gino Lombroso as the daughter of Guglielmo Ferrero. She was his wife.

Fairleigh Dickinson University BOGDAN RADITSA

VIEFHAUS, ERWIN, *Die Minderheitenfrage und die Entstehung der Minderheitenschutzverträge auf der Pariser Friedenskonferenz 1919. Eine Studie zur Geschichte des Nationalitätenproblems im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.* Würzburg: Holzner Verlag, 1960. Pp. 244. DM 24.-

This is a seriously written, painstakingly documented work dealing with the complex question of the rights and the protection of minorities in those Central and East European states which were referred to as *Zwischeneuropa* between the two World Wars.

There are no brilliant new ideas in this book but there emerges a sharp and penetrating analysis of the failure, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, by the "Big Four" members to cope with the demands and exaggerated expectations of newly created nation-states and with the prevailing spirit of nineteenth century nationalism, then rampant in Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Viefhaus presents first a historical background of the various attempts to solve the problem of minority rights, especially in old Austria, within this multinational Empire, using Professor Jellinek's *Staatslehre* as a point of departure. He then tries to find the various interpretations of "self-determination" in President Wilson's Fourteen Points and comments on the appearance of the protection of minorities as part of the American peace program. A group of U. S. government experts issued a memorandum as early as December 22, 1917, stating: "If Posen and Silesia go to Poland rigid protection must be afforded the minorities of Germans and Jews living there as well as in other parts of the Polish state." Even the French Government, as late as January 5, 1919, made proposals concerning the free determination of the peoples combined with the rights of ethnical and religious minorities.

But, as the Conference progressed, it was the objection of the British Government which eventually killed President Wilson's proposals to write strong protective laws for minorities into the peace treaties of the *Zwischeneuropa* states.

Throughout his book Mr. Viefhaus accentuates the participation of an American Jewish delegation in Paris which was deeply concerned with the problem of Jewish minority rights in Eastern Europe. Mr. Viefhaus deals extensively with the proposals of the "Comité des Délégations Juives auprès de la Conférence de la Paix" and with the discussions which the Americans—Julian W. Mack and Louis Marshall (both members of this committee)—carried on with David Hunter Miller, one of the chief legal advisors to President Wilson. But their hope to create "national cultural autonomies" for minorities as a political institutional basis for the whole new Eastern and Middle European nation-state community did not materialize. The final weak formulation, accepted by Mr. Wilson himself, in the treaty with Poland (which was afterwards used as the sample treaty for other countries) merely said: "Poland agrees . . . to protect the interest of inhabitants in Poland who differ from the majority of the population in race, language, or religion."

Mr. Viefhaus uses David Hunter Miller's *Diary* and the recently available recollections of the Chief Interpreter Paul Mantoux to draw his conclusions about the final signing of the treaties at the Peace Conference. He does not accuse President Wilson directly of partiality towards Poland and Czechoslovakia but he considers Wilson's personal feelings a contributing factor in his change of position. He also deplores the American President's inability to understand European nationality problems. Messrs. Beneš, Paderewski and Bratianu won their game at the Conference table because Wilson finally abandoned his original ideas and drafts which would have secured much stronger measures of protection for national minorities in Central and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Viefhaus' book was originally accepted as a Ph.D. dissertation by the University of Cologne in 1958. It is now published as volume 11 of the *Marburger Ostforschungen,* edited by Hellmuth Weiss.

Wayne State University MARGARET STERNE

DELZELL, CHARLES F., *Mussolini's Enemies: The Italian Anti-Fascist Resistance.* Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961. Pp. xix, 620. $12.50.

The author of this comprehensive and most readable study on the nature, significance, and extent of the anti-Fascist struggle against Mussolini's regime has been studying the subject since 1943, during service with the American Army in Italy. Since then he has had the opportunity to examine carefully much of the highly tendentious information on the subject; new documents published on the tenth anniversary of the liberation (1955); primary sources, including memoirs and diaries; overt and covert newspapers and pamphlets; and other non-Italian official documentation. The result is an objective and scholarly study on the political and socio-economic history of Italy from the advent of Mussolini in 1922 to European integration and the constitution of the Republic in 1948.

The book is divided into two almost equal parts. In the first, Professor Delzell delves deeply into the clandestine activities of Mussolini's enemies both in and outside of Italy from 1922 to September 8, 1943. In addition to the activities of the militant leaders of the proscribed leftist parties, outlawed labor unionists, liberal journalists, professional men, and academicians, the author reviews the role played by the Communist Party from 1934, when the Popular Front came into being, to its end in 1939; and the intervention in the Spanish Civil War by the ill-fated Roselli brothers and the Social-Communist leaders. Mussolini's determination to thrust Italy into the Second World War against the advice of his chiefs of staff and political leaders, gave the *fuorusciti* an opportunity to stiffen their resistance. Among other things, new foreign centers were organized in the United States and a Pan American Congress was held in Montevideo in 1942. Meanwhile, the opposition parties were revived with what became known as "the unity of action." The first part ends with an examination of the high lights of the conspiracies including the imbroglio that followed the completion of the armistice.

The second part opens with the Armed Resistance, (September 8, 1943, to April 25, 1945), and discusses in detail such topics as the partisan movement, the confusion that prevailed in the King's Italy (September 9, 1943, to June 4, 1944), the resurgence of the underground (January to June 1944), the ascendancy of the Committee of National Liberation (June 5 to November 3, 1944), the crisis that developed during the winter (November 1944 to March 1945), and the final insurrection (March to May 2, 1945). This was the period during which anti-Fascism and anti-Nazism were more strongly felt by the mass of the Italians in the unredeemed North than in the South which had been emancipated by the Allies. In the final chapter, "Balance Sheet," Professor Delzell weighs the contributions of the Armed Resistance, the demobilization and disarmament that resulted from the advent of Parri and De Gasperi, and the European integration that followed the constitution of the Republic.

Perhaps the most interesting part of the book is that dealing with the wartime partisan movement and with the underground Committee of National Liberation in northern Italy (where Mussolini had established his puppet government) and their relationship with the democratic forces in the South which, meanwhile, had been liberated by the Allies. There is abundant evidence to prove that Italy's *Resistenza Armata* proved itself to be one of the most effective weapons against Nazi-dominated Europe, for it succeeded in liberating most of the major cities of Northern Italy well in advance of the arrival of the Allies. Professor Delzell is not surprised at this achievement, since it represented the final phase of the resistance offered by the anti-Fascist forces in over two decades, both at home and abroad.

Professor Delzell's study throws considerable light on the record of this comprehensive underground struggle against Mussolini's dictatorship, a phase of Italian history that regrettably has been ignored by scholars and, therefore, the least well-known. Although Professor Delzell states that his account is neither definitive nor completely impartial, an achievement which is difficult of attainment under the best of circumstances and certainly unlikely when one is writing on such a contemporary and controversial subject as the Italian Resistance, this reviewer believes that he has written the first complete, objective account on this subject. Though he has weighed the evidence before him with impartiality, Professor Delzell, admittedly an American democrat, acknowledges his own bias in the interpretation and treatment of the subject. Nevertheless, he has produced, in the judgment of this reviewer, a work free of local partisanship and nationalism. His relative disinterestedness has enabled him to steer clear of many of the dangers to which he could easily have fallen prey. The study is supplied with excellent notes, a bibliographical note, and a serviceable index.

Columbia University HOWARD R. MARRARO

ERLICH, ALEXANDER, *The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1924-1928.* Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xxiii, 216.

Based on original sources, this thought-provoking study, published as Vol. 41 of the Russian Research Center of Harvard, will be most useful to students of Soviet history and of Communist economic policies. As suggested in the title, the

"Industrialization Debate" reached its climax in the years 1924-28; however, its roots can be traced back to the ideological discussions of the NEP and even the prerevolutionary era on the "true" meaning of socialism and on the problem of Russian "uniqueness." Also, some of the battles of the Soviet "Industrialization Debate" have been fought over again, *mutatis mutandis* but with extreme bitterness, in varied parts of the enlarged Soviet orbit after World War II. Mr. Erlich's topic deserves additional attention due to the growing importance of underdeveloped areas in the power struggle between East and West; in this new competition for technological progress and modernization of the economies, an increasing number of recently emerged nations have to choose between a Western type, "spontaneous" economic development and a highly centralized, rigidly controlled, "Soviet type" economy. One may hope, to be sure, that a "third road" based on a "mixed" economic structure will be feasible for the former colonial countries, but the outcome of present trends is far from obvious.

Mr. Erlich is well aware of the ramifications of his subject. After the successes of the NEP, accomplishing essentially the tasks of economic recovery from the war, the Soviet Government had to come to grips with the demands of "reconstruction," i.e., the necessity of enlarging Russia's capacity for economic growth. Lenin's death in January 1924 resulting in sharp political rivalries among his successors, and the consolidation of the surrounding hostile, "capitalistic" world forcing the regime to rely more and more upon domestic resources, set the stage for the critical transition from the NEP to the period of Five Year Plans. Beyond a general direction, old Marxist concepts failed to provide practical guidance for transformation of a society in which economic conditions were different from those analyzed by Marx. Thus the Soviet economists of the twenties had both to recast their orthodox Marxian conceptual framework and to adapt their theoretical tenets to the general political strategy of the party. This twofold task demanded a considerable amount of political sophistication as well as an insight into the practical problems of the time.

Part I of the book explores the views of the leading contestants of the debate and the changes which some of them underwent in the process of the discussion. The Bukharin-Rykov group argued that the key problem of the Soviet economy revolved around the relations between state industry and peasant agriculture, the development of the first depending on the rise of the second; therefore, no preponderance should be given to any particular section of the economy. These theories are contrasted in the book with the moderate tenets of Shanin and Sokol'nikov who, in line with Lenin's directives for the NEP, wanted to open up trade between small-scale industry and peasant farming, thus using small-scale production to reactivate idle productive capacity and also to promote long-range economic development. These "rightist" concepts, however, were attacked by the left-wing opposition led by Trotsky. The ecnomic tenets of "left communism" were best represented in the writings of Preobrazhenski who, under the double pressure of extreme capital shortage and a growing farm surplus population, was in favor of a "primitive socialist accumulation" to be brought about by shifting productive resources from the private to the socialized sector of the economy, and by accelerating socialist industrialization through adequate tax and price policies and through the monopoly of foreign trade. Drastic increase of industrial investments, at the expense of taxing the "rich" peasants, however, was bound to result in a curtailment of much-needed marketable agricultural surpluses. An attempt at breaking through the vicious circle, created by the lack of investable resources and the desperate need for quick increase in production, was made by Bazarov, who tried to work out a middle ground synthesis of the ideas of the "superindustrialist" Preobrazhenski-Shanin and the Bukharin-Rykov group. In his critical analysis, the author points out the shortcomings of all bolshevik economic theories of the twenties; describing the original blueprints, he repeatedly refers to the political premises and military considerations on which the blueprints were built. But, in the second part of his book, Mr. Erlich also carefully stresses that in the twenties the basic ideas of Left, Right or Center all "reflected not the 'ideological' juggling of facts and theoretical concepts but a genuine effort to come to grips with complex and intractable realities . . ." In this respect, the intellectual climate of the "Industrial Debate," in spite of its ideological implications, was a far cry from Stalin's subsequent "revolution from above."

The last chapter of the first half of Mr. Erlich's book deals, under the telling title of "An Exercise in Evasion," with Stalin's "pure and simple" Bukharinite position prior to the Fifteenth Party Congress. Restating the major issues of the "Industrial Debate" in terms of Western economic analysis in the second half of the work, the author concludes his book with a reappraisal of Soviet economic forces and possibilities. He contends that toward the end of the great debate the two main opponents were reasonably close to each other. Bukharin and his supporters admitted the inevitability of discontinuous economic growth even under Russian conditions, while Preobrazhenski became increasingly aware of the risks involved in rapid industrialization. But the Fifteenth Congress expelled the leadership of the left-wing opposition from the party in December 1927 while paying lip service to the necessity of a balanced economic development in the resolutions of the Congress; in less than two years, Stalin denounced the "rightist deviation" of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomski, proclaiming the goals of the First Five Year Plan in terms of which the most ardent "superindustrializers" had never before dreamed. Stalin's totalitarian methods, ignoring the basic demands of human beings and the traditional patterns of society, did not refrain from manipulating allegedly objective social forces or from using every means in order to stamp out manifestations of opposition to élitist conceptions. The introduction of a new totalitarian code into Soviet reality sealed the fate of all leading participants of the "Industrial Debate" —they all perished in the purges of the thirties.

The student of recent Central European history will have to agree with Mr. Erlich's conclusions given at the end of his book. The post-Stalin era witnessed an interesting revival of some ideas of the great debate, and not only in what is being considered as "revisionism" by the official party line. As a matter of fact, well before the Hungarian and Polish events of 1956, end even prior to the "new course" in Hungary initiated (with the approval of Moscow, to be sure) by Imre Nagy, the latter was accused by economic dictator Ernö Gerö of being a Bukharinite. It is perhaps more ironical that the Hungarian Stalinist leader, Rákosi, repeatedly referred in his speeches to the "hens that laid the golden eggs"—a metaphor first used by Bukharin in support of his "rightist" views. Apparently, political catchwords have their fate in the Soviet world, too.

Mr. Erlich's informative book is supplemented by a brief chronology of key events for the period 1921-1929 and by a number of valuable notes. The explanatory notes run parallel to the text, whereas the references are at the end of the book, following the bibliography of the sources cited.

University of Denver GEORGE BARANY

BRACHER, KARL DIETRICH, WOLFGANG SAUER and GERHARD SCHULZ, *Die nationalsozialistiche Machtergreifung. Studien zur Errichtung des totalitären Herr-*

schaftssystems in Deutschland 1933/34. (Schriften des Instituts für Politische Wissenschaft. Band 14). Köln-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1960. Pp. 972. DM 59.-

Those familiar with the readability of K. D. Bracher's *Auflösung der Weimarer Republik* (3. Auflage, Stuttgart-Düsseldorf, 1960) may be disappointed with this tripartite work in the same series. While maintaining the standards of objectivity and research depth of the other studies of the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft of the Freie Universität Berlin, this massive joint enterprise is tiresomely dull and amorphous in structure. Almost more regrettable is its failure, in spite of the fantastic amount of detail and numerous new insights, to achieve what so many of us hoped for—the status of a definitive work. Undoubtedly its size and coverage will discourage scholars from repeating the same operation. (We hope so!) However, a single author will some day have to synthesize, explain and relate what the three young German scholars have dug out, using, as they were apparently unable to do—except in token quantities—the Nazi Party records of the U. S. Berlin Document Center.

Had the authors truly followed the principle of a division of labor, which alone could have made such a compendious work definitive, the unhappy reader would not have to plow through at least two different treatments of *Gleichschaltung* in a given area. Of the three authors, Wolfgang Sauer has the most separate section of the book and the simplest style. "The mobilization of force," part three, treats the role of the Wehrmacht in the revolution, the rearmament program of 1933, and the problem of what to do with the SA in reasonably unified fashion. It is impossible to see what distinction was intended between Bracher's part one, "Stages in the seizure of power" and Gerhard Schulz' "The beginnings of the totalitarian manipulative state (*Massnahmenstaat*)," part two. Both have theoretical chapters, chapters on ideology and propaganda, culture and education, and above all, page after page describing the legalistic *Gleichschaltung* backed by terror of the political machinery. If Bracher had stayed with narrative and carried the account forward to the crisis within the *Bewegung* associated with the assumption of total power by the fall of 1933, leaving to Schulz the description in detail of the various instruments and mechanisms, the book might have been reduced by several hundred pages. As it is the reader is justified in skipping around, and the book will doubtless suffer the fate of compendia—to be read in fragments, and *ad hoc*.

Some of the sections range forward far into the late 1930s and even the war years (notably on the persecution of the churches and the Jews), and almost all have extensive survey-type introductions on conditions before 1933. Coupled with the really thorough analysis and comment on all the relevant secondary literature, this feature will recommend the book to serious students at an advanced level who wish to have a great deal of up-to-date data on Nazi methods. All three authors use illustrative Nazi texts extensively—perhaps longer ones than necessary. Two major contributions of the book are the excellent presentation of the failure of the nationalistic Right to maintain the position of preponderance in German life which it held in January 1933, and the demonstration of the falsity of the widely heard "excuse" that the Nazis really came to power legally and revealed only very late their aggressive lawlessness. Bracher's statistical analysis of the March 5, 1933, election results is interesting for its demonstration of pockets of Nazi weakness, as is his revelation of Neurath's early strong cooperation with the NSDAP, based on unpublished German Foreign Office documents.

Although all three use extensive new documentary material from the *Bundesarchiv* in Koblenz and the *Berlin Hauptarchiv* in Dahlem, Schulz' careful study of the Prussian and Reich Interior Ministries records (*Akten Grauert, Akten Pfundtner*) may make his work in these areas definitive. His account of the early power struggle between the Justice and Propaganda Ministries is new and interestingly written. Sauer's sections have had the benefit of the *Zeugenschriftum* of the Institut für Zeitgeschichte and what appear to be folders 42 and 43/I-II of the Miscellaneous Non-Biographical Records (Schumacher Collection) of the Berlin Document Center. A fruitful resource for all three authors was the *Sammlung Karl Brammer* of the *Dienstag Informationsberichte (Dienst Nationaler Tageszeitungen)*, a confidential news service.

There is no question that specialists must consult this work before proceeding further. Regrettably, very few others will. Bracher's introduction. "Prerequisites of National Socialist success," is better written than most of the book and worthy of general readership. The conclusion, also written by Bracher, is unfortunately too short and too narrowly conceived. Schulz has a good brief conclusion to his section, and, of course, scattered throughout the book are many pages of summary, if not judgment. Indeed, all too often we have intermediate summaries and academic discussions juxtaposed with highly detailed description; missing are bold analysis and straight talk. Doubtless the depth of the authors' research got in their way. There is not the slightest question of their objectivity, which, in German scholars writing about their own recent past, is no mean accomplishment.

University of Nebraska Robert Koehl

Knoellinger, Carl Erik, *Labor in Finland*. Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1960. Pp. xiv, 300. $6.00.

This is a work of considerable distinction, ranking among the most important scholarly studies of Finnish affairs published in recent years.. It is therefore fortunate that Knoellinger's book has appeared in an English-language edition, as well as in Finnish and Swedish. The subject matter is highly controversial (and therefore highly important), but the approach is informed and objective (and therefore highly valuable). The author has produced a comprehensive political and economic history of organized labor in Finland, as well as reliable analyses of the structures of employees' and employers' organizations, labor legislation provisions, and collective bargaining practices. There are judicious comments on the future of Finnish labor (and, indeed, of Finnish society). Finally, the appendices and notes are helpful, even to the specialist in Finnish affairs. This last feature is noteworthy in an English-language publication. Skillful use of the extensive sources indicates an energy which commands respect.

Respect, however, is not necessarily agreement. A number of Knoellinger's historical formulations invite disagreement. One of these is the statement (p. 48) that the General Strike of 1905 ". . . was in an outward sense not a strike for economic objectives. . . . Demands for purely social reform were not made in Finland." It is certainly true that the Finnish bourgeoisie supported the General Strike primarily for constitutional reasons. This reviewer wonders, however, whether, for instance, Finnish crofters who joined in the strike knew (much less cared) very much about the constitutional relationship between Finland and Russia. The novelist Väinö Linna, in his *Täällä Pohjantähden alla,* probably perceived these crofters' motivations more clearly than has the scholar. Furthermore, the economic historian in Knoellinger is sometimes conspicuously stronger than the political historian, as when (p. 98) the Finnish People's Democratic League (SKDL) is characterized as a popular front.

Two methodological questions also arise. Knoellinger, with many others, considers Finland as part of Scandinavia. This creates serious problems for comparative analysis, especially when the subject is the politics of organized labor. The latter, in Finland, differs in many basic respects from the politics of Scandinavian labor movements. In many cases, comparisons of either broader or narrower scope might be more revealing than comparisons confined to Scandinavian labor movements. In certain respects, for instance, the Finnish labor movement in the interwar decades resembled Eastern European labor movements during the same decades; these similarities, of course, disappeared after 1945. This merely demonstrates that all comparisons must be defined in space and time.

Knoellinger, like most historians, equates labor with organized labor. This equation means that large numbers of Finnish workers, especially farm workers, are not adequately emphasized. This lack of emphasis is unfortunate, since, as Knoellinger acknowledges (p. 20), "the whole labor question in Finland was for a long time essentially an agrarian-social matter." Furthermore, this equation is particularly misleading in the case of Finland, where, as Knoellinger properly stresses, the percentage of workers who are members of organized labor is relatively small. Another regrettable (but probably inevitable) consequence of this equation is to make the analysis cold and impersonal. In all the organizational emphasis, it is easy to forget that one is dealing with individual human beings. The reader (and perhaps the author as well) never gets close to the hopes and the heartbreaks of those who labor in Finland.

Brown University **Marvin Rintala**

Donohoe, James, *Hitler's Conservative Opponents in Bavaria, 1930-1945: A Study of Catholic, Monarchist, and Separatist Anti-Nazi Activities.* Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961. Pp. xi, 348. 32 guilders.

Historians no less than dramatists and novelists traditionally have given recognition to men who displayed moral courage amidst adversity, however Hamlet-like their courage may have been, however unsuccessful their efforts. It is to be expected and to be hoped, therefore, that there will be no end to books about the "Resistance" in Nazi Germany. The near monopoly over the theme by memoirists, journalists, and other legend creators during the first decade after 1944 was broken with the publication of Gerhard Ritter's study of Carl Goerdeler. Mother Mary Alice Gallin's study of ethical factors in the Resistance (a new edition with supplementary material is being published in 1961) finds further documentation in this useful contribution.

The Resistance of Prussian generals and civilians will continue to overshadow the opposition to Hitler in South Germany, but this study convincingly adds to the dimension of Resistance history. It shows that Resistance in Bavaria was deeply felt and fairly widespread, if one includes in the concept not only the organization of political rebellion but restrained public criticism and whispered opposition among friends. Some Bavarians criticized Hitler's ruthless centralization of the Reich; for Bavarian monarchists, no Hitler could be an acceptable substitute for the Wittelsbachs; and Catholic Bavarians, doggedly greeting one another with *"Grüss Gott!"* instead of *"Heil Hitler!"* were driven into hostility by Nazi attacks on Catholic institutions. They were encouraged in quiet moral resistance by the Bavarian hierarchy under Archbishop Faulhaber and from Rome itself. Both the author and this reviewer wish that more effective political resistance had been counseled; the German people and the West are still suffering the consequences of Germany's failure to rid *itself* of Hitlerism. The author's thesis is that conservative Resistance in Bavaria was chiefly motivated by moral concern, that its leadership was provided by the Catholic Church, and that it had "all the strength and all the weaknesses which are bound up with the Christian tradition" (p. 22). In discussing those weaknesses the author adds perspective to the thesis that Lutheranism uniquely fostered subservience to political authority among the Germans. But Donohoe effectively demonstrates that a Catholic revulsion against Nazism on moral grounds existed before 1933 and grew thereafter.

For many readers of this book, its outstanding heroes will be Hans and Sophie Scholl and other students at Munich who, beginning in the spring of 1942, asked fellow Germans to "work against the scourge of humanity," to remember that a nation "gets the kind of government it deserves!" (p. 161.) The accents of the "Student Revolt" were less Catholic and less conservative than those of others treated in this volume. There is no evidence in this study that the Allied policy of unconditional surrender diminished the efforts of the Munich students; rather they were pushed to a climax during the month that followed the Casablanca Conference. The author does not make a point of this, nor does he discuss the impact of the spectre of disintegration of the Reich—arising again in Bavaria as in 1918—upon the Resistance movement in the north.

This book represents such impressively thorough research in unpublished and published sources in this country and in Germany that one regrets more pains were not taken with its polishing and production. There are inexcusably many typographical errors; they even mar the errata list (p. 346), which in addition overlooks many mistakes in the text. What is called an "Index" is only a *Personenverzeichnis,* and an incomplete one at that. Discriminating cutting of the pages-long quotations in the text and hundred-plus pages of documents in the appendix could have resulted in a volume three-fifths as long as this one, with all its substance and an improved literary quality. All in all, though, one wishes for additional specialized studies of the Nazi era as thoroughly executed and as useful as this one.

Tulane University John L. Snell

Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945. Edited by the General Sikorski Historical Institute. Volume I, 1939-1943. London: Heinemann, 1961. Pp. 625. 63 S.

Soon after the fateful decision of the Soviet Government to sever relations with the Polish government in exile, the latter issued in Washington, in 1944, a collection of official documents on Polish-Soviet relations, 1918-1943. Prepared in the midst of the war and not destined for public use, the provisional collection was limited to the most important papers only and never continued. It is only now that a comprehensive, scholarly publication of practically the whole source material relating to the wartime conflict between Poland and Soviet Russia has been started by the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London. The first volume covering again, but this time quite exhaustively, the period from the outbreak of the war to the crisis which followed the discovery of the graves of Polish officers in the Katyń forest, with introductory documents going back to 1918, has just appeared.

This time it could not be an official publication, but the Editorial Board, which is already preparing the second volume up to the end of the war, is presided over by Count Edward Raczyński who, from 1934 to 1945, was Polish Ambassador to

Great Britain and from 1941 to 1943 also acting Foreign Minister. And in his preface, which is an excellent summary of the whole tragic story illustrated by the documents, that prominent diplomat, who recently published (in Polish) his wartime memoirs, after acknowledging the achievements of the Board, reveals that it was Lt. General Marján Kukiel who "co-ordinated the team work and supervised its progress." Since Professor Kukiel not only was one of the *dramatis personae,* as Polish Minister of National Defense, but is primarily an outstanding historian of international reputation, his name is the best possible guarantee of the high level and reliability of that impressive collection and of the editorial method.

Though some well-known documents had to be reprinted as indispensable background, the bulk of the material is taken from the rich archives of the Sikorski Institute and of the chancery of the President of the Polish Republic. These unpublished sources are also used in the very important "Notes to Documents" at the end of the volume (pp. 562 to 609), which deserve special attention. A few of these papers have been used before in the memoirs of various Polish leaders and in the book of Edward J. Rozek, *Allied Wartime Diplomacy—A Pattern in Poland* (New York, 1958), where one of them (No. 109, Sikorski's and Stalin's conversation of December 3, 1941), is included almost in full, while (as noted by the editors) another one (No. 238, Kot's conversation with Vyshinsky of July 8, 1942), appeared in Kot's book *Rozmowy z Kromlow* (London, 1959, in Polish). But even details which are not entirely new can be only interpreted and appreciated now, as part of the whole picture which is presented for the first time.

The new material starts with the record of the conversation between Sikorski and Lord Halifax on Soviet policy, held on November 14, 1939, (No. 70), and throughout the volumes such transcripts of conversations certainly make the most exciting reading. Two of them, chosen almost at random, can serve as good examples: the conversation between Sikorski and Sir Stafford Cripps, the British Ambassador to the Soviet Union, regarding the territorial claims of the Soviet Government on January 26, 1942, (No. 176), and the long discussion of General Anders with Stalin on the reduction of the Polish army in the USSR to 44,000 and the evacuation of the surplus to Iran, on March 18, 1942, (No. 193). General Anders, who used the same Polish record of that conversation in his memoirs, expressed the regret that, as usual, the record of the other side was never made available. The historian can only share that regret, but even so the basic issues appear clearly enough.

On the one hand, it is obvious that Soviet Russia never, not even in the most critical days of her struggle against the German invasion, gave up her claims to the eastern half of Poland and to the other territories gained at the time of Nazi-Soviet cooperation. And Sikorski had to defend Poland's integrity, as well as the independence of at least Lithuania, not only in his negotiations with the Soviet Government but also in his talks with the British statesmen who, even before the discussions relating to the British-Russian treaty of alliance had started, were inclined to accept those Russian claims. The new material now published is particularly rich in information on the desperate efforts of the Polish Government to prevent a formal recognition of all conventional claims of the Soviet Union (including the Curzon Line, specifically mentioned already in the conversation of January 26) in the treaty with Great Britain finally concluded on May 26, 1942.

On the other hand, it is especially clear that Russia, in spite of the hand extended to her by General Sikorski the day after Hitler's invasion, never took seriously the agreements made with him including the declaration of collaboration and friendship signed on December 4, 1941, on the occasion of his visit to Moscow.

It was not at all the fault of General Anders that the military cooperation against the Germans could not materialize. The countless documents showing the obstacles encountered by Poland's representatives in the Soviet Union, whether military or diplomatic, when they requested the implementation of the "amnesty" granted to the deported Polish citizens and of the creation of a truly Polish armed force in Russia, seem much less interesting than the records of the talks between the leaders and are rather monotonous to read. But in connection with these records they give ample evidence that even in the years (1941-1943) of what has been rightly called "the precarious alliances" the Soviet Union threatened not only Poland's territorial integrity but also her real independence as an allied nation under her constitutional government.

Both issues resulted in an open crisis and a state of tension in Polish-Soviet relations already before the discovery of the Katyń graves. Once more the records of conversations, first with Molotov and then with Stalin, also, now, in February 1943, conducted by the new Polish Ambassador Tadeuz Romer, and first published in the present collection (Nos. 291 and 295), prove the hopelessness of the situation, as does the exchange of notes, in London, between Foreign Minister Raczyński and the Soviet Ambassador Bogomolov, continuing from January 1942 (No. 177) to April 1943 (No. 309).

The last of their notes, in which Raczyński demanded an explanation of the fact of the thousands of Polish prisoners missing in the Soviet Union, was delivered, it is true, four days after the appeal of the Polish Government that the matter be investigated by the International Red Cross. But is it untrue that that government had not previously addressed to the Soviet Government "any inquiry or request for an explanation on this subject," as Molotov pretended when he announced the severance of relations between the two governments? Raczyński rightly recalled that, from October 1941, the Polish representatives had tried in vain, time and again, to obtain from the Soviet authorities any explanation in the matter of the missing officers. He also pointed out that the communiqué of the Soviet Information Bureau, issued in reply to the German charges, seemed to indicate that the Soviet Government possessed "more ample information on this matter than was communicated to the representatives of the Polish Government some time ago."

Now, after seventeen years, it can be said that the responsibility of the Soviet Government for the Katyń massacre has long been established beyond any possible doubt. Therefore it would seem unnecessary to return once more to that painful story, especially as the contemporaneous documents reprinted in the present publication could not add anything new. New is, however, the detailed information which is given in the last note (p. 609) regarding the communiqué of the Minister of National Defense with the appeal to the International Red Cross. It appears that the communiqué, though signed, for obvious reasons, by the minister responsible for questions relating to prisoners of war, had been discussed by the full Cabinet, which made the decision to approach the Red Cross, and that the final text, prepared in cooperation with the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of Information, received the approval of General Sikorski himself, whom even Stalin did not suspect of any "intention of collaborating with the Hitler gangsters" (in his letter to President Roosevelt of April 29, reprinted in No. 319).

This had to be put on record in view of the severe criticism of the action of the Polish Government by its Western allies, who were inclined to hold its inconsiderate step responsible for the break in Polish-Russian relations. As a matter of fact, that step which the Sikorski government, so anxious to improve those relations, considered its duty (see No. 318), served Soviet Russia merely as a pretext for achieving the long prepared break with a view to opposing the legitimate Polish Government with a Communist-controlled puppet regime, which was to be forced upon the Polish people after victory.

How this was done and how the victory over the Germans which, in the years 1943-1945, became more and more certain, was turned into a defeat for Poland, will be shown in the light of new source material in the second volume of this most valuable publication of the Sikorski Institute. All historians, impressed already by the first volume, are eagerly awaiting the second.

Fordham University OSCAR HALECKI

GSOVSKI, VLADIMIR, and KAZIMIERZ GRZYBOWSKI, eds., *Government, Law and Courts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.* New York: Praeger, 1959. Pp. 2067. $30.00.

The two-volume study under review is a remarkable monograph on law in the Soviet Union and in those Eastern European countries now under the Soviet regime. The work is divided into seven parts: (1) the regime and its origins, (2) the administration of justice. (3) judicial procedure, (4) the new penal law, (5) the sovietization of civil law, (6) labor law, (7) agrarian legislation. Each chapter is written by a specialist, a jurist native to the country in question. The work is so conceived that the above-listed topics may be studied in the totality of the sovietized countries from the angle of the evolution of the Soviet regime in the USSR from 1917 on and in the subjugated nations from the end of World War II. It is the opportunity offered to study the progress of sovietization in the respective countries that lends this work its particular interest.

The examination of each question begins with the analysis of its handling in the USSR, where the Communist solution is of longest standing and whence it was imposed as a model upon the satellites. The study of the regime set up in the vassal states allows us not only to follow the evolution of sovietization in general but also to discern particularities in each country stemming from its culture and national character.

The first part of this work enables us to grasp the basic concepts of law and justice in the Soviet Union. The concepts of justice in the USSR, in spite of the identity of terms, have a sense and significance quite different from those prevailing in the Western world. The Constitution of the USSR is not an organic law in the occidental sense of the term, but is rather a collection of political slogans and a program of Communist edification. So-called socialist legalism is not a rule of principles of justice but rather a rule of discipline for the private citizen and for the lesser authorities. It does not bind the state judicially, everything being subject to ceaseless fluctuations in conformity with the Marxian dialectic. Nothing is stable; everything changes constantly save the sacrosanct principle of the triumph and affirmation of the Communist regime. The first part is also concerned with a study in depth of the nature of popular democracy as a special regime reserved to peoples of a relatively high degree of culture subjected to Communism.

The second section admits us to the sphere of the administration of justice and demonstrates the position of the courts as instruments of oppression in a despotic government. This essential function of the courts was particularly characteristic of the Stalin era, when all the organs of the secret police played a most sinister role. Studying this field, we perceive the insignificant part accorded legal defense, the bar and the notaries.

In the third section we are informed of the basic principles underlying both penal and civil judicial procedure. Penal procedure is so conceived that the accused is deprived entirely of his rights at law and of all guarantees of an objective and impartial judgment, this being the exact opposite of the American "due process" concept. The civil procedure is equally dominated by the interests of the Communist state, the parties involved being deprived of all freedom of action.

The fourth part of this work is dedicated to the study of the new Soviet penal law, which is fully at the service of politics and is required to protect Communism against all enemies of the regime. This law recognizes crimes and delicts entirely unknown in the West. Since freedom of speech and thought are non-existent in the Soviet world, all criticism of the regime is regarded as a political crime. During the Stalin era, under a regime of terror and denunciation, the number of such cases was very high. Also considered political are so-called economic crimes and delicts, i.e., infractions of the laws protecting socialized property and protecting consumers against abuses at the hands of the personnel of nationalized shops and restaurants.

The fifth section deals with the sovietization of civil law, where the classic contract, expressing the liberty of two free parties to enter into an agreement, is replaced by statute law, which places civil obligations under official aegis. Furthermore, subjective civil rights are not protected whenever their exercise goes contrary to the principles of Communism; this means a radical transformation of both the sense and basic structure of civil law. The sixth part is devoted to labor law and reveals the extent to which the worker is exploited under a regime which deprives him of all guarantees of justice. The seventh and last part is concerned with problems of agriculture and the peasantry, notably with the transformations affecting agricultural property, which are always at the expense of the peasant in those Eastern European countries where he is traditionally deeply attached to his land and his patrimony.

This is a magnificent work of broad scope which, through the comparative law approach, affords us a grasp of the evolution of the sovietization of law in countries subject to Communism. It is a constructive work which allows the reader to draw conclusions of a scientific and political nature. In countries dominated by the Communist regime there is everywhere a tacit resistance and a survival of classic juridical concepts discernible even in the dispositions of Communist law itself. In each country, taking into consideration its cultural status and national character, the dangerously supple Communist tactic is to submit to certain deviations from the universal pattern. Those concerned with the fate of the free nations should "peaceful" coexistence lead to a Communist victory, should study this work scrupulously and patiently. It is particularly recommended to those in high office; it would be of assistance to the leadership of the free world in their inexorable opposition to the universal imperialism of Communism. All those concerned with the preservation of liberty may be grateful to the authors and editors of this instructive and highly important work.

Nice, France LOUIS FRENDL

TIGRID, PAVEL, *Marx na Hradčanech.* New York: Edice Svědectví, 1960. Pp. 124. $2.50.

Pavel Tigrid made himself known in postwar democratic Czechoslovakia as a prolific journalist by a courageous defense of democratic freedoms against encroachments by Communist members of the government. He continued in exile, in various capacities, to propound his beliefs after the Communist seizure of power, in February 1948, had compelled him to leave his country.

Fifteen years of Communist rule in Czechoslovakia, keen observation of international developments, and undoubtedly a process of intellectual and philosophical maturing, have led him to a substantial re-evaluation of the position of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, its prospects as well as the future outlook of the Czechoslovak people. This slender volume, a product, however, of intensive thinking, is the result of Tigrid's own "revisionism."

In his own words, it is the thesis of his work that "in Czechoslovakia as well as in the other countries of Central and East Europe and in Russia herself exist prerequisites for a growth of . . . new freedom." (p. 6)

However, limiting his study to the case of Czechoslovakia, he believes that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia carries in many aspects some typically Czechoslovak features, in that it prefers compromise to revolution, it hesitates to undertake extreme measures, it cautiously awaits developments; it also follows blindly Moscow's orders. After the initial period of entrenching itself in power and copying Stalin's brutal policy, the Party was caught in the ideological whirlwind of the "new course," which brought intense intellectual revival in Czechoslovakia as it did in Poland and Hungary. Tigrid has compiled enough evidence to prove that the Czechoslovak intelligentsia and the youth were openly demanding radical concessions from the government to the peoples' longing for freedom of expression. However, he also significantly points out that these demands did not find support in the working class. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia was the first to put an end to the period of "thaw," which had been initiated by the decisions of the 20th Congress of CPSU, and then to arrest tendencies which threatened to develop into an inundation, as happened in Poland and Hungary. Unlike in the other satellite countries, there were no substantial changes in Czechoslovak leadership; Stalinists changed conveniently but only seemingly into Malenkovites, then into Khrushchevites who themselves were until November 1956 of a different brand from those of the present, remaining, in fact, Stalinists to this day. Shortly after the fateful events in Hungary they declared an irreconcilable struggle against revisionists and under the guise of this all-embracing slogan silenced any opposition. They were able according to Tigrid, "to liquidate also the spirit of resistance, and the hope of a permanent change of some principles and most of the methods of Czechoslovak Communism." (p. 74)

This very sentence betrays Tigrid's own thesis, which he expresses again in the concluding pages, saying that "the only politically *realistic* hope of the Czechoslovak people for a more bearable, more dignifying, freer less uncertain daily life is in the liberalization of the CPC from within . . . " He indicates his own realistic belief in this development on the basis of the experience through which the Party has passed since 1956. Once exposed to revisionism it cannot combat it otherwise than by revising itself.

If this reasoning may be open to question, Tigrid himself is an indication that Czechoslovak political exile, too, has been exposed to revisionism—a chapter which provides most interesting reading in his book. Dividing the emigration into "irreconcilables" and "gradualists," he himself has joined the latter. He sees developments behind the Iron Curtain as a sociological process of the inevitable law of social dynamics which may finally lead to an understanding between West and East, between Czechs in the country and abroad.

Tigrid's work has an impressionistic mood, as Paul E. Zinner mentions in the preface. It overlooks the exigencies of a meticulous scholarly search for facts, a license which is permissible to a writer who is more an essayist than a scholar.

However, it would be desirable if his love and concern for Czech cultural expression were accompanied by a greater respect for the purity of the Czech language.

University of Denver JOSEF KORBEL

L'Institut Imre Nagy des Sciences Politiques, *Contribution de la révolution hongroise à la pensée socialiste.* Bruxelles, 1959.

When I knew nothing more about the first publication of the Imre Nagy Institute than its title I had some misgivings concerning its possible content. It is a pleasure to report that, with the exception of the typist's and proof-reader's contributions, this multigraphed volume containing the papers presented and the discussions at the meeting organized to commemorate the third anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution has surprised me very pleasantly. Judging by the remarks of the speakers and by the list of participants printed at the end of this slender volume, the conference was not too well attended, but those who were present represented socialist thinkers from many countries and they took their task, to review socialist thinking, very seriously.

With the exception of the opening speech given by the Hungarian author and director of the Institute, George Heltai, not much attention was paid to the Hungarian Revolution. Those at that conference under the presidency of Jan Marczewski, Professor at the Sorbonne, occasionally asked themselves what this revolution signified: was it nationalistic or international in scope and significance? But this reviewer felt that none of those present, not even Mr. Heltai or Mme. Kéthly, could add much to what we already know about this revolution or clarify some of the puzzling questions which have remained unanswered since 1956.

If the Hungarain Revolution was pushed somewhat into the background and if, for that matter, revolutions were repeatedly called anachronistic nineteenth-century manifestations, the soul-searching of the prominent socialists at the conference, many of whom admitted that they were ex-Stalinists, lacks nothing in sincerity and general interest. Most of the discussion centered around two questions: the theoretical, trying to define "modern" socialist thought, and the practical one, attempting to explain the role and significance of the workers' councils. Not that these were the only issues discussed, but they clearly were foremost in everybody's mind.

It was not surprising to find Bolshevism, Stalinism, rule by tyranny and bureaucracy rejected, but even Lenin and Marx were treated in the same manner. "The Hungarian Revolution proved that a post-capitalist society can be something else than a socialist society . . . It has shown that beyond capitalism the socialist future did not necessarily lie, nor did the realization of the schemes conceived by Marx," declared the French Philosophy professor Pierre Fougeyrolles who, after destroying all accepted soicalist theories, concluded that "socialism is a regulatory idea, . . . a moral idea that enlightens and guides us without allowing us to believe that men will ever live in a society truly socialist." Kostas Axelos, member of the editorial board of the French magazine *Arguments,* went even further in declaring that socialist arguments "rest on the level of slogans without knowing the realities covered by these words or the realities which they could cover, or what the method of action of possible new institutions could be."

The question of the workers' councils was similarly analyzed both as an economic and a political instiution. This, naturally, led to speculations about the nature of power and true democracy, without succeeding in finding answers to these almost eternal questions; the councils were left up in the air as a still not well understood possible road leading towards a better future.

These debates remind one of those held in the meetings of the Second International or in the pre-World War I German Socialist Party. Did the Hungarian Revolution bring these issues once again to the mind of socialist thinkers, or had they never been forgotten? I am certain that those at the conference knew that they were discussing problems which could be called the classic issues of the socialist movement and that they were rather discouraged by the fact that they were no nearer to solving them than previous generations. A certain pessimism pervades all the papers and discussions, best illustrated by Mr. Axelos' conclusion: "We cannot rediscover nor do we want to return to what came before theoretical or practical Marxism. Yet we do not know what socialism is, nor what it could be, nor what its basis is, nor how it could be realized in practice. The Hungarian Revolution challenged socialism. And it is not one of its least accomplishments to have not solved but to have posed the problems in such a radical manner."

University of Washington PETER F. SUGAR

KIRÁLY, ERNÖ, *Die Arbeiterselbstverwaltung in Ungarn. Aufstieg und Niedergang, 1956-1958; Ein Dokumentarbericht* (Untersuchungen zur Gegenwartskunde Südosteuropas, 3). München: R. Oldenbourg, 1961. Pp. 111.

The most significant epoch of Hungary's labor movement falls between 1956 and 1958. The author has successfully tried to elucidate its main phases and problems in the following chapters: The origin of workers' councils in Hungary in 1956; Development and climax of workers' autonomy; Forceful liquidation of local workers' councils; Hungarian councils in comparison with other council systems; The decline; Appendix, which includes a comparative analysis of workers' autonomy in Hungary and Poland, a well-compiled chronology of important events, and a not so well selected bibliography.

Due to Mr. Király's ability to deal with Hungarian sources, almost all the essential antecedents of the much-publicized revolutionary actions of Hungarian labor are revealed. The author's account of the fast developing events is quite acceptable. He is at his best when describing the post-1945 role of trade unions, which were subordinate organs of the monolithic Party machinery. In relation to the dynamism of the 1956-1958 movement, one of the author's well-established facts is that the country's intelligentsia, on the threshold of the 1956 anti-Communist uprising, demonstrated initiative in instigating workers to demand real autonomy in labor-management relations as well as in certain areas of national-political significance. This is how workers' councils became such important factors on the national scene, primarily during the closing days of the abortive revolution. In his quest for a true characterization of the workers' anti-regime attitude, a highly essential element has been left out. This is the stratification of Hungarian labor as it appeared on the eve of the October 1956 revolution. The sociological truth is that the country's labor could not be regarded as a compact, uniform or homogeneous social stratum, just preceding the uprising. The social composition of labor started changing immediately after World War II. Since 1945 most social strata have been discriminately treated as elements hostile to the new socialist order and, in essence, have been excluded from the socialist-type nation. Consequently, even up to 1950, profound changes took place in the class structure of the population. In line with this, the proportion of large-scale manufacturing employees within the group of industrial workers increased tremendously from a prewar level of 50% to about 88% at the end of 1950. But the real regrouping of society has occurred since 1951. Between 1951-1955, as a result of the socialist transformation of the country, a heretofore unknown social mobility developed. At that time almost 200,000 farmers, 110,000 non-manual workers, and 75,000 artisans were redirected into industry. Social mobility at that time was so high that it can be well illustrated by the case of the huge Goldberger Textile Works of Budapest, where over 54% of the workers entered the factory after 1950. Naturally, the vast layers of "declassed" elements could have hastened developments leading to the 1956 uprising, in which the Goldberger Textile Works played an important role. Needless to say, these declassed strata before 1945 constituted the bulwark of Hungary's society, which was based on private ownership. These layers only quantitatively strengthened the developing socialist society. Otherwise, they imposed a very serious problem on the regime. It is true that their everyday way of life had been proletarianized, but, simultaneously, their anti-regime mentality had grown and their simple presence on working sites much affected labor morale, discipline and the degree of class consciousness of the laborers as a whole. It is quite evident that this conglomerate social structure of the working class cannot be neglected in drawing final conclusions relating to the workers' part in the revolt. But neither Mr. Király nor any other expert have, as yet, considered this momentous aspect in scrutinizing the October 1956 events.

The depiction of János Kádár's role in general and in conjunction with the Central Workers' Council of Greater Budapest is worth mentioning. By all criteria the volume gives a well-founded account of the aims and activities of the revolutionary labor organizations. It is to be hoped that the Südost-Institut, Munich, is widening its otherwise well-planned research policy so that a comparative study of the history of the labor situation in East Central Europe can be put on the agenda.

Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. FRANCIS S. WAGNER

DORNBERG, JOHN, *Schizophrenic Germany.* New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961. Pp. 302. $6.50.

To call Germany "schizophrenic," with one part democratically-minded and the other part fascist, is to imply a sick people, tending to dissociation and disintegration. Mr. Dornberg does not mean to imply this, and in fact his carefully documented array of facts and figures does not lead him to conclude that such is the case or the danger, at least not yet.

Mr. Dornberg, editor of the *Overseas Weekly*—a periodical at this time under a cloud which must be assumed to cast some shadow upon its editor—upon returning to Europe as an adult, began to examine the "new" Germany. The more closely he looked, the more the new picture resembled the "old," and Mr. Dornberg has now pursued the phantom of the old Germany into the body of the German people. There he has found and here describes the neo-Nazism, anti-Semitism, revived militaristic and rightist tendencies, the acceptance of virtual one-party government, the teaching of history inadequate to corrective needs, the continuance of Nazis in government and bureaucracy, especially in state and local agencies, and much more. Details of specific cases are given and appear to be documented; everyone may read the book and ponder the problem; for a book like this can be a prick to conscience at least as powerful as an Eichmann case.

It is necesary to say, however, that *unlike* the Eichmann case, this book tends toward a false impression when taken as a whole. Mr. Dornberg's own evidence admits of more hope than he expresses. Time and again the author indicates that

Germany is showing itself, not split and dissociationist, but aware and constructive. One may take the reaction in a case like that of *Nation Europa. Nation Europa* is the leading organ of "all neo-Fascist elements in Europe and Germany" (p. 233). Although it has an international body of stockholders and contributors, its German publisher in 1957 was sentenced in Germany to a suspended jail term and three years probation for defamation of the German form of government and comparing it unfavorably with the Third Reich. In the same year a German Typesetter for this organ refused to continue his work because of an article implying approval of concentration camps. When dismissed from his press, he appealed the decision of the state to the federal labor court and won his case. "Most German newspapers [writes Mr. Dornberg] covered the trial and blasted with stinging editorials the [state] labor tribunal's decision that Schammberger had no right to refuse to work" (p. 234). Similarly, Mr. Dornberg shows that all groups in the nation have called for improvements in the teaching of modern history and for fair and explicit textbooks (p. 216). If there are still far too many high-ranking Nazis receiving pensions, loans, and other help under the "131 Law," it was the Lower-Saxony council of the German Federation of Labor Unions that, in 1958, published a report about these persons, thus alerting a large public to the issue. If remedial action has not been swift, this inaction does not mean that the nation approves or even ignores the situation.

The fact seems to be that Germany needs time to find its norms, to absorb the deviations from evolving standards, and to deepen the "new." The real tragedy will come if (because of new trials) this time is not vouchsafed.

Santa Monica, California PAULINE R. ANDERSON

SHORTER NOTICES

KIRN, PAUL, *Politische Geschichte der Deutschen Grenzen*. Mannheim: Verlag Bibliographisches Institut. 4th ed. 1958. Pp. 191. 14 maps. Lw 12.50.

The first edition of this survey of the history of German territorial boundaries was published in 1934. The present, fourth, edition is substantially enlarged but the compass and purpose remain essentially unchanged. Kirn begins with the treaty of Verdun, 843, and follows the shifting boundaries through the great modifications brought by war and peace settlements until 1939. The results of the last war, in the absence of a peace treaty, are not regarded as definitive. Bismarck's observations (1888) as to the unfortunate situation in which Germany has always found itself, by reason of having neighbors to the east and to the west, are Kirn's point of departure. This sensitivity to neighbors runs through the whole study. It is perhaps not fair to German thought to remark that France has also had neighbors and has also a history of her eastern boundaries to meditate upon.

In the course of the study the reader will notice that the Holy Roman Empire and Germany become confused. The map of Germany in the fourteenth century (facing p. 50) includes within the *Reichsgrenze* the Papal States, Burgundy, Bohemia, East and West Prussia. Later maps shrink the frontiers so that one gets the impression that Germany is being compressed by her neighbors. Bohemia is consistently included within Germany. Even Charles V, an inclusive imperialist, was aware of Bohemia's unique relationship to the Empire. The 1938 map (facing p. 174) includes the Sudetenland and Austria, whose 6.5 million German Austrians were united to "ihr grosses Vaterland" whether they wanted to be or not. On the first partition of Poland we read (p. 121) that Poland lost those parts of the kingdom where the population was predominantly non-Polish and did not belong to the core of the Polish state. One wonders if we are in for another period of German historical nonsense of this sort.

University of Colorado S. H. THOMSON

RITTER, GERHARD, *Die deutschen Militär-Attachés und das Auswärtige Amt*, Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften. Philosophisch-historische Klasse. Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1959. Pp. 52. Brosch D.M. 5.60.

The most eminent European authority on the problem of civil-military relations in Germany here presents a brief special contribution to the subject. The first part is a resume by Ritter of the position of the German military attachés down to the issue of Count Caprivi's *Instruction for Officers Seconded to Foreign Missions* in December 1890. The second, briefer but more important, and quite unique, part consists of seven documents written by Count Waldersee as Chief of the General Staff in 1890, in which he expresses his contempt, rage, and despair at the blow that the *Instruction* would deal to the independence of the military attachés and to the honor of the Army.

The original documents were photographed by Ritter at the Potsdam *Heeresarchiv* before it was destroyed in 1945. They are intended to show how the Chancellor set limits to the attempt of the soldiers to create an autonomous military diplomacy. The *Instruction*, the decisive point of which was that the whole military correspondence of the military attachés without exception should be under the control of the diplomatic chiefs of mission, succeeded, Ritter maintains, in preventing any further disturbance of foreign policy by the activity of the military attachés for the remaining twenty-four years before the outbreak of war. Henceforth the danger of "militarism"—that is, to use Ritter's definition, a situation in which military-technical considerations receive priority over political ends—stemmed from other parts of the political structure.

These documents provide further proof that Waldersee richly deserves the evil reputation of archmilitarist and arrogant caste-bound Prussian officer. Ritter emphasizes that he was an extreme, not a typical case. They also buttress Caprivi's stature as a courageous statesman who maintained the supremacy of the civilian political authority against the craft and ambition of the Chief of Staff and the whole swarm of generals and *Flügeladjutanten* surrounding the Kaiser.

Queens College, N. Y. ANDREW G. WHITESIDE

KOSZYK, KURT, ed., *Dortmunder Beiträge zur Zeitungsforschung,* Band 6. Dortmund: Verlag Fr. Wilh. Ruhfus, 1961. Pp. 101.

Volume 6 of the *Dortmunder Beiträge* contains an article of considerable interest to American readers, a biography of Franz Georg Edwin Louis Withold Viereck, the father of the well-known publicist Georg Sylvester Viereck (Ulrich Hess, "Louis Viereck und seine *Münchner Blätter* für Arbeiter 1882-1889," pp. 1-50). Born in 1851, member of the Corps "Teutonia" of Marburg University, and, in the late seventies, *Kammergerichtsreferendar,* Viereck resigned his position to become a Social-Democratic journalist and agitator. The article lists 16, mostly short-lived socialist papers of the 1880s which Viereck edited or to which he contributed; it throws light on the difficulties of press research and the situation of German libraries that for seven of these journals not one copy is known to have survived. The interest in the German socialist party shown by the police during the time of the *Sozialistengesetz* may result in copies being found in police files in the future. Viereck, who belonged to the right wing of the Social Democrats, severed his ties with the party in 1888-89 and became an apostle of the natural health movement called after Pfarrer Kneip of Wörishofen, Bavaria. In 1896 he emigrated to the United States (which he had earlier visited in 1881 to attend the funeral of Friedrich Hecker) and started the third period of his life. He was interested in promoting German cultural influence in the United States, friendly relations between both countries and the betterment of conditions for German immigrants. These activities brought the former socialist close to ideas of the Pan-German League without approving its chauvinist attitude. He became an American citizen in 1902. In 1903 he published a *Guide for German Immigrants;* in 1906 he founded a League for immigrants and in 1908 an association of German writers in USA. The article gives interesting details about his manifol literary activities based on documentation in the National archives. In 1911 Viereck returned to Germany where he lived until his death in 1922, except for a futile attempt to resume his pro-German activity in the U. S. in 1921.

From the biography one gains the impression of a gifted but unbalanced and unrealistic man. An "Exkurs" probes into Viereck's illegitimate birth (his mother was a well-known Berlin actress) and does not disprove the often-made assertion that Prince Wilhelm of Prussia (who later became Emperor Wilhelm I) was his father. It is strange that he had two god-fathers related to the Hohenzollern family. It may be mentioned at random that the *Dortmunder Beiträge* have published in recent years several important contributions dealing with the history of the French press and that the Westfälisch-Niederrheinische Institut für Zeitungsforschung, which sponsors the *Dortmunder Beiträge,* possesses a valuable French collection.

Bonn, Germany FRITZ T. EPSTEIN

CYSARZ, HERBERT, *Das deutsche Nationalbewusstsein.* München: Günter Olzog Verlag, 1961. Pp. 99. DM 5.80.

In dealing with an essay like this one, differences of language and culture appear; for in last analysis one is not confident that one understands the author's *Nationalbewusstsein.* Professor Cysarz, a writer, winner of a *Kulturpreis* in 1961 for this little book, a student and teacher of literature and philosophy, is, clearly, disturbed by aberrations like National Socialism and the current "antinationalism" of West Germany. To him both appear destructive of German national character and harmful to Germany and to Europe alike. His essay is a new exhortation to the German nation, as individuals and as a whole, to examine its history—more than half of the essay provides historical background—for the elements of true Germanism. Once again aware of this historically delineated national character, the nation should make of it a supra-historical ethic with which to animate the German polity and enable the German people to play its role upon the international stage. Professor Cysarz is emphatic in recognizing the interdependence of all nations in the modern world; he does not wish the German people to do other than to participate and cooperate in a world order; but he does expect it, through an awakened national consciousness, to gain creative and initiatory power for this role. He feels that in this century the German nation has lacked time, and hence freedom, to find a natural and stable order; thus he hopes that some decades of peace may be available to the Germans so that they will not again either be driven to extremes in their search for order, or have to accept imposed values.

A secondary purpose of the essay seems to be to reconcile the German people to change, especially to the loss of the German East. The transcendental ethic of national consciousness, if realized, makes it possible for German to communicate with German irrespective of boundary, for Germanness to play its appointed role on a larger stage, and for the cultural peculiarities and benefits of the German East to continue as a part of the German cultural whole.

Professor Cysarz is grappling with a problem all peoples face: how to maintain as persons and as nations their integrity in the ever-widening and ever-deepening complexity of modern society. For the Germans the author supplements Meinecke's *Die deutsche Katastrophe;* but he presents a thesis not without general interest.

Santa Monica, California PAULINE R. ANDERSON

KECSKEMETI, PAUL, *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising.* Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961. Pp. 178. $4.75.

This concise and systematic analysis of the social and political factors which led to the Hungarian Revolution of October, 1956, was prepared as part of the Rand Corporation research for the United States Air Force.

The author begins with the occupation of Hungary by the Soviet Army at the end of World War II, which facilitated the infiltration and eventual takeover of the government by the Communists. He points out that, as early as 1949, bitter rivalry and purges of the Communist leaders, overindustrialization and forced collectivization of agriculture started to weaken the Communist state. The all-important second factor, as the author mentions, originated at the Kremlin itself after the death of Stalin, with the announcement of the New Course policy, which greatly discredited the Communist "elite" before the masses of the satellite countries. The Communist writers of Hungary developed serious feelings of guilt for having supported the Rákosi terror. Their new attitude as an interparty opposition is described by the author. He then discusses the final disintegration of Communist authority which followed the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Poznań riots in June, 1956. Throughout the study, he emphasizes the "elite" and "mass" pattern of the socio-political evolution which preceded the October Revolution in 1956. As proof of his "elite" and "mass" theory Kecskemeti correctly states that "The weakening of pressure from above was a necessary factor in all large-scale outbreaks of mass violence."

In the remainder of the book he summarizes the uprisings in other satellite countries and compares them to the Hungarian Revolution. In his last chapter he speculates on the possibility of similar revolts in the future and comes to the conclusion that new upheavals are likely to arise only when ideological crises in the Communist "elite" and economic crises in the "masses" occur simultaneously.

The author does not analyze the October 1956 Revolution itself in detail but provides an up-to-date bibliography which can be consulted for studies on its tragic outcome and aftermath.

University of Colorado TIBOR SOGOR

RECENT PERIODICAL LITERATURE

GENERAL

Auty, R., "Spracherneuerung u. Sprachschöpfung im Donauraum, 1780-1850," *Österr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961) 5, 263-372.

Bass, E. M., "Economic Statistics," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 9, 18-22.

Bogdan, I., "Problemas Nacionales de la Europa Centro-Oriental," *Studia Croatica,* II (1961) 2-3, 147-174.

Briefs, G., "Die Schwäche des Ostens," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 64, 19-27.

Briefs, G., "Unbewältiger Marxismus," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 63, 19-29.

Bunza, B., "The Belgrade Conference," *Christ. Dem. Rev.,* XI (1961) 72, 3-7.

"The Communist Bloc—How United is it?" *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 10, 3-8.

Dimitrov, G., "The Communists are out to win over the Peasant Countries of the Globe," *Intern. Peasant Union,* Sept. 1961, 14-17.

Dox, G., "Möglichkeiten d. Wirtschaftswerbung im Osten," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 748-754.

Dumitriu, P., "The Two New Classes," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 9, 3-7.

Eigelsberger, P., "Wirtschafts-Komplementarität d. Donauländer," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 3, 193-200.

Fetjo, F., "The Communists of Eastern Europe Between Fatherland and Internationalism," *Rev.,* III (1961) 3, 18-29.

Fulbright, J. W., "For a Concert of Free Nations," *Foreign Aff.,* XXX (1961) 1, 1-19.

Goodman, E., "Die künftige Verschmelzung d. Völker," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 728-736.

Johann, B. M., "Nationalism and Internationalism," *Rev.,* III (1961) 3, 29-34.

Jurczenko, A., "Tendencias actuales en la teoria comunista sobre estado y ley," *Estudios sobre el Comunismo,* IX (1961) 34, 51-57.

Knirsch, P., "Produktion u. Distribution im Kommunismus," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 473-490.

v. Krannhals, H., "Der Ostbericht," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 73, 340-349.

Lendl, W., "Donauraum in europäischen Geographie," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 3, 177-186.

Levy, Y., "Les Partis et la Democratie (VI)," *Contrat Soc.,* V (1961) 4, 191-199.

Mikolajczyk, S., "The World Stands in the Shadow of Communist Threats," *Intern. Peasant Union,* Sept. 1961, 10-14.

Nagy, I., "The Five Basic Principles of International Relations and the Question of Our Foreign Policy," *Rev.,* III (1961) 3, 1-18.

Noack, P., "Die Intellektuellen," *Polit. Stud.,* XII (1961) 135, 429-431.

"Nueva publicación de documentos por Norteamerica," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 3, 525.

Oestmann, E., "Antisemitischer Nationalismus u. nationales Judentum," *Polit. Stud.,* XII (1961) 137, 575-591.

"The Quest for Affluence," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 11, 8-14.

Rabl, K., "Z. Frage des sog. 'Rechts auf die Heimat'," *Integration,* VIII (1961) 5, 194-201.

Reitzner, A., "Does Berlin Mean War?", *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 8, 205-206.

Rogalla, E., "The Moral Side of the Expulsions," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 9, 199-201.

Schillers, O., "Die Erforschung der Agrarpolitik des Ostens im Schaffen," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 9, 640-649.

Souvarine, B., "Le Programme Communiste," *Contrat Soc.,* V (1961) 4, 187-191.

Szegedi, M., "'New Class' or Classless Society," *Rev.,* III (1961) 3, 62-79.

Tarassowa, N., "Wie lebt man im Kommunismus?" *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 497-508.

Varga, S., "Die Rolle des Geldes während des Ubergangs zum Kommunismus," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 723-738.

Wiles, P., "Uberflusswirtschaft u. Volkkommunismus," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 713-723.

Willms, G., "Staatsschutz in der Krise," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 64, 27-43.

Zipfel, F., "Schicksal u. Vertreibung d. Deutschen aus Ungarn, Rumänien u. d. Tschechoslowakei," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands,* Bd. VII, 1958, 379-392.

AUSTRIA

Andreotti, F., "Kampf um das Trentino," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 63, 54-63.

Blechner, H., "Osterr. Weg in die Vereinten Nationen," *Osterr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.,* I (1961) 6, 351-357.

"Chronik z. Österr. Aussenpolit.," *Österr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.,* I (1961) 5, 333-347.

Heimerl, W., "Wirtschaftsplanung," II (1961) 5, *Österr. Ost. Hefte,* III (1961) 5, 378-385.

Knoll, S., "Österr. Anteil am Entstehen d. Rerum Novarum u. d. Quadragesimo Anno," *Wissensch. u. Weltbild,* IV (1961) 2, 81-90.

Gschnitzer, F., "Die sogenannte de-facto-Autonomie f. Südtirol," *Österr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.,* I (1961) 5, 287-292.

Gschnitzer, F., "Test Case—South Tirol," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 9, 201-204.

Kotzinger, U. W., "Wahlkampf in Österreich," *Polit. Vierteljahressch.,* 2 (1961) 1, 36-56.

Lehmann, H., "Österr.-Ungarns Belgienpolitik im ersten Weltkrieg," *Hist. Zft.* 192 (1961) 1, 60-93.

"Österr.-italienische Verhandlungen u. Notenaustausch z. Südtirolfrage," *Österr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.,* I (1961) 6, 376-394.

"Österreich u. d. ERP-Counterpart-Regelung," *Österr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.,* I (1961) 4, 256-268.

Straka, M., "Die Bevölkerungsentwicklung d. Steiermark v. 1528 bis 1782 auf Grund d. Kommunikantenzählungen," *Zft. d. Hist. Ver. f. Steiermark,* LII (1961), 3-54.

v. Wandruszka, A., "Die Persönlichkeit Kaiser Leopolds II," *Hist. Zft.,* 192 (1961) 2, 295-317.

Zemanek, K., "Neutral Austria in the United Nations," *Intern. Org.,* XV (1961) 3, 408-423.

Wedl, K., "Das Südtirol-Problem," *Polit. Stud.,* XII (1961) 138, 646-654.

BALTICA AND SCANDINAVICA

Carlgren, W. M., "Anteckninger Kring Johannes Hellners minnen," *Hist. Tidskrift,* (1961)/2, 121-159.

Carlsson, L., "Aktenskapsrätten i Visby stadslag," *Hist. Tidskrift,* (1961) /2, 159-182.

Hehn, J., "Die Wirtschaft Lettlands nach dem zweiten Jahr des Siebenjahrplans," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 9, 651-655.

Höjer, T., "Gustaf Löwenheilms sun pa sin ministerpost i Paris," *Hist. Tidskrift,* (1961)/1, 55-63.

Höjer, T., "En depesch av D. N. Bludov om förhallandena i Sverige pa varen 1813," *Hist. Tidskrift,* (1961) /2, 182-186.

Soom, A., "Der ostbaltische Holzhandel u. d. Holzindustrie im 17. Jahrhundert," *Hansische Geschichtsblätter,* 79 (1961), 80-101.

Angelus, O., "Sowjetpolitik im skandinavischen Raum," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 534-541.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

"Constitución Checoslovaca," *Inform. Jurídica,* (1961)/216-217, 23-49.

Dubský, Vl., "Založeni Rudé odborové internacionály a její vliv na vývoj odborového hnutí v ČSR počátkem 20. let," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.,* IX (1961) 4, 473-495.

Gácsová, A., "Historická literatúra o dejinách miest na Slovensku za feudalizmu," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 3, 378-397.

Glejdura, S., "La nueva Constitución de Checo-Eslovaquia," *Rev. d. Estud. Polit.,* (1961) 117-118, 191-215.

Habel, F., "Czech Groups in Exile," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 10, 234-237.

Horváth, P., "K dejinám pol'nohospodárskej výroby na Slovensku v prvej polovici 19. stor.," *Hist. Studie,* VI (1961), 215-263.

Horváth, P., "K problematike štúdia dejín pol'nohospodárskej výroby v 16. -18. storočí," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 3, 457-462.

Hrobak, P. A., "Prague: Red Espionage Center," *Slovakia,* XI (1961) 1, 1-12.

Hucko, J., "Osvetovo-buditel-ska činnost B. Fejerpatakyho Belopotockého," *Hist. Studie,* VI (1961), 171-215.

Kazimir, S., "K problematike vyskumu vyvoja cien a miezd na Slovensku," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 3, 480-485.

Kossarz, W., "Tschechoslowakische Forstwirtschaft," *Donauraum,* VI (1961) 3, 201-209.

Kovács, E., "Slovenské rol'níćtvo v hladových rokoch 1846-1847," *Hist. Studie,* VI (1960), 49-121.

Marsina, R.. "Vydávanie pramenov k dejinám feudalizmu na Slovensku," *Hist. Časopis.*

Pauco, J., "Slovakia Under Communism," *Slovakia,* XI (1961) 1, 13-21.

Paulinyi, A., "K dejinám Hroneckých železiarní v rokoch 1855-1865," *Hist. Studie.*

Spěvácek, J., "O problematice vydávání pramenů k dějinám feudalismu," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 3, 485-491.

Špiesz, A., "O štúdiu dejín remesla a manufaktúry," *Hist. Časopis,* IX (1961) 3, 473-477.

Stavrovsky, E., "K otázke vývinu hospodárstva a postavenia poddaných na severovýchodnom Slovensku v 17. stor.," *Hist. Studie,* VI (1960), 263-303.

Suchy, M., "K otázke sociálnej štruktúry miest na Slovensku v 16. storočí," *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 3, 477-480.

Tibensky, J., "Problémy výskumu vzniku a vývoja slovenskej feudálnej národnosti," *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 3, 397-420.

Tosch, A., "Schulreform in der Tschechoslowakei," *Osteuropa*, XI (1961) 7/8, 550-556.

Varsi, B., "Význam výskuma osídlenia východného Slovenska pre otázku vzniku a rozvoja slovenskej narodnosti," *Hist. Časopis*, IX (1961) 3, 420-44.

Vyvijalova, M., "Snahy o založenie slovenskych novin a časopisu v tridsiatych rokoch 19. stor.," *Hist. Studie*, VI (1960), 121-171.

Wolgemuthova, R., "Cesta anarchokomunistické skupiny V. Vrbenského ke KSČ," *Čsl. Časopis Hist.*, IX (1961) 4, 495-515.

GERMANY

Albrecht, E., "Die Versorgungskrise in d. Sowjetzone u. ihre Hintergründe," *Polit. Studien*, XII (1961) 137.

"Aufzeichnungen v. Dr. Bernhard Lösener (Walter Strauss)," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgesch.*, IX (1961) 3, 262-314.

Baumgart, P., "Zur Grundungsgesch. d. Auswärtigen Amtes in Preussen (1713-1728)," *Jahrbuch, f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands*, Bd. VII, 1958.

Beger, B., "Anatomie einer Wahl," *Polit. Meinung*, VI (1961) 65, 17-31.

Berezowski, Z., "Policy for a New Order," *Poland & Germany*, (1961)/3-6, 1-9.

Besson, W., "Neuere Literatur z. Gesch. d. Nationalsozialismus," *Vierteljahrschefte f. Zeitgesch.*, IX (1961) 3, 314-33.

Bodensieck, H., "Das Dritte Reich u. die Lage d. Juden in d. Tschecho-Slowakei nach München," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgesch.*, IX (1961) 3, 249-262.

Busch, O., "Die kommunale Wirtsch. in d. Berliner Gesch. d. Weimarer Zeit," *Jahrbuch f. Gesch. Mittel-u. Ostdeutschlands*, Bd. VIII, 1959, 223-265.

Caulais, J., "Allemagne sans Allemands," *L'Année Polit. et Econ.*, (1961)/162, 286-294.

Cysarz, H., "Vom Nationalbewusstsein d. Deutschen," *Polit. Studien*, XII (1961) 136, 501-503.

"Der Auftrat aus Berlin," *Polit. Meinung*, VI (1961) 63, 16-19.

"Die Landwirtschaft auf dem Weg in den Kommunismus," *Osteuropa*, XI (1961) 7/8, 508-511.

Dieckman, H., "Johannes Popitz als Finanzpolitiker u. Rechtswissenschaftler in der Weimarer Repub.," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands*, VII (1959), 265-319.

"Dritter Bericht d. Bundesregierung über d. Stand d. wirtschaftlichen Integration Europas f. die Zeit v. 16. Sept. 1960 bis z. 15. März 1961," *Österr. Zft. f. Aussenpolit.*, I (1961) 5, 316-33.

Drozdzynski, A., "Notes from Eichmann's Trial," *Zachod. Agencja Prasowa*, VIII 1961), 14-24.

Gallitsch, A., "Die Einführung d. Staatspost in Kurbrandenburg," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Osdeutschlands*, VII (1958), 207-229.

Gomułka, Wł., "The German Problem," *Polish Persp.*, IV 1961) 8-9, 3-12.

Harch, J., "Berlin-Problemet I ny Belysning," *Fremtiden*, XVI (1961) 6, 11-18.

Hausenstein, W., "Begegnungen mit Konrad Adenauer," *Polit. Studien, XII (1961) 138*,

Heidenheimer, A. J., "Der starke Regierungschef u. das Parteiensystem: Der 'Kanzler-Effekt' in der Bundesrepublik," *Polit. Vierteljahressch.*, II (1961) 3, 241-262.

Heimerl, W., "Wirtschaftsplanung—totale Planwirtschaft," III (1961) 5, 378-385.

Hellmann, M., "Beitrage z. Gesch. des Dreizehnjährigen Krieges im Ordenslande Preussen," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands*, VIII (1959), 1-51.

Horn, H., "Die Rolle des Bundes d. Landwirte im Kampf um den Bau des Mittellandkanals," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands*, VII (1958), 273-359.

Jentsch, G., "Das unzulängliche Reich," *Zft. f. Geopolit.*, XXXII (1961) 7/8, 245-249.

Kaiser, H., "Die NS-Machtergreifung u. ihr Führer," *Zft. f. Geopolit.*, XXXII 1961) 7/8, 257-260.

Kotowski, G., "Zur Gesch. d. Arbeiterbewegung in Mittel-u. Ostdeutschland. Ein Literaturbericht," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands*, VIII (1959) 409-471.

Krache, F., "Der letzte Deutsche Kronprinz," *Polit. Studien*, II (1961) 135, 461-474.

Krasuski, J., "The Problem of Prussia in Germany's Modern History in the light of modern German historiography," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 103-118.

Labuda, G., "Bruno Buchta, die Junker u. d. Weimarer Republik," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 156-161.

Luther, K. H., "Die nachrevolutionären Machtkampfe in Berlin," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands,* VIII (1959), 187-223.
Madajczyk, C., "Generalplan Ost.," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 3, 66-103.
Meier-Welcker, H., "Die deutsche Führung an der Westfront im Frühsommer 1918," *Welt Als Gesch.,* XXI (1961) 3, 164-185.
Mieck, I., "Das Berliner Fabrikengericht (1815-1875)," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel u. Ostdeutschlands,* VII (1958), 249-283.
Mieroszewski, J., "Wojna o Niemcy," *Kultura,* (1961) 9/167, 89-97.
Miller, M., "Pankows neue Friedensengel," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 136, 524-531.
Mipperdey, T., "Interessenverbände u. Parteien in Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Polit. Vierteljahressch.,* II (1961) 3, 262-281.
Nadolski, B., "Walka o szkołe humanistyczną w Prusach Królewskich w dobie Odrodzenia," *Zapiski Hist.,* XXVI (1961) 3, 7-27.
Nowak, Z., "Zródła i dynamika rozwoju produkcji przmysłowej Niemiec zachodnich," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 3, 3-25.
Petri, F., and P. Schöller, "Zur Bereinigung des Franktireurproblems v. August 1914," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgesch.,* IX (1961) 3, 234-249.
Rasten, A., "Berlin-krisen og valget i Tyskland," *Fremtiden,* XVI (1961) 7, 13-19.
Rothfels, H., "Nationalität u. Grenze im späten 19. u. frühen 20. Jahrhundert," *Vierteljahrshefte f. Zeitgesch.,* IX (1961) 3, 225-234.
Rusch, S., "Visées et manoevres de la politique de Bonn," *L'Année Polit. et Econ.,* (1961) /162, 275-286.
Schatten, F., "Ein Régime macht Bankrott," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 64, 3-8.
Schieder, T., "Grundfragen d. neueren deutschen Gesch.," *Hist. Zft.,* 192 (1961) 1, 1-17.
Schlüter-Hermkes, M., "10 Jahre deutsche UNESCO-arbeit," *Polit. Studien, XII (1961)* 135, 431-444.
Schochow, W., "Die landesgesch. Bibliographie in Mitteldeutschland seit dem zweiten Weltkrieg," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel-u. Ostdeutschlands,* VII (1958), 359-379.
Seier, H., "Kollaborative u. oppositionelle Momente der inneren Emigration Jochen Kleppers," *Jahrbuch f. d. Gesch. Mittel-u. Ostdeutschlands,* VIII (1959), 319-349.
Skidelsky, V., "Unsere künftigen Partner," *Zft. f. Geo-Polit.,* XXXII (1961) 9-10, 329-333.
Smogorzewski, C., "Un grand dessein allemand: coloniser la Russie," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* (1961) /3, 28-38.
Stoltz, O., "Brandt u. seine Mannschaft," *Polit. Meinung,* VI (1961) 6, 3-8.
v. Teuchert, F. F., "Die Widerstandsbewegung West," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 135, 444-454.
Varain, H., "Das Geld d. Parteien," *Gesch. in Wissenschaft u. Unterr.,* XII (1961) 8, 489-511.
Walczak, A. W., "Od Bund der Heimatvertriebenen u. Entrechteten (BHE) do Gesamtdeutsche Partei (GP)," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 3, 136-140.
Zaborowski, J., "O metodach 'Ostforschung' (na marginesie wydawnictwa 'Ostdeutschland unter fremder Verwaltung 1945-1955," *Przeg. Zach.,* XVII (1961) 3, 161-172.
Zaborowski, J., "German Imperialism and European Theories," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* IX (1961), 11-21.
Zaborowski, J., "Program of Nazism and its Realization," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa.* VIII (1961), 5-14.

HUNGARY

Hanak, T., "Kommunistische Diskussionen um Georg Lukacs," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 527-534.
Homonnay, E., "Las Relaciones Hungaro-Croatas después de 1918," *Studia Croatica,* II (1961) 2-3, 132-142.
"The Italian Constitution," *Italian Aff.,* X (1961) 3, 3481-3489.
Jauch, A., "Schiffswerften u. Schiffbau in Ungarn," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 9, 655-663.
Juhasz, Gy., "Beiträge zu Ungarns Aussenpolitik in den Tagen des Ausbruchs des zweiten Weltkrieges," *Acta Hist.,* VIII (1961) 1-2, 137-175.
Kecskemeti, P., "Anatomy of a Revolt," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 11, 22-28.
Kerekes, L., "Akten des Ungarischen Ministeriums des Äusseren z. Vorgesch. d. Annexion Österr.," *Acta. Hist.,* VII (1960) 3-4, 355-391.
Kubinyi, A., "L'historiographie hongroise moderne des villes," *Acta Hist.,* VIII (1961) 1-2, 175-191.
Lottich, K., "Hungary, Challenger of the Kremlin," *Sudeten Bltn.,* IX (1961) 10, 224-233.

Milei, G., "Sur l'histoire de la constitution du Parti Communiste de Hongrie," *Acta Hist.*, VII (1960) 3-4, 353-355.

Rozsnyói, A., "October Fifteenth, 1944 (History of Szálasi's Putsch)," *Acta Hist.*, VIII (1961) 1-2, 57-104.

Sebestyén, M., and F. Töke, "A Nagy Budapest Központi Munkástanácsrol," *Szemle,* III (1961) 3, 50-67.

Shevchenko, F. P., "Participation of Hungarians and Rumanians in the Partisan Movement in the Ukraine During the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union," (in Russ.), *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961)/5, 91-116.

Szegedi, M., "Uj osztály vagy osztálynélküli társadalom?" *Szemle,* III (1961) 3, 32-50.

Tomasic, D. W., "Dirección y estructura del poder en Hungria," *Estud. Sobre el Comunismo,* IX (1961) 34, 31-37.

Vajda, I., "Hungary and the CMEA," *New Hung. Qy.*, II (1961) 3, 125-139.

Vissi, Gy., "Politikai erkölcs és szabadság," *Szemle,* III (1961) 3, 1-32.

POLAND

Bartys, B. B., "Inwentarz dóbr Leźnica Mała w Łęczyckiem z 1811 r.," *Kwart. Hist. Kult. Materialnej,* VIII (1960) 4, 519-545.

Biegański, S., "Uwagi o polityce P.P.S. w pierwszej wojnie światowej," *Teki Hist.*, IX (1960-61), 191-215.

Bierzanek, R., "A. Klafkowski, Umova Poczdamska z dnia 2 sierpnia 1945 r.," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 123-128.

Bobr-Tylingo, S., "Stany Zjednoczone A. P. a powstanie styczniowe," *Teki Hist.*, XI (1960-61), 133-156.

Cerveny, P., "How They Chose Bycek,' *Ea. Eur.*, X (1961) 9, 7-13.

Dulczewski, Z., "Sociological and Demographic Publications on the Western and Northern Territories 1945-1960," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 128-156.

Dunin-Keplicz, K., "Political Reality and the Oder-Neisse Problem," *Zach. Agencja Prasowa,* IX (1961), 7-11.

Galeski, B., "Sociology of Peasants," *Polish Persp.*, IV (1961) 8-9, 33-42.

Golubiew, A., "La Pologne dans la structure historique de l'Europe," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* (1961)/3, 7-28.

Gralla, E., "Kritische Betrachtungen zu polnischen Passvorschriften," *Polit. Studien,* XII (1961) 137, 611-622.

Heinsdorf, H., "A responsible German Policy towards Poland?" *Poland & Germany,* (1961)/3-6, 12-21.

Helfritz, H., "De la historia de la Universidad de Breslau," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 3, 489-515.

Heydenkorn, B., "Zmiany struktury ludnościowej w Polsce," *Kultura,* (1961)/11-169, 123-133.

Jakobczyk, W., "Z dziejów walki o ziemie na pograniczu," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 3, 25-53.

Jaroszewski, Z., "L'extermination des malades mentaux sous l'occupation allemande," *Cahiers Pologne-Allemagne,* (1961)/3, 38-51.

Korpowski, B., "Sabotaż czy wypadek," *Kultura,* (1961) /11-169, 133-141.

Krasuski, J., "Wpływ traktatu w Rapallo na stosunki polsko-niemieckie," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 3, 53-66.

Laeuen, H., "Polens Verhältnis z. Ideologie," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 517-527.

Markiekicz, W., "Society and Culture in the Western Territories, 1945-1960," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 47-74.

Miedzinski, F., "Polsko-niemiecka wspołpraca przygraniczna," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 3, 127-136.

Nowakowski, S., "Social Ties in the Western Territories," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 31-47.

Pajewski, I., "Geiss, Der polnische Grenzstreifen 1914-1918," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 118-123.

Pietraszek, E., "Poszukiwania gornicze w południowej Małopolsce na przełomie XVIII i XIX w.," *Kwart. Hist. Kult. Materialnej,* IX (1961) 1, 65-75.

Rogala, W., "Niemiecka mniejszośc narodowa w Polsce w okresie rokowań gospodarczych (1927-1932)," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 3, 103-121.

Scott, S., "The Fair at Poznań," *Ea. Europe,* X (1961) 10, 16-22.

Soldaczuk, J., "Foreign Trade in a Socialist Economy," *Polish Persp.*, IV (1961) 6, 16-21.

"Szkice z dziejów Pomorza, t. II: Pomorze nowożytne (recenzja zbiorowa)," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXVI (1961) 2, 56-76.

Staszewski, W., "Prace badawcze, plany rozwojowe i udogodnienia turystyczne na Dolnym Śląsku," *Przeg. Zach.*, XVII (1961) 3, 154-161.

Tymowski, S., "Zagadnienia przestrzenne w regulacjach dóbr ziemiańskich w epoce Oświecenia," *Kwart Hist. Kult. Materialnej*, VIII (1960) 4, 501-519.

Wapinski, R., "Ruch robotniczy na terenie wojewodztwa pomorskiego w latach 1920-1923," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXVI (1961) 2, 7-45.

Wiewiora, B., "West German Territorial Claims against Poland and Intern. Law," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 3-31.

Wojciechowski, M., "Mniejszośc niemiecka w wojewodztwie pomorskim i III Rzesza w latach 1936-1939," *Zapiski Hist.*, XXVI (1961) 2, 45-56.

Wyczanski, A., "Proba oszacowania obrotu żytem w Polsce XVI w.," *Kwart. Hist. Kult. Materialnej*, IX (1961) 1, 23-35.

Ziolek, B., "Basic Demographic Problems in the Polish Western Territories," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 74-103.

Ziółkowski, J., "Poland's Trade Relations with the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic," *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 161-178.

Zlat, M., "Quinze ans de protection des monuments de Wrocław (1945-1960)," 2, *Polish West. Aff.*, II (1961) 1, 178-206.

"Zur Lage der Polnischen Wissenschaft," *Ostbrief*, VII (1961) 73, 335-340.

YUGOSLAVIA

"Activity of Yugoslav League for Peace, Independence and Equality of Peoples in 1960-61," *Yugoslav Surv.*, II (1961) 5, 636-641.

Andelic, L., "Le soulèvement de 13 juillet et l'offensive italoquisling sur le territoire libre de Monténégro, Bouches de Kotor et Sandjak," (in Serb.), *Istoriski Zapisi*, (1961) /2, 217-257.

Birnbaum, I., "Yugoslavia in the Limelight," *Ea. Eur.*, X (1961) 9, 14-18.

Buć, S., "Posljedioe Slavomanije," *Hrvatska Revija*, XI (1961) 1-2, 35-64.

Despot, M., "Križevačka manufaktura peći i suda u XVIII," *Hist. Zbornik*, XIII (1960), 209-214.

"Detenidos políticos y prisioneros en Yogoeslavia," *Studia Croatica*, II (1961) 2-3, 204-212.

"Emigrants 'Assoc.,'" *Yugoslav Surv.*, II (1961) 5, 631-635.

Gavrilović, S., "Agrarni nemiri u Križevačkoj županiji 1848-1850," *Hist. Zbornik*, XIII (1960), 47-110.

Katus, L., "La politique croate du gouvernement Tisza et les mouvements populaires de Croatie en 1883," *Acta Hist.*, VIII (1961) 1-2, 54-57.

Klaić, N., "Seljačke bune u XVII. stoljeću u. Hrvatskoj," *Hist. Zbornik*, XIII (1961), 119-154.

Knezevic, M., "Administration of Social Insurance, Health Inst. and Schools," *Yugoslav Trade Unions*, (1961) 4, 36-44.

Lakic, Z., "L'activité culturelle et d'instruction des organes du pouvoir populaire sur le territoire libre de Monténégro (1943-1944)," (in Serb.), *Istoriski Zapisi*, (1961) 2, 307-337.

Matkovic, D., "La Navegación Marítima y el Comercio Marítimo Croata," *Studia Croatica*, II (1961) 2-3, 194-204.

"Mi Smo Protiv Svake Jugoslavije," *Hrvatska Rev.*, XI (1961) 1-2, 5-12.

Milivojevic, D., "Distribution of Income in the 'Bor' Copper Mines," *Yugoslav Trade Unions*, (1961) 4, 19-26.

Moacanin, F., "Periodizacija Vojne Krajine," *Hist. Zbornik*, XIII (1960), 111-117.

"The National Economy in 1960," *Yugoslav Surv.*, II (1961) 5, 660-672.

Nikolic, M., "Forms of Assoc. in Yugoslav Economy," *Yugoslav Trade Unions*, (1961) 4, 26-36.

Pajovic, R., "L'occupation du Monténégro et les projets pour la création d'un État monténégrin 'indépendant,'" (in Serb.), *Istoriski Zapisi*, (1961) /2, 273-307.

"The People's Liberation War and the Socialist Revolution in Yugoslavia 1941-1945," *Yugoslav. Surv.*, II (1961) 5, 602-616.

Petričevic, J., "Mogućnosti Hrvatsek Suradnje," *Hrvatska Revija*, XI (1961) 1-2, 12-20.

Petričevic, J., "Política Agraria en Yogoeslavia," *Studia Croatica*, II (1961) 2-3, 117-130.

Polajnar, T., "New Measures in the Yugoslav Economy," *Yugoslav Trade Unions*, (1961)/4, 3-9.

"Protection of the Person and Human Rights in Criminal Procedure," *Yugoslav Surv.*, II (1961) 5, 617-628.

Schwanke, R., "Albanien (Januar-Juni 1961)," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 767-771.

Sepic, D., "Srpska vlada i počeci Jugoslavenskog odbora," *Hist. Zbornik,* XIII (1960), 1-45.

"The Serbian Chetniks in 1961," *Croatia Press,* XV (1961) 218, 17-21.

Šidak, J., "Prilozi historiji stranačkih odnosa u Hrvatskoj uoči 1848," *Hist. Zbornik,* XIII (1960), 167-207.

"La Situación de los Refugiados Croatas," *Hrvatska Rev.,* XI (1961) 1-2, 1-5.

"Survey of Trade Union Activities," *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1961) 4, 66-73.

Terzic, V., "Les opérations conclusives de l'Armée Yougoslave en 1945," (in Serb.), *Ist. Zapisi,* (1961) 2, 257-273.

Tomašić. D., "The Rumanian Communist Leadership," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 477-494.

Tomašić, D. A., "Sobre la nationalidad de los Musulmanes en Bosnia y Herzegovina," *Studia Croatica,* II (1961) 2-3, 147-181.

Veselinovic, S., "Chemistry of Distribution," *Yugoslav Trade Unions,* (1961) 4, 9-19.

Vujovic, D., "Les manifestes des partisans pour les soldats italiens au Monténégro en 1941," (in Serb.), *Ist. Zapisi,* (1961) 2, 337-347.

Vukmanovic, G., "Deux documents du détachement de libération nationale de la commune de Komani," (in Serb.), *Ist. Zapisi,* (1961) 2, 347-352.

"Yugoslav Economy 1945-1960," *Yugoslav Surv.,* II (1961) 5, 647-659.

Zuzic, M., "Prekid Hrvatske s Dinastijom Habsburga," *Hrvatska Revija,* I (1961) 1-2, 23-35.

U.S.S.R. AND UKRAINE

Arnold, T., "Die Zukunft d. Sowjetarmee," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 490-497.

Barton, P., "Le système concentrationnaire Soviétique," *Contrat Social,* V (1961) 4, 223-231.

Bashi, B., "National in Form Alone," *Prob. of People of USSR,* (1961)/11, 46-50.

"Broderstriden mellem Moskva og Peking," *Fremtiden,* XVI (1961) 6, 22-30.

Brzezinski, Z., "The Nature of the Soviet System," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 351-369.

Campbell, R., "Muscovy and the Council of Florence," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 402-419.

"A Conversation in Moscow," *Ea. Eur.,* X (1961) 11, 1-3.

Eitner, H. J., "Der Kreml u. d. Patriarchen," *Polit. Meinung,* XX (1961) 4, 47-65.

Freeman, J. F. and W. T. Lee, "Establishment of an Absolute Ruble Value for the Soviet Statist. Concept of the 'Gross Output of Industry,' " *Sov. Studies,* XIII (1961) 2, 172-187.

Frei, O., "Die Beziehungen zwischen Pankow u. Peking," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 541-545.

Gueorgiev, N., "The Study of Modern and Current Hist. in the Period Between the 20th and 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.," (in Russ.), *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961) 5, 40-52.

Hayenko, F., "Soviet Trade Unions: Servants of the State,"*Prob. of Peoples USSR,* X (1961), 3-12.

Hazard, J., "Las dos tendencias contemporáneas del derecho soviético," *Rev. d. Estud. Polit.,* (1961) /117-118, 171-183.

Hurwicz, E., "Zur Psychologie u. Problematik d. russischen Judentums," *Zft. f. Polit.* VIII (1961) 3, 256-271.

Iasny, N., "Etapes du Développement économique en URSS," *Contrat Soc.,* V (1961) 4, 215-223.

Karcz, J., "A Note on Sov. Farm Prices, 1952-1958," *Sov. Studies,* XIII (1961) 2, 191-206.

Kopp, F., "Das Verhältnis d. Nachleninschen Kommunismus zu den Nationen u. zum National-bewusstsein," *Ostbrief,* VII (1961) 73, 324-335.

Laird, R. and J. Chappell, Jr., "Kazakhstan: Russia's Agricultural Crutch," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 4, 326-344.

Laird, R., "Soviet Goals for 1965 and the Problems of Agriculture," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 454-465.

Laurat, L., "El Salario Real en la Unión Soviética," *Estud. el Comunismo,* IX (1961) 34, 61-66.

Lavergne, B., "Le discours de Khrouchtchev et le problème allemand," *L'Année Polit. et Écon.,* (1961)/162, 297-302.

Lewytzkyi, B., "Evolution in d. sowjetischen Planungspolitik," *Österr. Ost Hefte,* III (1961) 5, 352-363.

Meissner, B., "Die Sowjetunion vor dem XXII. Parteikongress: II. Die Aussenpolitik Chruschtschows," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 9, 601-620.

Meissner, B., "Die Sowjetunion vor dem XXII. Parteikongress: III. Parteiführung u. Parteiorganisation," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 10, 685-713.

Meister, J., "Das Machtpotential d. Sowjetunion," *Schweizer Monatshefte,* XXXI (1961) 7, 749-759.

Meyer, A., "USSR, Incorp.," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 369-377.

Newth, J. A., "Soviet Agriculture: The Private Sector 1950-1959," *Sov. Studies,* XIII (1961) 2, 160-172.

Osadczuk, B., "Testament Chruszczowa," *Kultura,* (1961) 9/167, 97-108.

"Le Ragioni Interne dello Scontro Cino-Sovietico," *Relazioni Intern.,* XXV (1961) 43, 1484-1486.

Ritvo, H., "Twenty-First Party Congress—Before and After (Part Two)," *Slav. Rev.,* XX (1961) 3, 436-454.

Rödl, P., "Der Mensch im kommunistischen Plansystem," *Gesch. in Wissensch. u. Unterr.,* XII (1961) 9, 579-585.

Scheggia, A., "Historia de Ucrania," *Oriente Europeo,* XI (1961) 3, 543-565.

Schlesinger, R., "Some Problems of Social Organ. Discussed on the Eve of the XXII Party Congress," *Sov. Studies,* XII (1961) 2, 125-154.

Schlesinger, R., "Zur Frage d. Verwandlung d. Kollektiv in Sowjetwirtschaften," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 511-517.

Shumliansky, R., "A Decline of Faith," *Prob. of Peoples of USSR,* (1961) /11, 13-18.

Shishkin, V. A., "Proletarian Solidarity of the Czechoslovak Working Class with the Working People of the Soviet Union (1921-1925)," (in Russ.), *Nov. i Nov. Istoria,* (1961) 5, 116-127.

Stupperich, R., "Das Verhältnis d. Russisch-orthodoxen Kirche z. ökumenischen Bewegung u. zum Weltrat d. Kirchen," *Osteuropa,* XI (1961) 7/8, 545-550.

Tobias, H., "The Bund and Lenin until 1903," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 4, 344-358.

Wolfe, B. D., "War Comes to Russia-in-Exile," *Russian Rev.,* XX (1961) 4, 294-312.

Zauberman, A., "New Soviet Books on Planning," *Sov. Studies,* XIII (1961) 2, 154-160.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Barragy, R. J., *The Diplomatic Penetration of Imperialist Russia into South America,* Milwaukee, Marquette Univ. Press, 1961.

Blum, J., *Lord and Peasant in Russia,* Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1961, $12.50.

Brzezinski, Z. K., *The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict* (2nd ed.), New York, Praeger, 1961, $2.75.

Ciechanosiecki, A., *Michal Kazimierz Oginski u. sein Musenhof zu Slonim,* Köln, Böhlau, 1961.

Darnoy, P., *Ungarn nach dem Volksaufstand,* Köln, Kiepenheuer & Wirsch, 1960, DM 14.80.

v. Deuerlein, E., *Die Einheit Deutschlands,* Frankfurt, A. Metzner, 1961, DM 31.50.

Eichborn, W. V., *Schlesiens Vermächtnis,* Köln, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1960.

Feierabend, L., *Ve vladach Druhé Republiky,* New York, Universum, 1961, $2.50.

v. Mauser, W., *Karl Hillebrand, Geschichte u. Wandel,* Leben Vorarlberger, 1961.

Fleming, D. F., *The Cold War and its Origins* (2 vols.), New York, Doubleday, 1961, $15.00.

Gorlitz, W., *(Generalfeldmarschall) Keitel Verbrecher Oder Offizier?* Berlin, Musterschmidt, 1961, DM 29.80.

Gorski, K. and M. Biskup, *Akta Stanów Prus Królewskich,* Tom III, Torun, Praca Wyudana z zasilku polskiej Akad. Nauk, 1961.

Handbook—Eastern Germany—Vol. II, Göttingen Research Comm., Würzburg, Holzner, 1960, $4.00.

Hartung, F., *Staatsbilende Kräfte d. Neuzeit,* Berlin, Dunker & Humboldt, 1961, DM 56.

v. Heitsch, O., *Osterr. u. d. Angelsächische Welt: Kulturbegegnungen u. Verleihe,* Wien-Stuttgart, Univ. w. Braumüller, 1961.

Hilberrg, R., *The Destruction of the European Jews,* Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1961, $17.50.

Hitlers Zweites Buch, Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlag, 1961, DM 19.80.

Hohenstein, A., *Warthelandisches Tagebuch aus den Jahren 1941-1942,* Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1961, DM 18.80.

Hubatsch, W., *Hohenzollern in der deutschen Geschichte,* Frankfurt, A. Metzner, 1961, DM 4.50.

Hubatsch, W., *Studien z. Gesch. Preussens,* Heidelberg, Quelle & Mayer, 1961, DM 20.

Kirchheimer, O., *Political Justice,* Princeton, Princeton U. Press, 1961, $8.50.

Lorenz, R., *Kaiser Karl u. d. Untergang d. Donaumonarchie,* Graz, Styria, 1959, DM 24.50.

Mauersberg, H., *Wirtschafts—u. Sozialgesch. Zentraleuropäischer Städte in neuerer Zeit,* Göttingen, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, DM 34.

Merkes, M., *Die deutsche Politik gegenüber d. spanischen Bürgerkrieg 1936-39,* Bonn, Rohrscheid, 1960, DM 16.

Neustupny, E., *Czechoslovakia,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $6.50.

Noack, U., *Geist u. Raum in d. Geschichte,* Berlin, Musterschmidt, 1961, DM 26.80.

Nove, A., *The Soviet Economy, New York,* Praeger, 1961, $6.50.

Paris, E., *Genocide in Satellite Croatia,* Chicago, Amer. Inst. for Balkan Aff., 1961.

Paupie, K., *Handbuch d. Österr. Pressegesch. 1848-1959,* Wien, Braumüller, 1961, $4.20.

Pounds, N., *Geographic Essays on Eastern Europe,* Bloomington, Russian and East Eur. Inst., Indiana Univ. Publication, 1961, $4.00.

Rich, N., and M. H. Fisher, *The Holstein Papers,* Vol. III, Cambridge, Cambridge U. Press, 1961, $17.50.

Rozehnal, A., *Unfulfilled Promises,* Rome, Accademia Cristiana Cecoslovacca, 1960, $3.50.

Scott, D., *Russian Political Institutions,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $6.25.

Seton-Watson, H., *The East European Revolution,* New York, Praeger, 1961, $6.00.

Snell, J., *Dilemma Over Germany,* New Orleans, Hauser Press, 1961, $7.00.

Vali, F., *Rift and Revolt in Hungary,* Cambridge, Harvard Univ. Press, 1961, $9.75.

Winter, E., *Russland u. das Papsttum,* Berlin, Akademie-Verlag, 1960, DM 19.

DATE DUE

UIC MAY 07 '88

RET'D PER MAY 25 1988

PERIODICALS MUST BE RETURNED TO PERIODICALS DESK ONLY.

DEMCO 38-297